Simon's Legal Resources

(Ontario/Canada)

HOME / About / Democracy, Law and Duty / Testimonials / Essays / Link Policy / Help! / Opinion Intake / Conditions of Use

TOPICS


JR - Government (and related) Employment Terminations

. Nahirny v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario

In Nahirny v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court considered the JR-justiciability of the termination of a union LCBO employee (it being apparently argued that it was a 'statutory power of decision'), here in an R2.1 frivolous and vexatious motion context:
[1] This court directed the Registrar to give notice to the Applicant pursuant to Rule 2.1 in August, and identified the following concerns with the application:
The Registrar is directed to issue a notice pursuant to r. 2.1 that the court is considering dismissing this application as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, based on the following concerns:

1. The impugned decision is a decision of the LCBO to terminate the employment of the applicant for creating false documents and using them in a process before the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

2. The Applicant’s employment was governed by a Collective Agreement between the Ontario Public Service Employees Union and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario.

The impugned decision of the LCBO (to terminate the applicant’s employment) does not appear to be an exercise of a statutory power of decision or to otherwise be subject to judicial review pursuant to ss. 2 and 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act. Further, jurisdiction over a dispute regarding termination of the Applicant’s employment would appear to lie to the Ontario Labour Relations Board or a labour arbitrator pursuant to the Collective Agreement.

Respondents shall not respond to submissions from the Applicant respecting this notice unless the court subsequently directs otherwise.
....

[7] It is plain and obvious that this court has no jurisdiction to judicially review the LCBO’s decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment. The termination decision is not an exercise of a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and is not a decision of a sufficiently public nature to found review jurisdiction in this court pursuant to s. 2(2) of the JRPA. ....

[8] The Applicant’s core argument seems to be that the LCBO was governed by privacy legislation in respect to the complaints made to the IPC, and thus that the steps taken by the LCBO in the IPC process, being governed by statute, are somehow “statutory powers of decision” or are of a sufficiently “public” nature as to be amenable to judicial review. That is simply not so. The LCBO’s compliance – or non-compliance – with privacy legislation are not statutory powers of decision, and the impugned decision – to terminate Mr Mahirny’s employment, does not become a statutory power of decision – or a decision of a sufficiently public nature to be amenable to judicial review – because they arise in the context of privacy regulation.



CC0

Unless authorship is otherwise stated or obvious from the context, all
written materials in this website were created by Simon Shields, who
waives all of his copyright and related or neighboring rights to this
Isthatlegal.ca webpage. Note in particular that this waiver only applies to
Simon's material, as copyright in statutory/regulatory materials and
case extracts were never his to give away.




Last modified: 02-10-26
By: admin