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Family - Parenting (2). Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette
In Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a family law appeal, here brought against a "temporary order ... granting the respondent father, Mr. Blanchette, equal parenting time with the parties’ 15-month-old child on a week-about basis".
Here the court considers CLRA parenting orders:The Law: Best interest of the Child is the sole focus:
[17] When determining parenting schedules for children, each case must be determined based on the specific facts before the court. There is no dispute that parenting decisions are to be based solely on the best interests of the child, as considered from the child’s perspective, in this case, a very young child. Parental preferences or “rights” play no role except in so far as they are necessary to ensure the best interests of the child: Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at p. 63-65.
[18] In Ontario, there is no presumption of a shared parenting schedule or equal parenting time: Barendregt, at para. 135. Schedules are determined with the sole focus of the best interests of the child. Any judge who deviates from that laser focus of the best interests of the child, commits an error in law.
[19] Section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act sets out a clear road map to assist judges in determining what is in the best interests of the child. While ss. 24(2) to (6) are not an exhaustive list of factors, failure to consider the listed factors is an error in law. A judge need not address each of the factors in their decision, but it must be apparent that they have turned their mind to them.
[20] Specifically, the relevant provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act provide as follows:24 (1) In making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with this section.
Primary consideration
(2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
Past conduct
(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child.
Allocation of parenting time
(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. [21] As stated above, the list of factors is not exhaustive and none of the factors are given priority except for the primary considerations listed in s. 24(2). No single criterion is determinative, the weight given to each one depends on the circumstances of the particular child: Churchill v. Elliot, 2024 ONSC 1907, 3 R.F.L. (9th) 225, at para. 33. . Houlden v. Ramdoo
In Houlden v. Ramdoo (Div Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed an appeal from an interim order that granted equal parenting time:[17] The parties agree that appellate courts owe significant deference to decisions concerning a child’s best interests, and should “only intervene when there has been a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law”: Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at paras. 11–15; J.N. v. C.G., 2023 ONCA 77 (CanLII).
Analysis
The motion judge did not err in his treatment of the status quo
[18] Subsection 16.1(2) of the Divorce Act gives the court jurisdiction to make interim parenting orders. When making such an order, s. 16(1) mandates that the best interests of the child is the only relevant consideration. When determining the best interests of the child on an interim parenting motion s. 16(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court must consider. These include the child’s age and stage of development, the history of care, each parent’s ability and willingness to meet the child’s needs and any family violence. Section 16(6) of the Divorce Act requires the court to “give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.” . S.R.I.S. v. N.Z.
In S.R.I.S. v. N.Z. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here from motions to change parenting under the Divorce Act [s.16]:[12] In making a parenting order, the court must consider only the best interests of the children: s. 16(1) of the Divorce Act. In these high-conflict circumstances, a trial court must assess the evidence and make credibility findings in order to determine what is in the best interests of the children. This is essentially a factual exercise, and this court is deferential to the findings of fact made by a trial judge.
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The Principles as Applied by the Trial Judge
[13] The trial judge considered the factors set out in s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act as follows.
(1) The children’s needs, given their age and stage of development: s. 16(3)(a)
[14] The trial judge found that the children “have been struggling.” Each makes serious allegations about their parents, but they shift their stories routinely. The trial judge favoured the evidence of a witness who described the children as “depressed and confused,” and as “cheery” pre-separation, but now “shy and introverted.”
(2) The nature and strength of the children’s relationship with each spouse and other relevant persons: s. 16(3)(b)
[15] The trial judge found that the children clearly love both their parents, but are caught in the middle of serious animosity and conflict. The children also have a good relationship with Father’s new wife.
[16] The trial judge observed that the children have a close relationship with Father’s estranged brother, T.S. Mother is close to T.S. and the children spend “many if not most weekends” with him and his family. The relationship between Father and his brother T.S. is deeply strained, and Father does not want the children to spend time with his brother.
(3) Each spouse’s willingness to support the children’s relationship with the other: s. 16(3)(c)
[17] The trial judge found that each parent was highly critical of the other’s parenting, but more so Father of Mother. Mother raised concerns that Father’s new spouse abused the children, but the trial judge found that these concerns “were not supported based on all the evidence before [her].” Father sharply criticized Mother’s inability to speak English and the effect this has on her ability to assist in the children’s education and to find work. The trial judge lastly found that Mother was more inclined to support the children’s relationship with him than he was to support their relationship with her.
(4) The history of the children’s care: s. 16(3)(d)
[18] As noted earlier in these reasons, the parties shared parenting time under the February 2019 order and each party had been actively involved in the day-to-day care of the children.
[19] The trial judge observed that Mother does not work, and so is available to care for the children when they are not at school. She is also supported by T.S. and his family. T.S. described Mother as caring well for the children. In terms of Mother’s ability to help the children with schoolwork, the trial judge noted that they were doing well at school and that the school had reported none of the concerns stressed by Father. However, Father advised us that Mother unilaterally changed the children’s school to their great distress, and that they are not doing well now. This is not a view to which we can give any weight on appeal.
(5) The children’s views and preferences: s. 16(3)(e)
[20] The children both told a representative of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) that they didn’t like the “week on and week off” approach. They said they wanted to live in the same house together. One of the children told the representative that he “feels sad all the time” and would like to speak to someone. Father “has not been supportive of therapy for the children despite their obvious struggles.”
[21] Father argues that he was treated unfairly by the OCL representative, because his witnesses were not interviewed while Mother’s witnesses were. This difference in treatment is not suggestive of bias, as Father suggests.
(6) The children’s cultural, linguistic, and religious upbringing: s. 16(3)(f)
[22] The whole family is Muslim, and their faith is deeply important to all of them.
(7) Any plans for the children’s care: s. 16(3)(g)
[23] Each party sought primary care responsibility. Mother expressed a desire to work as a Personal Support Worker (PSW), but had no concrete plans to achieve the necessary qualification and would still be available to care for the children. The trial judge noted that Mother has the support of T.S. and his family as far as caring for the children goes. Father’s plan of care heavily involved his new wife, A.T., who did not testify. The trial judge commented that “[g]iven how integral A.T. is to [Father’s] plan, it would have been helpful to hear evidence from her directly.”
(8) Each parent’s ability and willingness to care for the children and meet their needs: s. 16(3)(h)
[24] The trial judge found that Mother had been proactive in accessing supports for herself and her children, and that she would likely continue to do so. Father works longer hours and would rely on A.T. to help care for the children. A.T. is relatively new to Canada and does not drive. The trial judge concluded that, given Father’s refusal to acknowledge the impact of conflict on the children or to help them get assistance for their mental health challenges, he is “less able and/or willing to meet [their] needs”.
(9) Each parent’s ability and willingness to communicate and cooperate with the other: s. 16(3)(i)
[25] The trial judge found that neither parent had much ability to communicate amicably with the other.
(10) Any family violence and its impact on the children: s. 16(3)(j)
[26] Each parent accused the other of physical violence against the children. Each was offended by the allegations, and this has continued to impair their co‑parenting relationship. The trial judge was troubled by Father’s repeated allegations that Mother has a boyfriend named “T.” She observed that the OCL representative characterized these allegations as “[t]he use of religion and culture to reinforce shame and control” in an effort to shift the power imbalance between the two parents. The trial judge found that this is a form of family violence, and that it has caused emotional harm to the children as well as to Mother.
[27] On the parenting order, the trial judge largely found in Mother’s favour. Three factors animated her decision most significantly. First, she found that Mother is more likely to support Father’s relationship with the children, and Mother has a positive relationship with T.S., to whom the children are close. By contrast, Father went so far as to seek an order prohibiting a relationship between T.S. and the children, “without providing a child focused reason.” Second, Mother is available to care for the children during the week and on weekends, whereas Father’s work commitments require him to rely on A.T., which is not optimal for the children. Third, Father’s “continued perpetration of culturally specific domestic violence against [Mother]” is a serious concern.
[28] This reasoning led the trial judge to conclude that it was in the children’s best interests that they reside primarily with Mother, and that Father have “regular parenting time on weekends and holidays.” She ordered that Mother was to have sole decision-making authority for the children, but she must still consult with Father. She also prohibited the children from traveling outside Canada until the eldest child turned 16, given the impossibility of enforcing the court’s orders should Mother bring them to Pakistan and decide not to return.
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