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Bill of Rights - Cases. Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights v. Canada (Attorney General) ['property rights']
In Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed four consolidated appeals, here from dismissals from "six applications for judicial review of the Regulations Amending the Regulations Prescribing Certain Firearms and Other Weapons, Components and Parts of Weapons, Accessories, Cartridge Magazines, Ammunition and Projectiles as Prohibited, Restricted or Non-Restricted, SOR/2020-96 (the Regulations)".
Here the court considers a federal Bill of Rights s.1(a) ['right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property'] issue:E. Did the Federal Court err in finding no violation of the Bill of Rights?
[94] Before the Federal Court, the CCFR appellants argued that the Regulations deprive them of their property rights without due process, thereby infringing subsection 1(a) of the Bill of Rights. The Federal Court dismissed their arguments in a few paragraphs, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 39 [Authorson]. Consistent with Authorson, the Federal Court found that the procedural protections for property rights apply only in the context of an adjudication before a court or tribunal. Since the appellants are not facing such an adjudication of their rights, subsection 1(a) of the Bill of Rights does not apply.
[95] While the CCFR appellants reiterated their Bill of Rights argument in their written submissions (but not orally), it was most forcefully taken up and elaborated upon before this Court by Saskatchewan. Counsel for Saskatchewan submitted that the Federal Court erred in concluding that the Bill of Rights only applies in the context of the adjudication of rights before courts, and failed to appreciate that Authorson only dealt with the deprivation of the right to the enjoyment of property by the legislative branch, and not by the executive branch. In such a context, they argue, different considerations apply. In particular, due process requires advance notice to easily identifiable affected individuals. The legislation delegating to the executive the power to deprive individuals of their enjoyment of property must also provide due process to the affected individuals, such as an individualized hearing or a mechanism to determine compensation. Finally, Saskatchewan submitted that due process requires compensation to be paid to the affected firearm owners unless Parliament clearly provided that the deprivation is to occur without compensation.
[96] In my view, these arguments are without merit and the Federal Court did not err in concluding that the Regulations do not infringe the subsection 1(a) of the Bill of Rights. That provision reads as follows:"1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,"
"1. ""Il est par les présentes reconnu et déclaré que les droits de l’homme et les libertés fondamentales ci-après énoncés ont existé et continueront à exister pour tout individu au Canada quels que soient sa race, son origine nationale, sa couleur, sa religion ou son sexe :"
"(a"") the right to individual life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law;"
"a"")"" ""le droit de l’individu à la vie, à la liberté, à la sécurité de la personne ainsi qu’à la jouissance de ses biens, et le droit de ne pas s’en voir privé que par l’application régulière de la loi;" [97] The Supreme Court’s decision in Authorson is a complete answer to the submissions made by Saskatchewan. In that case, a large class of disabled veterans argued against the validity of a federal statute that purportedly extinguished their claims to interest on their governmentally administered pensions. The issue in that appeal was whether the due process clause of the Bill of Rights required Parliament to give just compensation to the veterans.
[98] Writing on behalf of the Supreme Court, Justice Major made it very clear that subsection 1(a) does not confer on individual citizens a right to notice and hearing to contest the passage of a statute, because due process protections cannot interfere with the right of Parliament to determine its own procedure. A change to that procedure would require an amendment to the Constitution. As for the procedural protections guaranteed by due process to property rights, the Court explicitly found that they only arise in an adjudicative context:42. What procedural protections for property rights are guaranteed by due process? In my opinion, the Bill of Rights guarantees notice and some opportunity to contest a governmental deprivation of property rights only in the context of an adjudication of that person’s rights and obligations before a court or tribunal. [99] Therefore, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between the adoption of a general rule and its application in an individualized setting. Applying that distinction to the case at bar, it further wrote:44. [...] Where the law requires the application of discretion or judgment to specific factual situations, notice and an opportunity to contest may be required. For example, such rights may exist where the government eliminates a veteran’s benefits because it believes he is no longer disabled, or because it believes he was never a member of the armed forces. However, notice and an opportunity to make a defence are not required where the government legislates to completely eliminate such benefits. [100] On that basis, it cannot seriously be argued that the Regulations are inconsistent with the requirements of subsection 1(a) of the Bill of Rights. To paraphrase Authorson, the Regulations do not involve an adjudicative setting for individual rights or the application of discretion to a specific set of facts. They apply to all firearms owners in Canada, based on public safety considerations, and their application is non-discretionary and contingent on facts. The situation would obviously be different in the context of a criminal prosecution for unlawful possession of a prohibited firearm or in a forfeiture proceeding.
[101] The decision of the Supreme Court in Authorson is consistent with common law principles of procedural fairness. It is well established that procedural fairness, which is part and parcel of due process, does not apply to decisions of a legislative nature: see for example, Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at p. 757; Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20 at para. 54; Reference re Canada Assistance Plan, 1991 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 297 at p. 558; Martineau v. Matsqui Disciplinary Bd., 1979 CanLII 184 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at p. 628. On the same basis, the GIC did not owe a duty of procedural fairness to individual owners who may be affected by the Regulations.
[102] Counsel for Saskatchewan attempted to distinguish Authorson on the basis that it related to legislation enacted by Parliament, as opposed to regulations promulgated by an Order in Council. This is a distinction without a difference. What matters, especially in administrative law, is substance, not form: Innovative Medicines at paras. 35-36. Regulations, much as legislation, are general in nature, based on broad considerations of public policy, and meant to apply to a large group of people. In fact, courts typically regard regulations of all kinds as legislative in nature: see the case law referred to in Brown and Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, Thompson Reuters, (April 2022), §7:39.
[103] In any event, this ship has sailed. This Court has more than once confirmed that the due process protections of subsection 1(a) of the Bill of Rights are not engaged by processes before the GIC: see, New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v. Canadian Radio-Television & Telecommunications Commission, 1984 CanLII 5348 (FCA), [1984] 2 F.C. 410, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 77 at pp. 430-431; Taseko Mines Limited v. Canada (Environment), 2017 FC 1100 at para. 132; aff’d 2019 FCA 320, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39066 (14 May 2020). In both cases, this Court found that the due process clause does not apply to executive acts or processes before the Minister and the GIC. Saskatchewan did not cite any legal authority for the contrary position. The fact that a small group of persons currently own the now prohibited firearms is not sufficient to transform a legislative decision into an administrative one: see Canadian Assn of Regulated Importers v. Canada, 1994 CanLII 3460 (FCA), [1994] 2 F.C. 247, 17 Admin L.R. (2d) 121 at paras. 19-20; Aasland v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks), 1999 CanLII 6015 (BC SC), 19 Admin LR (3d) 154 at para. 28.
[104] In my view, the appellants were not entitled to advance notice of the Regulations, and the Bill of Rights does not limit delegation or require compensation. Saskatchewan failed to cite any relevant authority to support these propositions. I need only add, in response to submissions made before us, that this case bears no relation to the duty to consult owed to Indigenous peoples, which is grounded in the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown. There is no corresponding right, constitutional or otherwise, to possession of a specific firearm (R. v. Simmermon, 1996 ABCA 33 at para. 21). Nor is there any de facto expropriation, since there is no evidence that Canada has acquired any asset or advantage as a result of the Regulations. As a result, the Federal Court did not err in concluding that the Regulations do not infringe the Bill of Rights. . Goodman v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
In Goodman v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (Fed CA, 2022) the Federal Court of Appeal considered a rare Canadian Bill of Rights case. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a pre-Charter statutory (not constitutional) attempt at the same sort of 'rights and freedoms' that the Charter later picked up on. It is rarely used these days, but is still 'on the (statute) books'. The case is short so I link it all here.
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