|
JR - Contracts. Land Design Inc. v. Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp.
In Land Design Inc. v. Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against a decision and a reconsideration decision of the Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp. [Infrastructure Ontario (IO)] "disqualifying LANDinc from a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) process", this "related to a contract for construction administration services for redevelopment and revitalization of Ontario Place, on the shores of Lake Ontario, in Toronto".
Here the court explains that it, sitting as a JR court, "does not have jurisdiction over claims of breach of contract" but that - if merited - might consider 'reconstituting' itself [via CJA 18(3)] as the Superior Court for this purpose:8. Breach of Contract Arguments
(73) This court does not have jurisdiction over claims of breach of contract in an application for judicial review; such claims lie within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice: Hamid v. Canadian Centre for Professional Legal Education, 2024 ONSC 7204, para. 16. As noted above in respect to jurisdiction, this court is a statutory court and cannot take jurisdiction over a claim where none has been conferred on this court by the Legislature.
(74) The Divisional Court is an intermediate review and appellate court made up of judges drawn from the Superior Court. Each member of this panel could take jurisdiction over a contract claim in discharging our roles as Justices of the Superior Court. But we may not do that while sitting as a panel of the Divisional Court.
(75) LANDinc cites Wang v. Banton, 2025 ONSC 4565 (Div. Ct.) as authority for the proposition that this court can reconstitute itself as a court exercising the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, rather than the Divisional Court, in an appropriate case. This case does not assist LANDinc. In Wang, Shore J., sitting as a single appeal judge of the Divisional Court, reconstituted herself to sit as a single judge of the Superior Court, to hear an appeal from an Associate Justice after she concluded that the impugned order was interlocutory rather than final. In both roles, Shore J. was sitting as an appellate judge. The record, the law, and the legal process, were identical for the appeal, and Shore J.’s exercise of discretion saved time and resources for the parties and the administration of justice and also reflected a concern that the jurisdictional issue had not been identified and addressed during triage and case management in the Divisional Court (ordinarily, such an error in jurisdiction should be identified and remedied early in the appeal process). Such an exercise of discretion is not authority for the Divisional Court to take jurisdiction over a matter properly addressed in the trial court.
(76) All of this said, circumstances can arise where a matter brought before this court should be before the trial court and where the delay for the parties to seek recourse below could work an injustice. In such a case, it would be open to this court to grant interim relief, on reasonable terms, pending the matter being reconstituted and placed before the trial court.
|
