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Judicial Review - Decision v Information

. Posendorf v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources)

In Posendorf v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against the decision of the District Manager of the Ministry of Natural Resources to refuse "the requested sale and temporary occupancy licence" respecting some land governed under the Public Lands Act.

Here the court considers the JR-justiciability of a letter stating that the Crown "“may consider” further compliance action if the structures were not removed":
The Removal Comments

[48] The statements about removal in the District Manager’s letter require separate treatment. It said that the structures “must be removed,” that Ms. Posendorf “is responsible for their removal,” and that she had 12 months to do so, failing which the Ministry might consider further compliance action.

[49] The respondents submitted that these statements were not a decision having legal effect. They reflected an attempt to secure voluntary compliance before deciding whether to invoke s. 24(2), s. 24(3), or another enforcement mechanism. Courts do not ordinarily judicially review a non-binding opinion, warning or stated intention to pursue a future course because such communications do not determine rights, impose legal obligations or produce prejudicial legal effects: Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347, at para. 29.

[50] I accept that submission. The letter did not invoke the notice-and-warrant process under s. 24(3), commence an application under s. 24(2), or determine a debt under s. 24(5). It said only that the Ministry “may consider” further compliance action if the structures were not removed. The available statutory route, the identity of any person legally responsible, and any right to recover costs remained to be determined through the procedures prescribed by the Act.

[51] The applicant’s ultra vires argument is therefore premature. If the Minister commences a possession application, issues formal notice and a warrant, or seeks recovery of removal costs, Ms. Posendorf may raise the relevant statutory and factual defences in the forum provided by law. Nothing in these reasons determines whether she is an occupier within s. 24, whether she may be required to remove the structures, or whether any cost is recoverable from her.

[52] Nevertheless, the wording used by the Ministry was inappropriate and regrettable. A person receiving an official letter stating that structures “must” be removed within a fixed time and that the recipient “is responsible” could reasonably understand that a legal obligation had been conclusively imposed. That was not the respondents’ position before this court, and it was not the legal effect of the letter.

[53] If the Ministry intended to invite voluntary compliance, it should have said so. It should have distinguished a request from a statutory direction and explained that any coercive step would require a further decision under the Act, with the notice and procedural protections applicable to that step. Administrative communications should not use mandatory language when the legal position remains undetermined.

[54] Those observations do not convert the removal comments into a reviewable decision or justify certiorari. They clarify why the comments have no present legal effect. The Ministry remains bound to proceed under the Act if it seeks possession, removal, demolition or cost recovery.
. Brown v. Town of Iroquois Falls

In Brown v. Town of Iroquois Falls (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR for delay.

Here the court finds that a letter reminding the applicant of the terms of a municipal resolution which applied to him was not JR-justiciable as being only informative in nature, and not a 'decision':
[6] As a first step, the Court must first decide whether the March 10, 2026 letter from the clerk is a decision subject to judicial review, or whether the applicant is really seeking judicial review of the resolution, from December 2018. Only once the court has determined which decision is the subject of the application can it turn its mind to whether the application should be dismissed for delay. The two possible “decisions” were made approximately seven years apart.

[7] Mr. Brown submits that the clerk’s decision to enforce the resolution is the decision for which he seeks judicial review. If this is a decision subject to judicial review, the decision was made in March 2026 and there was no delay in bringing the application.

[8] The Town submits that the clerk was only reminding Mr. Brown of the original resolution and that what Mr. Brown is really seeking is judicial review of the resolution passed in 2018. If this is the decision subject to judicial review, then there was a delay of over seven years in seeking judicial review.

[9] The letter, dated March 10, 2026, from the clerk provides as follows:
I am writing to remind you of the correspondence sent to you on January 7th, 2019 regarding communication with the Town of Iroquois Falls. A copy of that letter is enclosed for your reference.

As outlined in that letter, all communication with the Municipality is to be directed exclusively by email to [e-mail address]. This process remains in place.

We kindly ask that you ensure all future correspondence follows this protocol.

Thank you for your cooperation.
[10] It is clear from the letter that the clerk was simply reminding Mr. Brown of the Town resolution. The clerk was not making a fresh or new decision. The clerk does not have the authority to amend or rescind a council resolution. For this reason, the letter from the clerk is not a decision subject to judicial review.
. Drinnan v. Workplace Safety Insurance Appeal Tribunal

In Drinnan v. Workplace Safety Insurance Appeal Tribunal (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court granted the court's R2.1.01 ['frivolous, vexatious or abuse of process'] motion to quash a JR, here where it was 'apparently' brought against "a letter received by the Applicant on May 28, 2026 from WSIAT Emergency Management and Security" directed at addressing recent communications respecting "a pattern of increasingly inappropriate and concerning content, including unusual themes and unfounded allegations, delivered in a manner that is inconsistent with respectful and appropriate interaction".

Here the court considers the JR-justiciability of this "WSIAT Emergency Management and Security letter", both as a public-private matter and as a non-decision:
[16] To the extent that his Application relates to the WSIAT Emergency Management and Security letter of May 28, 2026, this letter is not a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 2(1)2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J-1 (JRPA), and is not amenable to judicial review. Security decisions and procedures at WSIAT are not a public function governed by statutory decision-making procedures.
. Dyck v. Barrie Municipal Non-Profit Housing Corporation

In Dyck v. Barrie Municipal Non-Profit Housing Corporation (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a public housing tenant's JR, this brought against "decisions regarding the calculation of her geared-to-income rent (“RGI”) by the respondent, Barrie Municipal Non-Profit Housing Corporation (“Barrie Housing”) under delegation from the respondent, County of Simcoe (“the County”)".

Here the court considers the sometimes fine line between a formal statutory decision versus information communication (here "correspondence") advising the applicant that what they seek is unavailable:
What actions by the County are properly the subject of judicial review

[31] The relief sought against the County in Ms. Dyck’s notice of application is an order setting aside its decisions of February 28, 2025 and September 27, 2025. Although Ms. Dyck alleges other errors by the County in her factum, those issues are not properly before the Court and, in any event, they do not involve administrative decisions which would be subject to judicial review.

[32] The County argues that the only decision which is subject to review in this application is its internal review decision of February 28, 2025. It argues that Ms. Dyck’s request for a review in her correspondence of August 26, 2025 was not denied on its merits but rather because the review requested was not available to her under the County’s Internal Review Policy.

[33] I agree that the review sought by Ms. Dyck in her correspondence of August 26, 2025 was fully addressed in the County’s decision of February 28, 2025, and that no further internal review of that decision was available. I find that the County’s correspondence to Ms. Dyck of September 27, 2025 was not an administrative decision subject to judicial review but rather was simply confirmation of the fact that the administrative process was complete with the decision of February 28, 2025.

[34] I would therefore deny Ms. Dyck’s request to review the County’s correspondence of September 27, 2025. and will only consider the County’s decision of February 28, 2025.
. Grassy Narrow First Nation v. His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, et al

In Grassy Narrow First Nation v. His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, et al (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against "the actions of a Director appointed under the Environmental Protection Act" who refused "to exercise his powers under the Act to issue stop and control orders against the mine".

Here the court considers, without clearly deciding, the JR-justiciability of an EPA "Director's letter":
[22] HMKIRO submits that the Director’s letter is not properly subject to judicial review, as it simply affirmed existing rights under the previous ECA and resulted in no change to the status quo. The Director’s response to Grassy Narrows was an unreviewable “courtesy letter”. HMKIRO submits that in any event, the Director acted reasonably in refusing to issue a stop order, and had no statutory basis upon which to issue a control order. Further, the duty to consult was not triggered.

[23] In my view, HMKIRO’s submission that the Director’s actions were no more than a “courtesy letter” and not subject to judicial review likely goes too far. While the scope of judicial review of a discretionary enforcement decision may be narrow, such decisions are not generally shielded from judicial review. The Judicial Review Procedure Act R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 expressly contemplates review of the refusal to exercise a statutory power. However, given my conclusions below that the application cannot succeed, I do not need to resolve this issue and have proceeded on the assumption, not the decision, that the Director’s letter is subject to judicial review.

....

[40] The most significant of the obstacles is the context in which the Director’s actions occurred. The Director is determining what, if any, enforcement actions should be taken. This is an area in which the Director enjoys significant discretion. Ministerial decisions of a discretionary nature attract a high degree of deference. Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41 (CanLII), [2001] 2 SCR 281 at para. 56. Further, as the Court of Appeal has recently reiterated, “[i]t is well established that an administrative decision maker’s decision not to take enforcement steps in response to a complaint is subject to a limited right of judicial review on procedural fairness grounds”: West Whitby Landowners Group Inc. v. Elexicon Energy Inc., 2025 ONCA 821 at para. 124.



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Last modified: 11-11-26
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