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Judicial Review - Charter. Cycle Toronto v. Ontario (Attorney General)
In Cycle Toronto v. Ontario (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against the granting of a JR which found that requiring "the removal of bicycle lanes from three downtown Toronto streets" under HTA s.195.6 ['Existing lanes in the City of Toronto, direction to restore'] and related regulations breached Charter s.7 ['life, liberty and security of the person'].
The court considers the role of JR in a Charter context:The role of the courts on Charter challenges
[20] It is important to avoid approaching judicial review under the Charter in a technical or mechanical fashion. The Charter is part of a larger democratic constitutional order and must be interpreted and applied in the context of that order and all that it entails.
[21] The starting point is this: ours is a Westminster parliamentary democracy with well-defined constitutional roles. As the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 states, Canada has “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”, a constitution that by 1867 had been directing the political branches of government for centuries. In that system, the executive proposes legislation but the decisions whether to legislate and how to do so belong to the legislature. Courts play no role in the policy development process, no role in the choices made by the government in proposing legislation, and no role in the legislature’s decision to pass a law. The role of the courts is to adjudicate disputes arising under the law once it is enacted. This separation of powers is a bedrock principle of constitutional law and it is uncontroversial in our legal tradition: see Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 27-31; The Honourable Malcolm Rowe, Chris Puskas and Allyse Cruise, “The Separation of Powers in Canada” (2024) 1 S.C.L.R. (3d) 323.
[22] Now, courts learn a great deal about a matter in the course of judicial review proceedings, and judges may be tempted to comment on matters of policy. The temptation to do so may be great; judges may suppose that they have much to offer to public policy debate. But the temptation must be resisted. It is not just that courts have no expertise in policy making – no expertise in making the sorts of polycentric decisions that legislatures make routinely. It is illegitimate for courts to involve themselves in matters of legislative policy. Policy is for politics. Whether courts think legislation is wise or unwise, is irrelevant so far as its constitutionality is concerned, and constitutionality is the only question with which courts are legitimately concerned: see e.g., Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, at para. 3; R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 173; and Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), 1990 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at p. 1142, per Dickson C.J.
[23] With respect, the application judge lost sight of this principle when, in the course of outlining the background to the application, he weighed in on policy and political considerations. He commented extensively on the political background to the legislation, recounting remarks by the Premier and Minister of Transportation, contested data concerning road use, and exchanges at legislative committee proceedings. He quoted at length from members of the public and organizations opposed to passage of the legislation, as well as the Mayor of Toronto and the City Manager – all of this prior to addressing the only matter with which the court was properly concerned: whether the legislation violated the Charter. Indeed, the application judge’s decision is replete with criticism not only of the legislation but also of the government’s conduct in promoting its passage. He went so far as to express concern that the legislation was passed despite the government’s internal policy advice and public criticism of the bill.
[24] None of this was relevant to the task before him.
[25] Lest there be any doubt: in formulating policy or legislating, neither the government nor the legislature is under any obligation to accept policy advice, whether from bureaucrats, experts, or members of the public. The choices they make are the stuff of politics. We are governed by those whom we elect and they are accountable to the people for the choices they make, not to the courts.
[26] It is important to remember that judicial independence is a two-way street: the government and legislature must obviously respect the independence of the courts, but courts must respect the roles and responsibilities of the other branches of government. Judicial review under the Charter is not an occasion for courts to comment on or critique policy or political decisions, as Tulloch C.J.O. explained in Dorceus v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 321, at paras. 23-24:[T]he cornerstone of the separation of powers is mutual respect. ...
Because respect is reciprocal, the judiciary must remain mindful not to intrude into the domains of the political branches. The courts of law exist to resolve legal disputes. The courtroom is not a political forum. Nor is it a proxy for the public inquiry process in which the policy judgments of the legislative and executive branches can be second-guessed and re-weighed. These differences between the judicial function and the political arena must be preserved. (Citations omitted.) . Apitipi Anicinapek Nation v. Ontario [IMPORTANT re constitutional Divisional Court jurisdiction]
In Apitipi Anicinapek Nation v. Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a Crown motion, here seeking "to quash part of the underlying application for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction".
The court considers whether it (as the Divisional Court in a JR) has jurisdiction to consider a Constitution Act s.52(1) declaration remedy, here in an indigenous context:[15] The moving parties therefore move to strike out those parts of the notice of application for judicial review that seek relief under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, as set out in the notice of motion, and the related notice of constitutional question. The AAN disagrees, submitting that the Divisional Court has jurisdiction.
[16] The substantive jurisdiction of the Divisional Court is statutory. It is a court of review. It has statutory appellate jurisdiction as set out in the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the CJA) and other statutes, which is not at issue here. Its jurisdiction on applications for judicial review, which is at issue here, is found in the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (the JRPA).
[17] Contrary to the AAN’s submissions, the Divisional Court’s status as a Branch of the Superior Court does not transform its substantive jurisdiction to include the broad inherent jurisdiction of a Superior Court judge. Nor does r. 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure expand the Court’s substantive jurisdiction on an application for judicial review: J.N. v. Durham Regional Police Service, 2012 ONCA 428, at para. 16.
[18] Section 2 of the JRPA sets out this Court’s jurisdiction for an application for judicial review. It is limited to applications for an order “in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari”, and other proceedings for a declaration or injunction “in relation to the exercise, refusal to exercise or proposed or purported exercise of a statutory power”. The Constitutional Challenge put forward in this application for judicial review does not fall within this jurisdiction.
[19] The JRPA defines “statutory power” and “statutory power of decision” in s. 1. The closest the Constitutional Challenge comes to falling within that definition is the general reference to regulations as part of the LARIA “Regime”. However, the application for judicial review does not assert that any regulation made under LARIA is unauthorized or invalid. The AAN is concerned about the absence of a statutory power to proceed with its proposal to the MNR under LARIA. The AAN seeks an order that the LARIA Regime be amended within one year after the requested s. 52 declaration to provide for the duty to consult under s. 35 to be triggered and met.
[20] With respect to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, legislation and the exercise of statutory powers must comply with s. 35. However, s. 35 is not itself a statutory power under the JRPA: Whiteduck v. Ontario, 2023 ONCA 543, para. 60; JRPA, s. 1; Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch F, s. 87.
[21] Further, the legislative process at large is not the exercise of a statutory power: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 765, at paras. 2, 18, 33, 38, per Karakatsanis J; Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians v. Ontario (Minister of Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2022 ONSC 5161 (Div. Ct.), at para. 38.
[22] Nor is this a question of which procedure is preferrable. “Once jurisdiction is determined, then the procedure to be followed is the procedure prescribed in the forum with jurisdiction”: Alford v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 ONSC 4269, at para. 45.
[23] The AAN further submits that this Court may hear the Constitutional Challenge because it is ancillary to the judicial review of the Decision. Most germane are two decisions of this Court: Mississauga First Nation v. Ontario (Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2022 ONSC 6859 and Regional Municipality of York v. Ontario (Minister of the Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2023 ONSC 5708.
[24] In Mississauga First Nation, at para. 54, the Court found that a constitutional challenge to amendments to legislation was ancillary to and dependent on the determination of the duty to consult in a judicial review application. However, in that case, the Court found that there was a refusal to exercise a statutory power, based on an unreasonable delay of about three years in addressing the application for judicial review, during which time the legislation was amended to remove a key statutory provision. Similarly, in Regional Municipality of York, an environmental assessment was pending for several years during which an amendment was passed that rendered the matter moot.
[25] We do not have like circumstances in this case. There was no inter-related step taken after the Decision to undermine the challenge to the Decision in this application for judicial review. The Constitutional Challenge to the entire Regime, and related request that the Regime be amended, is not merely support for the judicial review. It is a request for broad primary relief including legislative amendments and should be decided by a Superior Court judge. The provincial superior courts have always occupied a position of prime importance to rule on the constitutional validity of legislation: MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at pp. 752-753. The cases relied upon by the AAN do not approach what would be needed to show that the Constitutional Challenge is ancillary to this application for judicial review.
[26] Having considered all the AAN submissions, we conclude that the Constitutional Challenge plainly does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court under s. 2(1) of the JRPA. That claim is properly addressed before the Superior Court, not in this application for judicial review.
[27] In reaching this decision, we have taken into account the importance of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and all that it serves, as well as the importance of access to justice. While those principles do not expand the Court’s jurisdiction as broadly as is suggested by the AAN on this motion, they are reasons to exercise our jurisdiction to transfer the Constitutional Challenge to the Superior Court along with terms to facilitate a smooth transfer. . Daneshvar v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario
In Daneshvar v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (Div Ct, 2021) the Divisional Court considers the interaction of Charter and judicial review jurisdiction:[32] These concerns are not affected by the fact that the applicant purports to advance Charter arguments. The Divisional Court will only have jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief on an application for judicial review in the context of a Charter challenge where the government action relates to the exercise, refusal to exercise or proposal to exercise a statutory authority: Di Cienzo v. Attorney General of Ontario, 2017 ONSC 1351, at paras. 19-22, citing Falkiner v. Ontario Ministry of Community and Social services (1996), 1996 CanLII 12495 (ON SCDC), 140 D.L.R. 115 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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