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JR - SOR - Exception - 'Central Importance to the Legal System' (2)

. Ontario Nurses Association v. The University Health Network

In Ontario Nurses Association v. The University Health Network (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed the ONA's Charter JR, this brought against a labour arbitrator's finding that "the denial of long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits at age 65" violated Charter s.15 ['discrimination'] (this was agreed by the parties) but was saved by Charter s.1.

Here the court considers the JR SOR applicable to Charter issues, which - in this case - it also views as "(q)uestions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole":
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[14] The parties agree that the standard of review on the issue of a Charter breach is correctness.

[15] Although the presumptive standard on judicial review is reasonableness, “respect for the rule of law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness for certain types of legal questions.” Questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole[8] and questions addressing the constitutionality of an enabling statute, are subject to review on the standard of correctness. [9]

[16] Even where the standard of review on issues of constitutionality is correctness, the findings of fact that underlie the constitutional analysis are entitled to deference and are reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.[10]
. CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al.

In CNL Ltd. v. Kebaowek First Nation et al. (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed an appeal (from a JR), this over whether the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission "erred in failing to consider the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) standard as stipulated therein in relation to the approval" of "the proposed near surface disposal facility (NSDF) on the Chalk River Laboratories site (the Site) that would be used to store low-level radioactive waste (LLW)".

Here the court holds that the JR SOR for the interpretation of UNDA is an exception to the reasonableness standard:
[37] .... The interpretation of the UNDA is a general question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and, therefore, the standard of review is correctness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at paragraphs 17, 53 and 59).
. Oulds v. Attorney General of Ontario, et al.

In Oulds v. Attorney General of Ontario, et al. (Div Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this against HRTO decisions that "dismissed the complaint on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction as Oulds had failed to establish that her choice not to be vaccinated was based on “creed”".

The court considered the SOR applicable to this JR case, here against an argument that a 'general questions of law of central importance to the legal system' exception applies to attract an SOR of 'correctness':
[29] Para. 17 of Vavilov, reads, in part, as follows:
... the presumption of reasonableness review will be rebutted is where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness be applied. This will be the case for certain categories of questions, namely constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies.
....

[32] I do not accept Oulds’ submission that this case falls within the exception identified at para. 17 of Vavilov.

[33] As noted by the Court at paras. 58 - 62 of Vavilov, general questions of law are those that have implications beyond the “decision at hand”. It is not enough that a question may be of “wider public concern” or touch on an important issue: see also, Mason v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), 2023 SCC 1, at paras. 57-58. I also find that at issue in this case is the Tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute.

[34] I adopt the reasoning in Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155 (CanLII), at para. 10 in which the court upheld the lower court’s determination that “reasonableness” was the “appropriately deferential standard of review on an application for judicial review” of a decision of the Tribunal. The Court agreed with lower court’s application of the reasonableness standard in recognition “that the adjudicator "has a specialized expertise" in the area” [of human rights] and that “the reasonableness standard accords "the highest degree of deference. . .with respect to [the adjudicator's] determinations of fact and the interpretation and application of human rights law" unless the decision is not “rationally supported”: See also Ontario (Health) v Association of Ontario Midwives, 2022 ONCA 458.
. Teper v. Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario

In Teper v. Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed an MFIPPA JR, here against an IPC ruling that "the records requested were not in the TDSB's care or control and that the TDSB [SS: 'Toronto District School Board'] conducted a reasonable search for any responsive records".

Here the court considers the JR SOR exception for issues of 'central importance' to the legal system as a whole:
[26] For an exception of the presumptive reasonableness standard of review to apply, the issue must be a general question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole. Questions of law of "central importance" usually involve determination of issues necessary for the proper functioning of the justice system, and therefore, there is a need for uniform and consistent answers. These issues have included solicitor-client privilege, res judicata, abuse of process, and parliamentary privilege: Vavilov, at paras. 59-60.

[27] The question raised in this case may be an important legal issue, but the mere fact that there is a question on an important legal issue or of wider public concern is insufficient for a question to be a question of law of central importance. The Applicant has not demonstrated how the decision in this case would impact the administration of justice as a whole. The question in this case is about the right to access information found in the MFIPPA, in a specific, fact-driven context: see YUDC v. Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2022 ONSC 1755.

[28] In his factum, the Applicant relies heavily on the case of Ontario (Children's Lawyer) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 ONCA 559, 141 O.R. (3d) 481, leave to appeal refused [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 38285, which held that the correctness standard applied to review a decision regarding the interpretation of the term "custody or control" in freedom of information legislation, in the context of information held in the files of the Children's Lawyer. In that case, the father requested all notes and information from the Children's Lawyer, by making a request to the Ministry of the Attorney General ("MAG"). The adjudicator and this Court found that the documents were in MAG's custody and control. The Court of Appeal ultimately found that, given the context in which the records were created, and the purpose they serve, the records were not in MAG’s care and control and ought not be produced.

[29] The issue in Ontario (Children's Lawyer) was specifically about solicitor-client privilege and the role of the Children's Lawyer. The Court of Appeal found that the unique role of the Children's Lawyer and the issue of solicitor-client privilege are fundamental to the proper functioning of the legal system, and thus, reviewable on a standard of correctness.

[30] Those unique facts do not exist in the case before this Court. Further, Ontario (Children's Lawyer) was decided before the Supreme Court of Canada released Vavilov, which clarified the standard of review.

[31] I find that there is no basis for departing from the presumptive standard of review of reasonableness in this case.



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Last modified: 06-11-26
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