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Judicial Review - SoR - Reasonableness and 'Reasons for Decision'. Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
In Sharif v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a deportation-related appeal, here brought against the dismissal of a JR, that in turn challenging the Minister's [of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness] refusal to grant a UNHCR's request that "asked Canada to hold Mr. Sharif’s removal in abeyance while his communication [SS: regarding an complaint] to the UNHRC was under consideration".
Here the court considers whether the Minister's decision, made without formal 'reasons for decision', was 'reasonable' (the latter use in the JR SOR meaning of the term) - this starting out with a Baker 'fairness' analysis:a. The Reasonableness Standard
[103] The more important a decision is to the lives of those it affects, the more stringent the procedural protections will be to ensure that the consequences of a decision are justified in light of the facts and law: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 135.
[104] The standard of review is reasonableness: Vavilov, at para. 16. The purpose of reasonableness review is to uphold “the rule of law, while according deference to the statutory delegate’s decision”: Canada Post Corp. v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 900, at para. 29.
[105] Where reasons are not provided, a reviewing court must look to the record, from which the court will often uncover a clear rationale for the decision: Baker, at para. 44. Where no reasons have been provided and neither the record nor the larger context sheds light on the basis for the decision, the reviewing court must examine the constraints on the decision maker to determine whether the decision is reasonable. The analysis will focus more on the outcome than the reasoning process: Vavilov, at paras. 137-38.
[106] The burden is on Mr. Sharif to establish that the decision was unreasonable. Reasonableness is “a robust form of review” which depends on sensitivity to legal and factual constraints and requires an appreciation for institutional context and background: Vavilov, at paras. 13, 99-100.
b. Whether Reasons were Required
[107] Mr. Sharif submits that the principle of responsive justification required the Minister to explain and justify the decision given its particularly harsh consequences to him.
[108] The Minister submits that there is no right to reasons in this context and that, as a matter of custom, reasons are not provided for IMRs. Moreover, the Minister argues that the principle of responsive justification does not apply, as the decision was issued in response to a request from the UNHRC. Article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol requires Canada to respond to the UNHRC, and not to Mr. Sharif.
[109] The application judge accepted the Minister’s position that Mr. Sharif was not entitled to the Minister’s reasons for deciding not to accede to the IMR:This is because Canada’s obligations under the Protocol and international law are not owed to Mr. Sharif personally because Parliament has not incorporated into domestic legislation either the Covenant or the Protocol. Mr. Sharif’s assertion of an enforceable right with obligations stemming from international instruments, in the Minister’s submission, “usurps parliamentary sovereignty as Parliament has never incorporated these into domestic legislation”.
In the Court’s view, the Minister’s position that reasons are not required for the decision to not accede to the UN Committee’s IMR request in this case, is consistent with and supported by the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ahani. As noted above, Laskin J.A., observed that by signing the Optional Protocol Canada reserved the right to reject the UN Committee’s views and “reserved the right to enforce its own laws before the Committee gave its views”. The Court ruled an IMR request is not binding on Canada, is not a part of domestic law and Canada is free not to accede to an Interim Measures Request.
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The existence of a Crown prerogative arising from the Minister’s interaction with an international body such as the UN Commission, combined with an absence of domestic statutory constraints, make it reasonable for the Minister to adopt a practice of not providing reasons for either acceding or not acceding to an Interim Measures Request from the UN Committee. [110] While reasons are generally required when a decision has a significant impact on a party, I agree with the application judge that the Minister was not required to provide reasons for his decision. My reasons are as follows.
[111] First, Mr. Sharif was not a party to this request. The request was made by an international organization to Canada and Canada’s response was to the international organization. Cases in which written reasons tend to be required include those in which the decision-making process gives the parties participatory rights: Vavilov, at para. 77. Rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee indicates that the Committee is to consider the submissions of the state party and the complainant and communicate its views to the individual and the state party concerned. However, there is nothing in the ICCPR, the Optional Protocol, or r. 94 of the UNHRC’s Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee that requires the state party to give reasons for refusing to accede to an IMR.
[112] Second, in any case, there is no statutory right to reasons because IMRs issued by the UNHRC are not binding in Canadian law. Although the Optional Protocol has been ratified, Parliament has not incorporated the Optional Protocol into domestic legislation such that it does not have domestic effect absent a Charter claim. Canada therefore remains free to decline such requests from an interested third party, such as Mr. Sharif, without providing explanations to the individual concerned.
[113] Third, the common law duty of procedural fairness does not require reasons, and the Minister advises that its custom is not to provide reasons for declining an IMR request. Consequently, there is no legitimate expectation that reasons will be provided: Baker, at para. 26.
[114] For these reasons, while the issue is understandably of great concern to Mr. Sharif, I see no error in the application judge’s determination that reasons were not required.
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iii. Analysis of the Issue of Reasonableness
[125] Where no reasons are given, the reasonableness of the decision must be determined from the record before the court using the surrounding documents and circumstances including any admissible information the applicant for judicial review has been able to obtain: Vavilov, at paras. 137-38; and Portnov v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 171, [2021] 4 F.C.R. 501, at para. 54. . Sistermans v. CAA Insurance Co.
In Sistermans v. CAA Insurance Co. (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a joint LAT SABS JR/appeal, here regarding a claim settlement and "an application before the Tribunal, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement on the basis that he lacked capacity to enter into the agreement".
Here the court considers inadequate reasons as a JR 'reasonableness' factor:[68] It is open to the court upon judicial review to set aside an administrative decision as unreasonable based on insufficiency of reasons, but only if there are serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency: see Vavilov, at para. 100. .... . Petrykowski v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada
In Petrykowski v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR against the Federation of Law Societies of Canada ('FLSC'), here against a dismissal of an HRTO application involving a FLSC foreign (UK) law degree accreditation decision.
Here the court finds that a JR argument of 'inadequate reasons' "goes to" the main JR issue of reasonableness:[13] The Applicant further submits that the Decision is procedurally unfair because he should have been given a more thorough explanation for the outcome, emphasizing the importance of the Decision to him. The Applicant relies on Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653. The Applicant submits that the reasons for decision are inadequate to show a coherent and logical line of reasoning that accounted for the relevant factual and legal context.
[14] In this case, the reasons do not raise a concern about procedural fairness. To the extent that the Applicant argues that the reasons are inadequate, this goes to reasonableness. Further, as set out in Vavilov, at para. 304, the adequacy of reasons is not “a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision”. The reasons must “be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes”. . Ottawa Airport Professional Aviation Fire Fighters Association v. Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport Authority
In Ottawa Airport Professional Aviation Fire Fighters Association v. Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport Authority (Div Court, 2022) the Divisional Court makes clear the relationship between 'reasons for decision' and the SOR of 'reasonableness':[13] In determining whether a decision of an administrative tribunal is reasonable, the reviewing court must start with the reasons provided. A decision is reasonable if there is a coherent and rational line of analysis, and the result is justified in light of the law and the evidence (Vavilov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 SCC 65 at paras. 85, 86 and 99-100).
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