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RTA - Statutory Interpretation. Miller Estate v. Arguelles ['landlord' definition can be limited by RTA s.48]
In Miller Estate v. Arguelles (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a tenant's RTA appeal, this respecting s.48 ['Notice, landlord personally, etc., requires unit' (personal possession)] and s.71.1 ['Application based on certain notice' (supporting affidavit)] issues.
The court usefully points out that the meaning of 'landlord' [under RTA s.2(1)] can be varied by other RTA provisions (here s.48 'personal possession'), and that the s.202(1) 'real substance' provision should not be used as a convenience to override 'formal' difficulties:[29] The respondent relies on the broad definition of “landlord” under s. 2 of the RTA to argue that Ms. Miller’s Estate and her heirs can be landlords. The definition of “landlord” under s. 2 of the RTA is not restricted to individuals, and includes:(a) the owner of a rental unit or any other person who permits occupancy of a rental unit, other than a tenant who occupies a rental unit in a residential complex and who permits another person to also occupy the unit or any part of the unit,
(b) the heirs, assigns, personal representatives and successors in title of a person referred to in clause (a), and
(c) a person, other than a tenant occupying a rental unit in a residential complex, who is entitled to possession of the residential complex and who attempts to enforce any of the rights of a landlord under a tenancy agreement or this Act, including the right to collect rent; “person”, or any expression referring to a person, means an individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, trust or body corporate, or an individual in his or her capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator or other legal representative. [30] The difficulty with the respondent’s position is that it fails to recognize the fact that it is not all landlords who may invoke s. 48(1) to terminate a tenancy for landlord’s own use, but only landlords who meet the statutory criteria under ss. 48(1) and (5). In contrast to other sections of the RTA which use a broad definition of landlord, the statutory criteria under ss. 48(1) and (5) narrowly define a landlord as an individual: Hefzi v. Louw, 2023 BCSC 994, at para. 23;[3] Schuld v. Li, 2025 BCSC 681, at paras. 28-31. While an estate may be a landlord for other purposes under the RTA, such as to collect rent or effect repairs, an estate does not meet the statutory criteria set out for landlord’s own use under ss. 48(1) and (5) of the RTA because it is not an individual, nor can it have a spouse, child or parent.
[31] I acknowledge that the Board is required to “ascertain the real substance of all transactions and activities”, and in doing so can “disregard the outward form of a transaction or the separate corporate existence of participants”: RTA, s. 202(1)(a). In Slapsys (c.o.b. 1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676, 268 O.A.C. 395, for example, this court held that s. 202(1)(a) permitted the Board to pierce the corporate veil to terminate a tenancy for the personal use of the sole shareholder of the corporate owner of rental premises in that case.
[32] However, the Board’s power under s. 202(1)(a) has no application in the present case. A finding that the estate does not meet the requirement in s. 48 that a landlord must be an individual is not merely a matter of form, nor does it obfuscate the “real substance” of the transaction. In Slapsys, the sole shareholder of a corporation that owned the residential unit was an identifiable individual who had performed the duties and responsibilities of a landlord for many years. The shareholder, though technically a separate legal entity from the corporation that owned the unit, was clearly a landlord for the purposes of s. 48(1) in substance. In the present case, the estate has no identified personal representative or trustee. As a result, there is no individual that can be deemed a landlord to permit occupancy for that landlord’s own use. I will return below to the other impediments to landlord’s own use through an estate.
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[46] I accept that the Board erred by amending the eviction application to include the details of the March 2022 N12 notice that had not been included in the application at the time of filing. The Board erred by treating the absence of the details of the March 2022 N12 notice as a mere procedural defect when it was a substantive deficiency that could not be cured by amendment. The Board’s decision to amend the eviction application undermined the remedial, tenant-focused purpose of the RTA that informs the objective of s. 71.1.
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[54] These provisions are mandatory. There are no provisions under the RTA or SPPA that give the Board any discretion to accept an application for filing or to make an order terminating a tenancy and evicting a tenant if these provisions are not complied with. If the Legislature had wished to provide for discretion, it would have been a simple thing to include such a provision in s. 71.1, as it did elsewhere in the RTA. For example, with respect to the Board’s power on eviction applications, s. 83(1) provides that “the Board may, despite any other provision of this Act or the tenancy agreement” refuse to grant the eviction or postpone the enforcement of the eviction order. In contrast, s. 71.1 contains no such permissive language.
[55] The legislative objective of these provisions is clear: the N12 notices inform the legitimacy of the landlord’s reliance on s. 48(1). The Board’s decision to amend the eviction application effectively treated these provisions as discretionary and procedural, rather than mandatory substantive requirements that fulfill the legislative objective of the RTA by protecting against abuse of the landlord’s own use termination provision. As the RTA stipulates, the application should not have been accepted for filing in the absence of the requisite N12 notice disclosure. As the Board noted, there is no screening process for electronic filing. As a result, this requires the Board to give effect to s. 71.1(4) at the time of the hearing, as it is the only time to do so. This substantive deficiency cannot be cured by amending the eviction application. The respondent’s eviction application should not have proceeded in the first place and should have been dismissed. The eviction application was therefore a nullity. . Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al.
In Equity Builders Ltd. et al. v. Landlord and Tenant Board et al. (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court (mostly) dismissed a multiple-proceeding combination of both LL-initiated JRs and RTA s.210 appeals, here respecting multiple units in a Sarnia apartment building. After a fire "the Chief Building Official for the City of Sarnia issued an order to the Landlord directing that the premises be vacated", followed by a second order several days later restricting access to a lesser number of units. The LL subsequently refused re-entry to tenants not covered by the later less restrictive order, eventually resulting in RTA orders of illegal lock-out for numerous units - and that "the Landlords had substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment by the Tenants of their units; and found that the Landlords obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the Tenants".
Here the court notes the 'remedial' (similar to 'consumer') law interpretation applicable to the RTA, immediately followed by the RTA s.183 'expeditious proceedings' provisions:[54] In Elkins v. Van Wissen, 2023 ONCA 789, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized that the RTA is “remedial legislation with a tenant protection focus. The purposes of the [Act] are set out in s. 1. The first purpose listed is ‘to provide protection for residential tenants from…unlawful evictions’”: at para. 42. This case concerns an allegation of unlawful evictions.
[55] In White v. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority, 2022 ONCA 146, the Court of Appeal elaborates on the tenant protection focus of the Act as follows, at para. 10:The Act is remedial legislation designed to redress the imbalance of power between landlords and tenants. It removes leases from the ordinary contract law principles that would otherwise govern and establishes extensive statutory rights for tenants. The Act enjoys primacy over all other legislation, save the Ontario Human Rights Code, and the parties are prohibited from waiving or limiting the protection the Act provides. [56] With respect to the allegation regarding procedural fairness, it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the RTA is to “encourage speedy, fair and efficient access to justice in residential tenancy matters”: Ontario (Rental Housing Tribunal) v. Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, 2002 CanLII 41961 (ON CA), [2002] 161 O.A.C. 57, at para. 16. Section 183 of the RTA requires the Board to “adopt the most expeditious method of determining the questions arising in a proceeding that affords to all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard on the matter.” . Miller Estate v. Arguelles
In Miller Estate v. Arguelles (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court considered statutory interpretation of the RTA:[15] The Act is remedial, having a “tenant protection focus” and must receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and sprit. [See Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., 2007 ONCA 408]. . Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al.
In Akbari et al. v. Blenkinsop et al. (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considers RTA s.1 as a statutory interpretation provision, addressing the 'purpose' of the RTA as it does (the third of the text/context/purpose elements of Rizzo):[19] However, the Appellant submits that the LTB committed an error of law by concluding that he was jointly liable for the amounts ordered by the LTB without considering or analyzing the separate roles and responsibilities that the Landlords and the Applicant had with respect to the Complex. He notes the fact that the Appellant was not an owner of the property. Therefore, as he did not have legal authority to sell the property, he could not be legally responsible for a breach of section s. 48 of the RTA by selling the Complex within one year of the Respondents vacating the Complex.
[20] The Appellant submits that a proper interpretation of s. 57 of the RTA is that in situations of multipleLandlords, ionly landlords who are owners of a property can be held legally responsible for acting in bad faith termination of a tenancy where a sale is involved contrary to the provisions of s. 48.
[21] Had the LTB conducted this necessary inquiry to consider to what degree the Appellant was legally responsible, they would have concluded he was not liable because while he was a landlord; he was not an owner with the legal ability to sell the property.
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[30] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed. There is no requirement in the RTA for the LTB to adjudicate and apportion responsibility and liability as between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the s. 48 of the RTA.
[31] Section 1 of the RTA states as follows:The purposes of this act are to provide protection for residential tenants from unlawful rent increases and unlawful evictions, to establish a framework for the regulation of residential rents, to balance the rights and responsibilities of residential Landlords and tenants and to provide for the adjudication of disputes and for other processes to informally resolve disputes. 2006, c. 17, s. 1. [32] The balancing of rights referenced in this section is between residential Landlords and Tenants. It is, specifically, not a statute designed to address the balancing of rights between multiple Landlords with respect to a specific residential unit.
[33] Nowhere in this consumer protection legislation is there language requiring the LTB to make such inquiries and determine issues as between multiple Landlords.
[34] If the legislation required the LTB to make an inquiry and determination with respect to determining and apportioning responsibilities and liability as between multiple Landlords, as part of an inquiry to determine whether there has been a breach of s. 48 of the RTA, the RTA would clearly and unequivocally state this. It does not.
[35] As well, such a statutory scheme runs contrary to the general purpose of the legislation. For example, it would require tenants who file a bad faith application pursuant to s. 57 to participate in a process that could stretch out extensively beyond a finding a violation of s. 48 in order for the Tribunal to apportion responsibility and liability among multiple Landlords.
[36] Such a process could be factually complicated and legally lengthy. It could involve extensive evidence determining contractual rights and responsibilities between any number of Landlords with respect to a specific property.
[37] There are also numerous other methods or processes to apportion liability among multiple Landlords, including, but not limited to, contractual arrangements between Landlords who are owners and their agents, such as the Appellant. In many (if not most) instances that would involve the hearing of evidence with respect to the contractual relationships between Landlords. In many instances, the Tenants would have no knowledge of any such contracted arrangements.
[38] The purpose of s. 202 of the RTA is to assist the Tribunal in determining the real nature of the relationship between Landlords and Tenants. It is not to require the Tribunal to determine the relationship between multiple Landlords in the event of a breach of the RTA.
[39] Had the legislature mandated that the LTB address and apportion responsibility for breaches of s. 48 of the RTA, it would have been an error in law for the LTB not to undertake such an inquiry. However, as this requirement is not mandated or directed by the RTA, there can be no error of law due to a failure of the LTB to make such an inquiry and determination.
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