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JR - Discretion (2). Gerstel v. FSRA
In Gerstel v. FSRA (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against the "Financial Service Tribunal’s March 31, 2025 decision, which ordered the respondent, Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) to carry out the terms of a notice of proposal" which "proposed to refuse to renew the applicants’ licenses and to impose administrative penalties".
The court considered whether to exercise it's discretion "to judicially review the Tribunal’s decision with respect to the applicants’ licences when the applicants had a full right of appeal from the Tribunal’s decision on that issue", and where the "applicants initially filed a notice of appeal but failed to perfect their appeal":Should the court exercise its discretion to judicially review the Tribunal’s decision with respect to the applicants’ licences?
[11] Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. In deciding whether to exercise its discretion, the court is required to determine the appropriateness of judicial review in the circumstances, including by considering whether an adequate alternative remedy exists: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, at paras. 51-56, Strickland v. Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 37, at para. 40.
[12] In this case, the legislature has provided for a full right of appeal from decisions of the Tribunal on licensing issues. Subsection 21(1) of the Act [SS: Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act, 2006] authorizes the respondent to make proposals related to licensing under the Act, such as a proposal to refuse to issue or renew a licence. Subsection 21(3) of the Act provides a right to a hearing before the Tribunal with respect to such a notice and s. 21(4) authorizes the Tribunal to make orders resulting from the hearing. Subsection 21(5) provides a full right of appeal to this court from a Tribunal order under s. 21(4).
[13] There can be no doubt that a full right of appeal to the same court from which the applicants seek judicial review is an adequate alternative remedy. Indeed, an appeal would be a preferable avenue of review for the unsuccessful party at the Tribunal. The correctness standard of review for an appeal is stricter than the reasonableness standard that applies on judicial review. This is also not a situation like in Yatar where the right of appeal is limited to questions of law, leaving questions of fact or mixed fact and law to be addressed by judicial review. By providing a full right of appeal from the Tribunal’s orders related to licensing (as distinct from, for example, orders related to administrative penalties), the legislature intended for review of those orders to occur by appeal. To permit judicial review on the same issues for which the legislature has provided a full right of appeal would fail to respect legislative intent: Caledon Residences Inc. v. Ontario Land Tribunal, 2025 ONSC 6546, at para. 21.
[14] In this case, the applicants initially filed a notice of appeal from the Tribunal’s decision but failed to perfect their appeal. The court granted the applicants three extensions of time, with the third date being peremptory to the applicants. Shore J. denied the applicants’ request for a fourth extension. The appeal therefore was not permitted to proceed. The applicants did not challenge Shore J.’s decision. The applicants were required to challenge the Tribunal’s licensing decision by appeal. Their failure to do so does not allow them to instead challenge it by judicial review. I therefore would dismiss this aspect of the application. . Sierra Club Canada Foundation v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change)
In Sierra Club Canada Foundation v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change) (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against the earlier dismissal of a JR respecting a project "to tap oil and gas reserves far under the ocean floor and transport them to market".
Here, Stratas JA, makes observations that "will be of practical assistance to parties in future environmental assessments and Indigenous consultation processes" regarding the discretionary nature of JR, the rule of law and the equitable doctrine of 'clean hands':[50] At the end of the August 2020 session and in a follow-up email, the Agency offered to have further discussions with MTI to discuss the environmental impact statement. But MTI did not request any additional meetings with the Agency to discuss the marine transshipment issue.
[51] Based on this, Equinor says this Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the appeal. It says that remedies on judicial review are always discretionary and the Court has the discretion to dismiss any application for judicial review for this sort of delay or lack of responsiveness.
[52] The Federal Court did not agree with Equinor. The Federal Court found that the appellants raised the issue before the Agency finalized the scope of the Project, and that was good enough. Whether the issue was raised in a meaningful, truly responsive way is open to question.
[53] In this Court, Equinor says that the Federal Court erred on this. At best, it says, the issues were raised late and, to some extent, in a general, fleeting way without supporting submissions. Equinor stresses that the purpose of the environmental assessment process under the Act is to allow for a meaningful assessment of environmental concerns and Indigenous concerns, but also to ensure that assessments are efficient and timely. In its memorandum and in oral argument, Equinor suggests that delay or lack of responsiveness in raising and pressing an issue can be a ground for the Court to dismiss an application for judicial review, in whole or in part, depending on the issue.
[54] What legal basis does Equinor assert for this? Equinor says that relief on judicial review is discretionary. In particular, it relies on this Court’s comments in Makivik Corporation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 184, [2022] 1 F.C.R. 311. At paragraph 60, this Court said that "“remedies on judicial review…are discretionary”" and "“[t]he categories of cases in which courts may exercise the discretion not to undertake judicial review are not closed”".
[55] Supporting this are the wide words of the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 713. There, the Supreme Court (at para. 37) states briefly and in passing that "“even if [an] applicant makes out a case for review on the merits, the reviewing court has an overriding discretion to refuse relief”".
[56] There is no doubt that relief on judicial review is discretionary. But that alone leaves out much of the story.
[57] Makivik Corporation and Strickland — and many other cases for that matter — do not stand for the proposition that the Court can deny a party relief just because the Court is unhappy, offended or annoyed with a party’s conduct. The Court’s discretion is not that open-ended.
[58] Nor could it be. If it were, then the results of cases would depend on the sensibilities of a judge, or, as the English jurist and scholar John Seiden once memorably put it back in the seventeenth century, relief would depend on "“the length of the Chancellor’s foot,”" a very "“uncertain measure”" indeed: John Seiden, Table-Talk: Being the Discourses of John Selden, Esq. (ed. Richard Milward, 1689); see also Lord Denning, Landmarks in the Law (London: Butterworths, 1984). That would be the rule of whim, not the rule of law.
[59] Under the rule of law — a concept enshrined in the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, above) — judges must exercise discretions on stable legal standards, not idiosyncratic personal whims, feelings or vibes.
[60] In accordance with the rule of law, stable categories and rules have developed over time and regulate the reviewing court’s discretion to withhold relief in a judicial review. While the categories of judicial discretion are not ossified and can develop in response to modern considerations (for recent examples, see, e.g., Benison v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee), 2026 FCA 53 and Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. LeBon, 2013 FCA 55), equitable doctrines themselves do have operative rules and limits, and the Court obeys them.
[61] Equinor’s submission appears to invoke the equitable "“clean hands”" doctrine: a party that has engaged in misconduct is not entitled to relief. But that doctrine does have a threshold: only truly reprehensible conduct of a certain sort qualifies: see, e.g., Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Thanabalasingham, 2006 FCA 14. For example, a party seeking to set aside an administrative decision for unreasonableness may be caught by the doctrine if, in the prosecution or defence of the administrative proceedings, it has conducted itself immorally, fraudulently or beyond the pale in something connected with the judicial review. As Thanabalasingham instructs us, this is a high threshold, one far from met in this case.
[62] However, there is some merit to Equinor’s submission that the appellants’ delay in raising certain issues disqualifies them from advancing issues that should have been raised earlier, not for reasons founded in equity, but for other reasons.
[63] Judicial review of an administrative decision is shaped by the standards set out in the legislation, here the Act, that governs and shapes the administrative decision. Absent a constitutional concern, the Act, properly interpreted, is the law of the land. The Act binds and applies to everyone, including all participants in the administrative process—and reviewing courts too.
[64] Here, the purpose of the Act matters. As judges, we do not determine the purpose of legislation by adopting what we would like to see in it. We cannot use our own view of the Act’s purposes by "“[creating] an unexpressed exception to clear language”": Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), 2006 SCC 20, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 715 at para. 23; Hunt v. Canada, 2026 FCA 88 at para. 13; and see also M. Mancini, "“The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation”" (2022), 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919 at p. 927, which the Supreme Court relied upon in the seminal case of Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, 498 D.L.R. (4th) 316. . Binance Holdings Limited v. Ontario Securities Commission
In Binance Holdings Limited v. Ontario Securities Commission (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed joined appeals, here brought against investigative administrative "summons demanding the production of documents and, depending on how the summons is interpreted, responses to interrogatories (“information”) from Binance about its operations ...".
The court considered the propriety of the Divisional Court discretionarily declining to hear a judicial review, here on purported 'adequate alternative remedy' grounds:C. Did the Divisional Court err in declining judicial review of the Charter arguments?
[67] I am persuaded that the Divisional Court erred in principle in declining judicial review of Binance’s Charter arguments relating to the constitutional validity of the seizure. Although it would have been entitled to deny judicial review on the basis that Binance has an alternative path to obtaining adequate relief on these issues, it denied judicial review based on a mere possibility that Binance might have an alternative path to obtaining relief. It also did so without any exploration of the adequacy of that relief if it did prove to be available. In my view, this was not a proper basis for exercising discretion to deny judicial review. I am also persuaded that even if it had not been an error in principle for the Divisional Court to deny judicial review on the basis it did, its decision to do so was an unreasonable exercise of discretion. I would not defer to its decision.
[68] I recognize that judicial review “has always been understood to be discretionary” and that “the broadest judicial discretion may be exercised in determining whether a case is one in which declaratory relief ought to be awarded”: Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 37. This does not mean that the discretion not to undertake judicial review is immune from appellate oversight. Rather, “the exercise of discretion can be set aside when a judge ‘considered irrelevant factors, failed to consider relevant factors, or reached an unreasonable conclusion’”, or when a judge declines judicial review “on the basis of a ‘wrong principle’”: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, at para. 41, referring to Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, 1995 CanLII 145 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 39, 112.
[69] To be sure, there is a “well-established discretion to decline to undertake judicial review when some other, more suitable remedy is available” (emphasis added): Strickland, at para. 1. As Cromwell J. put it in Strickland, at para. 40, “[o]ne of the discretionary grounds for refusing to undertake judicial review is that there is an adequate alternative” (emphasis added). The test that he adopted for denying judicial review on this basis is premised on there being an alternative remedy available, as it asks: “is the alternative remedy adequate in all the circumstances to address the applicant’s grievance?” (emphasis in original): Strickland, at para. 42. There are therefore two parts to the test, the necessarily implicit part that there must be an alternative basis for obtaining the relief sought, and the second explicit part that requires that alternative basis to be “adequate”. It is instructive that in Strickland, before finding that deference should be given to a decision to decline judicial review based on an adequate alternative remedy, Cromwell J. engaged in a close, careful, and complete analysis of the jurisdiction of the proposed alternative decision maker (provincial superior courts) to address the vires of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. It was only after doing so and finding that the Federal Court’s premise that the provincial superior courts had such jurisdiction was “correct” that he deferred to the discretionary determination of the Federal Court to decline judicial review based on an alternative adequate remedy.
[70] As I have explained in para. 67 above, in this case, the Divisional Court declined judicial review of the constitutional issues without finding that Binance had access to an alternative remedy from another tribunal, on the basis that Binance had not attempted to have the Commission exercise jurisdiction to grant an alternative remedy. And it did so without exploring whether any remedy the Commission might provide would be “adequate”. It therefore exercised its discretion to deny judicial review based on the mere possibility of an alternative remedy, rather than on the basis that there was an adequate alternative remedy. It failed to apply either of the two parts of the Strickland test.
[71] The Commission argues that the Divisional Court was not required to apply the Strickland test in exercising its discretion because Cromwell J. made clear in that case that courts are not required to apply the Strickland factors as a “checklist”: Strickland, at para. 43. I do not accept this submission. Cromwell J. prefaced that comment, at para. 42, by making clear that the factors he was referring to were “a number of considerations” that he had listed as “relevant to deciding whether an alternative remedy or forum is adequate so as to justify a discretionary refusal to hear a judicial review application.” Those principles have nothing to do with the first part of the Strickland test, namely, whether there an alternative remedy exists. Moreover, although Strickland holds that the considerations listed in para. 42 need not be used as a checklist when applying the second part of the test by inquiring into the adequacy of an alternative remedy, it does not hold that a court is entitled to disregard entirely the adequacy of the proposed alternative remedy. Strickland requires that this issue be resolved, but the Divisional Court did not do so.
[72] I am therefore persuaded that the Divisional Court erred in principle in declining judicial review, and I would allow Binance’s appeal of its decision on this basis.
[73] In the alternative, I am persuaded that even if these shortcomings had not amounted to an error in principle, the decision of the Divisional Court to decline to undertake judicial review on the constitutional issues in the circumstances of this case was nonetheless an unreasonable exercise of discretion, not warranting deference. The Divisional Court was aware of the Commission’s position that an application to the Commission would be unproductive because it had already ruled at least twice that it did not have the jurisdiction to revoke or vary a summons. The Divisional Court was also aware that there was no stay of the Summons in place and that Binance was seeking a ruling on the constitutional validity of the Summons before engaging the expensive and time-consuming enterprise of delivering masses of documents within a short timeline. The Divisional Court certainly understood that if it declined judicial review Binance would be obliged, on pain of a contempt hearing, to continue to comply with the Summons that it believed to be unconstitutional until the Commission could render a decision on its jurisdiction at some unknown point in the future. Finally, the Divisional Court had to have been aware that if the Commission ultimately declined jurisdiction to provide an alternative remedy, no record of proceedings would be created addressing the constitutional issue, and no decision would be made on the merits by an administrative decision-maker. The application before it would therefore likely return on much the same record that the Divisional Court already had before it, after further delay and expense.
[74] Yet the Divisional Court chose to accept these risks based on nothing more than speculation that requiring Binance to bring its s. 144(1) application to the Commission could possibly produce a more complete record and result in a decision of the regulator. In my view, it was not reasonable for the Divisional Court to undertake these risks without resolving whether the Commission in fact had jurisdiction, and without considering the adequacy of the Commission’s ability to respond to the concerns that Binance was raising. In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 27, the Supreme Court affirmed that, “Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle, which finds expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers.” In my view, the decision to deny Binance the opportunity to do address that tension without first determining that a s. 144(1) application to the Commission was an alternative and adequate mechanism for doing so, was not a reasonable exercise of discretion.
[75] I would allow this ground of appeal. . BizTech v. Accreditation Canada
In BizTech v. Accreditation Canada (Div Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court considered what are essentially two JRs, these opposing decisions by Accreditation Canada and the Superintendent of Career Colleges [under the Ontario Career Colleges Act, 2005], these resulting in the revocation of a college's educational program which "triggered a statutory right by BizTech students in the DMS Program to a full refund of their fees."
The court considers the constitutional status of judicial reviews (JR), here in the context of determining whether JR can be "a proceeding" under Arbitration Act s.7(1) ['Stay'] and thus whether the court can exercise it's discretion to hear it or not:[133] When it comes to the stay of this judicial review proceeding, the starting point of the analysis is that judicial review by the courts is protected by s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It is a cornerstone of our justice system. And legislative lawmakers cannot remove the court’s ability to conduct judicial review: Ontario Place Protectors v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 183, at para 33; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 563, at para. 24. Thus, the fact the JRPA does not include mandatory language excluding arbitration is legally irrelevant given the constitutional status of judicial review, its relationship to the rule of law and the status of superior courts. As Lorne Sossin J.A. explains in Practice and Procedure Before Administrative Tribunals (Toronto: Ontario: Thomson Reuters), § 38:2. Nature, Source and Purpose of Judicial Review:Judicial review refers to the constitutional power, right and responsibility of the superior courts to ensure that state authority is exercised in accordance with the law. It is a vital aspect of the rule of law. As such the ability of courts to judicially review state action is not dependant on a legislature creating such a right. Unlike a right of appeal, which exists only to the extent that a legislature creates it, judicial review exists independent of legislative desire or creation as an inherent power of the superior courts flowing from sections 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
By virtue of the concept of the rule of law, all exercises of public authority must find their source in law. Furthermore, all decision-making powers have legal limits, derived from the enabling legislation, the common or civil law or the Constitution. Judicial review is the means by which the courts supervise those who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not overstep these limits. The function of judicial review is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process and its outcomes. [134] The JRPA is thus distinct from other statutes in this regard.
[135] However, this recognition does not answer the question before me. As urged in Peace River, the answer depends very much on the legal context, the terms of the arbitration agreement, and the specific facts of the case.
[136] The constitutional right to seek judicial review does not mean “a right to require the court to undertake judicial review” regardless of the nature of the question before it: Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, 1995 CanLII 145 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 30; Canada (Auditor General) v. Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources), 1989 CanLII 73 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, at p. 93.
[137] Discretion is inherent in undertaking the task of judicial review. At minimum, the court must determine whether judicial review is appropriate. In deciding that, if the court determines that one of the discretionary bases for refusing a remedy is present, they may decline to consider the merits of the judicial review application. The court also has the discretion to refuse to grant a remedy, even if they find that the decision under review is unreasonable: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 191, at para. 54; ss. 2(2), (5) of the JRPA. . Voices of Willowdale Inc. v. City of Toronto
In Voices of Willowdale Inc. v. City of Toronto (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this against an OLT decision "to adopt a zoning by-law to permit the construction of a three-story apartment building for people leaving homelessness. The new development would be in addition to the existing four-story building on the property, which houses 600 senior citizens.":
Here the issue was whether the court should exercise it's discretion to hear a JR after a leave to appeal application [under OLTA s.24] was dismissed (unusually, the OLTA has a leave requirement at the first level of court appeal):Should we exercise our discretion to hear the judicial review application in light of the ruling on the motion for leave to appeal?
[19] VOW brought a motion for leave to appeal under s. 24 of the OLTA, which permits an appeal to this Court, with leave, on questions of law.
[20] On May 17, 2024, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed. As is the practice in this Court, no reasons were provided.
[21] The City argues that VOW should not be permitted to proceed with judicial review on issues of law it raised in its notice of application for leave to appeal. The City argues VOW had a route to appeal errors of law and is now estopped from raising the same issues for which they were denied leave. The City submits that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and this Court should not exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review application because VOW had a full opportunity to raise any legal errors in its leave application.
[22] The Tribunal also submits that the Applicant should not be permitted to raise the same issues in their judicial review application that were raised in its leave motion.
[23] In Vavilov, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a right of appeal on a question of law does not preclude an individual from seeking judicial review for questions not dealt within the appeal.
[24] This Court was faced with a decision whether to consider an application for judicial review even though a statutory appeal had been filed, in Shearer v. Oz, 2024 ONSC 1723. In Shearer, both the appeal and the application for judicial review were before the same Divisional Court panel. The Court heard the appeal on a question of law. The Court also exercised its jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review on questions of fact or mixed fact and law. Corbett J., stated at para. 32 that:In respect to the application for judicial review, this court will not entertain the application to the extent that its substance is addressed adequately by another process. In this case, the "other process" is the appeal. The only issues before us that could form a basis for judicial review that this court will entertain, therefore, are questions of fact, mixed fact and law (where there is no extricable question of law) and exercises of discretion, all of which are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness in an application for judicial review: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. [25] This Court dismissed VOW's motion for leave to appeal without reasons. In oral argument during this application hearing, the City conceded that some of the issues raised in the motion for leave to appeal were ones of mixed fact and law and, therefore, outside the scope of a statutory appeal. I am satisfied that all the issues raised in this application for judicial review are either questions of fact, or questions of mixed fact and law with no extricable questions of law. Those issues could not have been dealt with in an appeal under s. 24 of the OLTA. Judicial review is still available to VOW on issues of fact, or mixed fact and law and the principle of issue estoppel does not arise. As a result, I find that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise our discretion to hear the application for judicial review notwithstanding the unsuccessful application for leave to appeal: Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 SCR 713. . Byrne v. Canada (Border Services Agency)
In Byrne v. Canada (Border Services Agency) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a JR, this against a CITT dismissal of an appeal, that brought when the "Canada Border Services Agency prohibited the entry of the pistol into Canada, finding that it was a "“prohibited weapon or device”" as it met the definition of a replica firearm under subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code".
Here the court declines to hear purely legal issues (holding that only issues of fact and issues of mixed fact and law could be heard) on a JR where there was an unused appeal on "any question of law" available [under s.68(1) Customs Act]:[2] .... To the extent that Mr. Byrne alleges that the CITT committed errors of law, his recourse was through appeal to this Court under subsection 68(1) of the Customs Act, R.C.S. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.): Canada (Attorney General) v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 2023 FCA 209 at para. 29. This Court’s jurisdiction on an application for judicial review such as this is confined to reviewing errors of fact or mixed fact and law. . Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al. [LTB recon as AAR versus JR discretion]
In Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al. (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court (mostly) dismissed a multiple-proceeding combination of both LL-initiated JRs and RTA s.210 appeals, here respecting multiple units in a Sarnia apartment building. After a fire "the Chief Building Official for the City of Sarnia issued an order to the Landlord directing that the premises be vacated", followed by a second order several days later restricting access to a lesser number of units. The LL subsequently refused re-entry to tenants not covered by the later less restrictive order, eventually resulting in RTA orders of illegal lock-out for numerous units - and that "the Landlords had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment by the Tenants of their units; and found that the Landlords obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the Tenants".
Here the court considers a JR prematurity issue were the advanced adequate alternative remedy is an administrative LTB reconsideration, and it's interaction with the court's JR discretion [JRPA s.2(1,5)]:Should this Court Hear the Application for Judicial Review
[60] The Tenants submit that this court should decline to hear the application for judicial review because the Tenants failed to request a reconsideration of the Board’s orders. Under Rule 26.1 of the Board’s Rules of Procedure:Any party may request review of any order which makes a final determination of the party’s rights. For these purposes an interim order may contain a final determination of rights. A person who is directly affected by a final order may also request a review of an order. [61] Rule 26.8 (e) of the Board’s Rules stipulates that a request for review must provide sufficient information to support a preliminary finding of an alleged serious error or an explanation of why the requestor was not reasonably able to participate in the hearing.
[62] The Board’s guideline contemplates that “serious errors” justifying a review of a decision include “unreasonable finding[s] of fact on a material issue” and “unreasonable exercise[s] of discretion which [result] in an order outside the usual range of remedies or results and where there are no reasons explaining the result”.
[63] According to the Tenants, the Board’s discretion to review is broad, and in this case, reconsideration would have been an adequate alternative remedy that should have been exhausted before applying for judicial review.
[64] In Yatar, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that determining the appropriateness of judicial review is ultimately a “balancing exercise” that goes beyond simply assessing the adequacy of the alternative remedy. As put by the Court, at para. 64:This Court in Strickland, at para. 43, also emphasizes the appropriateness of judicial review in the circumstances, referring to a “balancing exercise”:The categories of relevant factors are not closed, as it is for courts to identify and balance the relevant factors in the context of a particular case. Assessing whether there is an adequate alternative remedy, therefore, is not a matter of following a checklist focused on the similarities and differences between the potentially available remedies. The inquiry is broader than that. The court should consider not only the available alternative, but also the suitability and appropriateness of judicial review in the circumstances. In short, the question is not simply whether some other remedy is adequate, but also whether judicial review is appropriate. Ultimately, this calls for a type of balance of convenience analysis…(citations omitted, emphasis in original). [65] The Tenants are not suggesting that this court should not hear the Landlords’ appeal because of a failure to apply for a review of the Board’s orders. Further, their factum correctly points out that the grounds with respect to both the appeal and the application for judicial review are closely connected and intertwined. Therefore, from a judicial economy perspective, hearing the applications for judicial review at the same time as the appeals will not entail a significant use of additional judicial resources.
[66] In United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Local 249) v. Matrix North Construction Ltd., 2019 ONSC 5647, the Divisional Court found that it may be appropriate to require reconsideration before judicial review when “there are conflicting decisions by the Board on a matter of policy, and the Court determines that the Board should be given an opportunity to clarify the issue”: at para. 41. No such issue is raised in this proceeding. Another instance that might justify requiring judicial review might be where there is an allegation of procedural fairness, and the Court determines that the Board should have an opportunity to provide a remedy for the problem. However, the Tenants have conceded that the procedural fairness issues raised in this case are errors of law and, therefore, this court will be addressing them in the context of the appeal.
[67] To use the language adopted in Yatar, supra, the balance of convenience favours hearing the issues raised in the applications for judicial review at the same time as the issues raised in the appeal.
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