Private International Law - Jurisdiction Simpliciter
. Vale Canada Limited v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada
In Vale Canada Limited v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal in an international insurance case where an insured sued 22(!) insurers, and where the dispute was whether Ontario or New York had jurisdiction. In this quote the court endorses applying 'the conduct of business within the jurisdiction' as a presumptive connecting factors to establish jurisdiction simpliciter in a contract case:
 The Supreme Court noted in Chevron, at para. 91, the specific connecting factors set out in Van Breda were designed for tort cases and should not be taken as an inventory covering all claims known to law: “[A]ppropriate connecting factors can reasonably be expected to vary depending on the cause of action at issue”. We do not interpret that statement to mean, however, that the factors identified in Van Breda cannot be used in other causes of action, just that the mention of a factor in Van Breda does not automatically entail that conclusion. Rather, consideration must be given to whether the factor is appropriately applied to another cause of action at all, or in a modified form.. Vale Canada Limited v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada
 We conclude that carrying on business in Ontario is an appropriate presumptive connecting factor for claims that arise under contracts. The principled basis on which Van Breda identified carrying on business in the jurisdiction for use in tort cases also extends to contract cases. But, as we discuss below (see paras. 91-114), the approach to what constitutes carrying on business in Ontario in an insurance contract case might vary from the way that issue might be approached in a tort case.
 The presumptive connecting factors identified in Van Breda have a common rationale. They are “factors or factual situations that link the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant to the forum”: at para. 79. They are “illustrative of the factual situations in which it will typically be open to a court to assume jurisdiction over a matter … [and] therefore warrant presumptive effect” because, once such a factual situation is established, a court may properly assume jurisdiction on the basis that the real and substantial connection test is met, absent a defendant demonstrating that doing so would be inappropriate: at para. 80. The factors are in part derived from r. 17.02, as discussed above.
 The same rationale warrants treating carrying on business in the jurisdiction as a presumptive connecting factor in a contract case. Carrying on business in Ontario might link the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant to Ontario as a forum, even if the contract is not made in Ontario, depending on the relationship between the business activities, the contract, and what the contract and the claim are about. The connection will be especially strong where the business activities give rise to or are reflected in a contract that in whole or in part relates to property, interests, or activities in Ontario, that contemplates some aspect of contractual performance in Ontario, or that is aimed at protecting a person from harm that might otherwise be suffered in Ontario.
In Vale Canada Limited v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal in an international insurance case where an insured sued 22(!) insurers, and where the dispute was whether Ontario or New York had jurisdiction. In this quote the court extensively reviews the private international law of jurisdiction simpliciter:
(1) The Governing Principles of Jurisdiction SimpliciterAt para 50-67 the court reviews the additional presumptive connecting factor of "the private international law of other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and comity".
 The Supreme Court of Canada explained and described the “real and substantial connection” test, which is the basis on which a Canadian court determines whether to assume jurisdiction over a claim involving foreign parties, in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17,  1 S.C.R. 572.
 Before the court were two separate tort claims brought in Ontario by two Canadian residents who suffered injuries while vacationing in Cuba. One of the defendants was Club Resorts Ltd., a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands that managed the two hotels where the accidents occurred.
 In the Van Breda claim, Ms. Van Breda and her spouse, Mr. Berg, stayed at a resort managed by Club Resorts in Cuba. The stay was based on a contractual arrangement whereby Mr. Berg would provide two hours of tennis lessons per day in exchange for a free stay for two people. On the first day of their stay, Ms. Van Breda suffered catastrophic injuries when a metal structure on the beach collapsed on her.
 In the Charron claim, Dr. Charron and his spouse purchased an all-inclusive vacation package through a local travel agent that included scuba diving. The package was offered by a hotel managed by Club Resorts. On the fourth day of their stay, Dr. Charron drowned while scuba diving.
 To determine whether the Ontario courts were correct to assume jurisdiction over the actions and the foreign defendants in each of the two actions, the court established a new analytical framework for applying the real and substantial connection test that had been developed in case law over a number of years. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that the Ontario court had jurisdiction simpliciter over the two actions.
 Courts applying the real and substantial connection test are tasked with identifying a link between the forum and the subject matter of the litigation or between the forum and the defendant or both. It is that link that gives the court of the forum jurisdiction over the litigation. Because the court is assuming jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for an event that might not have happened in the forum, the fact that the plaintiff is present in the jurisdiction or suffered damage in the jurisdiction are not in themselves sufficient connecting factors to establish a presumptive real and substantial connection.
 The test is informed by the principles of order, fairness and comity among nations. However, those principles are not to be applied on an ad hoc basis to the facts of a particular case. The purpose of the new analytical framework was to provide stability and predictability by setting out an objective list of presumptive connecting factors to apply in each case. If one of those factors is present, then, unless it is rebutted by the defendant, the court will assume jurisdiction, subject to the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
 The Supreme Court also held that where there are multiple claims in tort or contract and tort, once there is a real and substantial connection for one of the claims, the court must assume jurisdiction over “all aspects of the case”: Van Breda, at para. 99.
 The Supreme Court set out four presumptive connecting factors that apply to tort claims and, prima facie, entitle a court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute:
1) The defendant is domiciled or resident in the province; The Supreme Court also explained that the list is not closed and provided guidance for identifying new presumptive factors for tort and other claims to be based on “connections that give rise to a relationship with the forum that is similar in nature to the ones which result from the listed factors”: Van Breda, at para. 91. Relevant considerations the court identified are:
2) The defendant carries on business in the province;
3) The tort was committed in the province; and
4) A contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.
1) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized presumptive connecting factors; Finally, the court explained that this basis for the assumption of jurisdiction is justified because it is consistent with the principles of order, fairness and comity, at para. 92:
2) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;
3) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and
4) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private international law of other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and comity.
All presumptive connecting factors generally point to a relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum such that it would be reasonable to expect that the defendant would be called to answer legal proceedings in that forum. Where such a relationship exists, one would generally expect Canadian courts to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment on the basis of the presumptive connecting factor in question, and foreign courts could be expected to do the same with respect to Canadian judgments. The assumption of jurisdiction would thus appear to be consistent with the principles of comity, order and fairness. Because these actions are not tort claims, but actions for the enforcement of insurance contracts, we must consider what presumptive connecting factors should be used to determine whether there is a real and substantial connection between these insurance contract actions and Ontario.
 The first consideration is whether the four connecting factors that apply to tort claims might also apply to the breach of contract claims before the court. The main factor considered by the motion judge was the second presumptive connecting factor set out in Van Breda, whether the insurers were carrying on business in Ontario. We will address that factor in detail below.
 The second consideration is whether there is case law that identifies relevant presumptive connecting factors for breach of contract claims involving non-Ontario defendants. Two appellate authorities have applied the Van Breda factors established for tort cases to breach of contract claims: Neophytou v. Fraser, 2015 ONCA 45, 63 C.P.C. (7th) 13; and Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd. v. IFS Vehicle Distributors ULC, 2016 ONCA 977, 135 O.R. (3d) 551. In Neophytou, the court assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the fourth Van Breda presumptive connecting factor – that a contract connected with the dispute was made in Ontario – over a matter involving a defendant who resided in the United States. And in Stuart Budd, the court assumed jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that the defendant, incorporated in British Columbia, carried on business in Ontario.
 The third consideration is whether there is statute law that addresses or identifies a relevant connecting factor. Rules 17.02(f) and 17.02(p) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (the “Rules”) – a regulation made under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 – authorizes when service of an originating process can be made without a court order on a party outside Ontario in a contract claim. While the Rules are procedural, the Supreme Court in Van Breda looked with favour on their persuasive import for determining presumptive connecting factors because “they represent an expression of wisdom and experience drawn from the life of the law”: at para. 83.
 Rule 17.02(f) deals with contract claims and allows service outside Ontario in four circumstances: a contract made in Ontario, a contract providing that it is governed by or interpreted in accordance with the law of Ontario, a contract providing that the courts of Ontario are to have jurisdiction over legal proceedings in respect of the contract (a forum selection clause), and where “a breach of the contract has been committed in Ontario, even though the breach was preceded or accompanied by a breach outside Ontario that rendered impossible the performance of the part of the contract that ought to have been performed in Ontario.”
. GIAO Consultants Ltd. v. 7779534 Canada Inc.
In GIAO Consultants Ltd. v. 7779534 Canada Inc. (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal considered basics of the jurisdiction simpliciter determination:
 The appellants concede that the motion judge was correct to consider the presumptive connecting factors from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, at para. 91, to determine whether an Ontario court is entitled to assume jurisdiction – (1) the defendant is domiciled or resident in Ontario; (2) the defendant carries on business in Ontario; (3) the commission of a tort in Ontario; or (4) a contract connected with the dispute was made in Ontario.. Haaretz.com v. Goldhar
In Haaretz.com v. Goldhar (SCC, 2018) the Supreme Court of Canada split into several rulings, with three judges dissenting in the result. These extracts are from the largest (3 judge) faction in the majority, and they deal the venue issue in an internet defamation case - with the focus being on libel 'tourism' [plaintiffs 'shopping' a case for favourable law and logistics].
This extract deals with the element of 'real and substantial connection' which is primary to the jurisdiction simpliciter consideration, this determines whether the Canadian court has jurisdiction to hear the case (not whether it should accept it, that's for the forum non conveniens inquiry):
C. Did the Motion Judge Err in Assuming Jurisdiction?. Airia Brands Inc. v Air Canada
 In determining whether a “real and substantial connection” exists between a chosen forum and the subject matter of the litigation, courts are required to consider two issues. First, a court must consider whether the existence of a recognized presumptive connecting factor has been established (Van Breda, at para. 80). If so, the court must consider whether the party challenging the assumption of jurisdiction has successfully rebutted the presumption (Van Breda, at para. 81).
(1) Existence of a Presumptive Connecting Factor
 The judges in the courts below agreed that a presumptive connecting factor had been established. Haaretz, however, submits that the situs of the tort is an unreliable basis on which to presume a “real and substantial connection” in Internet defamation cases. In its view, the ease with which publication can be established in such cases gives rise to only a “weak relationship” with the chosen forum.
 As previously discussed, in Van Breda, the Court stressed the importance of determining jurisdiction “on the basis of objective factors” establishing a relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the chosen forum (para. 82). The Court identified the following presumptive connecting factors grounding a court’s assumption of jurisdiction:
(a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;The tort of defamation, which is a tort of strict liability, is committed where material has been “communicated” to, that is, conveyed to and received by, at least one person other than the plaintiff (Crookes v. Newton, 2011 SCC 47,  3 S.C.R. 269, at paras. 1 and 16). This was recognized by this Court in Banro: “. . . a single instance of publication is sufficient for the tort to crystallize” (para. 55). In the case of Internet communications, the publication of defamatory statements occurs when they are read or downloaded by the recipient (Black, at para. 20; see also P. A. Downard, The Law of Libel in Canada (4th ed. 2018); Brown on Defamation: Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, United States (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), by R. E. Brown, at pp. 7‑17 to 7-25). Accordingly, the situs of Internet-based defamation is the place where the defamatory statements are read, accessed or downloaded by the third party (Crookes v. Holloway, 2007 BCSC 1325, 75 B.C.L.R. (4th) 316, at para. 26, aff’d 2008 BCCA 165, 77 B.C.L.R. (4th) 201; Brown, at pp. 7-122 to 7-126; M. Castel, “Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues in Multistate Defamation on the Internet” (2013), 51 Alta. L. Rev. 153, at p. 156).
(b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
(c) the tort was committed in the province; and
(d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province. [Emphasis added; para. 90.]
 Insofar as it attempts to raise doubt as to the validity of the presumptive connecting factors identified in Van Breda, Haaretz’s argument must be rejected. This Court has found that “[t]he situs of the tort is clearly an appropriate connecting factor” and that there is no difficulty “in acknowledging the validity of this factor once the situs has been identified” (Van Breda, at para. 88 (emphasis added)). Raising doubt as to the value of the situs of the tort as a presumptive connecting factor would significantly undermine the above-noted objectives of predictability and order at the jurisdiction simpliciter stage. Indeed, courts should be cautious in carving out exceptions to conflicts rules, as “[a]ny exception adds an element of uncertainty” (Tolofson v. Jensen, 1994 CanLII 44 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 1022, at p. 1061). It is therefore preferable to address any concerns relating to the insufficiency of a presumptive connecting factor either at the rebuttal stage of the jurisdiction simpliciter analysis or at the forum non conveniens stage.
 For these reasons, I conclude that a presumptive connecting factor has been established in the circumstances of this case, and I turn to the issue of whether the presumption has been rebutted.
(2) Rebutting the Presumption
 At this stage, it is appropriate to take into account the legitimate concerns raised by Haaretz about the ease with which a presumptive connecting factor may be established in Internet defamation cases. This Court has previously recognized the risk of jurisdictional overreach in these types of cases:
The tort of defamation presents an interesting challenge for the principles underlying the assumption of jurisdiction. At common law, the tort of defamation crystallizes upon publication of the libellous material . . . . This also raises difficult issues when publication occurs through the Internet . . . .(Banro, at para. 3)
Pepall J.A., dissenting at the Court of Appeal, expressed her reluctance to accept the motion judge’s assumption of jurisdiction in light of similar concerns:
To succeed in an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that the defamatory words were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff: see Crookes v. Newton,  3 S.C.R. 269,  S.C.J. No. 47, 2011 SCC 47, at para. 1. As well, at the jurisdiction stage of the proceedings, the plaintiff’s pleadings are accepted as true unless contradicted by evidence adduced by the defendants: see Banro, at para. 38. Accordingly, all that is needed for the presumptive connecting factor to be found is for the plaintiff to plead that the alleged defamatory material was communicated to at least one person in Ontario other than the plaintiff. While this is easy to establish in any defamation case, it is virtually automatic in a case of defamation on the Internet, where online publications are readily shared and accessed by users across the world. [Emphasis added; para. 127.] The ability to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction where there is only a weak relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum serves as an important check on jurisdiction (Van Breda, at para. 95). A careful examination of this question is therefore of particular importance in Internet defamation cases, where a presumptive connecting factor can easily be established.
 Having recognized the importance of the ability to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction, I turn to consider Haaretz’s submission that, based on the analyses of the motion judge and the majority below, rebutting the presumption of jurisdiction does not seem possible at all in these types of cases.
 This Court has recognized that presumptive connecting factors must not give rise to an irrebuttable presumption of jurisdiction. A defendant may argue that a given connection is inappropriate in the circumstances of a particular case:
The presumption of jurisdiction that arises where a recognized connecting factor — whether listed or new — applies is not irrebuttable. The burden of rebutting the presumption of jurisdiction rests, of course, on the party challenging the assumption of jurisdiction. That party must establish facts which demonstrate that the presumptive connecting factor does not point to any real relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum or points only to a weak relationship between them.(Van Breda, at para. 95; see also para. 81)
 In order for a defendant to succeed in showing that “a given connection is inappropriate in the circumstances of the case”, the circumstances must demonstrate that the relationship between the forum and the subject matter of the litigation is such that it would “not be reasonable to expect that the defendant would be called to answer proceedings in that jurisdiction” (Van Breda, at paras. 81 and 97; see also para. 92). To satisfy this test, the party challenging the court’s jurisdiction should rely on factors other than those considered at the forum non conveniens stage: “. . . the factors that would justify a stay in the forum non conveniens analysis should not be worked into the jurisdiction simpliciter analysis . . .” (Van Breda, at para. 56).
 Assuming that these principles are properly applied, the situs of the tort will not give rise to an irrebuttable presumption of jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. While it is not appropriate to propose an exhaustive list of factors that can rebut the presumption of jurisdiction in these types of cases, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would not be reasonable to expect that the defendant would be called to answer a legal proceeding in a chosen forum. For example, evidence that a plaintiff has no reputation in the chosen forum may be a factor tending to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction in a defamation action. As the protection of reputation is the primary purpose of defamation law (Banro, at paras. 57-58), absence of reputation would tend to point to a weak relationship between the forum and the subject matter of the litigation. Indeed, this Court, in Banro, relied in part on the plaintiff’s reputation in the chosen forum to conclude that it would be inappropriate to find that the presumption of jurisdiction had been rebutted in the circumstances of that case (para. 38).
 In the case at bar, the evidence fails to establish that Haaretz could not have reasonably expected to be called to answer a legal proceeding in Ontario. The pleadings indicate that Goldhar lives and operates his businesses in Ontario. Haaretz had knowledge of this fact, and the allegedly libellous article directly references Goldhar’s Canadian residency and Canadian business practices. As such, this is not a case where the presumption of jurisdiction is rebutted.
In Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada (Ont CA, 2017) the Court of Appeal, in the context of a class action, considers the factors involved in a court taking jurisdiction under the "real and substantial connection" test over a matter involving foreign defendants:
(i) The Evolution of the Real and Substantial Connection Test. Kaynes v BP
 As Lebel J. observed at para. 66 of Van Breda, striking a proper balance between flexibility and predictability, or between fairness and order, has been a constant theme in Canadian jurisprudence on jurisdiction.
 Starting in 1990 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 1990 CanLII 29 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 1077, and continuing with this court’s decision in Excalibur, overturning Perell J.’s decision in 2014 ONSC 4118 (CanLII), and for which leave to appeal was refused, the real and substantial connection test has been a dominant, although not exclusive, test governing the issue of jurisdiction.
 In Morguard, the Supreme Court addressed jurisdiction in the context of extra-provincial enforcement of judgments. Justice La Forest noted at pp. 1108-1109 that the real and substantial connection approach to jurisdiction provides a reasonable balance between the rights of the parties. In Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 416, the Supreme Court expanded the application of the real and substantial connection test to the recognition of foreign judgments. Justice Major held at para. 23 that a substantial connection with the subject matter of the action will satisfy the test even in the absence of such a connection with the defendant in the action. Accordingly, a Canadian court could assume jurisdiction if the foreign court had a real and substantial connection with the subject matter of the action or the parties. Justice Major further noted at para. 37 that the presence of traditional indicia of jurisdiction such as attornment, consent, residence, and presence serve to bolster the real and substantial connection.
 In Van Breda, a case dealing with the assumption of jurisdiction in tort actions, Lebel J. observed that, in developing the real and substantial connection test, the Supreme Court had crafted a constitutional principle rather than a simple conflicts rule. Justice Lebel sought to draw a clearer distinction between the constitutional and private international law dimensions of the test. The constitutional dimension of the rule concerns the territorial limits of jurisdiction. The real and substantial connection test establishes boundaries within which conflicts rules could be applied. The purpose of the constitutionally-imposed territorial limit is to ensure the existence of the relationship or connection needed to establish the legitimate exercise of state power. A weak or hypothetical connection casts doubt on the legitimacy of the exercise of state power over the affected persons. In contrast, conflict rules decide when jurisdiction can be assumed over a dispute, what law will govern a dispute, or how an adjudicative decision from another jurisdiction will be recognized and enforced. As Lebel J. stated, at para. 33, “The constitutional territorial limits … are concerned with setting the outer boundaries within which a variety of appropriate conflicts rules can be elaborated and applied.”
 In recognizing the need to develop an appropriate framework for the assumption of jurisdiction based on the real and substantial connection test, Lebel J. specified, at para. 73, that the framework for the assumption of jurisdiction cannot be “an unstable, ad hoc system made up on the fly on a case-by-case basis — however laudable the objective of individual fairness may be.” He went on to say, at paras. 78-79:
In my view, identifying a set of relevant presumptive connecting factors and determining their legal nature and effect will bring greater clarity and predictability to the analysis of the problems of assumption of jurisdiction, while at the same time ensuring consistency with the objectives of fairness and efficiency that underlie this branch of the law. Fairness, efficiency, and comity inform the test but are not stand alone connecting factors. At para. 84, Lebel J. specifically excluded “general principles or objectives of the conflicts system, such as fairness, efficiency or comity” from the list of presumptive connecting factors, although he did note that these principles may influence the appropriateness of new factors.
From this perspective, a clear distinction must be maintained between, on the one hand, the factors or factual situations that link the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant to the forum and, on the other hand, the principles and analytical tools, such as the values of fairness and efficiency or the principle of comity. These principles and analytical tools will inform their assessment in order to determine whether the real and substantial connection test is met. However, jurisdiction may also be based on traditional grounds, like the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction or consent to submit to the court’s jurisdiction, if they are established. The real and substantial connection test does not oust the traditional private international law bases for court jurisdiction.
 Justice Lebel also discussed whether a court would be limited in hearing only that part of a multijurisdictional claim that could be directly connected with the jurisdiction. In holding that a court would not be limited in such a manner, he explained at para. 99 that “[t]he purpose of the conflicts rules is to establish whether a real and substantial connection exists between the forum, the subject matter of the litigation and the defendant.” Where a real and substantial connection exists “in respect of a factual or legal situation, the court must assume jurisdiction over all aspects of the case.”
 Jurisdiction may therefore be based on traditional grounds such as presence or consent, or on the existence of a real and substantial connection. Moreover, as stated in Beals v. Saldanha, the former may bolster the latter.
 That traditional grounds are an appropriate basis for jurisdiction was reiterated in Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 69, a case involving an action for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in Ontario. In such an action, there is no need to establish a real and substantial connection between the enforcing forum and either the judgment debtor or the dispute.
 Of course, despite having jurisdiction, a court has discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction and to stay the proceedings based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In Kaynes v BP (Ont CA, 2014), which was grounded in a Securities Act tort provision, the Court of Appeal considered whether an action grounded in alleged misrepresentations made to Canadian purchasers of corporate shares from the New York Stock Exchange, was properly heard in an Ontario Court:
 Since Dickson J.’s landmark decision in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 1973 CanLII 192 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 393, Canadian courts have rejected the rigid and unduly mechanical “place of acting” test for determining the place of commission of a tort for purposes of determining jurisdiction. Moran v. Pyle involved a defective light bulb that was manufactured in Ontario and that caused injury in Saskatchewan. The defendant did not carry on business in Saskatchewan, all its manufacturing and assembly operations were in Ontario and it did not directly sell it products in Saskatchewan. The Supreme Court held that the tort was committed in Saskatchewan. As Dickson J. explained at p. 409:
[W]here a foreign defendant carelessly manufactures a product in a foreign jurisdiction which enters into the normal channels of trade and he knows or ought to know both that as a result of his carelessness a consumer may well be injured and it is reasonably foreseeable that the product would be used or consumed where the plaintiff used or consumed it, then the forum in which the plaintiff suffered damage is entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over that foreign defendant….By tendering his products in the market place directly or through normal distributive channels, a manufacturer ought to assume the burden of defending those products wherever they cause harm as long as the forum into which the manufacturer is taken is one that he reasonably ought to have had in his contemplation when he so tendered his goods. In my view, the same line of reasoning applies here. By releasing a document outside Ontario that BP knew it was required to send to Ontario shareholders, BP committed an act with sufficient connection to Ontario to qualify as the commission of a tort in Ontario.
 I find the reasons of Goudge J.A. in Central Sun Mining Inc. v. Vector Engineering Inc. 2013 ONCA 601 (CanLII), 2013 ONCA 601, 117 O.R. (3d) 313 (C.A.) instructive on this issue. That case involved a claim for negligent misrepresentation based on reports prepared in the United States and sent to the plaintiff’s office in Vancouver. Decisions relying on those reports were made by senior executives of the plaintiff located in Ontario. There was some question as to whether the reports had been sent to Ontario. This court found that even if they had not, there was a sufficient connection with Ontario to establish a real and substantial connection for purposes of jurisdiction (at para. 33):
The respondents foresaw that their studies would be received by the appellant and acted on in Toronto. They should have expected to be called to account in Ontario. In the modern world where corporations have various offices in various locations, corporate defendants should not escape liability simply because they send their studies to an office of the plaintiff outside Ontario with the clear understanding that it will be acted on in Ontario. While the present case does not involve a claim for negligent misrepresentation, I see no reason not to hold, by analogy, that when BP released documents that it was legally required to provide its Ontario shareholders, it committed an act that that had an immediate and direct connection with Ontario, an act that is sufficient to establish a real and substantial connection between the claim of this plaintiff and Ontario. In my view, the legislature could not have intended that a foreign corporation such as BP could avoid the reach of Ontario’s securities regime simply because the initial point of release of the document was outside Ontario.