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Family - Vesting. Schuringa v. Svetkoff
In Schuringa v. Svetkoff (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this brought against a motion judge's order "made in the course of family law litigation, which included two vesting orders of property".
The court considers the jurisdiction to make 'vesting orders' in a family law context:[22] The granting of a vesting order as a matter of enforcement in family law litigation is an exercise of a judge’s discretionary authority, and “[a]bsent an error in principle or an error in law in the exercise of that discretion, this court will not interfere”: Lynch v. Segal (2006), 2006 CanLII 42240 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at para. 63, leave to appeal refused, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 84.
[23] That said, this appeal raises real jurisdictional issues. There would appear to be two possible sources for the jurisdiction to make vesting orders in this case, s. 9 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. F.3, and s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. In this case, the availability of both sources is questionable.
[24] Section 9 of the Family Law Act empowers courts to vest property in a spouse during an application for the equalization of net family property. In this case the parties had agreed on the division of their net family property and therefore no application for equalization was required. In substance, Ms. Schuringa was seeking to enforce the terms of a separation agreement. It is not evident whether s. 9 could provide a basis for the vesting order.[2]
[25] With respect to s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act, although this court has confirmed the discretionary and elastic nature of the authority conferred to issue vesting orders, it has also made clear that in the family law context at least, s. 100 is an enforcement provision permitting vesting orders to be made relating to existing interests or payment obligations. In Lynch, at para. 32, Blair J.A. stated:I agree with the appellants that the onus is on the person seeking such an order to establish that it is appropriate. As a vesting order — in the family law context, at least — is in the nature of an enforcement order, the court will need to be satisfied (as the trial judge was here) that the previous conduct of the person obliged to pay, and his or her reasonably anticipated future behaviour, indicate that the payment order will not likely be complied with in the absence of more intrusive provisions [.] Thus, the spouse seeking the vesting order will have already established a payment liability on the part of the other spouse and the amount of that liability, and will need to persuade the court that the vesting order is necessary to ensure compliance with the obligation. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] . Chapman v. Ing
In Chapman v. Ing (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considers the role of family-business law vesting orders:(5) Vesting Order
[39] The respondent requested that this court issue a vesting order transferring her title in the Wyandotte property. A vesting order is essentially an equitable remedy designed to work as an enforcement mechanism. The court has a broad discretion, and the determination of whether such an order should issue depends on the factual matrix before it.
[40] Here, the respondent has already established her entitlement to the property, conditional upon payment of $39,000 to the appellant. The trial judge ordered that “[t]he effective date of the transfer of shares from Chapman to Ing will be deemed to be the date of separation (November 27, 2016), and the payment shall occur as soon as practicable, and no later than 60 days from the release of this decision”. In her later costs decision, the trial judge awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $193,381.13, all-inclusive. The costs award was offset by, among other things, the $39,000 to be paid by the respondent to the appellant. Therefore, the condition precedent for the transfer of the appellant’s shares has been satisfied and a vesting order should properly issue.
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