Contracts - Time is of the Essence. More v. 1362279 Ontario Ltd. (Seiko Homes)
In More v. 1362279 Ontario Ltd. (Seiko Homes) (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considers a "time is of the essence" issue in an APS closure:
 The central issue underlying this appeal is whether the motion judge erred in finding that the appellant was in anticipatory breach of the three APS when it faxed the letter repudiating the transaction just after 5:00 p.m. on October 1. The appellant makes two primary submissions on the appeal.. 6844987 Canada Inc. v. The United People of Canada/Les Peuple Unis du Canada
 First, the appellant argues that the motion judge erred in finding that the proper closing time was midnight on October 1, 2020, and therefore, the appellant anticipatorily breached the APS by faxing a letter to Mr. More terminating the transaction shortly after 5:00 p.m. The appellant contends that since the APS contained the “time is of the essence” clause, the timeline for closing was to be strictly enforced and that the respondents repudiated the agreement by failing to deliver the closing funds on the closing day. The appellant also points out that because the Teraview System does not permit transfers to be electronically registered past 5:00 p.m. on any business day, closing funds had to be tendered no later than 5:00 p.m.
 I do not accept the appellant’s submission. As to the 5:00 p.m. deadline, the motion judge held that the appellant’s position was contradicted by the DRA Mr. Tomas prepared and delivered to Mr. More, which provided that if the APS was silent on the time of closing, the deadline for “release” of funds from escrow would be 6:00 p.m. on closing day. In any event, the motion judge found that the appellant could not rely on the “time is of the essence” clause since there was no specific time set out in the APS. I see no error in that finding because it is consistent with this court’s observation in Di Millo v. 2099232 Ontario Inc., 2018 ONCA 1051, 430 D.L.R. (4th) 296, at paras. 31, 35:
A “time is of the essence” clause is engaged where a time limit is stipulated in a contract. The phrase “time is of the essence” means that a time limit in an agreement is essential such that breach of the time limit will permit the innocent party to terminate the contract. Put differently, the mere presence of the “time is of the essence” clause is of limited assistance to courts interpreting a contract where the contract is otherwise silent on the deadline to perform the obligations under the contract. This was squarely the situation before the motion judge.
[A] “time is of the essence” clause does not serve to impose a time limit but rather dictates the consequences that flow from failing to comply with a time limit stipulated in an agreement. [Emphasis added.]
 The motion judge also found that the appellant was not entitled to rely on the clause because it was “clearly not willing to close on the agreed date and terminated the transaction prematurely.” In my view, it was open to the motion judge to make those findings and I see no basis for appellate intervention: 1179 Hunt Club Inc. v. Ottawa Medical Square Inc., 2019 ONCA 700, at para. 14, citing Domicile Developments Inc. v. MacTavish (1999) 1999 CanLII 3738 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 302 (C.A.), at pp. 306-07 (paras. 10-12). In Domicile, this court expressly held that an innocent party must itself be “ready, desirous, prompt and eager” to carry out the agreement in order to take advantage of the “time is of the essence” clause.
 Second, the appellant challenges the motion judge’s finding that it acted unreasonably and in bad faith by prematurely cancelling the transaction owing to delays that should have been expected during the pandemic. The motion judge found that although Mr. More had explained the delays and sought an adjustment of the closing date to allow the funds to be delivered to the appellant, the appellant refused to consider that possibility. The motion judge further found that Mr. More was in receipt of the funds and would have personally delivered those funds to Mr. Tomas’ office, if necessary, had Mr. Tomas been responsive to communications. The appellant argues that there is no basis for the motion judge’s finding and highlights that Mr. Tomas continued to monitor his trust account until shortly after midnight going into October 2, and he determined no closing funds had been forwarded by Mr. More.
 I see no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the appellant acted unreasonably and in bad faith. It was open to the motion judge to find, on this record, that purchase transactions would usually be honoured despite minor delays in the delivery of closing funds that the appellant “pounced on” in a “totally unexpected fashion”. The motion judge accepted that during the pandemic, it was common practice for lawyers to work together to complete the rest of closing steps after the closing of the Teraview System and before midnight on closing day.
 Nor is it necessary for this court to decide definitively whether, as a matter of law, a purchaser can rely on the fact that their counsel is in receipt of closing funds in order to cure minor delays in delivering the funds to the vendor and/or the vendor’s counsel. In this case, once there was a finding of clear repudiation by the appellant just after 5:00 p.m. on October 1, the fact that the mortgage funds were ultimately delivered the day after the closing date is irrelevant because the innocent parties, namely, the respondents, were relieved of the requirement of tender at that point. As this court held in Di Millo, at para. 49, “when a party by words or conduct communicates a decision not to proceed to closing, the other party is released from any obligation to tender in order to prove he was ready, willing and able to close.”
 In sum, the motion judge did not err in finding that the appellant anticipatorily breached the APS before the midnight closing deadline, the “time is of the essence” clause is of no assistance to the appellant, and there is no basis to disturb the motion judge’s finding that the appellant acted unreasonably and in bad faith. I would dismiss the appeal.
In 6844987 Canada Inc. v. The United People of Canada/Les Peuple Unis du Canada (Sup Ct, 2022) the court considered the interaction between a contractual 'time is of the essence' provision and the duty of good faith:
 In Deangelis v. Weldan Properties (Haig) Inc., 2017 ONSC 4155, at paras. 41 to 43, Justice Ricchetti explained why the enforcement of “time is of the essence” clauses in commercial agreement of purchase and sale does not violate the principle that a contracting party must act in good faith:. Ching v. Pier 27 Toronto Inc.
It would be tempting to let principles of fairness and equity direct a finding that a three day delay in the closing in the four year history of the Agreement, is a minor breach resulting in a financial windfall to the builder and, therefore, the Agreement should be upheld.
However, in my view, it would be wrong in law to find that insisting on compliance with a term of the agreement, agreed to by both parties with the assistance of counsel, amounts to bad faith depriving a party of the ability to strictly enforce an agreement where time is of the essence. Such a determination would mean that no party could insist on strict compliance of the term of an agreement because to do so would or might amount to bad faith. This would throw the law of contract into chaos by creating uncertainty in the enforcement of contracts.
Such a decision would also be contrary to numerous authorities which provide that, when a party fails to comply with its obligation to complete the transaction at a specified time and there is a time of the essence clause, the other party has the right to terminate the agreement.
In Ching v. Pier 27 Toronto Inc. (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal made useful comments of the contract issue of 'time is of the essence', commonly used in real estate agreements of purchase and sale:
 I would also add that, though not argued by the parties, even if there was no election to affirm and no election to disaffirm, by default, at law, there would be no election. Accordingly, on the July 30, 2014, closing date, the Agreement continued. Neither party was ready, willing or able to close on that date. As such, the rule in King v. Urban & Country Transport Ltd. (1973), 1973 CanLII 740 (ON CA), 1 O.R. (2d) 449 (C.A.) was applicable. This rule was explained in Domicile Developments Inc. v. MacTavish (1999), 1999 CanLII 3738 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 302 (C.A.) as follows:. Jesan Real Estate Ltd. v. Doyle
In King v. Urban the purchaser was not in a position to close on the closing date; but the vendor was also in default and not entitled to rely on the time of the essence provision in the contract. Arnup J.A. resolved the stalemate by applying two propositions:
1. When time is of the essence and neither party is ready to close on the agreed date the agreement remains in effect.
2. Either party may reinstate time of the essence by setting a new date for closing and providing reasonable notice to the other party. [Footnote omitted.]
In Jesan Real Estate Ltd. v. Doyle (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal noted the effect of a 'time is of the essence' clause:
 As noted, the OPA also contains a clause that makes time of the essence. A “time is of the essence” clause is engaged where a time limit is stipulated in a contract. It means that a time limit in an agreement is essential such that breach of the time limit will permit the innocent party to terminate the contract. Di Millo v. 2099232 Ontario Inc., 2018 ONCA 1051, 430 D.L.R. (4th) 296, at paras. 32-33, leave to appeal refused,  S.C.C.A. No. 55.
 In any event, even if the timing for the deposit payment is ambiguous, Mr. Doyle was not entitled to pay the deposit anytime, as the application judge’s reasons imply. When an agreement does not expressly reference a time for performance, the law will imply a term that it must be performed within a reasonable time: Ju v. Tahmasebi, 2020 ONCA 383, 447 D.L.R. (4th) 349, at para. 20; Di Millo, at para. 38. ....