|
Indigenous - Child Welfare. Canada (Attorney General) v. Fisher River Cree Nation
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Fisher River Cree Nation (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against "the order of the Federal Court .... certifying as a class proceeding the action brought by the respondent First Nations".
Here the court, in the process of justifying it's class proceeding 'preferable procedure' conclusion, reviews the recent (post-1991) history of indigenous child welfare in Canada:[24] While the matter could be remitted to the Federal Court for redetermination, this Court is entitled under subparagraph 52(b)(i) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, to give the judgment that the Federal Court should have given. In determining to decide the certification motion rather than send it back to the Federal Court, I have considered the factors outlined in Doan v. Clearview AI Inc. 2025 FCA 133 at para. 44. In my view, the decision of the majority of this Court in Canada v. Stonechild, 2025 FCA 105 (leave to the Supreme Court of Canada has been sought, File 41960) is determinative of the outcome. Although neither the parties nor the certification judge had the benefit of the decision, the parties did have the opportunity to make submissions on the very same issue that was before this Court in Stonechild. Stonechild’s application was also fully argued before this Court.
[25] In Stonechild, the Federal Court had certified a class proceeding brought on behalf of off-reserve children and their families. The claim was seeking to hold the government of Canada liable for its role between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 2019, in allowing Indigenous children who were in state care to be placed in non-Indigenous homes and in the care of families that were not part of their Indigenous group, community, or people, thus resulting in their loss of identity, culture and family.
[26] The majority of this Court set aside the Federal Court’s decision on the basis that "“[t]he preferable procedure for [the] claim [was] a proceeding before a court with jurisdiction to compel the production of documents from the provinces, territories and child welfare authorities who were … de facto responsible, for the delivery of child services to off-reserve Indigenous children …and that [could], if appropriate, apportion liability between the provinces, their agencies and Canada”" (Stonechild at paras. 5, 17).
[27] The majority of this Court found that the certification judge had "“erred in not recognizing, at the level of legal principle, the immunity of the provincial crown from discovery in a Federal Court proceeding where the province is not a party”" (Stonechild at paras. 16-19). It added that where there "“are well-established jurisdictional limitations on the power of a court to compel the production of documents that a party asserts are essential to its defence or are necessary for an apportionment of liability, and there is a court with jurisdiction to compel production, it is difficult to see how proceedings in the former court can be the preferable procedure”" (Stonechild at para. 22).
[28] In turning its mind to the compellability of the child welfare agencies, the majority of this Court acknowledged that non-parties who do not benefit from common law immunity could be compelled pursuant to Rules 233 and 238 of the Federal Courts Rules. However, it also noted that the enforceability of a third-party production order against provincial child welfare agencies would depend on their status as either the Crown, a Crown agent or corporation, and that the answer to this question could be different in each province, which in turn would have an impact on the evidence before the court, its manageability and fairness (Stonechild at para. 23).
[29] In my view, the same considerations apply to this proposed class proceeding.
[30] As stated above, the respondent First Nations are seeking compensation for the collective harms suffered as a result of the removal of First Nations children from their lands and communities. In essence, they claim that the apprehension, placement and overrepresentation of First Nations children in child welfare, both on and off reserve, as well as the failure to provide essential services causing their members to move away from the community, made it impossible for those children to maintain their connection with their families and their communities, thus causing the collective loss of language, culture and tradition for the respondent First Nations. They hold Canada responsible for this loss.
[31] Despite the collective nature of the claim and the exclusion from the claim of the individual children and families personally affected by the removals, I agree with the Attorney General that it is the provision of child and family welfare services that lies at the heart of the proceeding.
[32] Prior to the adoption of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, the provinces and territories generally had primary jurisdiction over child and family welfare services, with each province and territory having its own legislation and standards. This is acknowledged by the respondent First Nations (AB at 58-119, Amended statement of claim at para. 45). Indeed, in their amended statement of claim, the respondent First Nations refer to the involvement of the provinces and territories in the provision of these services, particularly when describing Canada’s "“impugned conduct”".
[33] Notably, the respondent First Nations submit the following:a) "“Canada chose to altogether ignore its constitutional and other legal responsibilities with respect to the First Nations who do not meet Canada’s definition of ordinary residence on a Reserve, and simply left those children and families to their fate at the hands of highly discriminatory provincial child welfare services”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 55);
b) "“With respect to First Nations ordinarily resident on a Reserve, Canada required FNCFS Agencies to use provincial/territorial child welfare laws as a condition of funding”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 56). [34] Some of the shortcomings they allege against Canada in its approach in designing its funding channels include the following:a) providing "“inadequate funding for essential programs and services, and inadequate funding to align services with standards set by provincial or territorial legislation”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 62(g));
b) leaving the fate of First Nations children and families who did not meet Canada’s parameters of the FNCFS Program "“at the hands of provinces and territories”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 62(j)). [35] The respondent First Nations also rely on some of the findings of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2, which found:a) "“The inadequate fixed funding hindered the ability of FNCFS Agencies to provide provincially/territorially mandated child-welfare services”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 71(a));
b) "“Canada failed to update agreements with some provinces/territories to ensure that First Nations children and families received adequate and non-discriminatory child and family services”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 71(f));
c) "“Canada arbitrarily chose to leave many First Nations children and families to their fate at the hands of the provinces and territories”" (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 89). [36] Likewise, in addressing Canada’s specific duties, the respondent First Nations submit that Canada could not delegate its fiduciary responsibilities to First Nations children and families off reserve to the provinces and territories and that Canada "“remains responsible for the consequences of its actions and interactions with the provinces and territories”" affecting First Nations interests (my emphasis) (Amended statement of claim at para. 110).
[37] These excerpts from the amended statement of claim clearly demonstrate a link between the provinces and territories, the provision of the child and family welfare services and the impugned conduct for which Canada is being held liable.
[38] Moreover, the two program manuals that address FNCFS that were included in the appeal book, further illustrate the role of the provinces and territories in the provision of child welfare services, including services to children living on reserve. Provincial and territorial involvement is reflected in several components of the FNCFS program, which likewise lies at the heart of the respondent First Nations’ claim.
[39] The FNCFS National Program Manual, dated May 2005 and which is found at page 4948 of the appeal book, begins by providing a brief description of the history behind the adoption of the program in 1991. It explains that in 1965, Canada entered into an agreement with the province of Ontario whereby social services would be extended to First Nations communities on an equal basis to those provided to other provincial residents. Canada undertook to reimburse a portion of the costs to Ontario in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Other provinces also entered into bilateral agreements with Canada. In some cases, Canada entered into informal arrangements with bands and tribal councils, reimbursing caregivers for the placement of the children (AB at 4956, ss. 1.1.3-1.1.4).
[40] As First Nations services began to expand, mostly in an unregulated manner, a moratorium was placed on the expansion of child and family services agencies. In 1990, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) was granted the authority to create a national FNCFS program, as reflected in the National Program Directive 20-1 Chapter 5 (AB at 4957, s.1.1.6).
[41] Under the authorities provided, FNCFS agencies would operate and manage child and family services on reserve. While Canada would provide funding on behalf of the First Nations children ordinarily resident on the reserve, the provinces and territories would mandate and regulate the agencies according to provincial or territorial legislation and standards (AB at 4957, s.1.1.6).
[42] The FNCFS National Program Manual further informs that the "“primary objective of the FNCFS program [was] to support culturally appropriate child and family services for Indian children and families resident on reserve or [o]rdinarily [r]esident [o]n [r]eserve, in the best interest of the child, in accordance with the legislation and standards of the reference province”" (AB at 4958, s. 1.3.2). FNCFS "“[would] be managed and operated by provincially mandated First Nations organizations (Recipients)”" that "“[would] manage the program in accordance with provincial or territorial legislation and standards”" with Canada providing the funding in accordance with its authorities (AB at 4958-4959, s.1.3.4). Moreover, "“First Nation agencies and other Recipients [were required to] ensure that all persons [o]rdinarily [r]esident on [r]eserve and within their Catchment Area [would] receive a full range of child and family services reasonably comparable to those provided off reserve by the reference province or territory”" (AB at 4959, s.1.3.7).
[43] In describing the roles and responsibilities of the various parties, the FNCFS National Program Manual provides that the role of the Recipients was to deliver the FNCFS program in accordance with provincial legislation and standards while adhering to the terms and conditions of their funding agreements. They were required to adhere to the terms and conditions of tripartite or dual bilateral agreements, maintain records of their operations as required in their agreements, involve the INAC regions and the reference province or territory on issues that arose and to participate and take a lead in tripartite discussions with INAC and the province or territory (AB at 4962, s.1.5.4).
[44] As for the role of the provinces and territories, the FNCFS National Program Manual specifies that they were responsible for mandating Recipients in accordance with provincial or territorial legislation and standards, regulating them in their activities as they related to the legislation and standards, providing them oversight and taking action when requirements were not met, participating in tripartite activities and, applying the legislation and standards for child and family services equally to all residents of the province or territory, both on and off reserve (AB at 4962, s.1.5.5).
[45] It further provides that costs related to maintaining a child in alternate care would be reimbursed in accordance with provincially established rates and standards (AB at 4968, s.2.3).
[46] Finally, the FNCFS National Program Manual provides for the adoption of tripartite and bilateral agreements while acknowledging that circumstances could vary due to variations in provincial or territorial legislations and standards (AB at 4978-4979, ss.4.1-4.3). Where a FNCFS Recipient did not exist, provinces and territories were responsible for providing service to the entire on-reserve population, subject to reimbursement by INAC for those items that have been agreed to in a federal-provincial-territorial agreement (AB at 4981, s.4.6.1).
[47] Likewise, the National Social Programs Manual, which was published in 2012 and replaced five stand-alone national manuals including the one on FNCFS and which is found at page 5295 of the appeal book, also recognizes the role and involvement of the provinces in the provision of child and family services. The FNCFS agencies continue to receive their authority to provide child welfare services on reserve through delegation by the provinces, which services must be delivered in accordance with provincial legislation and standards (AB at 5324, ss. 1.1-1.2, and at 5331, s. 4.1).
[48] As can be seen, the FNCFS National Program Manual (2005) and the National Social Programs Manual (2012) clearly establish, in my view, the existence of a connection between Canada’s impugned conduct, the provinces and territories, and the provincially mandated child welfare agencies.
[49] Given the above, I am of the view that the provinces, territories and provincially mandated child welfare agencies are essential participants in the fair resolution of the claims advanced by the respondent First Nations. While the respondent First Nations may choose to assert their claim solely against Canada, the context in which they have presented their claim is such that Canada is entitled to proceed in a court where all necessary parties can be compelled to appear or to produce evidence.
[50] I recognize that in 2024, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5). The statute reinforces the authority of Indigenous governing bodies to enact and enforce their own child and family services laws, which shall prevail in the event of conflict or inconsistency with either federal or provincial laws or regulations respecting child and family services.
[51] However, the respondent First Nations are claiming for wrongs that are alleged to have occurred, for the most part, prior to 2019, and starting in 1991. As a result, Canada’s impugned conduct will have to be assessed against the proper jurisdictional context, which as the majority of this Court noted in Stonechild, includes hundreds of pieces of legislation, regulations and policies in force at various times during the proposed class period which could have an impact on the underlying class proceeding (Stonechild at para. 6).
[52] As result, it is clear that the proposed class proceeding is not the preferable procedure for disposing of the underlying action against Canada. The preferable procedure is one where the court can compel the participation of the provinces, territories and provincially mandated agencies that were responsible for the administration and delivery of child and family services to all Indigenous children, both on and off reserve. That said, my conclusion should not be construed as having decided that the subject-matter of the proposed class proceeding is justiciable, or that it does not involve core public policy decisions that fall within the legislative sphere of authority and are more appropriately examined through public inquiries (British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Neal, 2026 BCCA 391 and BM v. Ontario, 2025 ONSC 4575). . Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region v. R.C.
In Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region v. R.C. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, here brought against a motion judge's finding that "H.C. was an FNIM child" where 'FNIM' means First Nations, Inuit or Métis.
Here the court reviews CYFSA law regarding FNIM children:[1] Section 1 of Ontario Regulation 155/18 made pursuant to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14 (“CYFSA”) sets out the criteria for determining when a child in need of protection is a First Nations, Inuit or Métis (“FNIM”) child, which can have an impact on what orders are subsequently made in relation to the child. Section 1(a) and (b) provide that a child is an FNIM child in certain circumstances, such as when the child identifies as an FNIM child or is identified as such by a parent, or is a member of or identifies with an FNIM community. Section 1(c) provides that if “it cannot be determined under clause (a) or (b)” whether the child is an FNIM child, the finding can be made if a relative or sibling of the child identifies as an FNIM person or there is a close connection between the child and an FNIM community.
[2] H.C. is a young child in need of protection. Neither of his parents identify themselves or him as FNIM people and he is not a member of an FNIM community. However, H.C. has a half-brother with whom he has a close bond who does identify as an FNIM person. Based on this, a family court judge found on a motion that H.C. was an FNIM child.
....
A. The Statutory Scheme
(i) Requirement for Identification
[6] Section 81(1) of the CYFSA provides that a children’s aid society can apply to a court for a determination that a child is in need of protection. Such a determination can have profound implications for the child, including becoming a ward of the Crown or permanently adopted.
[7] Section 90(2)(b) of the CYFSA provides that one of the first things a court must do upon receiving an application brought pursuant to s. 81(1) is to determine “whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child and, if so, the child’s bands and First Nations, Inuit or Métis communities.”
(ii) Implications of Identification
[8] A finding that a child is an FNIM child has significant implications. It may engage the provisions of the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, (“the Federal Act”), s. 16 of which creates priority requirements for the placement of children in need of protection. Other implications were described in Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. N.P., 2019 ONSC 893, at para. 10:A child’s identification as First Nations, whether or not a member of a band or First Nations community, is important as there are many considerations under the CYFSA with respect to First Nations children. For example:1. The preamble to the legislation recognizes the importance of a child identifying with or belonging to a First Nation or a community and emphasizes the importance of ensuring, whenever possible, that care and services for children be in accordance with their distinct cultures, heritages and traditions.
2. In considering the purposes of the legislation, paragraph 6 ss. 1(2) of the CYFSA provides that First Nations, Métis and Inuit children are entitled wherever possible, to services provided in a manner that recognizes their cultures, heritages, traditions, connections to their communities, and the concept of the extended family.
3. Pursuant to s. 74 (3) of the CYFSA, the importance of preserving a First Nations child’s cultural identity and connection to community is a specific stand-alone consideration in determining what order is in the child’s best interests.
4. In addition, under s. 101(5) of the CYFSA, when determining the appropriate disposition for a First Nations child, unless there is a substantial reason for placing the child elsewhere, the child shall be placed with a member of the extended family, if possible or, if not, with another First Nations family. (iii) Determining Whether a Child is FNIM – Section 1 of Ontario Regulation 155/19
[9] Determinations of whether a child is an FNIM child are governed by Ontario Regulation 155/18, s. 1 of which provides as follows:1. A child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child for the purposes of the Act if,(a) the child identifies themself as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child or a parent of the child identifies the child as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child;
(b) the child is a member of or identifies with, as determined under section 21 of Ontario Regulation 156/18 (General Matters Under the Authority of the Minister) made under the Act, one or more bands or First Nations, Inuit or Métis communities; or
(c) it cannot be determined under clause (a) or (b) whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child but there is information that demonstrates that,
(i) a relative or sibling of the child identifies as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis person, or
(ii) there is a connection between the child and a band or a First Nations, Inuit or Métis community. ....
B. The Correct Interpretation of s. 1 of Ontario Regulation 155/18
(i) Overview
[22] The dispute between the parties before the motion judge and in this court relates to the correct interpretation of s. 1 of O. Reg. 155/18. The appellant submits that if it is clear that a child does not fall into the category described in s. 1(a) (where the child or a parent identifies as FNIM) or the category described in s. 1(b) (where the child is a member of or identifies with an FNIM community), then that ends the inquiry and the court should not consider s. 1(c). Rather, s. 1(c) should only be considered if the court cannot say, one way or the other, whether the child falls into the categories in (a) or (b). The respondent submits that the court is required to consider all three categories. If a child does not fall within (a) or (b), then the court must consider whether she falls into category (c).
[23] The crux of the disagreement is the meaning of the words “it cannot be determined under clause (a) or (b) whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child” in s. 1(c). According to the appellant, these words describe a situation where a court is unable to provide an affirmative or a negative answer to the questions posed by s. 1(a) and (b). According to the respondent, the words simply mean that the child has not been determined to be FNIM under (a) or (b), that is, that the questions do not result in an affirmative answer, so (c) must be considered.
....
(iii) Context and Purpose
[27] The purpose of the definition in s. 1 is to ensure that the objectives of the CYFSA respecting FNIM children are achieved. Those objectives are described in the Preamble to the Act:With respect to First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, the Government of Ontario acknowledges the following:
The Province of Ontario has unique and evolving relationships with First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples.
First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples are constitutionally recognized peoples in Canada, with their own laws, and distinct cultural, political and historical ties to the Province of Ontario.
Where a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child is otherwise eligible to receive a service under this Act, an inter-jurisdictional or intra-jurisdictional dispute should not prevent the timely provision of that service, in accordance with Jordan’s Principle.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes the importance of belonging to a community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned.
Further, the Government of Ontario believes the following:
First Nations, Inuit and Métis children should be happy, healthy, resilient, grounded in their cultures and languages and thriving as individuals and as members of their families, communities and nations.
Honouring the connection between First Nations, Inuit and Métis children and their distinct political and cultural communities is essential to helping them thrive and fostering their well-being.
For these reasons, the Government of Ontario is committed, in the spirit of reconciliation, to working with First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples to help ensure that wherever possible, they care for their children in accordance with their distinct cultures, heritages and traditions. [28] Section 1(1) of the CYFSA provides:1.(1) First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples should be entitled to provide, wherever possible, their own child and family services, and all services to First Nations, Inuit and Métis children and young persons and their families should be provided in a manner that recognizes their cultures, heritages, traditions, connection to their communities, and the concept of the extended family. [29] It is a sad reality that the Indigenous people of Canada have been profoundly affected by colonialism, displacement and efforts to assimilate them. One effect of this is that it is not always easy to obtain concise and accurate information about a person’s Indigenous ancestry or ties to a particular community, as explained in British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Service) v. R.D.W., 2022 BCPC 216, at para. 46:Further, as the Métis Commission noted, there are many reasons why people cannot trace their lineage with particularity including historical and ongoing colonialism, displacement, and forced assimilation through residential schools and the “60’s Scoop.” All of those factors may cause alienation, displacement from community, and disconnection from culture, community, family and supports. Not everyone with Indigenous roots can prove those roots; but they ought not to be disentitled from receiving culturally appropriate services in [Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46] matters. [30] Based on these factors, I agree with the motion judge’s conclusion, at para. 21 of her reasons, that “[e]mploying a broad view that focusses on inclusivity rather than exclusion, is consistent with the aims of the legislation.” I also agree with her conclusions at paras. 23-24:The Society’s interpretation of the Regulation is, in my view, contrary to the overarching purpose of the legislative amendments. Given the CYFSA’s express recognition of the erasure of Indigenous identity by colonial systems, it would be ironic if the Regulation were read in a restrictive manner whereby a child could be denied an appropriate finding based on their parents’ inability or unwillingness to make the appropriate identification, but where other family members do identify as First Nations, Inuk or Métis.
Amendments to the CYFSA were made with the express intent of removing colonial definitions of who could and could not be considered Indigenous. There was a recognition both that previous definitions were imposed and often inappropriate and also that because of historic wrongs, proving Indigenous ancestry is often difficult. (iv) Other Decisions
[31] The definition of an FNIM child in s. 1 of O. Reg. 155/18 has been considered in a number of decisions, although none expressly considered the interpretation issue that arises in this case.
[32] The appellant relies on Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.P., 2021 ONSC 6788, at para. 47:The analysis of whether these children are First Nations, Inuk or Métis children is therefore focused upon s. 1(a) of the Regulation and the court must consider: (a) whether the children themselves self-identify as First Nations, Inuk or Métis persons, and (b) whether a parent identifies the children as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis person. If, after consideration of these questions, the court finds that the issue cannot be determined, the court must then consider whether a relative or sibling of the children identifies as a First Nations, Inuk or Métis person under s. 1(c)(i). [33] The appellant also relies on Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. C.A., 2018 ONCJ 592, 14 R.F.L. (8th) 481, at para. 43:As determinations of whether L.A. is a First Nation child cannot be determined under clauses (a) or (b) of O. Reg 155/18, the court has to look for any information, firstly, that any relative or sibling of the child L.A. identifies as a First Nation person. There is such information. [34] While the appellant describes these portions of the decisions as correct articulations of the test, they are really simply paraphrasing the provision. The correct interpretation of s. 1 was not at issue in either case. In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.P., the court concluded that two children were FNIM children on the basis of s. 1(a) because they had identified as such. With respect to a third child, the court concluded that “I cannot be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the child S.A.M. is not a First Nations, Inuk of Métis child” (at para. 63) and accordingly went on to consider s. 1(c). This approach is consistent with the appellant’s interpretation, but the decision is silent on the issue of whether s. 1(c) ought to be considered if the questions arising from ss. 1(a) and (b) are answered in the negative.
[35] As the motion judge noted at para. 14 of her reasons, in Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. C.A., the court considered s. 1(c) after concluding that the child did not meet the criteria under s. 1(a) or (b), which appears to be inconsistent with the appellant’s interpretation.
[36] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.T., 2019 ONCJ 207, at paras. 47-57, a child was found to be an FNIM child on the basis of s. 1(c) after the court concluded that the criteria in s. 1(a) and (b) had not been met. The same approach appears to have been taken in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. I.L., 2023 ONCJ 213, at paras. 28-40, although the findings with respect to ss. 1(a) and (b) are not entirely clear from the reasons.
....
C. Conflicting Evidence
[43] In applying s. 1(c) of O. Reg. 155/18, the motion judge relied on Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. C.A., at para. 18, and concluded that the term “sibling” includes half-siblings (at para. 25). At para. 26, she adopted the following conclusion from Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.P., at para. 66:Sibling relationships are often of the most powerful and long-standing connections in a child’s life; this is not simply as a result of their shared biology. The importance of maintaining sibling relationships is clearly acknowledged within the CYFSA in multiple forms (e.g. best interests considerations, rights of access, etc.). Had Legislature intended the court to more closely scrutinize the specific nature of the sibling relationship for purposes of First Nations, Inuk or Métis identification findings, there would have been specific direction to do so. In Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.P., the court concluded that the child was an FNIM child pursuant to s. 1(c) on the basis that his half-siblings identified as Indigenous.
|
