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Civil Litigation - SLAPP - Pointes Protection - Harm-Expression Balancing Exception. 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association
In 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association (SCC, 2020), the leading case on Ontario's SLAPP laws, the Supreme Court of Canada discusses harm-expression balancing: (2) Section 137.1(4)(b) — Public Interest Hurdle
[61] At last, I arrive at what is the crux of the analysis. Section 137.1(4)(b) provides that, to avoid having its proceeding dismissed, the responding party must satisfy the motion judge that the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.
[62] As I have often mentioned in these reasons, this provision is the core of s. 137.1. The purpose of s. 137.1 is to function as a mechanism to screen out lawsuits that unduly limit expression on matters of public interest through the identification and pre-trial dismissal of such actions. While s. 137.1(4)(a) directs a judge’s specific attention to the merit of the proceeding and the existence of a valid defence in order to ensure that the proceeding is meritorious, s. 137.1(4)(b) open-endedly engages with the overarching concern that this statute, and anti-SLAPP legislation generally, seek to address by assessing the public interest and public participation implications. In this way, s. 137.1(4)(b) is the key portion of the s. 137.1 analysis, as it serves as a robust backstop for motion judges to dismiss even technically meritorious claims if the public interest in protecting the expression that gives rise to the proceeding outweighs the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.
[63] Statutory interpretation is a contextual exercise that requires reading a provision with and in light of other provisions: accordingly, if the bar is set too high at s. 137.1(4)(a)(i) or (ii), a motion judge will never reach s. 137.1(4)(b) — this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated given the legislative history and intent behind s. 137.1. The legislature repeatedly emphasized proportionality as the paramount consideration in determining whether a lawsuit should be dismissed. Weighing the public interest in freedom of expression and public participation against the public interest in vindicating a meritorious claim is a theme that runs through the entire legislative history, and this informs how s. 137.1 should be judicially understood.
[64] The import of s. 137.1(4)(b) is made abundantly evident by looking at the context in which s. 137.1 was enacted. For example, the APR urged that “[t]here should be no special safeguards to prevent abuse. The balancing of interests at the heart of the remedy will allow appropriate disposition of cases” (Summary of Recommendations, para. 20 (emphasis added)). This goal of achieving balance was echoed during the readings of the bill in the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. At second reading, the Attorney General of Ontario stated the following:[translation] Balance has been a recurring theme: the need to strike a balance that will dismiss abusive lawsuits while permitting legitimate actions. I can assure you that we have heard everything that has been said to us. Balance is a key feature of this bill.
(Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2014), at p. 1971 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur)) The theme of balance was raised frequently throughout the debates by multiple members across party lines (Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2014), at pp. 1972-74 (Mr. Lorenzo Berardinetti); p. 1974 (Mr. Chris Ballard); p. 1975 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur)). (See also Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2015), at p. 6017 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur); p. 6021 (Mr. Lorenzo Berardinetti); pp. 6025-27 (Mr. Jagmeet Singh).)
[65] I pause here to explain my use of the expression “weighing exercise” and to briefly address whether there is a substantive difference between a weighing exercise and a balancing exercise, and which exercise s. 137.1(4)(b) requires. This concern was raised by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association as an intervener before this Court.
[66] Here, the provision expressly requires that one consideration “outweig[h]” the other. I am of the view that this is substantively different than if the statute had required that the two considerations be balanced against one another. The difference can be illustrated by the following quantification of weighing and balancing: where one factor must outweigh the other, the ratio between the two must be at least 51/49; in contrast, where one factor must be balanced against the other, a ratio of 50/50, or even 45/55, might be sufficient for a judge to rule in favour of the former. The word “outweighs” necessarily precludes such a conclusion.
[67] While I do not purport to decide for all statutes the definitive difference between weighing and balancing, the fact that the statute here requires that one consideration outweigh the other, and not simply that the considerations be balanced against one another, should be relevant to a motion judge’s consideration of whether the plaintiff has satisfied its burden under s. 137.1(4)(b).
(a) Harm Analysis
[68] Harm is principally important in order for the plaintiff to meet its burden under s. 137.1(4)(b). The statutory provision expressly contemplates the harm suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression being weighed against the public interest in protecting that expression. As a prerequisite to the weighing exercise, the statutory language therefore requires two showings: (i) the existence of harm and (ii) causation — the harm was suffered as a result of the moving party’s expression.
[69] Either monetary harm or non-monetary harm can be relevant to demonstrating (i) above. I am in agreement with the Attorney General of Ontario at the time the legislation was debated, who recognized at second reading “that reputation is one of the most valuable assets a person or a business can possess” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2014), at p. 1971 (Hon. Madeleine Meilleur)). Accordingly, harm is not limited to monetary harm, and neither type of harm is more important than the other. Nor is harm synonymous with the damages alleged. The text of the provision does not depend on a particular kind of harm, but expressly refers only to harm in general.
[70] Further, since s. 137.1(4)(b) is, in effect, a weighing exercise, there is no threshold requirement for the harm to be sufficiently worthy of consideration. The magnitude of the harm becomes relevant when the motion judge must determine whether it is “sufficiently serious” that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. In other words, the magnitude of the harm simply adds weight to one side of the weighing exercise.
[71] This does not mean that the harm pleaded by the plaintiff should be taken at face value or that bald assertions are sufficient. But I would not go so far as to require a fully developed damages brief, nor would I require that the harm be monetized, as the question here relates to the existence of harm, not its quantification. The statutory language employed in s. 137.1(4)(b) is “harm likely to”, which modifies both “be” and “have been”; this indicates that the plaintiff need not prove harm or causation, but must simply provide evidence for the motion judge to draw an inference of likelihood in respect of the existence of the harm and the relevant causal link. The evidentiary burden might depend on the nature of the substantive law that is applied, although it must be borne in mind that a s. 137.1 motion is not an adjudication on the merits: for example, in a defamation action, harm (and therefore general damages) is presumed, but the plaintiff would still have to support a claim for special damages. Importantly, though, no definitive determination of harm or causation is required.
[72] I add that, naturally, evidence of a causal link between the expression and the harm will be especially important where there may be sources other than the defendant’s expression that may have caused the plaintiff harm (C.A. reasons, at para. 92). Causation is not, however, an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that while the causal chain between the defendant’s expression and the harm suffered by the plaintiff may be weaker for some elements of the harm suffered, it might nonetheless be strong for other elements. This is a case-by-case inquiry undertaken by the motion judge.
(b) Weighing of the Public Interest
[73] Once harm has been established and shown to be causally related to the expression, s. 137.1(4)(b) requires that the harm and corresponding public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue be weighed against the public interest in protecting the expression. Therefore, as under s. 137.1(3), public interest becomes critical to the analysis.
[74] However, the term “public interest” is used differently in s. 137.1(4)(b) than in s. 137.1(3). Under s. 137.1(3), the query is concerned with whether the expression relates to a matter of public interest. The assessment is not qualitative — i.e. it does not matter whether the expression helps or hampers the public interest. Under s. 137.1(4)(b), in contrast, the legislature expressly makes the public interest relevant to specific goals: permitting the proceeding to continue and protecting the impugned expression. Therefore, not just any matter of public interest will be relevant. Instead, the quality of the expression, and the motivation behind it, are relevant here.
[75] Indeed, “a statement that contains deliberate falsehoods, [or] gratuitous personal attacks . . . may still be an expression that relates to a matter of public interest. However, the public interest in protecting that speech will be less than would have been the case had the same message been delivered without the lies, [or] vitriol” (C.A. reasons, at para. 94, citing Able Translations Ltd. v. Express International Translations Inc., 2016 ONSC 6785, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 380, at paras. 82-84 and 96-103, aff’d 2018 ONCA 690, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 568).
[76] While judges should be wary of the inquiry descending into a moralistic taste test, this Court recognized as early as R. v. Keegstra, 1990 CanLII 24 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, that not all expression is created equal: “While we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity, it is equally destructive of free expression values, as well as the other values which underlie a free and democratic society, to treat all expression as equally crucial to those principles at the core of s. 2(b)” (p. 760).
[77] The weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b) can thus be informed by this Court’s s. 2(b) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms jurisprudence, which grounds the level of protection afforded to expression in the nature of the expression (R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at para. 181). For example, the inquiry might look to the core values underlying freedom of expression, such as the search for truth, participation in political decision making, and diversity in forms of self‑fulfilment and human flourishing (Sharpe, at para. 182; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 829 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 24). The closer the expression is to any of these core values, the greater the public interest in protecting it.
[78] I outline below some further factors that may bear on the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b). I note that in Platnick v. Bent, 2018 ONCA 687, 426 D.L.R. (4th) 60, at para. 99, Doherty J.A. made reference to recognized “indicia of a SLAPP suit” (emphasis omitted). He recognized four indicia in particular: (1) “a history of the plaintiff using litigation or the threat of litigation to silence critics”; (2) “a financial or power imbalance that strongly favours the plaintiff”; (3) “a punitive or retributory purpose animating the plaintiff’s bringing of the claim”; and (4) “minimal or nominal damages suffered by the plaintiff” (para. 99). Doherty J.A. found that where these indicia are present, the weighing exercise favours granting the s. 137.1 motion and dismissing the underlying proceeding. The Court of Appeal for Ontario has since applied these indicia in a number of cases (see, e.g., Lascaris v. B’nai Brith Canada, 2019 ONCA 163, 144 O.R. (3d) 211).
[79] I am of the view that these four indicia may bear on the analysis only to the extent that they are tethered to the text of the statute and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature. This is because the s. 137.1(4)(b) stage is fundamentally a public interest weighing exercise and not simply an inquiry into the hallmarks of a SLAPP. Therefore, for this reason, the only factors that might be relevant in guiding that weighing exercise are those tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4)(b), which calls for a consideration of: the harm suffered or potentially suffered by the plaintiff, the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue, and the public interest in protecting the underlying expression.
[80] Accordingly, additional factors may also prove useful. For example, the following factors, in no particular order of importance, may be relevant for the motion judge to consider: the importance of the expression, the history of litigation between the parties, broader or collateral effects on other expressions on matters of public interest, the potential chilling effect on future expression either by a party or by others, the defendant’s history of activism or advocacy in the public interest, any disproportion between the resources being used in the lawsuit and the harm caused or the expected damages award, and the possibility that the expression or the claim might provoke hostility against an identifiably vulnerable group or a group protected under s. 15 of the Charter or human rights legislation. I reiterate that the relevance of the foregoing factors must be tethered to the text of s. 137.1(4)(b) and the considerations explicitly contemplated by the legislature to conduct the weighing exercise.
[81] Fundamentally, the open-ended nature of s. 137.1(4)(b) provides courts with the ability to scrutinize what is really going on in the particular case before them: s. 137.1(4)(b) effectively allows motion judges to assess how allowing individuals or organizations to vindicate their rights through a lawsuit — a fundamental value in its own right in a democracy — affects, in turn, freedom of expression and its corresponding influence on public discourse and participation in a pluralistic democracy.
[82] In conclusion, under s. 137.1(4)(b), the burden is on the plaintiff — i.e. the responding party — to show on a balance of probabilities that it likely has suffered or will suffer harm, that such harm is a result of the expression established under s. 137.1(3), and that the corresponding public interest in allowing the underlying proceeding to continue outweighs the deleterious effects on expression and public participation. This weighing exercise is the crux or core of the s. 137.1 analysis, as it captures the overarching concern of the legislation, as evidenced by the legislative history. It accordingly should be given due importance by the motion judge in assessing a s. 137.1 motion.
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