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Current Notes
>>>>>>>>>> Homelessness Irony: A Charter Right to Where Your Home is Located (If You Have a Home) ... But None to a Home. Drover v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Drover v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, here from a denied application seeking "a declaration that residency requirements for returning officers and other senior election officials in the Elections Act are contrary to s. 7 of the Charter".
Here the court usefully walks through respective historical Charter s.7 ['life, liberty and security of the person'] doctrine, here on whether: "where to live is a liberty interest protected under s. 7" [much to my surprise the CA says it is, which - unless the SCC reverses (which I think is highly likely) - is going to spawn a bunch of interesting litigation ...]. Whee ... interesting litigation!:Note: This case offends me for it's result - ie. holding a Charter s.7 'right' to where one has their home, but (in other cases) essentially 'giving up' [ie. holding as non-justiciable] as to whether one has a home to live in at all [Restoule v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2021), para 209]. Section 7 law enables this outcome by protecting again 'state action' that infringes 'liberty' - that is, a restriction on where one resides is undeniably state action. Where this gets SCC-iffy (in my mind) is the further proposition that it negatively impacts "a quintessentially private decision going to the very heart of personal or individual autonomy" [Godbout, para 66], which is the acknowledged essence of 'liberty'.
But - sticking with this ruling as it stands after this CA ruling, what offends me is that where one does not have the choice of living anywhere [ie. you are homeless], you have no similar s.7 Charter rights to a home - even though a 'choice' of homes lies at "the very heart of personal or individual autonomy". Again, if you have the choice it's a constitutionally protected one, but you don't have a constitutionally protected right to the choice.
Ironically (though maybe optimistically?), there is no mention of this homelessness issue and how the underlying s.7 principles in the case can impact on the many ways in which the law positively (ie. through undeniably 'state action') can prevent one from even having a home. Those further issues include zoning, building codes, parks law, trespass law, break & enter [CCC 348] and it's extensive police enforcement. Most significant are the vast, vast statutory and common law underpinnings of 'other-excluding' property law - law which protects the exclusive real property rights of those who (not only built their own homes, which is morally laudable) but in the vast majority of cases did no more for their entitlement than to possess the monetary wealth that bought it, regardless of the degree of excess material wealth they possess (and thus exclude others from). So what if a citizen made the "quintessentially private decision going to the very heart of [their] personal or individual autonomy" that they want to live in any of those unorthodox (and generally law-violating) lands and/or buildings? No 'state action' problem with Charter s.7 then ... hmm ...
>>>>>>>>>> New RTA 'Ineffective Assistance of Counsel' Doctrine [20 June 2025]This is a useful three-separate judge ruling Div Court case on the use of 'ineffective assistance of counsel' as an LTB defence (normally used as a criminal defence). The upshot is that you can use the defence, though it must be raised promptly at the LTB - essentially at first oppourtunity, likely either through a re-opening interlocutory motion, or at least at the LTB reconsideration.
Ricketts v. Veerisingnam (Div Ct, 2025)
Corbett J - who wrote the majority ruling - has done a lot of RTA stuff (all through COVID times), isn't perceived as excessively liberal on L&T matters, and his judgment I think will govern this favourably for tenants. Given inadequate paralegal (and even lawyer) representation in the RTA field this needs to be kept in mind as de facto defence, to be raised ASAP when merited.
>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation, Standards of Review, Vavilov - It's All About Presumptions [09 June 2025]Most separate legal doctrine embodies their own versions of the generally-recognized-as-distinct concepts of 'interpretation' (both general and statutory) and 'standard of review (SOR)'. Indeed it's hard to locate a body of law for which this is not true. While 'interpretation' operates at the trial (or administrative hearing) stage, and 'standard of review' operates at the review (appeal or judicial review) stages, they share the common feature of being necessary preliminary 'framing' inquiries before the 'workhorse' task of merit assessment can be undertaken.
Recently I have also come to believe that they share another feature: ie. they can both be located accurately within the larger category of legal 'presumptions'. Let's explore that theory.
With respect to 'interpretation' (and once the relevant adjudicative body finds statutory, regulatory or other 'ambiguity'), the presumptions are of a different nature according to the many different interpretive doctrines being considered. For example:. in the benefits-conferring law situation the presumption is one of a "broad and generous manner" in favour of the claimant [Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) (SCC, 1998), para 36];
. in the ejusdem generis situation the presumption is one that "where a class of things is modified by general wording that expands the class, the general wording is usually restricted to things of the same type as the listed items" [County of Lambton Community Development Corporation v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation et al. (Div Court, 2023), para 14];
. in the multiple-statute situation the interpretation is one that "presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter" [BNSF Railway Company v. Greater Vancouver Water District (Fed CA, 2025), para 81];
. in the statutory 'silence' context the presumption is that "the exclusion of words from legislation reflects intention" [University Health Network v. Ontario (Minister of Finance) (Ont CA, 2001)]. With respect to the appellate SOR (ie. 'correctness v. palpable and overriding error') structuring, the presumption is that the trial (or administrative hearing) assessment on fact (both pure and mixed with law) issues will be deferred-to at the appeal stage, but not the legal issues - which are assessed on a 'correctness' standard (which is essentially no standard at all). Thus in this appeal context the presumption is one of 'deference'.
With respect to the judicial review (JR) SOR (ie. 'reasonableness') structuring, the presumption is that the administrative hearing (or, less commonly, the administrative decision) will be conducted in accordance with the Vavilov 'tribunals must do it just like courts, mostly' facade, a pained politically-induced process whereby the Supreme Court attempts to retain respect for the legislature while not rocking the boat too much otherwise. The de facto presumption here is pretty much the same as in the appellate context (ie. deference for fact decisions), because courts' can't (quite rightly) stomach anything different. This is the case because after centuries of engaging in mass good faith truth-finding, they have - unsurprisingly - 'got it right'. They'd be idiots to vary from that, and they're not idiots - far from it.
The above observations illustrate that the much fussed-over Vavilov appeal-JR 'standards of review' structuring is nothing more (and nothing less) than another 'new' interpretative doctrine (that is, a 'presumption' that fact-findings by the trial court are to be respected) applicable to review situations. If the term 'standard of review' were replaced with, respectively: appeal, JR and/or review interpretation doctrine' - the net effect would be an improvement in our semantic usage, as the new term connotes more information than the former.
>>>>>>>>>> First Canada Disability Benefit Act Regulation28 May 2025: As of 15 May 2025 a key Regulation under the Canada Disability Benefit Act (CDB) came into force. The CDB is a new federal disability income support program with a maximum of $200/month payable. Eligibility for the CDB is premised on the pre-existing (and harsh) Disability Tax Certificate (DTC). As of 28 May 2025 Ontario has announced that they will not claw-back the CDB from ODSP.
Canada Disability Benefit Regulations: SOR/2025-35
Here's a recent government summary of the Act and the Regulation: About the Canada Disability Benefit.
>>>>>>>>>> Small Claims Court Limits Raised to $50,000 on 01 October 2025On 01 October 2025 the monetary limit of the Small Claims Court will be raised to $50,000. This also applies to orders for the recovery of possession of personal property of a value up to $50,000 [Reg 42/25, amending Reg 626/00].
Further, the minimum limit to Small Claims Court appeals to the Divisional Court will be increased at the same date to payment of money in excess of $5,000. This appeal limit also applies to orders for the recovery of possession of personal property of a value up to $5,000 [Reg 42/25, amending Reg 626/00].
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