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Family - Childrens' Aid Services (CAS). J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al.
In J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court grants a motion to quash an appeal, this where the underlying appeal "requests, among other things, an order setting aside the Openness order, Adoption order and Extended Society Care order", this in a child protection context.
Here the court considers appellate jurisdiction over CAS adoption orders [under CYFSA s.216 'Effect of Adoption Order - Order final']:Jurisdiction - Adoption Order
[75] The mother also seeks to appeal the Adoption Order. However, a plain reading of s. 216(1) of the CYFSA establishes that Adoption orders are final and irrevocable and shall not be challenged, including by way of declaratory relief or judicial review.
[76] This is subject to the limited right of appeal provided by s. 215 of the CYFSA which provides that the individuals entitled to appeal are prospective adoptive parents and the Director or local child welfare authority that made the statement under s. 202 and submitted the report respecting the child’s adjustment in the home.
[77] Courts have endorsed this interpretation of the CYFSA, recognizing that it promotes finality and serves the best interests of children.
[78] The strict language of s. 216(1) of the CYFSA underscores the final and conclusive nature of an Adoption order. Finality is central to promoting permanence and stability for the child.
[79] The only authority provided to the court involved a temporary setting aside of an Adoption order in circumstances where the Adoption itself was not really being challenged. Rather, the child protection authorities had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements.
[80] In Bruce Grey Child and Family Services v. R.G., 2015 ONCJ 412, the Court stated:15. Before placing A.G. for adoption, the Applicant did not give the required notice under Section 145.1.1 of the Act to anyone, notwithstanding the legal requirement to do so. Specifically, the Applicant did not give the required notice to the OCL with respect to the access order involving A.G. and D.R. The Applicant made no apparent effort to consider who else might be entitled to such a notice under the broad provision for access by A.G. to “her other siblings” before placing A.G. with the Respondent.
16. Notice not having been given by the Applicant, no person entitled to seek an Openness order was made aware of the fact of the placement for adoption and no one therefore applied under Section 145.1.2 of the Act for such an order.
No one was attempting to change the order or undo the Adoption order but only to allow the court to consider whether there ought to be an openness. So the court ordered:
Adoption Order dated March 20th, 2013, at Orangeville, wherein the Respondent adopted the child now known as A.G. is accordingly temporarily set aside pending the service of the said notices and the hearing of any applications for Openness orders that may be made after service of the said notices, as if the child A.G. had not yet been placed for adoption. [81] In Bruce Grey, no party sought to set aside or challenge the Adoption order itself. Rather, the temporary order was made to permit the Court to consider whether an Openness order ought to have been pursued after the required statutory notices had been provided.
[82] Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an adoption order. . J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al.
In J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court grants a motion to quash an appeal, this where the underlying appeal "requests, among other things, an order setting aside the Openness order, Adoption order and Extended Society Care order", this in a child protection context.
Here the court considers it's jurisdiction to hear appeals from 'extended society care orders':Jurisdiction - Extended Society Care Order
[62] On January 27, 2021, the Divisional Court disposed of the appeal of the Extended Society Care order.
[63] Any further appeal from the Divisional Court lies to the Court of Appeal, and the mother would be required to obtain an extension of time to appeal.
[64] Section 121(5) of the CYFSA prohibits an extension of time where the child has been placed for adoption.
[65] In Kenora Patricia Child and Family Services v. S., [2004] O.J. 768, at para. 2, the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue and emphasized that the legislative intent is clear. Once an adoption has been finalized, the Court will not extend the time for appealing a Crown wardship order.
[66] However, the case of A.M. v. Chatham Kent Integrated Children’s Services, 2007 ONCA 411 is instructive.
[67] The case concerned the appellant's attempt to challenge a Crown wardship order and suspend a final adoption order for a child who was apprehended by the Chatham Kent Children’s Aid Society (CAS) shortly after birth due to the mother’s inability to care for him. The appellant, later confirmed as child’s biological father, sought to assume custody but failed to act promptly despite multiple warnings and opportunities provided by the CAS. The child was ultimately placed for adoption, and the adoption order was finalized.
[68] In the Ontario Court of Justice, the court granted the appellant status as a parent to move to set aside the Crown wardship order but this was overturned on appeal to Superior Court.
[69] At the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued that the Crown wardship order should be set aside due to inadequate notice and alleged misconduct by the CAS, including claims of fraud. The appellant sought to suspend the adoption order and assume custody of the child.
[70] The children’s services, argued that the appellant was given adequate notice and opportunities to challenge the Crown wardship order and present a parenting plan. The CAS argued that it acted within its statutory mandate and in the best interests of the child.
[71] The Court of Appeal held that the appellant could not challenge the Crown wardship order or set aside the final adoption order on the following basis:- There was a statutory bar as Section 157(1) of the Child and Family Services Act (previous legislation prior to the CYFSA) precludes any review or challenge to a final adoption order, except through appeal. The appellant was also barred by section 64(9) from bringing a status review application after F.M. was placed for adoption.
- The Court found no evidence of fraud or deliberate misconduct by the CAS. The CAS acted within its statutory mandate, provided the appellant with adequate notice, and gave him reasonable opportunities to challenge the Crown wardship order and present a parenting plan. The appellant failed to act in a timely manner despite repeated warnings.
. The Court emphasized that the CAS acted in the best interests of the child by proceeding with the adoption when the appellant did not meet deadlines or demonstrate stability. The appellant’s delay and lack of action undermined his case.
. Even assuming the court had inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction to intervene, the circumstances did not warrant such intervention. The appellant had multiple opportunities to challenge the Crown wardship order but failed to act promptly.
. The Court concluded that there was no legal or factual basis to set aside the adoption order and dismissed the appeal without costs. [72] While emphasizing the finality of Crown Wardship orders, the Court left open the possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, the court’s inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction may be engaged:
[18] In our view, in light of s. 157(1), this appeal cannot succeed in the circumstances of this case. We say this for the reasons that follow.
[19] First, as is conceded by the appellant, the appellant was precluded by s. 64(9) from bringing a status review application after F.M. had been placed for adoption on October 3, 2005.
[20] Second, pursuant to s. 157(1), the final Adoption order precluded the hearing of any set aside motion.
[21] While we refrain from determining whether a motion to set aside could succeed in different circumstances, we are of the view that it certainly cannot in the circumstances of this case.
[22] There was no persuasive evidence that the CAS deliberately misled the appellant in any way or that it deliberately ignored the December 22 material or took any steps to halt the adoption hearing for the purpose of circumventing a set aside hearing. We do not agree with the appellant’s characterization of the CAS conduct in this case as “fraud”, a characterization made for the first time at the appellate level. In any event, we see no foundation for that allegation.
[23] In our view, the CAS acted entirely within its mandate in fulfilling its obligation towards the child. Moreover, it dealt fairly with the appellant because it gave him adequate warning of its intention to place the child for adoption and to proceed to finalize the adoption. It gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity to put forward a parenting plan and to move to set aside the Crown wardship order. Indeed, on September 22, the CAS specifically advised the appellant about the October 3 placement date. When the appellant failed to move in a timely fashion, the CAS acted properly and in the child’s interests, as it was bound by statute to do, in proceeding with F.M.’s adoption.
[24] In those circumstances, there is no basis upon which to set aside the Adoption order.
[25] Third, for the reasons set out above, even assuming for the purpose of this argument that the court has inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction to intervene to set aside the Crown wardship order, this case did not present the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so. The appellant had several opportunities to challenge the Crown wardship order had he moved promptly. This is not a case where a gap in legislation prejudiced the best interests of the child.
[73] Even if there is a possibility that the mother could satisfy a court that it should exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction, the Divisional Court has already dealt with the appeal from the Extended Society Care order. The next step would be to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, but she would need to obtain leave to extend the timeline to appeal.
[74] Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the Extended Society Care. . J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al.
In J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court grants a motion to quash an appeal, this where the underlying appeal "requests, among other things, an order setting aside the Openness order, Adoption order and Extended Society Care order", this in a child protection context.
Here the court considers it's jurisdiction to hear appeals from 'openness orders' [under CYFSA s.196], which are orders to maintain some degree of contact between an adopted child and their pre-adoption relatives:Jurisdiction - Openness Order
[54] Pursuant to s. 196 of the CYFSA, a court may make an Openness order permitting post-adoption contact with persons who have a significant relationship with the child that is “beneficial and meaningful.”
[55] Section 196(7) of the CYFSA provides:(7) The court may make an Openness order under this section in respect of a child if it is satisfied that,
(a) the Openness order is in the best interests of the child;
(b) the Openness order will permit the continuation of a relationship with a person that is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and
(c) the child has consented to the order, if they are 12 or older. [56] Section 198 of the CYFSA provides for an application to vary or terminate an openness order before an adoption. It reads as follows:198 (1) A society or a person with whom a child has been placed for adoption may apply to the court for an order to vary or terminate an openness order made under section 194, 196 or 197.
(2) An application under this section shall not be made after an order for the adoption of the child is made under section 199. [57] The only appeal provisions in the CYFSA regarding appeals of openness orders is in s.208 dealing with an appeal of order to vary or terminate openness order. It reads:208 (1) (1) An appeal from a court’s order under section 198 or 207 may be made by,
(a) any person who was entitled to apply for the order to vary or terminate the openness order; or
(b) any person who was entitled to notice of the application to vary or terminate the openness order. 2020, c. 25, Sched. 2, s. 5 (5).
(1.1) The appeal shall be made to,
(a) the Superior Court of Justice, if the order was made at the Ontario Court of Justice; or
(b) the Divisional Court, if the order was made at the Family Court of the Superior Court of Justice. 2020, c. 25, Sched. 2, s. 5 (5).
(2) Pending final disposition of the appeal, the Superior Court of Justice or the Divisional Court, as applicable, may on any party’s motion make a temporary order in the child’s best interests that varies or suspends an openness order. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 208 (2); 2020, c. 25, Sched. 2, s. 5 (6).
(3) No extension of the time for an appeal shall be granted. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 208 (3). [58] Therefore, the CYFSA only allows an original Openness order to be varied and terminated upon an application brought under ss. 198 and 207 of the CYFSA before an adoption order is made. Section 208 of the CYFSA limits appeals to orders varying or terminating an Openness order.
[59] In the unreported decision of Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Halton v. E.M., Justice Trimble quashed an appeal of an Openness order for lack of statutory authority. It was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal, 2014 ONCA 688. The Court confirmed that there was no statutory authority to appeal a final Openness order and that the appeal of the Crown wardship order constituted an impermissible collateral attack.
[60] There is no statutory authority under the CYFSA for an appeal of an Openness order.
[61] Therefore, the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an Openness order. . J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al.
In J.S-R.v. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa et al. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court grants a motion to quash an appeal, this where the underlying appeal "requests, among other things, an order setting aside the Openness order, Adoption order and Extended Society Care order", this in a child protection context.
Here the court sets out some legal bases of Childrens' Aid Societies:[45] In Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. C.(I.), 1993 CanLII 5608, [1993] O.J. No. 2360 (QL), at paras. 26, 30, 35 and 38, the court held that the Society is a statutory actor whose powers derive from legislation and whose mandate cannot be altered except as authorized by statute.
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[47] The CASO must ensure compliance by implementing systemic controls on its employees and that it is accountable to those affected by its decisions. In Finn v. Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society, 2023 ONSC 5495, the reviewing court stated that it must evaluate whether the decision-maker adhered to the duty of procedural fairness by (a) assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and (b) determining what procedures and safeguards were required to comply with the duty.
[48] In B.D. v. Children’s Aid Society of Durham Region, 1996 CanLII 1067, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 297, the Court of Appeal held that the CAS’s actions must be fair, impartial, and properly investigated.
[49] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. B.H., [2007] O.J. No. 2446, at para. 55, the Court emphasized that the society must present all relevant and probative evidence, including unfavourable evidence, so that the best decision for the children may be made.
[50] Where there are allegations of serious unfairness or abuse of statutory power, and where fresh evidence, if admitted, shows misconduct, the court retains its supervisory jurisdiction that cannot be ousted at this interim stage. Section 216 [SS: 'Effect of Adoption Order - Order final'] of the CYFSA cannot bar this review of the appeal on its merits. . Hospital for Sick Children v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner)
In Hospital for Sick Children v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a joint appeal/JR, this against a "decision of the respondent Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario" (IPC) where "the IPC found that privacy breaches had occurred, and that the Applicants had failed to comply with the requirement to notify affected individuals".
Here the court briefly summarizes some duties (particularly regarding party information) of a local CAS:[10] Halton is a designated children’s aid society pursuant to s. 34(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (the “CYFSA”). Its services include (i) the investigation of allegations that children may be in need of protection, (ii) protection of children where necessary, (iii) providing guidance, counselling and other services to families respecting the protection of children, (iv) providing care or supervision for children assigned to its care or supervision, and (v) placing children for adoption: see CYFSA, s. 35(1). Pursuant to Part X (Personal Information) of the CYFSA, Halton is a “service provider” that collects and maintains in its custody and control “personal information” for the purpose of providing its services: see CYFSA, ss. 281-332. For this purpose, the term “personal information” has the same meaning as in FIPPA: see CYFSA, s. 2(1). (In these reasons, a “service provider” as defined is s. 281 of the CYFSA and a “health information custodian” as defined in s. 2 of PHIPA are sometimes referred to collectively as an “information custodian”.) . H.C. v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto
In H.C. v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a JR, here against a CFSRB order limited to ordering the Toronto CAS (CAST) "to provide a letter explaining the investigation and why it was unable to disclose more information gathered in the investigation".
Here the court illustrates functions, investigations and review procedures of a Childrens' Aid Society:[5] CAST is a designated children’s aid society under s. 34(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1 (“CYFSA”). Under s. 35(1)(a), one of its functions is to investigate allegations or evidence that children may be in need of protection. In doing that, it follows the requirements in ss. 119 and 120 of CYFSA, ss. 30, 31 of General Matters under the Authority of the Minister, O. Reg. 156/18, and Ontario Child Protection Standards, 2016, Standard 1, Standard 2, and Appendix A. (the “Standards”).
[6] A person may make a complaint to a children’s aid society. If they are not content with the outcome of the complaint review procedure, they may bring an application for relief at the CFSRB: CYFSA, s. 120. The CFSRB may review the following matters, which are listed in s. 120(4):1. Allegations that the society has refused to proceed with a complaint made by the complainant under subsection 119 (1) as required under subsection 119 (2).
2. Allegations that the society has failed to respond to the complainant’s complaint within the timeframe required by regulation.
3. Allegations that the society has failed to comply with the complaint review procedure or with any other procedural requirements under this Act relating to the review of complaints.
4. Allegations that the society has failed to comply with subsection 15 (2).
5. Allegations that the society has failed to provide the complainant with reasons for a decision that affects the complainant’s interests.
6. Such other matters as may be prescribed. [7] With respect to s. 120(4)6, no such other matters have been prescribed: General Matters under the Authority of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, O. Reg. 155/18.
[8] With respect to the fourth listed ground, s. 15(2) provides as follows:s. 15(2) Service providers shall ensure that children and young persons and their parents have an opportunity to be heard and represented when decisions affecting their interests are made and to be heard when they have concerns about the services they are receiving. ....
2. The CAST Investigation
[10] After receipt of H.C.’s complaint, CAST commenced a community caregiver investigation into the matter. H.C. stated his concerns to M.S., who was responsible for carrying out the investigation (the “Investigator”). As per protocol, the Investigator consulted with the Child and Youth Advocacy Bureau of the Toronto Police Services to determine whether a joint investigation was required. A Detective reviewed the information and advised CAST that police involvement did not appear warranted but to advise if the CAST investigation revealed any criminality.
[11] On April 19, 2024, the Investigator spoke with H.C. by telephone and obtained information about H.C.’s concerns. This was a 15-minute call. She advised H.C. of the investigation process and possible outcomes. H.C. confirmed that R.’s marks were almost gone but he sent photos of the marks.
[12] The Investigator requested H.C. to take R. to the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect clinic (“SCAN”) at the Sick Children’s Hospital. Dr. Yeung of the SCAN team examined R. that day and provided an opinion that the mark could be a bruise or dermatitis. Dr. Yeung recommended that CAST inquire whether the school had started using any new chemicals and to gather information regarding any incidents or injuries that day. Dr. Yeung noted that if they were bruises, they were concerning due to the location and size.
[13] On April 22, 2024, the Investigator had another 20-minute phone call with H.C. who disagreed with the SCAN clinic’s assessment. H.C. complained that the examination was only done with the doctor’s “naked eye” and asserted that CAST should insist on a more thorough examination or get a second opinion. He provided a link to a website about a camera with intense lighting that could see below the skin’s surface that could be used for such examinations.
[14] On April 25, 2024, the Investigator met with R. in accordance with the Standards. This was a 45-minute meeting. H.C. was present and participated in the meeting as R. is non-verbal. H.C. provided information about R.’s experience at the school. He strongly argued that whoever was responsible for changing R.’s diaper used physical force that left bruises likely due to retaliation for an argument H.C. had had with the staff that morning.
[15] On April 29, 2024, the Investigator spoke with Dr. Yeung about H.C.’s concerns about the adequacy of the SCAN clinic’s assessment. Dr. Yeung advised that she was unfamiliar with the illumination technology suggested by H.C. The SCAN clinic did not use it. Dr. Yeung further advised that in formulating her opinion, she relied upon the academic literature and had consulted with other SCAN physicians about the case.
[16] From April 20, 2024, to May 9, 2024, the Investigator interviewed all staff members who spent time in R.’s classroom on April 18, 2024. The Investigator inquired about any concerns about child abuse or neglect, the relationship between school staff and R., any chemicals used in R.’s classroom, the staff’s conduct with R. on April 18, 2024, the interactions between the staff and H.C. that day, and anything that could have caused the marks. The Investigator also observed the classroom and its physical layout to assess the credibility and sufficiency of the information received from the staff. Thus, in addition to the medical investigation and the police contact, the investigation included information from two school administrators, five school staff, an on-site visit, and an inspection of classroom logs.
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3. The Procedural History and the Decisions Under Review
The Verification Decision of CAST
[18] On June 6, 2024, the Investigator held a verification conference with her supervisor. They reviewed the information gathered during the investigation and concluded that it was more likely than not that R. was not harmed by school staff and the complaint was not verified. They considered the fact that the medical assessment was inconclusive, the absence of any observed incidents between staff and R. that day, and the existence of alternative explanations for the markings. If the marks were bruises, they could have been caused by unobserved physical interactions between R. and other children that day.
[19] That same day, the Investigator orally informed H.C. of the verification decision. She explained the balance of probabilities threshold and the fact the public school was to conduct their own internal investigation and would continue to work with H.C. about his child’s safety.
[20] In a letter dated June 11, 2024, CAST informed H.C. that the allegation of physical harm to R. was not verified. The letter was signed by the Investigator, who was identified as a “Senior Child Welfare Worker” and her Intake Supervisor.
The Internal Complaints Review Panel Decision of CAST
[21] On June 12, 2024, the Intake Supervisor spoke with H.C. by phone as H.C. strongly disagreed with the investigation outcome. The Intake Supervisor explained the general nature of a community caregiver investigation and listened to H.C.’s concerns including past incidents with the school. H.C. relayed his view that he had not known until April 18, 2024, that the staff would beat his child and his view that the principal and the staff were collectively involved. The Intake Supervisor advised H.C. about the complaints process but told him it would not result in a re-investigation.
[22] On June 14, 2024, H.C. filed a police report. After speaking with the Investigator who provided an overview of the CAST investigation, the Detective addressing the matter agreed with the CAST’s investigative steps and declined to re-open the police investigation.
[23] On June 14, 2024, H.C. took steps to initiate a complaint to CAST under s. 119 of CYFSA. H.C. spoke to the manager of Client Services, who helps with CAST’s Internal Complaints Review Panel (“ICRP”) process. H.C. strongly advocated for his child and insisted that the investigation was inadequate. H.C. was told the ICRP process would not result in re-investigation, but H.C. wished to proceed with his complaint.
[24] On June 14 and 21, H.C. provided emails about his concerns. Amongst his concerns were his views that the school failed to meet his child’s needs, he was not properly interviewed, and he was not consulted before the investigation was closed. He also complained that the worker on the investigation doubted his testimony and that CAST did not tell him what steps were taken to investigate the matter. A meeting was then held on July 15, 2024.
[25] On July 19, 2024, a letter was given to H.C. outlining ICRP’s conclusion that H.C. had an opportunity to provide information through in-person meetings, phone calls and email and his information was considered. They also concluded that the Investigator had objectively reviewed the information obtained during the investigation and that reasons for the conclusion had been given. The letter indicated that CAST was unable to provide more information to H.C. due to privacy laws.
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[52] To provide context to the assessment of the reasonableness of the decision, the legal framework for an institutional community caregiver investigation requires CAST to:(a) Determine the appropriate response to information alleging that a child is or may be in need of protection within 24 hours of receiving such information,
(b) If the appropriate response is a child protection investigation, CAST must complete the following steps:. conduct a review of current and historical information;
. prepare an investigation plan;
. if information is received alleging a criminal offence, inform police and work with the police according to established protocols;
. interview the alleged victim(s), staff witnesses (current and former), child witnesses, facility administrator, supervisor of the alleged perpetrator, and the alleged perpetrator;
. examine the physical layout of the setting;
. complete a safety assessment; and
. complete a risk assessment if necessary. (c) Ensure the assigned worker has specialized skills and knowledge in the area of community caregiver investigations;
(d) Ensure the case is reviewed with a supervisor at least once during an investigation;
(e) Make the verification decision in a conference which includes, at minimum, the worker and their supervisor and uses a balance of probabilities threshold;
(f) When sufficient information is gathered to determine whether the child is safe and whether there is any longer-term risk of maltreatment, the verification decision is made. See CYFSA, s. 126; O. Reg. 156/18, ss. 30, 31; the Standards.
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