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Labour - Rules, Workplace. Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed an employer's labour JR, this brought against "a labour arbitrator’s decision on policy grievances brought by railway workers unions against an employer’s new drug and alcohol measures".
Here the court considers the 'KVP test' which applies to the introduction of "new workplace rules and measures":[6] The arbitrator allowed the grievances in respect of the new measures at issue on this application. In doing so, he applied the following test set out in Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers’ Union, Local 2537, and KVP Co. (1965), 1965 CanLII 1009 (ON LA), 16 L.A.C. 73, which was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458, at para. 24: “[A]ny rule or policy unilaterally imposed by an employer and not subsequently agreed to by the union, must be consistent with the collective agreement and be reasonable.” The parties agree that this was the correct test to apply, but disagree on how it should be applied in this case.
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[25] In this case, the applicant unilaterally introduced new workplace rules and measures. As a result, the KVP test applies: Irving, at paras. 22-27. This is not in dispute.
[26] Under the first part of the KVP test, the arbitrator has to determine whether the rule is consistent with the collective agreement. In this case, “just cause” is not defined in the collective agreement. While the arbitrator discusses at length how “just cause” has been interpreted in arbitral cases in relation to drug testing, he did not find that the rules adopted by the applicant were inconsistent with, or contrary to, any of the express provisions in the collective agreement, nor have the respondents alleged any inconsistency with the wording of any specific provisions of the collective agreement.
[27] In the absence of an inconsistency with a specific provision of the collective agreement, the arbitrator was required to consider the second part of the KVP test, i.e., the reasonableness of the rules. The general requirement for “just cause” or “reasonable cause” is the very rationale for the second branch of the test, that is, rules unilaterally made in the exercise of management discretion under a collective agreement must be reasonable if the breach of the rule results in disciplinary action. This was explained as follows by the Supreme Court of Canada in Irving, at paras. 22-23:[22] When employers in a unionized workplace unilaterally enact workplace rules and policies, they are not permitted to “promulgate unreasonable rules and then punish employees who infringe them” […].
[23] This constraint arises because an employer may only discharge or discipline an employee for “just cause” or “reasonable cause” – a central protection for employees. As a result, rules enacted by an employer as a vehicle for discipline must meet the requirement of reasonable cause […]. See also Irving, at paras. 24-26.
[28] Assessing the reasonableness of management-imposed rules requires that there be a “delicate, case-by-case balancing” of interests: Irving, at paras. 19, 27. Pursuant to this approach, an arbitrator considers all of the surrounding circumstances, and may take into account, among other things, the nature of the employer’s interests, any less intrusive means available to address the employer’s concerns, and the impact on employees: Irving, at para. 27.
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[34] By failing to engage in a balancing of interests, the arbitrator in this case committed the same error as the one identified by this Court in Humber River Health v. Teamsters Local Union No. 419, 2025 ONSC 2270 (Div. Ct.), at para. 55 (which was cited by the arbitrator at para. 39):In finding that non-compliance with a mandatory vaccination policy can never be met with discipline because these policies engage an employee’s right to consent to medical treatment and/or disclose medical information, the Arbitrator failed to engage in any balancing of Humber’s duty to protect its patients, staff and visitors against the significant health and safety risks associated with the COVID-19 virus as required by KVP and Irving. [Emphasis in the original.] [35] The respondents do not challenge the fact that the arbitrator did not engage in a balancing of interests analysis in this case. Their position is that such an analysis was unnecessary given the arbitrator’s reliance on a number of arbitral cases regarding the meaning of “just cause”, which effectively subsumed the balancing exercise.
[36] Prior arbitral cases can be relevant to the balancing of interests that must be performed by an arbitrator, and they may obviate the need for a detailed and thorough analysis and balancing of interests. However, they do not justify a failure to engage in any balancing of interests, especially when, as in this case, there are significant differences between the circumstances and evidence in the prior cases and the circumstances and evidence before the arbitrator.
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