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Family - Hague Convention
MORE CASES
Part 2
. A.A. v. Z.S.M.
In A.A. v. Z.S.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allows an appeal, here where the issue involved "the interplay between provincial family law and federal immigration and refugee laws and obligations in the context of a child’s alleged wrongful retention in Canada".
Here the court considers the "ordering an automatic stay of the CLRA proceedings in the face of the appellant’s and the child’s refugee applications":[1] This appeal involves the interplay between provincial family law and federal immigration and refugee laws and obligations in the context of a child’s alleged wrongful retention in Canada. The question here is whether the court below erred in ordering the child’s return from Ontario to her habitual residence of Bangladesh under s. 40 [SS: 'Interim powers of court'] of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (the “CLRA”), while the child and mother’s refugee applications under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “IRPA”) were pending. The further context comprises disputed allegations of domestic violence that form the basis for the appellant mother’s refugee application and her request that the court assume jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute under s. 23 of the CLRA [SS: 'Serious harm to child'] on the ground that the child would face “serious harm” if ordered returned to Bangladesh.[2]
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[62] The determination of this issue, as framed by the parties, OCL and interveners, depends on the correct interpretation of this court’s decision in M.A.A. It is accordingly necessary to consider M.A.A. in the broader context of the relevant provisions of the CLRA and the IRPA, as interpreted by this court in A.M.R.I. and the majority of the Supreme Court in F. v. N. (SCC). I will discuss this context before turning to an analysis of M.A.A.
[63] In sum, as I explain in the following paragraphs, M.A.A. does not bar return orders under the CLRA in the face of outstanding refugee applications. At the same time, F. v. N. (SCC) does not require the return of a child even where the court is satisfied that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained. Moreover, I reject the suggestion by the appellant, OCL and interveners that M.A.A. mandates a bifurcated analysis, namely, that ss. 23 and 40 be considered independently of each other. As the majority in F. v. N. (SCC) clarifies, ss. 23 and 40 of the CLRA should be considered together:The return order procedure in s. 40 of the CLRA thus starts from the premise that the best interests of the child are aligned with their prompt return to their habitual place of residence so as to minimize the harmful effects of child abduction. Returning the child to the jurisdiction with which they have the closest connection is also understood to be in the child’s best interests. The analysis of the jurisdictional questions contemplated in s. 40, including the risk of serious harm in s. 23, starts from this ordinary alignment of best interests and focuses on factors that would tend to establish, as an exception, serious harm if the child was returned. [64] As the majority goes on to explain, the assessment is not a comprehensive comparison of the child’s life in the two jurisdictions or a broad-based best interests test as is conducted for a parenting order on the merits. At the same time, s. 23 establishes the exceptional circumstances under which it is no longer appropriate to order a return under s. 40.
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(b) Sections 23 and 40 of the CLRA
[68] The parties’ respective positions posit different interpretations of ss. 23 and 40 of the CLRA to which I now turn. What do ss. 23 and 40 say and how have they been interpreted?
[69] For ease of reference, I reproduce again the relevant provisions of s. 23(b) under which a court may assume jurisdiction:(a) the child is physically present in Ontario; and
(b) the court is satisfied that the child would, on the balance of probabilities, suffer serious harm if,
(i) the child remains with a person legally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child,
(ii) the child is returned to a person legally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child, or
(iii) the child is removed from Ontario.
[Emphasis added.] [70] In the circumstances of a proven wrongful removal or retention of a child, s. 40 provides the court with interim powers with respect to decision-making responsibility, parenting time and contact as they relate to extra-provincial matters. I have underlined certain provisions reproduced below to illustrate the discretionary nature of the interim powers of the court and, importantly for an understanding of the permissible ambit of M.A.A., the absence of any mandatory stay or return order requirement, even in the context of outstanding refugee applications:Section 40. Upon application, a court,
(a) that is satisfied that a child has been wrongfully removed to or is being wrongfully retained in Ontario; or
...
May do any one or more of the following:
1. Make such interim parenting order or contact order as the court considers is in the best interests of the child.
2. Stay the application subject to,
i. the condition that a party to the application promptly commence a similar proceeding before an extra-provincial tribunal, or
ii. such other conditions as the court considers appropriate.
3. Order a party to return the child to such place as the court considers appropriate and, in the discretion of the court, order payment of the cost of the reasonable travel and other expenses of the child and any parties to or witnesses at the hearing of the application.
[Emphasis added.] [71] Section 40 appears in Part III of the CLRA respecting decision-making responsibility, parenting time, contact, and guardianship. Section 19 sets out the purposes of Part III. The purposes highlighted in subsections 19(b) and (c) are relevant to this appeal:(b) to recognize that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by judicial tribunals of more than one province, territory or state in relation to the determination of decision-making responsibility with respect to the same child ought to be avoided, and to make provision so that the courts of Ontario will, unless there are exceptional circumstances, refrain from exercising or decline jurisdiction in cases where it is more appropriate for the matter to be determined by a tribunal having jurisdiction in another place with which the child has a closer connection;
(c) to discourage the abduction of children as an alternative to the determination of decision-making responsibility by due process… [Emphasis added.] (c) F. v. N. (SCC)
[72] The governing case on the meaning of and the interplay between ss. 23 and 40 is F. v. N. (SCC). In F. v. N. (SCC), the Supreme Court considered how ss. 23 and 40 of the CLRA operate together and set out an applicable analytical framework for their consideration.
[73] F. v. N. (SCC) involved the application by a father for an order returning the children of the marriage to Dubai under s. 40 of the CLRA. The mother had brought the children to Ontario for a visit and refused to return to Dubai where the family had resided. She asked the court to assume jurisdiction under s. 23(b), claiming that her lack of residency status in the United Arab Emirates gave rise to serious harm due to the likelihood of the children’s separation from her, their primary caregiver, if the court ordered their return. She did not allege domestic violence, nor were there outstanding refugee applications.
[74] The majority of the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s determination that in all the circumstances of the case, the child would not suffer serious harm. The protective circumstances in that case included the father’s undertaking to ensure the mother’s independent residency in Dubai by purchasing property for her in her name. The majority then took the additional step of incorporating the father’s undertaking in the court’s order.
[75] Drawing on the earlier referenced purposes set out in s. 19 of the CLRA, the majority held, at para. 63, that the CLRA operates on the rebuttable presumption that in the case of a found wrongful abduction or retention, “the child’s best interests are aligned with their prompt return to the jurisdiction of their habitual residence unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify Ontario courts taking up jurisdiction”.
[76] The majority further confirmed that s. 23 of the CLRA stands as such an exception because it enshrines “the imperative of protecting a child when serious harm is made out”: at para. 66. The majority clarified that a determination of serious harm under s. 23(b) is not the same as a determination of the merits of the parenting dispute: at paras. 67-68. Section 23 addresses a jurisdictional issue and should be read with the goal of the CLRA in mind: that the decision on the merits is made by the appropriate authority: at para. 67.
[77] The majority in F. v. N. (SCC) noted that s. 40 governs return orders when a wrongful abduction or retention is found and that this provision must be read and understood in the context of the larger statutory scheme that includes s. 23: at para. 93. The majority noted, at para. 96, that where there is no evidence allowing the court to assume jurisdiction under s. 23, the court cannot use its interim powers under s. 40 to indefinitely postpone the return of a child. As with s. 23, the majority explained, at para. 97, that the best interests analysis under s. 40 is different at this stage:As with any decision affecting children, judges should consider the best interests of the child in exercising their s. 40 powers…. However, due to the interim nature of the powers, courts should not embark on a detailed analysis of the best interests factors set out in s. 24(3) of the CLRA[10] at this stage. [Emphasis added.] [78] The appellant, OCL and interveners argue that F. v. N. (SCC) can be distinguished from M.A.A. and the present case because it did not involve outstanding refugee applications. As such, they argue, F. v. N. (SCC) does not supersede M.A.A.’s instruction that a return order cannot be made in the face of outstanding refugee applications. To hold otherwise, they say, would ignore the principle of non-refoulement and Canada’s international obligations.
[79] I am not persuaded by these submissions. As earlier discussed in these reasons, F. v. N. (SCC) provides an analytical framework that is unaffected by the nature of the specific alleged serious harm under s. 23(b) of the CLRA. An outstanding refugee application and its potential extinction is but one form that serious harm may take. The F. v. N. (SCC) framework highlights the rebuttable presumption under s. 40 that once the court is satisfied the child has been wrongfully removed or retained, the child’s best interests generally align with a return to his or her home country. Finally, F. v. N. (SCC) expressly requires that ss. 23(b) and 40 be considered together and in the context of the statutory framework and purposes of the CLRA.
(d) A.M.R.I.
[80] Importantly, F. v. N. (SCC)’s analytical framework and interpretation of ss. 23(b) and 40 are consistent with A.M.R.I. and the latter’s discussion of return orders and the application of non-refoulement principles in accordance with Canada’s international obligations, including the rebuttable presumption of serious harm upon return that arises from a positive refugee application determination. As earlier noted, the majority in F. v. N. (SCC) makes clear that s. 23 creates an exception to the rebuttable presumption that children’s best interests are served by a return to their habitual residence.
[81] This court’s decision in A.M.R.I. confirms that when issues of refugee and child protection law intersect, the principles of one will not oust the jurisdiction of the other. To ensure that the rights of the child under both regimes are protected, judicial discretion is fundamental to the best interests of the child analysis. A.M.R.I. reiterates a balancing of all relevant principles, with the best interests of the child standing as the paramount consideration.
[82] A.M.R.I. concerned the return of a child to Mexico, a signatory to the Hague Convention. The child came to Canada to visit her father. Once in Canada, the child commenced an application for refugee status based on allegations of abuse by her mother in Mexico. The child’s refugee application was determined, and she was granted refugee status. Nevertheless, the mother obtained a return order. The child’s father appealed the return order and challenged the constitutionality of s. 46 of the CLRA. Section 46 incorporates the Hague Convention into Ontario domestic law, including the mandatory return of children to their country of habitual residence subject to specific exceptions. The father argued that the court’s return powers under s. 46 infringed the principle of non-refoulement, codified by s. 115 of the IRPA.
[83] The goals of return orders under the Hague Convention are the same as those under s. 40 of the CLRA, namely, to protect children against the harmful effects of wrongful abduction; to deter parents from abducting children in the hope that they will be able to establish links in a new country that might ultimately award them custody; and to ensure the speedy adjudication of the merits in the forum of the children’s habitual residence: F. v. N. (SCC), at para. 95, citing Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, 1 S.C.R. 398, at paras. 25-27.
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[87] In A.M.R.I., the court grappled with the significance of an Immigration and Refugee Board (“IRB”) refugee determination on an application for return under the Hague Convention. It concluded, at para. 74, that “when a child has been recognized as a Convention refugee by the IRB, a rebuttable presumption arises that there is a risk of persecution on return of the child to his or her country of habitual residence” and that “[a] risk of ‘persecution’ in the immigration context clearly implicates the type of harm contemplated by art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention.”
[88] Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention provides that the requested state authority “is not bound to order the return of the child” if the person opposing the return application establishes that: “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” It is well established that “serious risk of harm” under s. 23(b) of the CLRA is less than “a grave risk” of harm under art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention: Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372, 140 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 58; Zafar, at para. 84.
[89] The court concluded, at paras. 77-78, that a refugee child’s right against refoulement is not infringed by the return powers under the CLRA because of the discretion afforded to state authorities to refuse a return order on specific grounds and the rebuttable presumption of a risk of serious harm upon the determination of refugee status.
[90] Even, as in A.M.R.I., where the child had been granted refugee status in Canada, the court reconciled the provisions of the CLRA and the principle of non-refoulement. This critically undermines the position advocated for by the appellant, OCL and interveners that the mere existence of a refugee application acts as an absolute bar to return. Instead, the court’s characterization of a determination of the child’s refugee status “as giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of a risk of harm” supports a nuanced approach that requires the consideration of all relevant principles.[11]
[91] As affirmed in F. v. N. (SCC), for both Hague and non-Hague Convention cases, the approach set out in A.M.R.I. maintains the balance necessary to protect refugee rights while also respecting the goals of s. 40 return orders. As A.M.R.I. further instructs, at para. 73: “[c]ourts must therefore be alert to any attempt to misuse the refugee protection scheme” by an abducting parent seeking “to gain tactical advantage in a looming or pending custody battle.”
(e) M.A.A.
[92] Through the lens of the applicable statutory context and governing principles, I now review M.A.A.
[93] As in the present case, M.A.A. involved a mother fleeing from an allegedly abusive relationship and seeking refugee status for herself and her children on that basis. The father disputed the allegations of domestic violence and sought the return of the children under s. 40 of the CLRA. The mother asked the court to assume jurisdiction under s. 23, relying on the allegations of abuse against the father as the basis for serious harm to the children. Importantly, the court in that case had a Voice of the Child Report from the oldest child, I., age 11 at the time of the appeal. The child described his father hitting him with a belt and threatening him with an iron. There was fresh evidence suggesting that the child was suffering from increased anxiety connected to the prospect of a return to his father’s care. The application judge rejected the evidence about the alleged abuse from the mother and the children as lacking credibility, finding that the children’s evidence of abuse was coached by the mother.
[94] This court accepted fresh evidence of I.’s heightened anxiety about being unsafe if returned to live with his father in Kuwait. The fresh evidence also included that the mother had been convicted in Kuwait of kidnapping the children and that the father had obtained two court orders in Kuwait: an order granting him custody of the children; and an “obedience order” obligating the mother to “enter into submission” to her husband and “obey her husband”: M.A.A., at para. 34.
[95] The mother’s appeal was allowed after this court found that serious harm had been made out under s. 23(b) and determined that the court should assume jurisdiction.
[96] The appellant, OCL and interveners in the present case rely heavily on various statements in the court’s reasons in M.A.A. In particular, they maintain that the following statement in para. 72 of the reasons is dispositive: “A return order must not be made under s. 40(3) in the face of a pending refugee claim.”
[97] I disagree. This statement should not be considered in isolation from the rest of the reasons and the factual underpinnings on which they rest. When the reasons are read as a whole, M.A.A. does not create a blanket prohibition against a return order in the face of outstanding refugee applications.
[98] To read M.A.A. in the way urged by the appellant, OCL and interveners would be inconsistent with the statutory provisions and the governing principles that I have just reviewed. M.A.A. does not serve to override the court’s jurisdiction to exercise its authority under the CLRA in the face of an outstanding refugee application. This would leave the court in the unintended position where it was powerless to provide the appropriate remedy and protect the best interests of children who are wrongfully abducted or retained. Critically, there is nothing in the CLRA or IRPA that mandates an automatic bar to return orders in the face of outstanding refugee claims. Rather, as F. v. N. (SCC) instructs, a court considering a return order must carry out a detailed analysis of all relevant factors.
[99] Moreover, it is clear, as demonstrated in para. 78 of the reasons, that M.A.A. allows for the exercise of the court’s discretion to the extent permitted under the CLRA:When a request is made for the court to exercise jurisdiction under s. 23 in the face of a pending refugee claim, but the court is not satisfied that the serious harm requirement has been met, the court may want to consider exercising its power under s. 40(2) to stay the proceedings until the refugee claim is determined. [Emphasis added.] [100] M.A.A. did not, however, require an engagement with this discretionary power under s. 40(2) because this court was satisfied that the serious harm requirement had been met and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
[101] The reasons in M.A.A. belie the suggestion that a refugee claim gives rise to a mandatory stay of the proceedings. Instead, when read as a whole, the reasons demonstrate that the court engaged in a balanced approach to the interplay between ss. 23(b) and 40 of the CLRA, consistent with the framework later prescribed by the Supreme Court in F. v. N. (SCC).
[102] I accordingly reject the submission made by the appellant, OCL and interveners in the present case that M.A.A. prohibits a return order under s. 40 in the face of a pending refugee claim.
(f) Conclusion
[103] The existence of a refugee claim does not automatically stay CLRA proceedings or oust the court’s discretion to make an order under s. 40. It is, however, a significant consideration. As stated in M.A.A., in the face of a pending refugee claim, “the court may want to consider exercising its power under s. 40(2) to stay the proceedings until the refugee claim is determined” (emphasis added).
[104] The court must weigh the goals of return orders pursuant to provincial legislation (or the Hague Convention, as the case may be), against federal and international obligations under refugee law, to exercise its discretion appropriately. Where, as here, an IRB decision can be expedited and obtained in short order, this will significantly affect the calculus as to whether a stay or return order should be made.
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[106] As I earlier explained, the IRB decision is not determinative of the analysis under ss. 23 and 40 of the CLRA. A positive determination creates a rebuttable presumption. Moreover, the IRB hearing is in camera and takes into account only the appellant’s evidence. As this court noted in A.M.R.I., at para. 73, as is customary in such hearings, the respondent “would have no notice of the IRB hearing and no opportunity to participate, including no opportunity to respond to the serious allegations of abuse made against him.” The IRB decision will nevertheless be a material consideration.
[107] The focus of this appeal is the scope of the required analysis under ss. 23 and 40 of the CLRA. Its particular context includes outstanding refugee applications and allegations of domestic violence that also form the basis for untried criminal charges against the respondent. The required analysis is multi-factored and fact-driven. The court must consider all relevant factors to exercise its powers and discretion under ss. 23 and 40. . Thomas v. Thomas
In Thomas v. Thomas (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a Hague Convention child custody appeal:[1] Mr. Thomas appeals from the order of the application judge that dismissed his application under the Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention"). At the conclusion of the hearing, we allowed the appeal and made an order that the parties’ son be returned forthwith to his habitual residence in Balch Springs, Texas. We said our reasons would follow and I now provide those reasons.
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[14] While the application judge correctly cited the applicable legal principles relating to an application under the Hague Convention, it is clear to me that she failed to properly apply those principles. In particular, she failed to understand the degree of proof that is required for a proper determination of whether the acquiescence exception in Article 13(a) could be relied upon.
[15] I recite certain principles that apply in Hague Convention cases as they relate to this case. I draw those principles from earlier decisions of this court including Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis (2001), 2001 CanLII 24075 (ON CA), 55 O.R. (3d) 456 and Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 130. Those principles include:i. The object of the Hague Convention is to deter abductions of children and to secure the prompt return of children where abductions occur;
ii. “consent” and “acquiescence” as used in Article 13(a) should be given their ordinary meaning;
iii. Acquiescence is a question of the actual subjective intention of the wronged parent;
iv. The onus rests on the abducting parent to establish acquiescence by the objecting parent;
v. Acquiescence must be established on clear and cogent evidence;
vi. To be established, it must be shown that the acquiescence was unequivocal;
vii. The standard for finding acquiescence is high. ....
[23] There are obvious problems with this finding. For one, citing the balance of probabilities standard is inconsistent with existing authorities that establish that the “standard for finding acquiescence is high”: Jackson v. Graczyk, 2007 ONCA 388, 86 O.R. (3d) 183, at para. 50. It is also inconsistent with the requirement that there be clear and cogent evidence of acquiescence. Clear and cogent evidence does not require a balancing of evidence of the type envisaged in the balance of probabilities standard. The clear and cogent evidence standard is also not established by a finding that the appellant “implicitly consented”.
[24] Before concluding, the application judge proceeds to fault the appellant, not once but twice more, for never demanding that Isaiah be returned to Texas, once again demonstrating that she has reversed the onus of proof.
[25] As I have already alluded to, the application judge never addresses, at any point in her reasons, the requirement that acquiescence is a question of the actual subjective intention of the objecting parent. On this point, I repeat the test referred to in Katsigiannis, at para. 48, that “[a]cquiescence is a question of the actual subjective intention of the wronged parent, not the outside world's perception of his intentions.” The application judge never resolves how the actions of the appellant, even as characterized by her, could be seen to be consistent with a finding that he subjectively intended that Isaiah would remain in Toronto.
[26] I contrast this case to cases where acquiescence has been established. For example, in Jackson, the court observed that, after the relocation of the child, the father had never telephoned to ask about his son. Here, the appellant was not only in immediate contact with the respondent, but he also consistently communicated with Isaiah up to the hearing of the application. The father in Jackson missed several opportunities to visit his son. Here, the appellant traveled to Toronto to see his son as earlier described. The court found in Jackson that the father took no real interest in his son’s life. The situation here is the polar opposite of that finding.
[27] I return to the objective of the Hague Convention. It is to secure the prompt return of abducted children. The Convention establishes “a presumption in favour of ordering the child’s summary return under Article 12”: Ibrahim, at para. 21. The application judge’s decision does not fulfill the objective of the Hague Convention nor does it accord with that presumption. . Dieffenbacher v. Dieffenbacher IV
In Dieffenbacher v. Dieffenbacher IV (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal comments on the Hague Convention regarding family law, here in a motion to stay pending appeal:[11] This motion must also be considered through the lens of the Hague Convention. As Benotto J.A. stated in J.P.B. v. C.B., 2016 ONCA 996, at para. 33:Applications pursuant to the Hague Convention are to be dealt with expeditiously. Continuing delays frustrate the purpose of the legislation, favour the non-complying parent, and postpone the determination of the children's best interests in the country where they are habitually resident. [12] I agree with Hourigan J.A.’s comment in Zafar, at para. 26:I adopt the reasons of Roberts C.J. of the United States Supreme Court in Chafin v. Chafin (2012), 133 S.Ct. 1017, at p. 1027, as quoted in Balev in para. 35:In cases in which a stay would not be granted but for the prospect of mootness, a child would lose precious months when she could have been readjusting to life in her country of habitual residence, even though the appeal has little chance of success. Such routine stays due to mootness would be likely but would conflict with the Convention's mandate of prompt return to a child's country of habitual residence. [Emphasis added.] [13] To the same effect see Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398, at para. 33, where the Supreme Court states: “A clear purpose of multilateral treaties is to harmonize parties’ domestic laws around agreed-upon rules, practices, and principles. The Hague Convention was intended to establish procedures common to all the contracting states that would ensure the prompt return of children”, as the Hague Convention’s preamble stipulates. . Parmar v. Flora
In Parmar v. Flora (Ont CA, 2022) the Court of Appeal considered the international family law Hague Convention and issues of child residence:(1) The principles
Purpose of the Hague Convention
[20] The purpose of the Hague Convention is to secure the prompt return of a child wrongfully removed or wrongfully retained. Article 1 provides:The objects of the present Convention are -
a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States. Wrongful removal or retention
[21] Not every removal or retention is wrongful. As per art. 3 of the Hague Convention, the removal or the retention of a child from her habitual residence is wrongful when:a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person … under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. [22] A removal or retention is wrongful if the child was habitually resident in the country immediately before the alleged wrongful removal or retention. Therefore, habitual residence is central to the Hague Convention because it defines when a removal or retention is wrongful: see Ludwig, at para. 22.
Habitual residence
[23] The approach to habitual residence was changed in 2018 when the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decision in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] S.C.R. 398. The parental intention model previously used was replaced with a hybrid model. The hybrid model considers parental intention, but also the circumstances of the child.
[24] This court’s decision in Ludwig, incorporating the changes from Balev, outlined a two-step process to determine habitual residence. At the first stage, the court is to determine the date of the alleged wrongful removal or retention. At the second stage, the court is to look to all the circumstances, including parental intention and the circumstances of the child, to determine the “focal point of the child’s life”, having regard to the child’s links to both countries and the circumstances of the move from one country to the other. The application judge’s conclusion is entitled to deference. . F. v. N.
In F. v. N. (SCC, 2022) the Supreme Court of Canada considered a child abduction by a parent from the UAE (not a Hague Convention signatory) to Ontario. The case bears heavily on the extra-provincial matters provisions of the Childrens Law Reform Act, and balances the dominant 'best interests' of the child doctrine against respect for foreign jurisdictions - particularly whether the cultural differences in foreign jurisdiction child protection law can be weighed towards best interests [para 49-98].
. Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev
In Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev (SCC, 2018) the Supreme Court of Canada canvasses the nature and function of the Hague Convention [the 'Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction']:A. The Hague Convention
[22] The Hague Convention was concluded on October 25, 1980. With more than 90 contracting parties, it ranks as one of the most important and successful family law instruments completed under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Canada has been a party from the beginning. The Hague Convention is implemented by legislation in every province and territory.
[23] The harms the Hague Convention seeks to remedy are evident. International child abductions have serious consequences for the children abducted and the parents left behind. The children are removed from their home environments and often from contact with the other parents. They may be transplanted into a culture with which they have no prior ties, with different social structures, school systems, and sometimes languages. Dueling custody battles waged in different countries may follow, delaying resolution of custody issues. None of this is good for children or parents.
[24] The Hague Convention is aimed at enforcing custody rights and securing the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained children to their country of habitual residence: see Article 1; Thomson v. Thomson, 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, at pp. 579-81. The return order is not a custody determination: Article 19. It is simply an order designed to restore the status quo which existed before the wrongful removal or retention, and to deprive the “wrongful” parent of any advantage that might otherwise be gained by the abduction. Its purpose is to return the child to the jurisdiction which is most appropriate for the determination of custody and access.
[25] Prompt return serves three related purposes. First, it protects against the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention: see R. Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Critical Analysis (2013), at p. 96; E. Gallagher, “A House Is Not (Necessarily) a Home: A Discussion of the Common Law Approach to Habitual Residence” (2015), 47 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. 463, at p. 465; Thomson, at p. 559; Re B. (A Minor) (Abduction), [1994] 2 F.L.R. 249 (E.W.C.A.), at p. 260.
[26] Second, it deters parents from abducting the child in the hope that they will be able to establish links in a new country that might ultimately award them custody: see E. Pérez-Vera, “Explanatory Report”, in Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session (1980), t. III, Child Abduction (1981),[2] at p. 429; see also W. (V.) v. S. (D.), 1996 CanLII 192 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108, at para. 36; Gallagher, at p. 465; A. M. Greene, “Seen and Not Heard?: Children’s Objections Under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction” (2005), 13 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 105, at pp. 111-12.
[27] Finally, prompt return is aimed at speedy adjudication of the merits of a custody or access dispute in the forum of a child’s habitual residence, eliminating disputes about the proper forum for resolution of custody and access issues: see Schuz, at p. 96; Gallagher, at p. 465.
[28] The heart of the Hague Convention’s prompt return mechanism is Article 3, which provides that the removal or retention of a child is wrongful (a) where it is in breach of custody rights under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention and (b) where those rights were actually being exercised or would have been exercised but for the wrongful removal or retention. Crucially for the purposes of this appeal, the concept of habitual residence is not defined in the treaty.
[29] If the requirements of Article 3 are established, Article 12 requires the judge in the requested state to order “the return of the child forthwith” unless certain exceptions apply. These exceptions can be summarized as follows:(1) The parent seeking return was not exercising custody or consented to the removal or retention (Article 13(a));
(2) There is grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or place the child in an intolerable situation (Article 13(b));
(3) The child of sufficient age and maturity objects to being returned (Article 13(2));
(4) The return of the child would not be permitted by fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested state (Article 20); and,
(5) The application was brought one year or more from the date of wrongful removal or retention, and the judge determines the child is settled in the new environment (Article 12). [30] Only one requirement of Article 3 is challenged in this case — whether the children were habitually resident in Germany at the time of the wrongful retention. And only the third exception remains relevant — the children’s alleged objection to being returned to Germany.
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