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Contract - Restraint of Trade (2). F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited
In F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a franchise contract appeal, this brought against the lower court's conclusion that "both the non-competition clause and the non-solicitation clause were ambiguous as to the scope of restricted activities, and therefore unenforceable by the franchisor against the former franchisees".
Here the court considers the task of "determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant" as a matter of contractual interpretation, with a central focus on 'ambiguity':[29] The first question in determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant is to determine its meaning as to restricted activities, time and geography. As Zarnett J.A. noted in M & P Drug Mart at para. 36, “a covenant that is ambiguous on any of these matters is prima facie unenforceable … because it is not possible to show, in the face of unresolved ambiguity, that the covenant is reasonable” (emphasis added).
[30] In Shafron, the Supreme Court held at paras. 27, 36 and 43 that, if a restrictive covenant is ambiguous such that the ambiguity cannot be resolved, it is not necessary to determine whether the covenant is reasonable, as it will be unenforceable. Before concluding that there is unresolved ambiguity, the court must interpret the restrictive covenant. The question is whether, when properly interpreted, the meaning can be ascertained, or whether it remains unclear.
[31] The principles of contract interpretation were summarized in Weyerhaeuser Company Limited v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 1007, 77 B.L.R. (5th) 175, at para. 65, rev’d on other grounds, 2019 SCC 60, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 394. A judge interpreting a contract should:(i) determine the intention of the parties in accordance with the language they have used in the written document, based upon the “cardinal presumption” that they have intended what they have said;
(ii) read the text of the written agreement as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, in a manner that gives meaning to all of its terms and avoids an interpretation that would render one or more of its terms ineffective;
(iii) read the contract in the context of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of the formation of the contract ….;
(iv) read the text in a fashion that accords with sound commercial principles and good business sense, avoiding a commercially absurd result, objectively assessed. [32] While the plain meaning of the words used by the parties will be important, the meaning of a document is derived not just from the words used, but from the context or the circumstances in which the words were used. “To find ambiguity, one must come to certain conclusions as to the meaning of the words used”: Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, 85 O.R. (3d) 616, at paras. 52, 54.
[33] The validity of a restrictive covenant can be determined only upon an overall assessment of the clause, the agreement within which it is found, and all of the surrounding circumstances: Elsley, at p. 924. As Dickson J. (as he then was) cautioned in Elsley, at pp. 923-924:It is important, I think, to resist the inclination to lift a restrictive covenant out of an employment agreement and examine it in a disembodied manner, as if it were some strange scientific specimen under microscopic scrutiny. The validity, or otherwise, of a restrictive covenant can be determined only upon an overall assessment of the clause, the agreement within which it is found, and all of the surrounding circumstances. [34] Further, the principles of interpretation should not lead a court to “strain to create an ambiguity where none exists”: Chilton v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co. (1997), 1997 CanLII 765 (ON CA), 32 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at p. 169. It is an extricable error of law for a court to identify an ambiguity where none exists after applying the relevant principles of contractual interpretation: Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, 424 D.L.R. (4th) 169, at paras. 63-64; 1401380 Ontario Limited (Wilderness North Air) v. Hydro One Remote Communities Inc., 2025 ONCA 827, at paras. 42-44, leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested, 2026 S.C.C.A. No. 22.
[35] In my view, the application judge erred in law by failing to apply the relevant principles of contractual interpretation, including considering the restrictive covenants in the context of the franchise agreement as a whole and the surrounding circumstances. Instead, she took a decontextualized approach, identifying ambiguities in the language of the clauses as to the scope of prohibited activities. The question is whether there are, at the end of the analysis, “unresolved ambiguities” with respect to the scope of the activities sought to be precluded, not whether the words, when considered in the abstract, are capable of more than one meaning.
[36] Applying the correct principles, I am unable to conclude that the scope of the activities covered in each of the restrictive covenants is ambiguous.
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[48] To be enforceable, the restrictive covenants must be reasonable as between the parties. The factors to be considered are: (1) whether there was a proprietary interest entitled to protection; (2) whether the temporal or spatial limits are too broad; and (3) whether the covenant is overly broad in the activity it proscribes: Mason v. Chem-Trend Limited Partnership, 2011 ONCA 344, 106 O.R. (3d) 72, at para. 16, citing H.L. Staebler Company Ltd. v. Allan, 2008 ONCA 576, 92 O.R. (3d) 107, at para. 36; Martin v. ConCreate USL Limited Partnership, 2013 ONCA 72, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 123, at para. 54. In the context of a franchise agreement the question is whether the franchisor has “a legitimate or proprietary interest to protect in the goodwill in its … system, including the trade secrets, method of operation, contacts and other benefits that are obtained by a franchisee”: MEDIchair LP, at para. 39. Whether the restriction is reasonable must be considered in the context of “the clause, the agreement within which it is found, and all of the surrounding circumstances”: Elsley, at p. 924.
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[51] Whether a restrictive covenant is unreasonably broad however is not a function of the way it was breached. The issue is whether, when considered in the context of the appellant’s legitimate proprietary interests, the restrictive covenant is enforceable. .... . F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited
In F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a franchise contract appeal, this brought against the lower court's conclusion that "both the non-competition clause and the non-solicitation clause were ambiguous as to the scope of restricted activities, and therefore unenforceable by the franchisor against the former franchisees".
Here the court considers the evidentiary presumption that restrictive contractual covenants are invalid:[21] Restrictive covenants are presumptively invalid irrespective of the type of contract in which they appear because they are in restraint of trade. The exception is where they are found to be reasonable – as between the parties and with respect to the public interest: Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies, 1978 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, at pp. 923-928. See also Shafron, at paras. 15-17, and M & P Drug Mart, at paras. 32-33.
[22] It is at the stage of determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant as between the parties that a distinction arises between restrictions found in employment contracts and those contained in contracts for the sale of a business. Courts have recognized that restrictive covenants in employment contracts are subject to “more rigorous scrutiny” because of the absence of payment for goodwill and the generally accepted imbalance in power between employee and employer: Shafron, at paras. 23, 25. See also Elsley, at p. 924; Shafron, at paras. 18-23; M & P Drug Mart, at para. 34; Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 95, at paras. 35, 39;[5] MEDIchair LP v. DME Medequip Inc., 2016 ONCA 168, 129 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 33.
[23] It has been argued that restrictive covenants in franchise agreements should also be subject to more rigorous scrutiny although they arise in the context of a commercial relationship. In MEDIchair LP, at paras. 36-37, Feldman J.A., citing various authorities, referred to the “recent ongoing debate” as to whether a restrictive covenant in a franchise agreement should be viewed and treated as it is in a contract of employment because of an imbalance in bargaining power or as it is in the sale of a business, concluding that it was not necessary in that case to decide what level of scrutiny applied. She was not required to determine the issue since the focus of the inquiry in that case was on whether the franchisor had a legitimate protectable interest, and not on whether the scope of the restrictions were reasonable. . F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited
In F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a franchise contract appeal, this brought against the lower court's conclusion that "both the non-competition clause and the non-solicitation clause were ambiguous as to the scope of restricted activities, and therefore unenforceable by the franchisor against the former franchisees".
Here the court considers the appellate SOR for restrictive covenant contractual issues:Standard of Review
[18] The meaning of a restrictive covenant, including whether it is ambiguous, is a question of contractual interpretation that, absent an extricable error of law, is subject to a deferential standard of review. An extricable error includes “the application of an incorrect principle, the failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or the failure to consider a relevant factor”: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, at paras. 50, 53. A finding of ambiguity that is made without considering the wording of contractual provisions in the context of the agreement as a whole can constitute an extricable error of law: Orillia (City) v. Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited, 2021 ONCA 291, 32 R.P.R. (6th) 179, at paras. 19, 26. . ITCAD Tech Inc. v. Patel et. al.
In ITCAD Tech Inc. v. Patel et. al. (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here involving a cross-claimed case where the motion court granted to plaintiffs [Patel] "summary judgment ... on their claim for the two months pay that had been withheld and awarded them punitive damages" and also found that the plaintiffs "had breached the non-competition clause in the contract between the parties and awarded" damages to the the defendants [ITCAD] (plaintiffs by counterclaim).
Here the court considers 'restraint of trade' issues:The Restrictive Covenant
The Restrictive Provision
[40] The 2021 Agreement between the parties included the following provision:
Non-Competition/Non-Solicitation: The Independent Contractor agrees that:(i) During the term of this Agreement and for a period of 12 months after the expiration of this Agreement and any Extension, ITCAD is the sole representative through which the Independent Contractor provides services to the Client, and the Independent Contractor agrees that ITCAD has the sole and exclusive right to submit and represent the Independent Contractor for the Request for Services from the Client.
(ii) During the term of this Agreement and for the period of 12 months after the expiration of the Agreement and any Extension, he will not accept work directly or indirectly from the Client without ITCAD’s prior written consent. [41] The 2022 Agreement contained essentially the same provision.
Was the Non-compete clause invalid at common law?
[42] In Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 157, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the following principles that must be kept in mind when considering the validity of restrictive covenants at common law:1. Restrictive covenants are covenants in restraint of trade, which “are contrary to public policy because they interfere with individual liberty of action and because the exercise of trade should be encouraged and should be free.” They are therefore presumptively unenforceable: para. 16.
2. “However, the recognition of the freedom of the public to contract requires that there be exceptions to the general rule against restraints of trade. The exception is where the restraint of trade is found to be reasonable.” Assessing reasonableness is done with reference to the interests of the parties concerned and with reference to the interests of the public: para. 17.
3. Restrictive covenants in an employment contract are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than restrictive covenants in a contract for a sale of a business. This is because there is “more freedom of contract between buyer and seller than between a master and servant or between an employer and a person seeking employment”: para. 19. There is generally an imbalance in power between employer and employee: para. 22.
4. “The onus is on the person seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant to show the reasonableness of its terms”: para. 27. [43] The Consultants submit that the motion judge erred, when he found that the non-compete clause was enforceable at common law. As noted by the Consultants, the test for the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in the employment context requires a court to answer the following questions:(a) Does the party seeking to enforce the covenant have a proprietary or legitimate interest entitled to protection?
(b) Are the temporary and spatial features of the covenant reasonable or too broad?
(c) Does the covenant prevent competition generally, and if so, is this restriction reasonably required for the protection of the covenantee in the circumstances?
Elsley v. J.G. Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd., 1978 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, at p. 925. ....
[50] Finally, far from furthering the right to freedom of contract, which is the countervailing interest in favour of allowing for the enforcement of restrictive covenants, the enforcement of the restrictive covenant in this case was, indirectly, a stamp of approval of ITCAD’s conduct, which involved directing the Consultants to enter into a contract with an entity that they did not want to contract with. This frustrated, rather than furthered, their freedom to contract.
[51] For these reasons, I find that the motion judge ignored the fundamental principles that must guide the enforceability of restrictive covenants at common law when he allowed the restrictive covenant to be enforced in the circumstances of this case. This is an extricable legal error. His decision in this regard must be set aside. Given this finding, ITCAD’s counterclaim for damages cannot succeed. I appreciate that in coming to this conclusion I am disagreeing with the decision of the Small Claims Court judge in 673978 Canada Ltd. v. ITCAD Tech Inc., concerning the enforceability of the restrictive covenant. However, I am not bound by that decision and decline to follow it. . 7868073 Canada Ltd. v. 1841978 Ontario Inc.
In 7868073 Canada Ltd. v. 1841978 Ontario Inc. (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the validity of an licensing agreement, here on grounds of restraint of trade:(i) Did the trial judge err in failing to find the License Agreement was an unlawful restraint of trade?
[37] First, the appellants argue that the trial judge erred in failing to consider whether the License Agreement was void ab initio as a restraint of trade.
[38] On its face, the License Agreement limits Mr. Langlois’ ability to work using his knowledge and experience in the powder-coating industry for the benefit of anyone other than the ACS plaintiffs, even after he stopped working for ACS. Relying on Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 157, at paras. 16-17, the appellants say that such a provision is void as being contrary to public policy unless it can be shown to be reasonable having regard to three factors: its geographic scope, its period, and the extent of the activity it prohibits. Here, they contend that the worldwide scope and restriction on the use of Mr. Langlois’ knowledge in perpetuity make the restrictions in the License Agreement obviously unreasonable. In failing to even consider those factors, the appellants submit that the trial judge failed to apply the proper test to determine if the License Agreement was void ab initio as an unlawful restraint of trade, which they say it clearly was. Although they acknowledged in oral argument[10] that the Shafron test has not been applied in the employment context to hold that contracts of employment, while in effect, are an unlawful restraint of trade because they prohibit an employee from competing with their employer during their employment[11], the appellants nonetheless submitted that the Shafron test should apply in this case based on “first principles”.
[39] Also relying on Shafron, the appellants argue that the onus was on the ACS plaintiffs to show that the License Agreement was not an unlawful restraint of trade and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellants to show that the License Agreement is invalid or unenforceable. I would not accept these submissions. The Shafron decision, on which the appellants rely, is about a restrictive covenant in an employment contract that restricted the right of an employee to compete with his former employer after leaving his employment. The decision also speaks generally to restrictive covenants, for example, those contained in a contract for a sale of business addressing a seller’s right to compete with a purchaser following a sale.
[40] While there is no doubt that restraint of trade principles may apply to a restrictive covenant applicable after the termination of a licensing agreement (e.g., Tank Lining Corp. v. Dunlop Industrial Ltd. (1982), 1982 CanLII 2023 (ON CA), 40 O.R. (2d) 219 (C.A.)), the appellants have proffered no authority to support their argument in this case that restraint of trade principles apply to the License Agreement prior to termination or cancellation in accordance with its terms.
[41] I am sceptical that restraint of trade principles apply in this case. See, e.g. Warner Brothers Pictures Inc. v. Nelson, [1936] 3 All E.R. 160 (K.B.), in which Branson J. held that restraint of trade principles did not apply to a contract which required an actress to provide her services exclusively to the plaintiff film producers. He said, “[w]here, as in the present contract, the covenants are all concerned with what is to happen whilst the defendant is employed by the plaintiffs and not thereafter, there is no room for the application of the doctrine of restraint of trade”: at p. 163.
[42] However, in his authoritative text, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), John D. McCamus questions whether the principle from Warner Brothers should be “generalized beyond the employment context”: at p. 527, fn. 154. This is because covenants restraining competition have been subject to the restraint of trade principle during the term of other contracts, such as certain music publication contracts used by music publishers for young artists and solus contracts used by gas station suppliers. Nonetheless, in relation to the question whether restraint of trade principles should apply during the currency of the License Agreement, I see the principle in Warner Brothers as being more appropriate.
[43] Under the terms of the License Agreement, Mr. Langlois granted an exclusive worldwide license in the Licensed Rights to 786 in exchange for an interest in 786. He sought out his investor business partners, who had little, if any, knowledge of the powder coating industry, so he could grow his business. The restrictions on competing prior to cancellation or termination of the License Agreement were neither unreasonable to him nor contrary to public policy. That such restrictions existed made sense in the context of the business arrangement that was negotiated. Mr. Langlois participated in the negotiations, agreed to the terms of the License Agreement and was not hampered by inequality of bargaining power.
[44] However, in the end, I need not resolve the issue whether restraint of trade principles apply. Even assuming that they could apply while the License Agreement was in force, I am satisfied that the restriction on Mr. Langlois’ use of the Licensed Rights was reasonable between the parties and reasonable in the public interest for the same reasons that I consider restraint of trade principles may not apply. Notwithstanding its broad geographic scope and the limits it placed on selling, distributing and putting to use the Licensed Rights, the License Agreement was temporally limited in the sense that it was subject to cancellation and termination by the Licensor, and restricted Mr. Langlois from competing with ACS only during its currency. It did not purport to restrain him from using the Licensed Rights after its termination and went no further than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of 786, the party in whose favour it was granted: see MEDIchair LP v. DME Medequip Inc., 2016 ONCA 168, 129 O.R. (3d) 161, at para. 38.
[45] As this court observed in Martin v. ConCreate USL Limited Partnership, 2013 ONCA 72, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 123, “[g]reater deference is given to the freedom of contract of ‘knowledgeable persons of equal bargaining power’”: at para. 53, citing Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies Ltd., 1978 CanLII 7 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, at p. 923; see also Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 95, at para. 58. Mr. Langlois was not in a situation akin to an employee, where the power imbalance between an employer and employee demands more rigorous scrutiny: see Shafron, at para. 23; M & P Drug Mart Inc. v. Norton, 2022 ONCA 398, 79 C.C.E.L. (4th) 171, at para. 34. Assuming, without deciding, that restraint of trade principles apply, I am satisfied that the License Agreement is reasonable between the parties and with reference to the public interest.
[46] I acknowledge that, at both the outset and the conclusion of her discussion concerning Mr. Langlois’ and Gary Sugar’s arguments that the License Agreement was invalid or unenforceable, the trial judge stated that the onus was on them to show that it was. I observe that the onus of proof issue may be more nuanced than the appellants acknowledge: see e.g., Martin v. ConCreate, at paras. 49-50. However, as I have reached the conclusion that, even assuming that restraint of trade principles apply, the License Agreement was reasonable between the parties, the question whether the motion judge reversed the burden of proof does not arise.
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