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JR - Motion to Strike [R38.12]. Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores
In Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court granted a motion to stay a JR on abuse of process grounds, this where it was brought to challenge "two municipal resolutions authorizing the demolition of the Dean Lake Bridge, a through-truss bridge adjacent to Highway 17 in Northeastern Ontario".
This case involves the too-frequent confusion between generic JR proceedings [under the JRPA] and Municipal Act s.273 ['Application to quash by-law'] applications - the latter being procedurally being brought under RCP 14.05, the former under RCP 38 and 68 - and appropriate remedies therefor:[2] In this motion, the respondent, the Municipality of Huron Shores (“the Municipality”) seeks an Order striking or staying the application. The Municipality argues that the application is an abuse of process or, alternatively, that the applicants have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25 (“Municipal Act”) and instead have improperly sought to invoke judicial review.
[3] The applicants are residents of the Municipality and members of the Community Voices Committee Incorporated (“the Residents”). They oppose the Municipality’s motion. They argue that their application satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (“JRPA”) and that there is no legal requirement that their challenge to the Municipality’s resolutions proceed exclusively under the Municipal Act.
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Issues to be Determined
[16] In oral argument, the Municipality conceded that the Residents are not prohibited from proceeding by way of judicial review. Both judicial review and a s. 273 application are legal avenues available to the Residents: Durham Citizens Lobby for Environmental Awareness & Responsibility Inc. v. Durham (Regional Municipality), 2011 ONSC 7143 at para. 15. The issue is whether a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy such that the Court ought to decline to exercise its discretion to conduct a judicial review.
[17] The issues to be determined in this motion are as follows:a. Do the Residents have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act;
b. Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process; and,
c. Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application. Do the Residents have a reasonable alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act
The Law
[18] Judicial review is a discretionary remedy that is not available to litigants as of right. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that a court may exercise that discretion not only to determine an application on its merits, but also to determine whether to undertake judicial review at all: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2022 ONCA 446, at para. 44.
[19] Judicial review may be refused where there is an adequate alternative remedy: Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 SCR 713, at paras. 40-45.
[20] In determining whether to proceed with an application for judicial review, a court should weigh all relevant circumstances. When presented with a potential alternative remedy, this requires the court to examine both the adequacy of the alternative remedy and the suitability and appropriateness of judicial review: Strickland, at para. 43.
[21] In Strickland at para. 42, the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive set of considerations to be balanced, including the following: the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the alternative forum, including its remedial capacity; the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; the convenience of the alternative remedy; the existence of adequate and effective recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; expeditiousness; economical use of judicial resources; and, cost.
[22] The balancing exercise should also weigh the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the legislative scheme in issue: Strickland, at para. 44.
Analysis
[23] Having regard to all the circumstances, I find that a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy to an application for judicial review in this matter.
[24] If granted, an application for judicial review would proceed in the Divisional Court before a panel of three judges. A s. 273 application would proceed before a single judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Judicial economy therefore favours a s. 273 application.
[25] Expeditiousness, convenience, and cost also tip in favour of a s. 273 application. Divisional Court sittings for the Northeast Region occur twice annually, in the Spring and Fall, in Sudbury. Superior Court sittings occur throughout the year and, in this case, would take place in Sault Ste. Marie. The Superior Court sittings would be closer to where the parties are located, thereby reducing the costs of participation. These considerations also favour a s. 273 application.
[26] Also relevant to the issue of costs is the fact that this motion has been brought at an early stage in these proceedings, before any significant time or costs have been incurred by the parties. This mitigates prejudice should the application be struck or stayed in favour of an alternative remedy.
[27] The Residents argue that judicial review has a broader scope of review than a s. 273 application. They submit that it would involve not only a review of the legality of the Resolutions, but also the procedural fairness of the decision-making process that culminated in the Resolutions. As the application also raises issues of reasonable apprehension of bias and bad faith, they submit that the door could arguably be opened to a reasonableness review of the Municipality’s exercise of its decision-making authority.
[28] The case law does not support the Residents’ argument that their application offers a substantially broader scope of review. Requiring the Residents to proceed with a s. 273 application would not significantly narrow the scope of the issues that could be raised. As noted by Ellies J. in Fortin v. Sudbury (City), 2020 ONSC 5300, at para. 56:As I will explain, courts have quashed by-laws as being illegal under s. 273 for a number of different reasons. In addition to quashing by-laws that are enacted beyond the scope of a municipality’s statutory authority, courts have quashed by-laws where a municipality has failed to follow statutorily-mandated or common law procedural requirements, where Council has demonstrated bias, and where Council has demonstrated bad faith. The applicant attacks the KED by-laws on all three of these legal grounds. [29] See also: London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., 2007 SCC 29, [2007] 2 SCR 588; Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), 1990 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1170; Grosvenor v. East Luther Grand Valley (Township), 2007 ONCA 55; Re McGill and City of Brantford, 1980 CanLII 1741 (ON HCJ).
[30] Proceeding in the manner proposed by the Residents would also not open the door to otherwise unavailable standards of review. As noted in Fortin at para. 67, in addressing the standard of review in a s. 273 application:Thus, there are differing standards of review depending on whether the question is one of vires or not: Wpd Sumac Ridge Wind Inc. v. Kawartha Lakes (City)¸2015 ONSC 4164 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 20-21. I believe that what can be safely gleaned from the decision in RSJ Holdings is that the degree of deference to be shown to municipal acts will depend on the extent to which the illegality in question involves a question of law and the extent to which it affects the democratic legitimacy of its decision. [31] What those standards of review would be in this case is an issue to be determined when the proceeding is ultimately adjudicated on its merits.
[32] In my view, the remedies available on an application for judicial review are also not substantially different from those available in a s. 273 application. Pursuant to s. 2(1) of the JRPA, an applicant for judicial review may request relief in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Pursuant to s. 273 of the Municipal Act, the Court is limited to quashing the by-laws at issue, however, it is also available to an applicant pursuant to Rule 14.05(3)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to request ancillary relief including mandatory orders, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In my view, injunctive relief is a reasonable substitute for an order of prohibition, the only order not available in a s. 273 application.
[33] In my view, the scope of review, standard of review, and range of available remedies are all neutral factors which do not weigh in favour of either judicial review or a s. 273 application.
[34] Another consideration which tips the scale in favour of a s. 273 application is the nature of the evidentiary record available for use in the application. With narrow exceptions, a court on judicial review is limited to the record that was before the decision-maker: Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727, at para 12; Barney v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2021 NSSC 264, at para. 34. No such constraints are applicable to a s. 273 application. While the Residents argue that it is premature to speculate whether additional evidence may be required, I agree with the Municipality that, given the issues raised in the application, including bad faith and bias, it is possible and indeed likely that evidence beyond the record before the Municipality will be required to fully adjudicate this matter. This weighs in favour of a s. 273 application.
[35] Finally, the Municipality argues, and I agree, that a s. 273 application is the legislature’s chosen forum and process to challenge municipal by-laws, resolutions, and orders and that it should not be departed from lightly, particularly when the substance of the application engages the very issues contemplated by s. 273. While judicial review is available, it should not be preferred to the legislature’s chosen forum absent circumstances weighing in its favour: Yatar at para. 45; Minnow Lake Restoration Group Inc. v. Sudbury (City), 2022 ONSC 4084, at para. 52. As I have found, no such circumstances exist in the present case – instead the circumstances either weigh in favour of a s. 273 application or are neutral as between the two processes.
Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process
[36] The Municipality argues that the Residents’ application is an abuse of process because it constitutes an attempt by the Residents to circumvent the legislature’s statutory framework for challenging municipal decisions, and because it relies upon legislation which is inapplicable to the case before the Court, namely the Bridges Act. The Municipality also raises issues of delay.
[37] As it pertains to the choice of forum, I would reiterate that both judicial review and a s. 273 application were legal avenues available to the Residents. While I have found that the Court ought not to exercise its discretion to grant judicial review, it is my view that it was not an abuse of process for the Residents to ask the Court to consider the merits of such a process.
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Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application
[39] The Court’s authority to strike an application arises pursuant to Rules 25.11 and 38.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party is required to demonstrate that the pleading: may prejudice the fair trial of the action; is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious; or is an abuse of the process of the court.
[40] In this case, I have found that the Residents’ application was not an abuse of the process of the court. There is also no evidence before me that the application may prejudice a fair hearing of the proceeding, or that it is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. I therefore decline to strike the Residents’ application.
[41] In my view, a stay of this proceeding is the more appropriate remedy. A stay is a discretionary order available pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). Pursuant to s. 107 of the CJA, a stay may be ordered when there are two or more proceedings in two or more different courts, and they have a question of law or fact in common or claim relief arising from the same occurrence. While a parallel proceeding has not yet been commenced, in this case where one has been directed, I find that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion and order a stay.
[42] I therefore order a stay of this proceeding until after the determination of a s. 273 application, if any.
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