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Injunctions - RJR - General
MORE CASES
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. Slepcsik v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
In Slepcsik v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismisses a motion to stay an immigration removal pending appeal.
Here the court considers the RJR-Macdonald stay pending appeal test, here in the context of a motion to stay an immigration removal order:[29] As reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Google, the applicable test for a stay or interlocutory injunction is the tripartite test set out in RJR-MacDonald. It is an exceptional equitable remedy that has been described as both flexible and drastic (Ostrich Farms at para. 82; Google at para. 23). In order to meet the requirements of the tripartite test, Mr. Slepcsik must establish that (i) there is a serious issue to be determined in his underlying appeal; (ii) he will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and (iii) the balance of convenience favours granting the order and staying his removal (RJR-MacDonald; Toth). The Court is bound to consider each part of the tripartite test based upon the evidentiary record before it (Fortius Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue), 2022 FCA 176 at para. 15 [Fortius]).
[30] The decision as to whether to grant a stay is a discretionary one. When exercising that discretion, a court shall, in the context of applying the tripartite test, consider whether granting the stay is just and equitable in the context-specific circumstances of the case (Google at para. 25). To be clear, bearing in mind the considerations of justice and equity does not alter the strict requirements of the tripartite test, nor does it add an additional limb or prong to that test (Pak at para. 22; He v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 517 at para. 13).
[31] It is worthwhile to emphasize that, even in the context of a removal, all three prongs of the test must be satisfied for a court to grant relief (Sheldon M. Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership v. Canada (National Revenue), 2023 FCA 242 at para. 10; Western Oilfield Equipment Rentals Ltd. v. M-I L.L.C., 2020 FCA 3 at para. 7; Ahlul-Bayt Centre, Ottawa v. Canada (National Revenue), 2018 FCA 61 at para. 8 [Ahlul-Bayt]; Mohamed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 112 at para. 11). A court is not permitted to grant a stay where a prong of the test has not been met (Ostrich Farms at paras. 14 and 69). In other words, the "“failure of any of the three elements of the test is fatal”" (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ishaq, 2015 FCA 212 at para. 15; see also Canada (Heritage) v. 9616934 Canada Inc., 2023 FCA 141 at para. 11; Air Passengers Rights v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2020 FCA 92).
[32] That is not to say, however, that the three prongs are wholly independent and unrelated. Strength in one element of the test may serve to balance a weakness in another (Ostrich Farms at para. 14). Despite the foregoing flexibility, each prong of the test must nevertheless be satisfied (ibid). As Justice Gascon explains, this inherent flexibility "“ … does not mean that one of the three compartments can be completely empty and compensated by the other two being filled to a higher level. There still needs to be something on each of the three branches, and none of the elements of the test can be entirely left aside and rescued by the other two”" (Pak at para. 24).
IV. Serious Issue
[33] For the first prong of the tripartite test, a serious issue, the threshold is generally low (RJR-MacDonald at p. 337; Fortius at para. 16). The court must be satisfied that the issue raised is "“neither vexatious nor frivolous”" based on a "“preliminary assessment of the merits”" of the underlying proceeding (RJR-MacDonald at p. 337; Fortius at para. 16). Further, "“[a] prolonged examination of the merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable”" (RJR-MacDonald at p. 337).
[34] An elevated threshold applies "“when the result of the interlocutory motion will in effect amount to a final determination of the action”" (RJR-MacDonald at p. 338; see also Baron at paras. 66–67). I agree with Mr. Slepcsik that the elevated threshold does not apply in the present motion.
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V. Irreparable Harm
[38] Mr. Slepcsik bears the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is returned to his country of citizenship prior to his appeal being finally determined (Fortius at para. 18; Ostrich Farms at para. 11; Atwal at para. 14).
[39] The term "“irreparable”" refers to "“the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude”" (RJR-MacDonald at p. 341). Such harm "“cannot be quantified in monetary terms or cannot otherwise be cured”" (Ahlul-Bayt at para. 10; see also Fortius at para. 18; RJR-MacDonald at p. 341).
[40] It is well established that irreparable harm must always be proven – it cannot be presumed or inferred (Landry v. Abenakis of Wolinak First Nation, 2021 FCA 197 at para. 98 [Landry]; Fortius at para. 18; Ahlul-Bayt at para. 15). Our Court has repeatedly stated that in order to prove irreparable harm, the moving party "“must demonstrate in a detailed and concrete way that it will suffer real, definite, unavoidable harm—not hypothetical and speculative harm—that cannot be repaired later”" (Janssen Inc. v. Abbvie Corporation, 2014 FCA 112 at para. 24 [Janssen]; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Abdelhak, 2022 FCA 27 [Abdelhak]; Ostrich Farms at para. 46; Canada (Attorney General) v. Oshkosh Defense Canada Inc., 2018 FCA 102 at para. 24; see also Stoney First Nation v. Shotclose, 2011 FCA 232 at paras. 47–49 [Stoney First Nation]; Glooscap Heritage Society v. Canada (National Revenue), 2012 FCA 255 at para. 31 [Glooscap]).
[41] Indeed, "“assumptions, speculations, hypotheticals and arguable assertions, unsupported by evidence, carry no weight”" (Glooscap at para. 31; Ahlul-Bayt at para. 15; see also Atwal at para. 15). Rather "“[o]nly clear and compelling evidence can satisfy”" this prong of the test (Fortius at para. 18; see also Salt River First Nation #195 v. Heron, 2024 FCA 87 at paras. 8 and 15). In other words, general assertions cannot establish irreparable harm, "“detailed and specific evidence”" is required (Abdelhak at para. 17; Janssen at para. 24).
[42] This prong of the test requires evidence at a convincing level of particularity that demonstrates a real probability that unavoidable irreparable harm will result unless a stay is granted (Ahlul-Bayt at para. 15; Fortius at para. 18; Stoney First Nation at para. 48; Glooscap at para. 31; Gateway City Church v. Canada (National Revenue), 2013 FCA 126 at para. 16). The court must be satisfied that the evidence demonstrates "“the existence of real, definite, and unavoidable harm”" (Landry at para. 98). A "“series of possibilities”" is insufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm (Atwal at para. 14). It is equally "“not sufficient to demonstrate that irreparable harm could or [is] likely to occur; rather, it ha[s] to be shown that such harm would be suffered”" (Landry at para. 99).
[43] The rationale for this strict evidentiary requirement was explained in Stoney First Nation:It is all too easy for those seeking a stay in a case like this to enumerate problems, call them serious, and then, when describing the harm that might result, to use broad, expressive terms that essentially just assert – not demonstrate to the Court’s satisfaction – that the harm is irreparable.
(Stoney First Nation at para. 48) [44] Under ordinary circumstances, only the harm suffered by the moving party would qualify under this prong of the test (Glooscap at para. 31). There are, however, limited and modest modifications to this principle (ibid). In the context of stays of removal, one may consider not only the irreparable harm to the moving party but also to their family (Pak at para. 49; Ogierikhi et al. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 256 at para. 10 [Ogierikhi]; Ghanaseharan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 261 at paras. 13–14 [Ghanaseharan]).
[45] Equally in the context of stays of removal, irreparable harm implies that there would be a serious likelihood of jeopardy to the moving party’s life, security or safety, or that of their family (Mondelus v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1138 at para. 73; Ogierikhi at para. 10; Golubyev v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 395 at para. 12; Pak at para. 52).
[46] The harms and hardships that are the inherent consequences of removal cannot constitute irreparable harm for the purpose of the tripartite test – otherwise, a stay would be the norm and removal from Canada would be the exception (Palka v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FCA 165 at para. 12 [Palka]; Ghanaseharan at paras. 13-14; Atwal at paras. 16−17; Pak at para. 52; Fortius at para. 30). Such consequences include enforced separation, hardship for the family, psychological and emotional hardship, financial loss, the loss of employment, the interruption of education, and disruption to the lives built in Canada, among others (Fortius at para. 30; Baron at para. 69; Melo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 188 F.T.R. 39 at para. 21, 2000 CanLII 15140 (F.C.) [Melo]; Ghanaseharan para. 13–14; Atwal at para. 16). There is no doubt that such consequences can be traumatic, deeply disturbing, and heartbreaking for the individuals involved. Nevertheless, and unfortunately for those facing removal, they do not constitute irreparable harm.
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[67] Second, discrimination is not necessarily persecution nor is it irreparable harm (Tulina-Litvin v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 105 at para. 47; Sorokin v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 355 at para. 6; Suryandari v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1611 at para. 46; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4 (Geneva, reissued February 2019), at para. 54). If that were the case, it would mean that no one of Roma ethnicity would be able to be removed to the Czech Republic, or indeed to a number of other European nations.
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C. Family Separation
[71] This Court has consistently made it clear that family separation and hardship, while heartbreaking, do not constitute irreparable harm for the purposes of a stay of removal (Fortius at para. 30; Atwal at para. 16; Melo at para. 21; Baron at paras. 57 and 69). This is the case even where the minor children are Canadian citizens (Baron at para. 57). Disruption to the family is, sadly, always a consequence of removal. If enforced separation and family disruption were to constitute irreparable harm – it would be the norm to stay removals of family members (Palka at para. 12; Ghanaseharan at para. 13).
[72] It is worth recalling that Parliament has not decided that the presence of family members in Canada, including minor children, constitutes an impediment to removal. Our Court noted this over twenty years ago, and it remains the case today (Legault v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125 at para. 12; see also Baron at para. 57). The question of whether the involvement of a Canadian child ought to act as a bar to removal is one for Parliament, not the courts.
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[81] Mental health issues, notably anxiety or depression, do not generally amount to irreparable harm when they are tied to an impending removal (Pak at para. 63; Savage v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1582 at para. 51[Savage]; Singh v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 650 at para. 16 [Singh]). In other words, stress, anxiety, and depression caused by the prospect of removal from Canada are an insufficient basis to establish irreparable harm, as these are inherent to removal (Palka at para. 17; Roh v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1273 at para. 52 [Roh]; Bernadini v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 CanLII 23894 (F.C.); Mboweni v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 CanLII 41503 (F.C.) at para. 6; Mahuroof v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 CanLII 36998 at para. 23 [Mahuroof]).
[82] This is the case even where the depression and/or anxiety is accompanied by suicidal ideation when these symptoms are linked to a pending removal (Savage at para. 51; Ryabinin v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 1118 at paras. 9–12 [Ryabinin]; Enodumwenben v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1686 [Enodumwenben]; Roh at para. 52; Mufutau v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 78789 (F.C.) at para. 16; Mahuroof at paras. 21–23; Jeong v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 CanLII 76012 (FC) at para. 24; Haruna v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 98478 (F.C.) at para. 14; Singh v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 CanLII 25722 (F.C.) at paras. 29 and 34; Chen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 33024 (F.C.) at paras. 3–7 [Chen]; Chikezie v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 CanLII 56951 (F.C.) at paras. 4–7; Taiwo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 52466 (F.C.); Powell v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 120416 (F.C.) at paras. 29 and 32 [Powell]; Jabed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 51907 (F.C.) at para. 34; Nwaogu v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 99174 (F.C.) at paras. 9–10; Sandhu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 126 at paras. 4–7); Gbadamosi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 CanLII 80687 (F.C.) at paras. 31–33 [Gbadamosi]; Bastien at paras. 22–23). That being said, there are certainly instances where suicidal behaviour, even when arising from the prospect of removal, can rise to the level of irreparable harm (Tiliouine v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1146 at para. 13; Pak at para. 66; Mazakian v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FC 1248, at paras. 11–29 and 33; Cabanas Alvarez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 CanLII 67824 (F.C.); Mehr v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 CanLII 80547 (F.C.) at paras. 32–37; Oladipupo v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 921 at paras. 45–46 and 50). Ultimately, it remains a question of whether there is clear, convincing and non-speculative evidence before the court that there is a serious and imminent risk of suicide.
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[88] Medical reports, such as Dr. Ghebrehariat’s report, that are prepared in anticipation of removal should be approached with caution. Indeed, the courts have consistently been cautious in treating reports and letters from clinicians which (i) are prepared on the basis of a single appointment; (ii) are prepared in the context of removal proceedings, (iii) display no evidence of concrete follow-up treatment; and/or (iv) recommend that their clients be allowed to stay in Canada (Palka at para. 17; Chehade v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 293 at para. 15; Jeong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 CanLII 21167 (F.C.); Varela Garrido v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FC 1804 at para. 17 [Varela Garrido]; Ryabinin paras. 8–11; Singh at para. 16; Mahuroof at para. 23; Chen at paras. 3–7; Sidhu v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 CanLII 16784 (F.C.); Powell at paras. 27–31; Gbadamosi at para. 34; Enodumwenben). Such letters and reports have often been discounted on the basis that they are not neutral or that they amount to advocacy (Varela Garrido at para. 17; Powell at para. 30).
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VI. Balance of Convenience
[99] The third prong of the tripartite test requires that the court conduct an assessment of the balance of convenience. This involves a determination of which of the two parties will suffer the greatest harm should the requested stay be granted or refused (Ostrich Farms at para. 50; RJR-MacDonald at p. 342; Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 1987 CarswellMan 176 at para. 36). . Deeb v. Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization
In Deeb v. Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court considered the RJR interlocutory stay pending test, and it's elements:[17] In RJR-MacDonald, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a three-part test for determining whether a court should exercise its discretion to grant an interlocutory stay: (1) is there a serious issue to be tried; (2) would the person applying for the stay suffer irreparable harm if the stay were not granted; and (3) is the balance of convenience in favour of granting the interlocutory stay or denying it. See RJR-MacDonald at 334.
[18] While the three parts of the test are factors to consider, they are not prerequisites. The three factors are not watertight compartments, and the strength of one may compensate for the weakness of another. The ultimate test for granting a stay is the interests of justice. Thus, the fundamental question is whether the granting of a stay is just and equitable in all of the circumstances of the case. This will necessarily be context-specific. See Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34 at para. 25, M & M Homes Inc. v. 2088556 Ontario Inc., 2020 ONCA 134 at para. 42, and Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919 at para. 18.
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[23] At the first stage of the test, the judge is to undertake a preliminary investigation of the merits. However, a prolonged examination of the merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable. Once satisfied that the case on the merits is neither frivolous nor vexatious, the judge should proceed to consider the second and third stages of the test, even if the judge is of the opinion that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed at trial. See RJR-MacDonald at 337-338, 348.
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[38] In RJR-MacDonald, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the “irreparable harm” factor refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its magnitude. It includes harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms. Quantifiable financial loss may also be considered irreparable harm so long as it is unclear that such loss could be recovered at the time of a decision on the merits (e.g., because one party cannot collect damages from the other). The Supreme Court of Canada gave the following examples of irreparable harm: where one party will be put out of business by the court’s decision, and where one party will suffer permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to its business reputation. See RJR-MacDonald at 341, 348.
[39] The Respondents rely on Sazant, a decision on a stay motion involving a doctor whose right to practice had been revoked following disciplinary proceedings. In Sazant, La Forme J.A. held that evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative, and that a professional’s financial loss as a result of revocation was far from being dispositive. See Sazant at para. 11. La Forme J.A. suggested that the type of harm that was almost always present in proceedings related to regulated professionals was insufficient to show irreparable harm and that something more was required. He found that Dr. Sazant had not established that his practice would be lost forever. Ultimately, he concluded that Dr. Sazant had not met the second part of the test.
[40] The Respondents also rely on Kitmitto, a decision of this Court, which applies the principles set out in Sazant in a stay motion regarding sanctions imposed by the Tribunal in relation to violations of the Securities Act. Kitmotto reiterates that the mere possibility of harm is not enough to satisfy the irreparable harm test, and that some financial loss is not irreparable harm. See Kitmitto at paras. 13-14, 19, 20, 26, 27.
[41] The Applicant has referred to a number of cases that appear to adopt a more flexible approach to irreparable harm than in Sazant and Kitmitto. See, e.g., International Steel Services Inc. v. Dynatec Madagasgar S.A., 2016 ONSC 2810 at paras. 51-52, 60 and EVS (Edge Value Solutions) Canada Ltd. v. Nestle Canada Inc., 2022 ONSC 7003 at para. 50, where it was held that a plaintiff is only required to establish a meaningful risk of irreparable harm or a meaningful doubt as to the adequacy of damages if the stay is not granted.
[42] I note that the Court of Appeal has recently cited Kitmotto and stated that “[t]he mere possibility of financial harm, and even bankruptcy, is not enough to satisfy the irreparable harm test”. The Court of Appeal also stated that an applicant for a stay cannot rely on speculative evidence about irreparable harm, and must establish that there is a high degree of probability that permanent and non-compensable harm will in fact occur. See Ontario Securities Commission v. Cacoeli Asset Management Inc., 2025 ONCA 465 at paras. 18, 30 (“Cacoeli”).
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[48] Under the last branch of the test, the court must determine which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory stay pending a decision on the merits. The factors to be considered at this stage are numerous and will vary in each individual case. See RJR-MacDonald at 342-343.
[49] Where the authority of a law enforcement agency is challenged, no interlocutory stay should issue to restrain that authority from performing its duties to the public unless, in the balance of convenience, the public interest is taken into consideration and given the weight it should carry. See RJR-MacDonald at 343 and Cacoeli at para. 41.
[50] In Kitmitto, this Court found that it is necessary for the public to have confidence in the integrity of the capital markets, and confidence that the laws regulating the markets will be rigorously enforced. See Kitmitto at para. 33. See also Azeff v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2016 ONSC 1279 at paras. 16-17. In this case, serious findings of professional misconduct have been made against Mr. Deeb.
[51] As stated above, I was prepared to assume that, based on a flexible approach to irreparable harm, Mr. Deeb will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted. However, the weight to be given to this “irreparable harm” must be determined at this stage. Among other things, although the magnitude of the harm is not a proper consideration under the irreparable harm branch of the test, it is a proper consideration at the balance of convenience stage.
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[55] .... significant weight must be given to the public interest in this case given the serious findings of professional misconduct made by the CIRO panel. There is no question that the Liability and Sanctions Decisions were made pursuant to CIRO’s duty to act in the public interest, including the public interest in the protection of investors, the effective regulation of securities markets, and the confidence of the public in fair and efficient capital markets.
[56] Given the substantial weaknesses in the evidence regarding the harm suffered by Mr. Deeb and the important consideration that must be given to the public interest in this case, I find that the balance of convenience does not favour the granting of a stay. . West Carleton Community Alliance v. The City of Ottawa et al
In West Carleton Community Alliance v. The City of Ottawa et al (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court partially granted a motion, here seeking a stay of a by-law amendment's "implementation pending the hearing of its application" and further, the striking of "portions of the application and portions of the Applicant’s record" - these within a JR brought "to quash both the Amendment and the MSR" ["Municipal Support Resolution"].
Here the court considers the stay RJR-McDonald test:[10] The parties agree that the stay motion is governed by the three-part test in R.J.R.-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311: Is there a serious issue to be tried? Would the Applicant suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted? Does the balance of convenience favour a stay?
[11] Although strength in one part of the test may make up for weakness in another, the Applicant must meet all three prongs of the test in order to succeed: Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 122, at para. 6.
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[14] The parties agree that the threshold on this part of the test for a stay is a low one. The court is to make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the case. If the court is satisfied that the application is not frivolous or vexatious, it is to go on to consider the second and third parts of the test, even if the court believes the application is unlikely to succeed. The court is not to engage in a prolonged assessment of the merits unless the stay would have the effect of determining the issue on a final basis, or the question at issue is one of law alone: R.J.R.-Macdonald Inc.
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ii) Will the Applicant suffer irreparable harm if there is no stay?
[27] Irreparable harm refers to the nature, not the magnitude, of the harm suffered: R.J.R.-Macdonald Inc.. The Court in R.J.R.-Macdonald Inc. included the “permanent loss of natural resources” as an example of harm that may be irreparable. The evidence is required to be clear and not speculative.
[28] In a case involving environmental damage, the court should not insist on irrefutable evidence of irreparable harm. Evidence that would support a finding that irreparable harm would be suffered is sufficient. Ottawa (City) v. Ottawa (City) (Chief Building Official), (2003) 2003 CanLII 64304 (ON SC), 67 O.R. (3d) 490 (S.C.), at para. 24. . Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc.
In Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a motion for a stay pending appeal, here in an appeal against an "order striking out their statement of defence" for non-compliance with earlier orders.
Here the court considers the RJR test elements:[20] The relevant criteria for a stay sought under r. 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure are not controversial. The overarching consideration is whether the justice of the case warrants the requested stay. Informing that consideration are the following factors that the moving party must satisfy on a balance of probabilities: 1) the appeal raises a serious issue to be determined on the appeal; 2) the moving party will likely suffer irreparable harm; and 3) the balance of convenience favours the granting of the requested stay: Hermina Developments Inc. v. Epireon Capital Limited, 2025 ONCA 559, at paras. 11-12; 2642948 Ontario Inc. v. Jonny’s Antiques Ltd., 2025 ONCA 381, at para. 17.
[21] None of these factors are watertight categories; the strength of one may compensate for the weakness of the others: Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, at para. 18. However, all three factors must be satisfied for a stay to be granted: Carvalho Estate v. Verma, 2024 ONCA 222, 170 O.R. (3d) 781, at para. 5.
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