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JR - Municipal

. Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores

In Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court granted a motion to stay a JR on abuse of process grounds, this where it was brought to challenge "two municipal resolutions authorizing the demolition of the Dean Lake Bridge, a through-truss bridge adjacent to Highway 17 in Northeastern Ontario".

This case involves the too-frequent confusion between generic JR proceedings [under the JRPA] and Municipal Act s.273 ['Application to quash by-law'] applications - the latter being procedurally being brought under RCP 14.05, the former under RCP 38 and 68 - and appropriate remedies therefor:
[2] In this motion, the respondent, the Municipality of Huron Shores (“the Municipality”) seeks an Order striking or staying the application. The Municipality argues that the application is an abuse of process or, alternatively, that the applicants have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25 (“Municipal Act”) and instead have improperly sought to invoke judicial review.

[3] The applicants are residents of the Municipality and members of the Community Voices Committee Incorporated (“the Residents”). They oppose the Municipality’s motion. They argue that their application satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (“JRPA”) and that there is no legal requirement that their challenge to the Municipality’s resolutions proceed exclusively under the Municipal Act.

....

Issues to be Determined

[16] In oral argument, the Municipality conceded that the Residents are not prohibited from proceeding by way of judicial review. Both judicial review and a s. 273 application are legal avenues available to the Residents: Durham Citizens Lobby for Environmental Awareness & Responsibility Inc. v. Durham (Regional Municipality), 2011 ONSC 7143 at para. 15. The issue is whether a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy such that the Court ought to decline to exercise its discretion to conduct a judicial review.

[17] The issues to be determined in this motion are as follows:
a. Do the Residents have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act;

b. Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process; and,

c. Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application.
Do the Residents have a reasonable alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act

The Law

[18] Judicial review is a discretionary remedy that is not available to litigants as of right. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that a court may exercise that discretion not only to determine an application on its merits, but also to determine whether to undertake judicial review at all: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2022 ONCA 446, at para. 44.

[19] Judicial review may be refused where there is an adequate alternative remedy: Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 SCR 713, at paras. 40-45.

[20] In determining whether to proceed with an application for judicial review, a court should weigh all relevant circumstances. When presented with a potential alternative remedy, this requires the court to examine both the adequacy of the alternative remedy and the suitability and appropriateness of judicial review: Strickland, at para. 43.

[21] In Strickland at para. 42, the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive set of considerations to be balanced, including the following: the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the alternative forum, including its remedial capacity; the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; the convenience of the alternative remedy; the existence of adequate and effective recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; expeditiousness; economical use of judicial resources; and, cost.

[22] The balancing exercise should also weigh the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the legislative scheme in issue: Strickland, at para. 44.

Analysis

[23] Having regard to all the circumstances, I find that a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy to an application for judicial review in this matter.

[24] If granted, an application for judicial review would proceed in the Divisional Court before a panel of three judges. A s. 273 application would proceed before a single judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Judicial economy therefore favours a s. 273 application.

[25] Expeditiousness, convenience, and cost also tip in favour of a s. 273 application. Divisional Court sittings for the Northeast Region occur twice annually, in the Spring and Fall, in Sudbury. Superior Court sittings occur throughout the year and, in this case, would take place in Sault Ste. Marie. The Superior Court sittings would be closer to where the parties are located, thereby reducing the costs of participation. These considerations also favour a s. 273 application.

[26] Also relevant to the issue of costs is the fact that this motion has been brought at an early stage in these proceedings, before any significant time or costs have been incurred by the parties. This mitigates prejudice should the application be struck or stayed in favour of an alternative remedy.

[27] The Residents argue that judicial review has a broader scope of review than a s. 273 application. They submit that it would involve not only a review of the legality of the Resolutions, but also the procedural fairness of the decision-making process that culminated in the Resolutions. As the application also raises issues of reasonable apprehension of bias and bad faith, they submit that the door could arguably be opened to a reasonableness review of the Municipality’s exercise of its decision-making authority.

[28] The case law does not support the Residents’ argument that their application offers a substantially broader scope of review. Requiring the Residents to proceed with a s. 273 application would not significantly narrow the scope of the issues that could be raised. As noted by Ellies J. in Fortin v. Sudbury (City), 2020 ONSC 5300, at para. 56:
As I will explain, courts have quashed by-laws as being illegal under s. 273 for a number of different reasons. In addition to quashing by-laws that are enacted beyond the scope of a municipality’s statutory authority, courts have quashed by-laws where a municipality has failed to follow statutorily-mandated or common law procedural requirements, where Council has demonstrated bias, and where Council has demonstrated bad faith. The applicant attacks the KED by-laws on all three of these legal grounds.
[29] See also: London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., 2007 SCC 29, [2007] 2 SCR 588; Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), 1990 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1170; Grosvenor v. East Luther Grand Valley (Township), 2007 ONCA 55; Re McGill and City of Brantford, 1980 CanLII 1741 (ON HCJ).

[30] Proceeding in the manner proposed by the Residents would also not open the door to otherwise unavailable standards of review. As noted in Fortin at para. 67, in addressing the standard of review in a s. 273 application:
Thus, there are differing standards of review depending on whether the question is one of vires or not: Wpd Sumac Ridge Wind Inc. v. Kawartha Lakes (City)¸2015 ONSC 4164 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 20-21. I believe that what can be safely gleaned from the decision in RSJ Holdings is that the degree of deference to be shown to municipal acts will depend on the extent to which the illegality in question involves a question of law and the extent to which it affects the democratic legitimacy of its decision.
[31] What those standards of review would be in this case is an issue to be determined when the proceeding is ultimately adjudicated on its merits.

[32] In my view, the remedies available on an application for judicial review are also not substantially different from those available in a s. 273 application. Pursuant to s. 2(1) of the JRPA, an applicant for judicial review may request relief in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Pursuant to s. 273 of the Municipal Act, the Court is limited to quashing the by-laws at issue, however, it is also available to an applicant pursuant to Rule 14.05(3)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to request ancillary relief including mandatory orders, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In my view, injunctive relief is a reasonable substitute for an order of prohibition, the only order not available in a s. 273 application.

[33] In my view, the scope of review, standard of review, and range of available remedies are all neutral factors which do not weigh in favour of either judicial review or a s. 273 application.

[34] Another consideration which tips the scale in favour of a s. 273 application is the nature of the evidentiary record available for use in the application. With narrow exceptions, a court on judicial review is limited to the record that was before the decision-maker: Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727, at para 12; Barney v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2021 NSSC 264, at para. 34. No such constraints are applicable to a s. 273 application. While the Residents argue that it is premature to speculate whether additional evidence may be required, I agree with the Municipality that, given the issues raised in the application, including bad faith and bias, it is possible and indeed likely that evidence beyond the record before the Municipality will be required to fully adjudicate this matter. This weighs in favour of a s. 273 application.

[35] Finally, the Municipality argues, and I agree, that a s. 273 application is the legislature’s chosen forum and process to challenge municipal by-laws, resolutions, and orders and that it should not be departed from lightly, particularly when the substance of the application engages the very issues contemplated by s. 273. While judicial review is available, it should not be preferred to the legislature’s chosen forum absent circumstances weighing in its favour: Yatar at para. 45; Minnow Lake Restoration Group Inc. v. Sudbury (City), 2022 ONSC 4084, at para. 52. As I have found, no such circumstances exist in the present case – instead the circumstances either weigh in favour of a s. 273 application or are neutral as between the two processes.

Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process

[36] The Municipality argues that the Residents’ application is an abuse of process because it constitutes an attempt by the Residents to circumvent the legislature’s statutory framework for challenging municipal decisions, and because it relies upon legislation which is inapplicable to the case before the Court, namely the Bridges Act. The Municipality also raises issues of delay.

[37] As it pertains to the choice of forum, I would reiterate that both judicial review and a s. 273 application were legal avenues available to the Residents. While I have found that the Court ought not to exercise its discretion to grant judicial review, it is my view that it was not an abuse of process for the Residents to ask the Court to consider the merits of such a process.

....

Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application

[39] The Court’s authority to strike an application arises pursuant to Rules 25.11 and 38.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party is required to demonstrate that the pleading: may prejudice the fair trial of the action; is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious; or is an abuse of the process of the court.

[40] In this case, I have found that the Residents’ application was not an abuse of the process of the court. There is also no evidence before me that the application may prejudice a fair hearing of the proceeding, or that it is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. I therefore decline to strike the Residents’ application.

[41] In my view, a stay of this proceeding is the more appropriate remedy. A stay is a discretionary order available pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). Pursuant to s. 107 of the CJA, a stay may be ordered when there are two or more proceedings in two or more different courts, and they have a question of law or fact in common or claim relief arising from the same occurrence. While a parallel proceeding has not yet been commenced, in this case where one has been directed, I find that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion and order a stay.

[42] I therefore order a stay of this proceeding until after the determination of a s. 273 application, if any.
. Sherwin v. Blunt

In Sherwin v. Blunt (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed a complainant's JR, this brought when "the Integrity Commissioner informed Mr. Sherwin that she was declining his request for an investigation of the complaints on the basis that she lacked jurisdiction".

Here the court notes that the "Integrity Commissioner’s decision is bereft of any explanation for how she arrived at the conclusion that she lacked jurisdiction", and considers both 'adequacy of reasons' and adequate alternative remedy (AAR) arguments in this context:
[32] .... The issues raised by this judicial review focus on the decision that the Respondent lacked jurisdiction and the adequacy of those reasons.

....

[38] On its face and on a plain reading, the Integrity Commissioner’s decision is bereft of any explanation for how she arrived at the conclusion that she lacked jurisdiction. It might be argued that perhaps she meant that she lacked jurisdiction because there were alternate procedures available; however, that is not clear from her decision and does not assist for reasons that follow.

[39] The Integrity Commissioner directed the Applicant to communicate with Township legal counsel on four of the five complaints. That is not an alternate procedure under other legislation or Municipal policy. There is no legislation that directs a complainant in respect of an integrity complaint to deal directly with legal counsel for the alleged violator, nor is there any reference in her decision to any municipal policy that so directs. Certainly, the Respondent made no mention of such legislation or Municipal policy in her decision, and counsel could not identify same.

[40] The Respondent’s direction to the Applicant to raise the issues in his complaint with the Township’s legal counsel is not an ‘alternate procedure’ contemplated by the Code of Conduct policy. Respondent’s counsel on this judicial review was unable to explain how “go see the lawyer” is an alternate procedure under legislation or the Township’s policy.

[41] With respect to the direction that the zoning complaint (complaint #4) can and should be addressed through the OLT appeal, that direction misapprehends the scope of the OLT proceeding which cannot and does not address the ethical issues raised by the Applicant concerning the conduct of the mayor and councillors. The OLT hearing looks at the proposed rezoning request on its merits. It is a hearing de novo. Evidence that councillors acted in bad faith or discriminated against the Applicant based on his place of origin is irrelevant. That is “water under the bridge”. The OLT does not adjudicate on propriety of the conduct of municipal councillors; rather, it looks at the merit of the requested rezoning afresh with no regard for whether councillors adhered to their Code of Conduct.

[42] Thus, the OLT appeal will address whether the rezoning should be granted but does not address whether the complaints made by the Applicant that the mayor and councillors breached the Code of Conduct are meritorious. The OLT is not, in this sense, an alternate process to address the issues raised by the complaint. Put another way, the OLT appeal will deal with the result of the impugned conduct, – denial of the rezoning application, but will not address the allegations of misconduct by the mayor and councillors that preceded and informed that result.

[43] In these circumstances, the Integrity Commissioner’s directions to pursue discussions with the Township’s lawyer and that the OLT proceeding will address the complaint made are unreasonable and do not justify her decision to decline jurisdiction.

[44] Further, the failure to provide any reasons that explain how she arrived at the conclusion that she lacked jurisdiction is unreasonable.
. West Carleton Community Alliance v. City of Ottawa

In West Carleton Community Alliance v. City of Ottawa (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against an Ottawa zoning by-law.

Here the court considers the conflicts that arise where the applicant seeks by JR to quash a municipal bylaw (under the JRPA in the Divisional Court), but also to quash the bylaw under MA s.273 ['Application to quash by-law'] - which should be brought in the Superior Court:
[39] The jurisdictional issue arises because the applicant has brought an application for judicial review but has also asked, in the alternative, for relief under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001. The Divisional Court has jurisdiction to quash the Zoning By-law, as set out in s. 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c J.1. However, if the applicant wanted to proceed under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, it had to bring its application in the Superior Court, not the Divisional Court. It cannot be addressed, as suggested, in the alternative.

[40] This Court may exercise its discretion not to hear the judicial review because the applicant could have proceeded under s. 273: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 181, at paras. 51 and 54. Several factors inform the question of whether that alternative process is adequate in this case: Yatar, at para. 64, citing Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 43. We have not been asked to dismiss this application in favour of that alternative process and, having considered the factors relevant to the exercise of our discretion, we would not do so. In the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to proceed with the judicial review application, which can fully and efficiently address the issues raised.
. 2417563 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton

In 2417563 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this seeking "to quash the by-law and set aside the sale to 258" - these both relating to the sale of a narrow strip of land by the municipality.

Here the court considers the sometimes procedural confusion between JRs (in the Divisional Court) and Municipal Act s.273 applications (in the Superior Court) to quash a by-law for illegality:
Clarifying the nature of the application

[18] As noted at the outset of these reasons, the applicants seek to quash the by-law. The notice of application in this matter is styled as a “notice of application for judicial review”, but that notice refers to and relies on, inter alia, both the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (the “JRPA”) and s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 250 (the “Municipal Act”). Under s. 6 of the former, “an application for judicial review shall be made to the Divisional Court.” Under ss. 272 and 273 of the latter, a “by-law passed in good faith … shall not be quashed or open to review by any court because of the unreasonableness” of the by-law (s. 272), but, on an application, “the Superior Court of Justice may quash a by-law … for illegality” (s. 273).

[19] In other words, a panel of judges of this court has jurisdiction to hear an application for judicial review of a by-law, while the jurisdiction to review and quash for illegality is reserved to a single judge of the Superior Court, yet both heads of relief are sought by the applicants in this court.

[20] Recognizing this problem with the application, the City sought an order bifurcating the proceeding in a case management conference held before Trimble J. In an endorsement dated May 19, 2025, Trimble J. denied the request to bifurcate, writing as follows:
First, notwithstanding that the Application to Quash the By-law and the Application for Judicial Review of the City’s decision are separate proceedings decided in separate fora, it is not mandatory that each must be pursued separately. In Minnow Lake Restoration Group Inc. v. Sudbury (City), 2022 ONSC 4084, at paragraphs 51-54, the Divisional Court left the decision as to the two forms of relief being claimed in the same proceeding to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and not something limited to “exceptional circumstances”.

Second, litigation is not to be conducted in instalments (see: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2022 ONCA 446, at para. 55 citing Shearer v. Oz, 2021 ONSC 7844, at para. 5). Judicial economy demands that the Application proceed to a full panel, notwithstanding that the separate parts would normally be heard in different fora.
[21] Accordingly, before us, the applicants have pursued their claims under s. 273 and have submitted that “there is no bar to … seeking both judicial review and an order quashing the by-law in question in the same proceeding. It is open to the court to consider both requests in a single proceeding.”

[22] The parties agree that we are not bound by the conclusions of Trimble J. To the extent that the quoted excerpt of his endorsement suggests that this court may consider an application made under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, I disagree.

[23] Strictly speaking, there is but a single application before us, although it refers to differing heads of relief based on differing statutory foundations. As a statutory court, the Divisional Court must find its jurisdiction in a statute. In this case, our jurisdiction is limited to that conferred on the court by the JRPA, which is further limited by s. 272 of the Municipal Act. This court has no jurisdiction to grant relief under s. 273 of the Municipal Act.

[24] It is true that in Minnow Lake, writing for this court, Lederer J. dealt with a similar situation (see paras. 30 – 31), but he did not conclude that this court could hear and consider an application brought under s. 273 of the Municipal Act at the same time as an application for judicial review. Instead, he concluded that it could hear and determine the application for judicial review brought in that case notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy (i.e., an application to the Superior Court under s. 273): see paras. 51 – 53. In part, the court came to that conclusion because the sole argument in favour of the judicial review of the by-law (alleged procedural unfairness), was the same argument that was the foundation for the claim that the impugned by-law was illegal: see para. 54.

[25] I note also that while the Court of Appeal in Yatar (reversed on other grounds: 2024 SCC 8) does make the point that litigation should not be conducted in instalments, in that case both the appeal and the judicial review in question were properly brought in the same court, not in different courts as is the case here.[1]

[26] I therefore proceed to consider only the application for judicial review.


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