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RTA - Definitions - "Landlord". Lyle-Mayes v. Lazar et al.
In Lyle-Mayes v. Lazar et al. (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed an RTA appeal, this brought against an "ex parte eviction order of the Landlord and Tenant Board" and "the Board’s review order of the ex parte Order .... confirming the ex parte Order ...".
Here the court considers the RTA meaning of 'landlord', and related interpretive principles:[30] The Act at ss. 2(1) defines “landlord” as including,a) The owner of a rental unit or any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit, other than a tenant who occupies a rental unit in a complex and who permits another person to also occupy the unit or any part of the unit,
b) The heirs, assigns, personal representatives and successors in title of a person referred to in clause (a), and
c) A person, other than a tenant occupying a rental unit in a residential complex, who is entitled to possession of the residential complex, and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord under a tenancy agreement or this Act, including the right to collect rent; (“locateur”). [31] In Slapsys ,1406393 Ontario Inc. v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (“Slapsys”) at paras. 7-8, the Ontario Court of Appeal observed that the Act’s definition of “landlord” can include “a person who permits occupancy of a rental unit”. This determination, the Court held, will “depend upon the facts, including particularly whether the person has the ultimate authority to permit occupancy”.
Analysis
[32] In my view, the Member conducting the review of the ex parte Order, correctly identified the central issue to be decided by him. That issue is whether the Appellant’s communications with Mr. Somo had the effect of creating a tenancy agreement. It is also my view that this appeal may be disposed of by determining whether the Member applied the correct legal test in concluding that no tenancy agreement had been created once the Respondent Tenant’s tenancy came to an end.
[33] I find that the Member did not apply the correct legal standard in concluding that no Tenancy had been established. I reach this conclusion because in the Member’s analysis, he focuses exclusively on the general principles of agency law in concluding that Mr. Somo did not have the authority to enter into a lease with the Appellant on behalf of the Respondent Landlord. Instead, in my view, the Member should have considered the central question whether Mr. Somo satisfied the expansive definition of “landlord” under the Act. By failing to analyze this issue, I find that the Member did not apply the correct legal test to decide whether a tenancy was created.
[34] The Act’s definition of “landlord” is intentionally broad to ensure that it is consistent with the legislation’s tenant protection purpose and is a reflection of both the practical complexities and power imbalances in landlord and tenant relationships, including in their formation. The creation of legal relationships and obligations than can be potentially enforced against multiple actors assists to ensure that legal remedies are more easily accessible for tenants and prospective tenants.
[35] In Slapsys, the Court of Appeal recognized that the definition of “landlord” allows for there to be more than one “landlord” for a single rental unit (at para. 7). The Court also emphasized that by virtue of s. 202 of the Act, the Board is obligated to ascertain the true substance of the transaction and the good faith of the parties when making findings (at para. 13).
[36] In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chiarelli, 2014 ONCA 391, at paras. 59-60, Juriansz J.A. (as he then was), dissenting in part, addressed some of the reasons that an expansive definition of “landlord” has long been seen as important for the protection of tenants. He observed that tenants sometimes deal only with property managers, and do not know the identity of the owners, which would otherwise bar them from initiating applications to enforce their rights if property managers did not fall within the definition of “landlord”. Juriansz J.A. further noted that “the expansive definition serves the purpose of providing an informal and efficient procedure for determining disputes between landlords and tenants; this purpose ‘is facilitated by permitting such individuals as property managers to assume the role and status of landlords for the purpose of invoking the procedures and remedies of the [landlord and tenant legislation]’ [citations omitted]” (at para. 60).
[37] After having considered the clear direction of the Court of Appeal in Slapsys that in making findings on any application the Board must ascertain the true substance of the transaction and the good faith of the parties, as well as the tenant protection rationale for the Act’s expansive definition of “landlord”, I find that the correct test in deciding whether the Appellant’s communications with Mr. Somo created a tenancy agreement is to determine whether in all of the circumstances Mr. Somo is a “landlord” as defined by the Act. I further find that in not answering this question, the Member committed an error of law that resulted in a substantial wrong that warrant’s court intervention.
[38] In reaching this conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that the law of agency plays no role in the determination of the status of landlord under the Act. Depending on the circumstances, it may be one of many factors to be analyzed by the adjudicator, particularly given the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Slapsys.
[39] When addressing the issue of ostensible authority, however, one must not limit the analysis to the words of the principal; the analysis also includes a consideration of their conduct. The Court of Appeal provides this guidance in Monachino v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 2000 CanLII 5686 at para. 35, where it states:Where a person, by words or conduct, represents or permits it to be represented that another person has authority to act on his behalf, he is bound by the acts of the other person with respect to anyone dealing with him as an agent on the faith of any such representation, to the same extent as if such other person had the authority that the was represented to have, even though he had no such authority. [40] Nowhere in the Member’s analysis of the issue of ostensible authority does he consider the Respondent Landlord’s conduct. In my view, that omission is not an inconsequential error of law. . Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al.
In Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al. (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court (mostly) dismissed a multiple-proceeding combination of both LL-initiated JRs and RTA s.210 appeals, here respecting multiple units in a Sarnia apartment building. After a fire "the Chief Building Official for the City of Sarnia issued an order to the Landlord directing that the premises be vacated", followed by a second order several days later restricting access to a lesser number of units. The LL subsequently refused re-entry to tenants not covered by the later less restrictive order, eventually resulting in RTA orders of illegal lock-out for numerous units - and that "the Landlords had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment by the Tenants of their units; and found that the Landlords obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the Tenants".
Here the court finds that a individual party should have received notice before they were held to be a landlord, which entailed jointly and several liability with a corporation:Did the Board deny Mr. Singh procedural fairness by finding him to be a landlord without notice?
[68] The Landlords argue that it was procedurally unfair for the Board to find that Mr. Singh is “landlord” as defined in the RTA and therefore personally liable for the monetary awards without giving Mr. Singh notice it was considering so and receiving submission on the issue. We agree.
[69] The term “landlord” is defined in the RTA to include the owner of a rental unit as well as any person who “permits occupancy of a rental unit” or any person who is “entitled to possession of the residential complex and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord.”
[70] Mr. Singh was not named by the Board as a landlord in the first or second interim orders (dated March May 8, 2023, and March 11, 2024, respectively). He was only named as a landlord in the unit specific orders. In those orders, the Board incorrectly stated that the tenants had sought an order against Mr. Singh. In fact, none of the tenants named Mr. Singh as the landlord in their application. They each named Equity Builders or EQB as the landlord.[1]
[71] The Board did not give reasons for naming Mr. Singh as a landlord.
[72] The Tenants argue there was ample evidence to support the finding that Mr. Singh is a landlord as defined in the RTA. The Tenants argue there was nothing unfair about the Board naming Mr. Singh as a landlord because he referred to himself as the landlord throughout his testimony and he testified that he was responsible for many of the decisions about whether the tenants would be permitted back into their units, which was the central issue in the hearings. Finally, the Tenants argues that Mr. Singh was effectively on notice that he may be named as a landlord because the Board raised the issue during the hearings.
[73] Ms. Singh was entitled to a fair hearing before the Board. What is required for a fair hearing is flexible, variable and context specific. When deciding whether the proceedings below were procedurally fair, we must consider the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it, the nature of the statutory scheme, the importance of the decision to Mr. Singh, and the choice of procedure selected by the administrative tribunal: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
[74] In terms of the nature and importance of this issue, the Board’s decision to name Mr. Singh as a “landlord” has very serious implications for him. Because of that decision, he is jointly and severally liable for all the damages awarded to the individual tenants. However, he is not personally liable for the administrative fines which total $525,000.
[75] Turning then to the procedure the Board followed in relation to this issue. The Board expressly raised the question of who ought to be named as the landlord during the hearings. At the start of the third day of the hearing, on September 29, 2023, the Board noted that the tenants had named different people and entities as the landlord(s) in their applications and the Board had named different people and entitles as the landlord(s) in the Notices of Hearing. The Board asked the parties to try to reach an agreement on that issue. The Board then said that if the parties could not reach an agreement, “we would probably have to go through on a case-by-case basis to determine who [is] to be listed or not listed.”
[76] The parties never told the Board that they had reached an agreement on who should be named as the landlord(s) and none of the tenants sought to amend their application to name Mr. Singh as a landlord.
[77] In the written closing submission filed on behalf of the 14 tenants, the tenants referred to Mr. Singh as the property manager or a director of Equity Builders. In one paragraph, when describing Mr. Singh’s evidence, the tenants referred to Mr. Singh as “the landlord.” But the tenants did not make any submissions about who should be named as the landlord(s) or why Mr. Singh should be named as a landlord.
[78] The Landlord’s closing submissions only name Equity Builders Ltd. as the landlord. The Landlord’s closing submissions also contain no submissions on whether any other person or entity should be named as a landlord.
[79] The Board did not seek further submissions on the issue it raised on September 29, 2023.
[80] There is no doubt that the Board had the authority to name Mr. Singh as a landlord. The Board can add or remove a party “as it considers appropriate”: Landlord and Tenant Board Rules of Procedure, r. 1.6(b), RTA, s. 187(2). The Board is also expressly entitled to disregard "the separate corporate existence of participants” when making its findings: RTA, s. 202(1). The question, though, is not whether the Board had jurisdiction to name Mr. Singh as a landlord in addition to naming Equity Builder’s Inc. The question is also not whether there was evidence to support the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Singh is a landlord. The question for us is whether it was procedurally fair for the Board to have done so in this case.
[81] We find that it was procedurally unfair for the Board to name Mr. Singh as a landlord in the absence of an express request by the tenants to do so without giving Mr. Singh notice of its intention to name him as a landlord and without giving him an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.
[82] The appropriate remedy for this breach of the duty of procedural fairness is to remit the matter back to the Board for a new hearing only on the narrow issue of whether Mr. Singh should be named as a landlord in the orders. . Miller Estate v. Arguelles [LL estate standing]
In Miller Estate v. Arguelles (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a tenant's RTA appeal, here from a 'personal possession' for a family member eviction. The case was complicated by the death of the owner during the LTB proceeding, and the LTB application separate listings of 'landlord' (the property manager) and the 'owner'.
Here the court considered the effect of the LTB's amendment of the application to change the applicant from the deceased owner to their estate:[13] The tenant has framed the issues on appeal as follows: ....2. Did the Board err in law by amending the eviction application to The Estate of Ann Miller, without naming an executor, trustee or administrator to pursue the eviction application? ....
Amending the Applicant to “The Estate of Ann Miller”
[23] The tenant is of the view that the Board erred in law by amending the eviction application to name as a party an estate with no personal representative and that “The Estate of Ann Miller” is not an individual, as required for an eviction under s. 48 of the Act. I disagree.
[24] Section 48 does provide that a landlord giving notice to terminate so that a child may occupy the unit must be an individual. Ann Miller was a party to the N12 notice. She was an individual. She remained so when the application was issued. Her death did not make her any less an individual for the purposes of that notice.
[25] Although it may have been preferable for the Board to amend the application to reflect a trustee of Ann Miller’s estate, it was not necessary that it do so because a specific individual representative of the estate was not required to determine the issues in this case.
[26] In proceeding as it did, the Board complied with its mandate under s. 183 of the Act, to adopt the most expeditious method of determining the questions arising in a proceeding that afforded to all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard upon the matter. . Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al.
In Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al. (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considered (and dismissed) a 'landlord's' appeal. I parenthesize the term 'landlord' because that's a primary issue in the case, as the appellant was not the landlord as the common law understands that, but rather another tenant (I'll refer to them here as the 'appellant') - and only a landlord by virtue of the RTA definition [s.2 "landlord", (a)], which reads:“landlord” includes,
(a) the owner of a rental unit or any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit, other than a tenant who occupies a rental unit in a residential complex and who permits another person to also occupy the unit or any part of the unit,
(b) the heirs, assigns, personal representatives and successors in title of a person referred to in clause (a), and
(c) a person, other than a tenant occupying a rental unit in a residential complex, who is entitled to possession of the residential complex and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord under a tenancy agreement or this Act, including the right to collect rent; (“locateur”) During the course of the LTB proceedings, the Board found "that the Appellant had permitted the tenants to occupy the rental unit with the knowledge of the Landlords" [para 10], and thus presumably that the category that the appellant fell under was "any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit". As well, the building owners - although they were parties - did not attend either at the LTB or the court level. The case isn't clear on this and my best guess is that this other tenant was acting as a property manager [para 5,11].
The appellant issued a 'personal possession' termination [RTA s.48] on behalf of the owners, and in that "identified himself on the Notice as both 'a Landlord and a Representative'" [para 6], and the tenants then vacated without an LTB application. When the tenant's subsequently learned that the property was listed for sale (within one year), they applied to the LTB for a "Bad Faith Application with the LTB pursuant to s. 57", which is a recently-passed tenant-compensation provision applying to several categories of terminations, including that for personal possession termination under RTA s.48. There is an evidentiary provision [RTA 57(5)] that renders the 'listing the property for sale within one year' as creating a rebuttable presumption that the termination was in 'bad faith' .
The result of the s.57 compensation application was that the LTB held that the appellant was legitimately acting for the owners and ordered "that both the Landlords and the Appellant were jointly liable to pay compensation to the tenants in the amount of $7, 253" [para 12]. A review (reconsideration) was conducted but resulted in no change in the order. Subsequently, the appellant commenced this Divisional Court RTA s.210 appeal, to which the owners were non-participating parties. The appellant argued - unsuccessfully and solely - that the Board erred in law "by finding him jointly liable, pursuant to s. 57 of the RTA, for serving the Eviction Notice in bad faith because the LTB did not analyze the separate roles and responsibilities of the Landlords and the Appellant ..." [para 17]:[30] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed. There is no requirement in the RTA for the LTB to adjudicate and apportion responsibility and liability as between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the s. 48 of the RTA.
[31] Section 1 of the RTA states as follows:The purposes of this act are to provide protection for residential tenants from unlawful rent increases and unlawful evictions, to establish a framework for the regulation of residential rents, to balance the rights and responsibilities of residential Landlords and tenants and to provide for the adjudication of disputes and for other processes to informally resolve disputes. 2006, c. 17, s. 1. [32] The balancing of rights referenced in this section is between residential Landlords and Tenants. It is, specifically, not a statute designed to address the balancing of rights between multiple Landlords with respect to a specific residential unit.
[33] Nowhere in this consumer protection legislation is there language requiring the LTB to make such inquiries and determine issues as between multiple Landlords.
[34] If the legislation required the LTB to make an inquiry and determination with respect to determining and apportioning responsibilities and liability as between multiple Landlords, as part of an inquiry to determine whether there has been a breach of s. 48 of the RTA, the RTA would clearly and unequivocally state this. It does not.
[35] As well, such a statutory scheme runs contrary to the general purpose of the legislation. For example, it would require tenants who file a bad faith application pursuant to s. 57 to participate in a process that could stretch out extensively beyond a finding a violation of s. 48 in order for the Tribunal to apportion responsibility and liability among multiple Landlords.
[36] Such a process could be factually complicated and legally lengthy. It could involve extensive evidence determining contractual rights and responsibilities between any number of Landlords with respect to a specific property.
[37] There are also numerous other methods or processes to apportion liability among multiple Landlords, including, but not limited to, contractual arrangements between Landlords who are owners and their agents, such as the Appellant. In many (if not most) instances that would involve the hearing of evidence with respect to the contractual relationships between Landlords. In many instances, the Tenants would have no knowledge of any such contracted arrangements.
[38] The purpose of s. 202 of the RTA is to assist the Tribunal in determining the real nature of the relationship between Landlords and Tenants. It is not to require the Tribunal to determine the relationship between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the RTA.
[39] Had the legislature mandated that the LTB address and apportion responsibility for breaches of s. 48 of the RTA, it would have been an error in law for the LTB not to undertake such an inquiry. However, as this requirement is not mandated or directed by the RTA, there can be no error of law due to a failure of the LTB to make such an inquiry and determination.
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