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Family - Support (2). Starra v. Starra
In Starra v. Starra (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here brought against "the motion judge’s order granting the respondent’s request to change spousal support in light of his imminent retirement and dismissing her motion for the retroactive adjustment of spousal support".
Here the court comments on the integral role of investment financial planning in our society, here in the family law support context:[26] The motion judge carefully considered the parties’ full circumstances, including that the parties’ net worths are similar. The motion judge referred to s. 19(e) of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2016) to the effect that a payor’s retirement has an impact on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines analysis:Eventually, as we get old enough, we all have to “live off our capital”, to draw down our capital resources to pay for our current needs, especially those without pensions. RRSPs have to be converted into RRIFs (Registered Retirement Income Funds) or annuities. Businesses and farms have to be sold. Interest from investments becomes insufficient to fund daily needs. See also Schulstad v. Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95, 91 R.F.L. (7th) 84, at paras. 52, 60.
[27] The motion judge also considered Boston v. Boston, 2001 SCC 43, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413, at para. 54, where the Supreme Court of Canada explained that, under a compensatory spousal support order, where a pension is equalized by way of a lump sum payment, the recipient has an obligation to use the assets equalized between the parties in an income-producing way for use upon the payor’s retirement. . Starra v. Starra
In Starra v. Starra (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a family law appeal, here brought against "the motion judge’s order granting the respondent’s request to change spousal support in light of his imminent retirement and dismissing her motion for the retroactive adjustment of spousal support".
Here the court considers the appellate SOR for support orders:[25] The standard of review for support orders involves significant deference. This is informed both by the discretion involved in making support orders and the importance of finality in family law litigation. An appeal court should only intervene where there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error of law. An appeal court is not entitled to overturn a support order simply because it would have made a different decision or balanced the factors differently: Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at para. 12. . Obahiagbon v. Nhau
In Obahiagbon v. Nhau (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against lower court findings that "the parties were “spouses” pursuant to s. 29 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 and that the respondent was entitled to mid-range spousal support from the appellant on both a compensatory and non-compensatory basis."
Here the court considers the deference to be accorded family support orders:[7] Significant deference must be given to trial judges in relation to support orders. An appeal court should only intervene in the appeal of an order resolving financial disputes in a family law case “when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law”: Cronier v. Cusack, 2023 ONCA 178, at para. 8, citing Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at para. 12. . Gillespie v. Gillespie
In Gillespie v. Gillespie (Div Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court considered the appellate SORfor family law support:[25] Considerable deference is owed to a first instance decision on support: Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518. As set out in para. 12 of Hickey, the discretion involved in making a support Order is best exercised by the judge who has heard the parties directly. Orders should not be overturned unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong. . Scheibler v. Scheibler
In Scheibler v. Scheibler (Ont CA, 2024) the Court of Appeal discussed adjusting a support order for it's tax consequences:[17] The appellant’s third submission, in the alternative, is that, at a minimum, the trial judge erred by failing to take account of the income tax consequences to the appellant of having to pay a lump sum order for spousal support, which is not tax deductible, as compared to ongoing support, which is tax deductible. The appellant submits that we should therefore reduce the support award by 17.5%, a tax rate which we should be able to discern by examining the appellant’s income tax returns.
[18] We do not accede to this submission. The trial judge determined the amount of support he concluded the respondent should receive for transitional retroactive non-compensatory spousal support. The trial judge was not asked to reduce that amount to reflect tax consequences. The failure to do so does not reflect an error in principle. In any event, we are not satisfied that the record before us would permit us to properly assess the potential income tax consequences. . Scheibler v. Scheibler
In Scheibler v. Scheibler (Ont CA, 2024) the Court of Appeal addresses the appellate SOR for spousal support issues:[10] A high level of deference is owed to a trial judge’s determination of appropriate spousal support because of its fact-based and discretionary nature. This level of deference is appropriate because it “recognizes that the discretion involved in making a support order is best exercised by the judge who has heard the parties directly.” Moreover, “it avoids giving parties an incentive to appeal judgments and incur added expenses”. Further, “this approach promotes finality in family law litigation and recognizes the importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial judge”: Hickey v. Hickey, 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 10 and 12.
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