|
Evidence - Motive. R. v. Singh [religious motives]
In R. v. Singh (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, this from "eight counts arising from allegations of assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement".
Here the court considered the propriety of assessing evidence in light of the complainant's religious beliefs and motives:[17] Evidence is admissible if (1) it is relevant to a live material issue, (2) its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effects, and (3) no other exclusionary rule applies: R. v. Calnen, 2019 SCC 6, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 301, at para. 107, per Martin J. (dissenting in part, but not on this point). Instead of contesting the first two requirements, the appellant rests his case on the third. Citing R. v. Santhosh, 2016 ONCA 731, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 41, he submits that an exclusionary rule barred the trial judge from using the complainant’s motives to rebut the fabrication allegations because those motives were religious.
[18] Santhosh, however, did not adopt such a sweeping rule. Instead of blocking the admission of religious belief evidence for legitimate purposes, that case only barred using it for the illegitimate purpose which arose on the facts – believing or disbelieving witnesses because they are religious or non-religious: at para. 40. That use is prohibited because holding or not holding religious beliefs “does not establish a ‘tendency or disposition’ to tell the truth or lie”: at para. 44, quoting R. v. McMillan (1975), 1975 CanLII 43 (ON CA), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 160 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 167, aff’d 1977 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 824.
[19] I would decline to expand Santhosh’s exclusionary rule to categorically bar the admission of the motive evidence here. Both precedent and policy counsel against doing so.
[20] First, precedent establishes that evidence of religious beliefs may sometimes be admitted where relevant to a live material issue. The Supreme Court of Canada admitted such evidence to establish modus operandi, and Santhosh suggested that it may be also admissible to show a witness’s interest or bias: R. v. Shearing, 2002 SCC 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, at paras. 31, 63, 66, 71, 73-74; Santhosh, at para. 52, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 610, Advisory Committee’s Note.
[21] Another such live material issue is motive. It is important to be aware of all the reasons – both secular and religious – why victims of sexual and intimate partner violence may disclose abuse later: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para. 65; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at para. 183. If a party puts the timing of disclosure at issue by alleging motive to fabricate, the opposing party is thus entitled to show that other motives explain that timing: R. v. Pargelen (1996), 1996 CanLII 420 (ON CA), 31 O.R. (3d) 504 (C.A.), at p. 516; R. v. Brown (2005), 2005 CanLII 30694 (ON CA), 201 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 14-17.[2] Courts have accordingly grappled with “spiritual … considerations that may be preventing the victim from talking about the violence”: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207, at para. 178. Like non-religious motives, such religious beliefs may rebut fabrication by explaining the timing of disclosure: Greaves v. Greaves (2004), 2004 CanLII 25489 (ON SC), 4 R.F.L. (6th) 1 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 9; Zunnurain v. Chowdhury, 2024 ONSC 5552, at para. 231.
[22] Second, two important principles – the truth-seeking objective and state neutrality – confirm that a contextual approach is preferable to a categorical bar.
[23] Truth-seeking favours contextualism over blanket prohibitions. The law of evidence starts from the premise that all relevant evidence should be admissible and prefers case-specific balancing and careful limiting instructions to categorical bars: R. v. Grant, 2015 SCC 9, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 475, at paras. 18-19; R. v. Corbett, 1988 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at p. 691. Admitting evidence of religious belief where it is probative of a legitimate issue and not unduly prejudicial advances this truth-seeking function, while across-the-board exclusion frustrates it.
[24] The principle of state neutrality also prefers contextualism over categorical exclusion. A neutral state “shows respect for all postures towards religion” by neither favouring nor disfavouring any of them: S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235, at para. 32. State neutrality preserves pluralism by fostering equality, solidarity, mutual understanding, and diversity. By affirming the freedom of all to believe or not to believe and valuing everyone equally, this inclusive principle enables diverse people and communities to live together peacefully and participate fully in public life free from discrimination, coercion, or judgment: Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, at paras. 45, 47; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 74-75.
[25] By respecting all postures, state neutrality recognizes the importance of belief to individual identity for religious believers and holders of non-religious conscientious beliefs alike. In the words of Justice Albie Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court, religious beliefs – and, I add, conscientious ones – are “key” to human dignity and “central” to the activities of those who hold them: Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education, [2000] ZACC 11, 2000 (4) S.A. 757, at para. 36; see also Loyola, at paras. 43-44; Mouvement laïque, at paras. 73-74; McKitty v. Hayani, 2019 ONCA 805, 439 D.L.R. (4th) 504, at para. 62.
[26] Applied to evidence law, state neutrality precludes both favouring and disfavouring religion-related evidence on the basis that it is religious. Finding witnesses more credible because they are religious violates state neutrality by favouring religious belief: Santhosh, at paras. 47-49. But the converse is also true – a categorical bar on otherwise admissible evidence simply because it implicates religion risks unfairly disfavouring religious beliefs. In this case, despite challenging the complainant’s religious motives, the appellant did not object to her non-religious motives. Because both motives are capable of explaining the complainant’s actions, admitting the latter but excluding the former simply because it is religious risks creating a “hierarchy of beliefs” that ranks some convictions as more legitimate than others: Mouvement laïque, at para. 73.
[27] Categorically excluding evidence of religious motives for not disclosing sooner also risks disfavouring many complainants based on their beliefs. By sending a message that religious motives concerning when to disclose violence are illegitimate, a blanket bar risks creating an “ideal victim” myth that excludes the complainants who hold those beliefs, denies them the law’s protection, discourages them from reporting, and undermines their trust and broader public trust in the administration of justice: R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726, at para. 37; R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at para. 35; R. v. Kinamore, 2025 SCC 19, 503 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at para. 74.
[28] These harms may be felt most heavily by marginalized or racialized newcomer women like the complainant in this case. These women are often especially vulnerable to sexual and intimate partner violence, they already frequently face serious barriers to reporting and accessing justice, and their religious views are sometimes poorly understood by the rest of society. Adding an evidentiary hurdle that prevents them from defending themselves against fabrication allegations by explaining those views risks pushing them even further to the margins and sending a message that the courtroom is an unwelcoming environment: R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 480, at paras. 61-62; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763, at para. 101, per Martin J. (concurring); Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2022 ONSC 1303, 161 O.R. (3d) 360, at paras. 73, 119, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2023 ONCA 476, 167 O.R. (3d) 561, leave to appeal granted and appeal heard and reserved February 11-12, 2025, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 529; Santhosh, at para. 47.
[29] State neutrality instead steers a middle path that accommodates belief while preserving guardrails. A “secular state respects religious differences” rather than seeking to erase them: Loyola, at para. 43. While trial fairness and the sound administration of justice must be defended, attempting to banish religion from the courtroom is unprincipled and unrealistic in our pluralistic society. Because neutrality is inclusive not exclusionary, the law strives to make space for religious and conscientious beliefs in the courtroom where possible: N.S., at paras. 50-56.
[30] Guardrails against the risks of improper reasoning are, of course, needed. Evidence of religious motives can risk prejudice, stereotyping, and distraction from the core issues. Inflammatory remarks by counsel that mock or belittle religious or conscientious beliefs fuel these risks, as do unfocused detours into the intricacies of religious doctrine. Care is needed to guard against the risks of privileging mainstream views and disfavouring minority views or non-believers: Santhosh, at paras. 46-48; Shearing, at paras. 66, 71; R. v. A.T., 2015 ONCA 65, 124 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 32-40; R. v. Bouhsass (2002), 2002 CanLII 45109 (ON CA), 62 O.R. (3d) 103 (C.A.), at para. 12.
[31] Contextual balancing and careful limits on use supply these guardrails. In Shearing, for instance, the Supreme Court deferred to the trial judge’s careful balancing of the probative value and prejudicial effect of similar fact evidence implicating religious beliefs: at paras. 66, 71-74. Even where evidence of religious motives passes this balancing test, robust use limits remain. Using such evidence to believe or disbelieve witnesses because they are religious or non-religious remains off-limits. Instructions or self-directions about the proper and improper uses of evidence of religious motives can keep the trier of fact focused on the core issues and avoid impermissible reasoning. Inflammatory remarks by counsel should be corrected, and unnecessary excursions into the finer points or merits of beliefs should be avoided: A.T., at paras. 33, 38-40; Santhosh, at para. 50.
b. Application: The Trial Judge Used the Evidence Properly
[32] In this case, the trial judge did not commit any reversible error in his use of the evidence of the complainant’s religious motives. It was open to him to consider that evidence because it was relevant to a live material issue. Because the defence put the timing of disclosure at issue by alleging motives to fabricate, the Crown was entitled to show that the complainant had other reasons, including religious motives, for not disclosing the violence sooner.
[33] The trial judge used the evidence for that very proper purpose, stating that the complainant’s religious beliefs undercut the defence’s fabrication theory. Read in the context of the record, this statement was clearly meant to support his ultimate conclusion that the complainant was acting for reasons other than the alleged motives to fabricate. The appellant’s submission that the trial judge instead found the complainant more credible because she was religious – an argument the Crown never made – overlooks both the context and the presumption of correct application: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 79. Thus, the trial judge did not violate Santhosh’s exclusionary rule. . R. v. Morris
In R. v. Morris (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered 'motive to fabricate', here in a criminal jury charge context:a. The Issues
[27] The principal submission on appeal is that the jury did not receive the required assistance from the trial judge concerning motive, resulting in a charge that was fatally unbalanced.[3] The submission has several interrelated parts.
[28] First, the appellant submits that the second paragraph of the Motive instruction was flawed, and that this flaw was accentuated by the myths and stereotypes instruction. In cross-examination, a motive to fabricate was suggested to N.B. – to get the appellant out of the lives of his family, and thus, please his stepfather. Crown counsel referred to this in his closing address as something he expected defence counsel to argue. According to the appellant, the jury should have been told they could consider whether N.B. had a motive to fabricate and should have been given guidance on that task in accordance with R. v. L.L., 2009 ONCA 413, 96 O.R. (3d) 412, at para. 53. An essential part of that guidance is that the defence has no onus to show a motive to fabricate, and the lack of an apparent motive to fabricate does not enhance credibility. Instead, the effect of the trial judge’s instruction was that the jury was told not to consider whether N.B. had a motive to fabricate and was not told that the lack of an apparent motive to lie did not enhance N.B.’s credibility.
[29] Second, the appellant argues that the first paragraph of the Motive instruction invited the jury to consider the appellant’s motive to commit the offences as “one of the many things for you to consider as you determine whether [the appellant] is guilty.” This was an error, according to the appellant, as there was no evidence of a motive on the part of the appellant. The Crown’s suggestion, in closing argument, that either the appellant had a desire to engage in sexual acts with pre-teen boys or not,[4] was an improper invitation to engage in a prohibited line of reasoning. But the trial judge did not tell the jury not to consider the Crown’s statement, rather, according to the appellant, the instruction invited the jury to do so, as the Crown’s improper statement was the only suggestion of a motive of the appellant for the jury to refer to.
b. Discussion
[30] An appellate court is to adopt a functional approach when reviewing jury instructions for legal error. It must direct its review to the ultimate function of instructions, which is to properly equip the jury in the circumstances of the trial to decide the case according to the law and the evidence. A properly equipped jury is one that is “both (a) accurately and (b) sufficiently instructed”: R. v. Abdullahi, 2023 SCC 19, 483 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 37. The overriding question in the appellate assessment of jury instructions is whether they fulfilled that function: Abdullahi, at paras. 34-37.
[31] In addressing that question, it must be borne in mind that the accused is entitled to a properly instructed jury, not a perfectly instructed one. The charge must be read as a whole; it must be considered in the context of the trial as a whole; and its substance (rather than adherence to any prescribed formula) is what matters: Abdullahi, at para. 35.
[32] The question of whether the jury was accurately instructed is an “inquiry [into] the overall understanding of a given issue in the mind of the jury”, considering the charge as a whole: Abdullahi, at paras. 39, 41. Where the instructions contain both correct and problematic statements about the same issue “[t]he organization of the charge and the placement of alleged inaccuracies within it will inform the overall accuracy of the charge”: Abdullahi, at para. 42.
[33] The sufficiency of an instruction involves two related questions: first, was the instruction required because it is mandatory in every case, or due to the circumstances of the particular case (a contingent instruction) and, second, if an instruction was required, was it given in sufficient detail: Abdullahi, at para. 46. When a particular instruction is required, it is an error of law to omit it: Abdullahi, at para. 49. Whether a required instruction has been given in sufficient detail must be assessed in the context of the charge as a whole: Abdullahi, at para. 53. The question is whether enough, not whether all, has been said to sufficiently equip the jury with what it needs to consider: Abdullahi, at para. 56.
[34] Counsel’s closing arguments may be relevant to the assessment of the instructions. On the one hand they may fill gaps in the judge’s review of the evidence, although they cannot replace an accurate and sufficient instruction on the law by the trial judge, from whom the jury has been told to take the law. On the other hand, sometimes an argument of counsel, or a problematic statement, will support the need for the trial judge to give a specific instruction to the jury or to tell them to disregard counsel’s statement: Abdullahi, at paras. 63-65.
[35] The failure of counsel to request a specific inclusion in the instruction, or to object to what has been included, can be a relevant consideration, but it is not determinative, as the responsibility for the charge lies with the trial judge: Abdullahi, at para. 67. Counsel’s silence may reinforce the conclusion that a contingent instruction was not required, or that, when read as a whole, the charge was accurate. Counsel’s silence may be particularly significant where the decision not to object was tactical: Abdullahi, at paras. 68-69.
i. The Motive to Fabricate Instruction
[36] The motive to fabricate instruction in this case was as follows:[s]imilarly, in deciding this case, a motive to fabricate by the complainant [N.B.] is not one of the essential elements in this case which needs to be established in deciding the guilt or innocence of the [appellant]. You do not need to answer the question “why would [N.B.] lie” or find that he had no motive to fabricate in deciding this case. [37] The appellant argues that this instruction was flawed because it essentially told the jury not to consider whether N.B. had a motive to fabricate, and they were not told that the absence of an apparent motive to fabricate did not enhance N.B.’s credibility.
[38] I do not accept that there was any basis on which the jury should have been instructed to consider whether N.B. had a motive to fabricate. Neither L.L. nor R. v. Reves, 2025 ABCA 5, 81 Alta. L.R. (7th) 238, relied on by the appellant, support that submission.
[39] In L.L., this court was concerned with a case in which “[s]everal witnesses gave evidence about the complainant’s relationship with the [accused] and about the possibility that she had a motive to fabricate”: at para. 22. Both counsel addressed the jury about whether the complainant had a motive to fabricate: L.L., at paras. 27-30. In particular, in his closing submission in L.L., Crown counsel had commented on the absence of motive to fabricate, stating that lack of motive “is a critical factor in [the jury’s] deliberations”, and asserting that “this woman had no motive to lie”: L.L., at para. 30. As this court observed, the Crown’s comments in closing created two problems – they suggested the lack of motive to fabricate had been proven (an assertion the evidence did not support) and they created a risk that the jury would conclude that the complainant must be telling the truth if there was no demonstrated motive to lie.
[40] The trial judge’s instructions in L.L. did not address the problems created by the trial Crown’s closing, but simply pointed out that it was for the jury to determine whether a motive to fabricate had been established. The instructions also did not address how the jury should treat a failure to demonstrate a motive to fabricate.
[41] Against that backdrop this court held that the trial judge should have cautioned the jury against attributing undue weight to the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate. In particular, the corrective instruction should have addressed:. the difference between absence of apparent motive and proven absence of motive;
. that it was open to the jury to find an absence of any apparent motive to fabricate on the part of the complainant;
. that absence of apparent motive to fabricate is one of many factors to consider in assessing the credibility of the complainant; and
. that the accused has no obligation to prove a motive to fabricate and the onus remains on the Crown throughout to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [42] Reves was also a case in which counsel for the accused had argued to the jury that the complainant had fabricated the allegations and Crown counsel had responded that the complainant had no motive to lie. The Alberta Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge’s instructions were deficient in two respects. First, they did not include a warning that absence of evidence that the complainant had a motive to fabricate did not equate to evidence that she was telling the truth, and second, they did not include an instruction that raising the possibility of fabrication does not shift the burden of proof to the appellant. The absence of an objection at trial from the accused’s counsel to this aspect of the jury instruction was not determinative.
[43] This case is substantially different. A motive to fabricate was not argued to the jury, nor was there a basis in the evidence to suggest the possibility of one.
[44] Crown counsel did not argue that N.B. had no motive to lie; he did not argue that the jury should take an absence of a motive to lie (proven or apparent) into account as an indicator of N.B.’s credibility. This was reflected in the trial judge’s summary of the Crown’s theory to the jury, which did not posit that N.B. lacked a motive to lie. Although Crown counsel did anticipate, in his closing address to the jury, that the defence might suggest that N.B. had a motive to fabricate to please his stepfather, defence counsel did not do so when he addressed the jury. To the contrary, he expressly told the jury that they need not answer N.B.’s rhetorical question “why would I make this up?” and he asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that they should not answer that question.
[45] There was also no evidentiary basis for the jury to consider a possible motive to fabricate. Although defence counsel asked N.B. whether he had ever discussed with his stepfather a desire to get the appellant out of their lives, or a concern that the appellant was usurping his stepfather’s role, N.B. denied that there were any such discussions.
[46] Given the absence of any argument by the defence at trial that there was a possible motive to fabricate, and the absence of any reliance by the Crown on the lack of a motive to fabricate, the trial judge did not err by instructing the jury, in accordance with the defence request, that they should not consider a motive to fabricate – they should not answer N.B.’s rhetorical question, “why would I make this up?”
[47] In the circumstances this raises two further questions. First, was it incumbent on the trial judge to go further and instruct the jury that the absence of apparent motive to fabricate is one of many factors to consider in assessing the credibility of the complainant (as in L.L.), or second, was it incumbent on the trial judge to warn the jury that lack of motive to fabricate did not equate to evidence that N.B. was telling the truth (as in Reves)? As noted, in those cases, absence of a motive to fabricate was relevant, because it was argued to the jury in each case that such absence was significant.
[48] The rationale for the explanations given in L.L. and Reves was simply not present here. In this case, no one suggested to the jury that there was any significance to the absence of a motive to fabricate – the jury was warned away from the issue entirely. Accepting the appellant’s argument would mean that a detailed motive to fabricate instruction should be given to the jury in every case. That is not the law.
[49] Moreover, it is the substance of the instruction, read as a whole, rather than adherence to any formulaic wording, that matters. In defence counsel’s closing address to the jury, after telling the jury they need not answer N.B.’s “why would I make this up” question, he went on to say that he expected the trial judge would instruct them that lack of an apparent motive to lie did not enhance “truth or reliability”. But importantly, he added that the jury should instead “ask [themself] the proper question which is this. Given the inconsistencies and the other features of the evidence, is it reliable enough for me to be sure that [the appellant] committed these offences?”
[50] The trial judge’s charge directed the jury to exactly that “proper question”. It reviewed both the defence theory of inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence and the Crown’s theory of why N.B.’s evidence held together. It reminded the jury that the burden was on the Crown and the appellant did not have to prove anything. It also gave guidance on the assessment of credibility and reliability – guidance that did not suggest that the lack of an apparent motive to lie enhanced N.B.’s credibility or reliability.
[51] In these circumstances, the absence of an objection to the wording of the motive to fabricate instruction is telling – it is an indicator that, when read as a whole, the charge was accurate on the issue of motive to fabricate.
....
ii. The Motive to Commit the Offences Instruction
[55] The trial judge’s instruction informed the jury that the appellant’s motive was not an essential element of the offences with which he was charged, but that motive was one of the things that the jury could consider in determining whether the appellant was guilty. The charge did not go on to say that the Crown alleged a particular motive or point to any evidence of what might constitute a motive for the jury to assess.
[56] As the Supreme Court explained in R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 579, at paras. 130-132, in most cases the Crown need not prove the accused had a motive, as it is not an essential element of the offence. In such cases:the necessity of charging a jury on motive falls along a continuum. At one end of the continuum are “cases where the evidence as to identity of the [offender] is purely circumstantial and proof of motive on the part of the Crown so essential that reference must be made to motive in charging the jury”. At the other end of the continuum are cases where there is a proven absence of motive. In such cases, the trial judge must charge on motive, as the proven absence of motive is ordinarily an important factor favouring the accused.
But between these two poles, “the necessity to charge on motive depends upon the course of the trial and the nature and probative value of the evidence adduced”, and “[i]n these cases, a substantial discretion must be left to the trial judge”. Moreover, “motive is always a matter of fact and evidence and, therefore, primarily for the judge and jury rather than the appellate tribunal” and trial judges “must be given reasonable latitude” in charging the jury. Accordingly, the trial judge’s decision as to whether to charge on motive “should not be lightly reversed”. In addition, trial judges have discretion as to how to deal with issues relating to motive, and “there is no formula that must be followed”. [Emphasis in original; citations omitted.] . R. v. Jaggernauth
In R. v. Jaggernauth (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a defendant's criminal appeal, this from convictions for "attempted murder and counselling to commit murder" on circumstantial evidence.
Here the court considers 'motive' evidence:[76] Ms. Pimenta was without question the target of an attack that had no purpose other than to kill her. The shooting occurred at her home where she lived alone, and the crossbow-armed attacker had no criminal objective other than to kill her. The evidence of the appellant’s compelling motive and his strong animus against Ms. Pimenta were highly relevant in establishing his complicity in the attempted killing: see R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 42, at para. 60 and R. v. McDonald, 2017 ONCA 568, 351 C.C.C. (3d) 486, at paras. 71-72. The timing of the attack followed an escalation in the family law dispute, where, by October 2018 Ms. Pimenta had retained counsel, commenced legal proceedings, and registered a CPL against the appellant’s home. The appellant was in real jeopardy of losing his home and was so angry that he told his manager at work about it, expressing a desire to see Ms. Pimenta dead. And, voicing concerns about “losing everything”, the appellant had reached out to an old friend with criminal contacts, in a serious attempt to find someone to kill Ms. Pimenta. The day after Ms. Pimenta was shot, at a time when the appellant claimed to have had no knowledge of the attack, he engaged in conduct suggesting he was worried about and trying to avoid police surveillance.
[77] As this court reiterated in R. v. Staples, 2022 ONCA 266, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 149, leave to appeal refused, [2022] S.C.C.A. No. 182, when rejecting an unreasonable verdict argument made in a case that, like this one, turned on circumstantial evidence of identity, including strong evidence of motive, it was for the trier of fact to “determine whether the cumulative effect of this evidence – not simply its individual parts considered in isolation – excluded inferences other than guilt”: at para. 123 (emphasis in original). The trial judge fairly and thoroughly considered the circumstantial evidence, drawing inferences that were both available and reasonable, and concluding that the appellant was guilty of the offences charged after evaluating the evidence as a whole. I am not persuaded that no properly instructed trier of fact could have been satisfied that the appellant’s guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the evidence considered as a whole. Accordingly, I would reject the “unreasonable verdict” ground of appeal. . R. v. Booker
In R. v. Booker (Ont CA, 2024) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from fraud and 'uttering a forged document' convictions.
Here, the court considers an issue of 'motive' - ie. the relationship of the absence of motive to lie and credibility:[33] It is well recognized that where there is no apparent motive to fabricate, but the evidence falls short of proving absence of motive, it is impermissible to conclude a witness has no motive to fabricate and must be telling the truth: R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, 375 C.C.C. (3d) 534, at paras. 19-22.
[34] In this case, the trial judge did not make a Bartholomew error. He simply rejected the appellant’s argument of a motive. He did not go further and make a positive finding that Mr. Nabi had no motive to fabricate whatsoever, nor did he reason, as a result of the absence of evidence of a “clear, strong and proven” motive to lie, that Mr. Nabi must be telling the truth. . R. v. R.K.
In R. v. R.K. (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal considered the credibility effect of an absence of motive:[46] A lack of evidence of a complainant’s motive to lie may be relevant to credibility, particularly where motive to fabricate is raised by the defence: R.v. Gerrard, 2022 SCC 13, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 487, at para. 4. The risks lie in confusing an absence of evidence of motive to lie with evidence of no motive to lie; giving undue weight to an absence of evidence of motive to lie; moving directly from a finding of no apparent motive lie to the conclusion that a witness is telling the truth; finding a proven absence of motive to lie when the evidence does not support the finding; or placing an onus on the accused to prove the complainant had a motive to lie: Gerrard, at para. 4; R. v. A.E.S.P., 2022 ONCA 405, at para. 42; and R. v. Ignacio, 2021 ONCA 69, 400 C.C.C. (3d) 343, at paras. 34-36, 51- 52, and 57-58, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 127. . R. v. Megill
In R. v. Megill (Ont CA, 2021) the Court of Appeal considers the issue of a witness' motive to testify:[109] The motive of a witness to testify is a subject that may be explored in cross-examination. For example, a witness may be cross-examined about circumstances that tend to show bias, interest or corruption. The witness' denials may be contradicted by evidence as an exception to the collateral facts rule: see, for example, Attorney General v. Hitchcock (1847), 1 Ex. 91; McDonald v. The Queen, 1959 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1960] S.C.R. 186, at p. 191; and R. v. S. (A.) (2002), 2002 CanLII 44934 (ON CA), 165 C.C.C. (3d) 426 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 32. . R v McSween
In R v McSween (Ont CA, 2020) the Court of Appeal explains the difference between motive and intent:[84] The trial judge also erred in his approach to the mens rea for offences under s. 163.1. The error lay in confusing motive and intent.
[85] Intent and motive are two distinct concepts. The Supreme Court spoke of the interaction of motive with intention in Lewis v. The Queen, 1979 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 821, at p. 831 noting that while often spoken of in the same breath, intent and motive are conceptually distinct. This was again reiterated in in Dynar v. United States, 1997 CanLII 359 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, where Cory and Iacobucci JJ. wrote, at para. 81: It does not matter to society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused's motive was, but only what the accused intended to do. It is no consolation to one whose car has been stolen that the thief stole the car intending to sell it to purchase food for a food bank. See also R. v. Hamilton, 2005 SCC 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432, at paras. 38-45; Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law – A Treatise, 7th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014), at pp. 244-249. . R. v. McDonald
In this criminal case, R. v. McDonald (Ont CA, 2017), Watt JA stated with respect to motive:[70] Motive is not an essential element in murder or in its classification as first degree murder. But evidence of motive is relevant, material and admissible in prosecutions for murder, especially where the case for the Crown is wholly or largely circumstantial: Luciano, at para. 164; R. v. Lewis, 1979 CanLII 19 (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 821, at pp. 833-38.
[71] Evidence of motive is material because it helps to establish two critical components of the case for the Crown: the identity and state of mind of the person who is alleged to have committed the offence: Luciano, at para. 165; Plomp v. The Queen (1963), 110 C.L.R. 234 (H.C.), at pp. 243, and 249-50; R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 42, at paras. 59-60; R. v. Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, 250 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at paras. 51 and 72.
[72] Evidence of motive is a species of circumstantial evidence used to prove, or to assist in proving, a human act. By nature, evidence of motive is prospectant: because a person had a motive to do an act X, that person probably did the act X alleged: Peter Tillers, ed., Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 1A (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1983) § 51, pp. 1144-1146; see also R. v. Yumnu, 2010 ONCA 637, 260 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 273, affirmed on other grounds, 2012 SCC 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777.
[73] Motive may be evidenced by a person’s words, conduct or some combination of each. On occasion, the conduct said to establish motive may involve the commission of offences other than those charged or other extrinsic misconduct: Luciano, at para. 114. The evidence of extrinsic misconduct [SS: similar fact evidence] must be relevant to prove the alleged motive and properly admissible under the rules of evidence.
|
