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Administrative - Reasons for Decision (2). Geddes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
In Geddes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismisses a JR against the Animal Care Review Board (ACRB) under the PAWS animal welfare regime. The ACRB decisions confirmed orders that "certain animals— which had been removed from the Applicant’s property by Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) — should not be returned to the Applicant. The Board also confirmed seven Statements of Account (“SOA”), payable by the Applicant in the total amount of $105,059.35."
The court comments on an argument that the tribunal failed to considered cases advanced by the appellant:The Board’s alleged failure to consider the Applicant’s case law
[46] The Applicant submits that in its Initial Decision the Board failed to refer to any of the cases put forth by the Applicant. He submits that the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness dictate that the Board consider the cases put forth by the Applicant and reference them in its decision. The Applicant submits that, although in its Reconsideration Decision, the Board states its conclusion that the cases relied upon by the Applicant are distinguishable or irrelevant, it does not explain how or why it reached that conclusion, thereby depriving the Applicant of “the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that they have actually listened to the parties”: Vavilov, at para. 127.
[47] We do not accept those submissions. As Vavilov makes clear, at para. 92, a reviewing court is not to expect administrative decisions to read like court decisions.
[48] First, there is no requirement on a tribunal to make reference to every case referenced by a party. Absent a submission that a particular case calls into question the reasonableness of the decisions at issue, it is not a reviewable error not to deal with caselaw. In any event, the Board did, in fact, make specific reference to cases raised by the Applicant, explaining why they were not applicable: see Reconsideration Decision, at paras. 22-37. The Applicant conceded that in assessing the reasonableness of the Board’s decisions we could consider the reasoning in both decisions to determine if together they demonstrated the hallmarks of reasonableness.
[49] In our view the Board provided adequate reasons for its conclusions concerning the applicability and relevance of the case law referenced by the parties and we find no breach of procedural fairness or lack of natural justice in the Board’s determinations and treatment of the case law it was asked to consider. . Geddes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
In Geddes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismisses a JR against the Animal Care Review Board (ACRB) under the PAWS animal welfare regime. The ACRB decisions confirmed orders that "certain animals— which had been removed from the Applicant’s property by Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) — should not be returned to the Applicant. The Board also confirmed seven Statements of Account (“SOA”), payable by the Applicant in the total amount of $105,059.35."
The court comments on a presumption on assessing the adequate of reasons in the administrative context:[44] Administrative decision makers are presumed to have weighed and considered all the evidence unless it is proven otherwise. The fact that a piece of evidence is not mentioned does not mean that it was ignored: Arvan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 223, at para. 20. Only where a decision maker does not deal with evidence that “squarely contradicts” its reasoning and conclusions will that render the decision unreasonable: Arvan, at para. 21. . New Blue Ontario Fund v. Ontario (Chief Electoral Officer)
In New Blue Ontario Fund v. Ontario (Chief Electoral Officer) (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court illustrates some Election Finances Act procedures, here were a political party felt they were entitled to greater allowance subsidies.
Here, the court contrasts the duty to give reasons of an adjudicator (typically, a tribunal) with those of a (simpler) administrative decision-maker:[57] In this case the context of the proceeding is not one where the CEO is an adjudicator. He is an officer of Ontario’s Legislative Assembly, with statutory authority to administer the EFA. As such, he was required to explain the reasons for his decision taking into account the arguments that had been put before him, not to consider every aspect of the statutory context that might bear upon his decision.
[58] Thus, we do not accept that the CEO’s decision should be considered unreasonable for failing to explicitly deal with an argument about the statute’s purpose that was not put before him. . Loeb v. Toronto (City)
In Loeb v. Toronto (City) (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers an 'inadequate reasons' argument challenging (by JR) a decision of a committee of adjustment [under Planning Act s.45(8.1)]:Are the Committee’s Reasons Inadequate?
[35] The Applicants take the position that the Decision is “procedurally unfair” because it does not adequately explain the reasons for the decision. They submit that because the Decision does not comply with the requirements of s. 45(8.1) of the Planning Act, it is invalid and must be quashed.
[36] Subsection 45(8.1) of the Planning Act states as follows:The decision of the Committee, “whether granting or refusing an application, shall be in writing, shall be signed by the members who concur in the decision and shall,
(a) set out the reasons for the decision; and
(b) contain a brief explanation of the effect, if any, that the written and oral submissions mentioned in subsection (8.2) had on the decision. [37] Subsection 45(8.2) states that the above provision applies to any written submissions relating to the application that were made to the committee before its decision and any oral submissions that were made at the hearing.
[38] I disagree with the Applicants’ position that a decision that does not strictly comply with the requirements of s. 45(8.1) is invalid. To begin with, s. 45(8.1) does not provide such a consequence. By contrast, s. 45(8) of the Planning Act states that “[n]o decision of the committee on an application is valid unless it is concurred in by the majority of the members of the committee that heard that application.” Therefore, where the legislature has intended that the consequence of a failure to comply with the statutory requirements is that the decision is invalid, it has specifically stated that.
[39] Moreover, the relevant subsection of s. 45 of the Planning Act was amended in 2015 under the Smart Growth for Our Communities Act, 2015, S.O. 2015, C. 26, s. 29(3). The previous version of s. 45(8) of the Planning Act provided that no decision of the committee on an application was valid unless the majority of the members concurred and also required that the decision “shall be in writing and shall set out the reasons for the decision…[.]” Previously, a decision of the committee was invalid if the reasons were insufficient. In separating out subsections 45(8.1) and (8.2) from the previous version of s. 45(8), the legislature chose to limit invalidity to the sole basis in the current version of s. 45(8), that is, non-concurrence by a majority of the members of the committee.
[40] Moreover, this interpretation of s. 45(8.1) is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding that where reasons are not provided or are deficient, the court should examine the decision in light of the record, the larger context, and other relevant constraints: Vavilov, at paras. 137-138.
[41] In Bacher v. GR (CAN) Investments, 2022 ONSC 2937 (Div. Ct.), at para. 23, this court held that the correct approach to assessing reasons, based on Vavilov, is to assess whether the tribunal’s reasons explain the decision to the parties, provide public accountability, and permit effective appellate review. In the context of a decision of a Committee of Adjustments, in Opara and Leslie, 2012 ONSC 2483 (Div. Ct.), at para. 13, this court held that the “four tests” do not have to be applied “entirely separately and formulaically” but that it is sufficient if the reasons make it clear that the decision-maker substantively applied the “four tests” after properly considering the appropriate factors and evidence.
[42] While the Applicants rely on this court’s decision in Masters v. Claremont Development Corporation, 2021 ONSC 3311 (Div. Ct.), in that case, this court declined to set aside a decision for the tribunal’s failure to provide adequate reasons and instead found that the decision was sufficiently supported by the record.
[43] In this case, while the Decision itself is brief, it is clear from the record that the Committee applied the four tests and considered the evidence before it. There was a significant amount of evidence before the Committee beyond the parties’ oral submissions, including surveys, architectural plans, a tree protection plan, and a table of other minor variances approved in the neighbourhood. The material from the previous application was also available to the Committee, and there was an overlap in the committee members from the previous hearing before the TLAB.
[44] At the hearing, the Committee members mentioned that the plan had been revised significantly to address the concerns raised by the previous application, that the proposal was not out of keeping with Forest Hill community, and that it addressed the neighbours’ submissions. The Committee was not persuaded by the Applicants’ submissions, which did not identify significant impacts. The Committee found that the proposal mitigated against such impacts, which would be further addressed by the conditions that the Committee imposed in its Decision.
[45] When read in the context of the record and the transcript of the hearing, I consider that the Decision addresses the four tests and provides sufficient reasons to explain the Decision to the parties, provide public accountability and permit effective appellate review. Accordingly, the reasons for the Decision are adequate. . Ramsay v. Waterloo Region District School Board
In Ramsay v. Waterloo Region District School Board (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considers any duty to give reasons in an administrative, non-tribunal context:[54] The WRDSB argues that the reasons provided were sufficient. The Supreme Court has held that there is no duty to give formal reasons in a context where the decision was made by elected representatives pursuant to a democratic process. It submits that a school board’s reasoning may be deduced from the debate, deliberations and the statements of policy (see: Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293; Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5). The Act does not require the provision of reasons in writing for a decision. The only statutory requirement it imposes is to provide written notice of the result and applicable sanctions. This was done.
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