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Police - Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA). Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency
In Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed a JR, this brought against the dismissal of a review by the LECA Complaints Director, that of the dismissal of a "complaint to the chief of police of the Peel Regional Police" (which had been referred to the chief by the LECA Complaints Director).
The courts considers the degree of procedural fairness to be accorded a police complainant, here where the applicant argued that a LECA-referred investigation "was procedurally unfair, because in coming to his conclusion, the investigator relied upon materials that had not been produced to him" (that is, non-disclosure of "copies of the officers’ notes and memoranda"):[41] Mr. Sarpong argues that the investigation was procedurally unfair, because in coming to his conclusion, the investigator relied upon materials that had not been produced to him. These materials included the officers’ notes and memoranda which included the officers’ responses to the complaint. He says that as a result, he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to know and meet the case, and to “make focused submissions that the investigative synthesis was unreliable on chronology and sequence.” For the following reasons, I disagree and find that the failure of the investigator to provide Mr. Sarpong with copies of the officers’ notes and memoranda was not procedurally unfair.
[42] In Boua, at para. 16, this court held that there is no legal requirement to interview a complainant during a police conduct complaint investigation, saying: “Complainants are entitled to a comparatively low level of procedural fairness with respect to investigations because they are not facing a concrete impact to their rights and interest. It is the police officers who are at risk of findings of misconduct and the resulting consequences.”
[43] In Cozzi v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2016 ONSC 627 (Div. Ct.), this court held that while s. 62 of the Police Services Act required the chief of police to give prompt notice of the substance of a complaint to the subject officer, there was no reciprocal statutory requirement to produce the officer’s response to the complainant.[3] At para. 6, the court reasoned:It is important to note that the investigation is not a hearing and the right to disclosure that would accrue at the hearing stage of the process does not accrue at the investigative stage, which is not an adjudication. Providing all witnesses with access to the statements of other witnesses raises the spectre of tainting and collusion (both advertent and inadvertent) and could delay what is meant to be an efficient process. Because of the potential jeopardy faced by the subject officer, the legislature has mandated disclosure to that officer. . Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency
In Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed a JR, this brought against the dismissal of a review by the LECA Complaints Director, that of the dismissal of a "complaint to the chief of police of the Peel Regional Police" (which had been referred to the chief by the LECA Complaints Director).
Here the court both illustrates and reviews procedures for the cumbersome LECA administrative regime governing police complaints:[1] Richard Sarpong complained to the Complaints Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency about the conduct of four Peel Regional Police officers: Ema Fogt, Kenaul Douglas, Davide Zara, and Torrence Bostock. He had been sitting in his car in a hotel parking lot, when the officers approached him, demanded that he produce identification, and threatened him with arrest, if he failed to do so.
[2] The Complaints Director referred the complaint to the chief of police of the Peel Regional Police for investigation. The complaint was assigned to an investigator who concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish officer misconduct, and that Mr. Sarpong’s complaints were therefore unsubstantiated.
[3] Mr. Sarpong was dissatisfied with the disposition of his complaint and requested that the Complaints Director review the investigator’s conclusions. In his request for review, he alleged that the police demand for identifying information was unlawful, that he had been unlawfully detained, and that police had used abusive language in speaking with him. Following his review, the Director confirmed the investigator’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct on the part of the officers.
[4] On this judicial review application, Mr. Sarpong requests that the decision of the Complaints Director be quashed, and that the complaint be remitted to him for redetermination. In support of that relief, he argues that the Director’s decision was unreasonable, that the investigation was procedurally unfair, and that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the investigator which the Director failed to consider.
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[7] Mr. Sarpong’s complaint was reviewed under the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1. Under s. 159(1) of the CSPA, the Director referred the complaint to the chief of police of Peel Regional Police. Under s. 159(6) of the Act, chiefs of police are required to cause such complaints to be investigated, and under s. 166(1), to cause the investigation to be reported on in a written report.
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Request for review
[14] Under s. 167(1) of the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, if, after considering the report on the investigation, the chief of police does not have reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct of the person who was the subject of the investigation constitutes misconduct, he or she must give written notice of the determination to the complainant, the person who was the subject of the investigation and the Complaints Director. Under s. 167(3) of the Act, the complainant may, no later than 30 days after receiving notice, apply to the Complaints Director for a review of the determination.
[15] Under s. 167(4) of the Act, the Director is then required to review the determination, taking into account any material provided by the complainant, the chief of police or the person who was the subject of the investigation. In doing so, the Director is required to consider two issues: first, whether the professional standards investigator adequately addressed the issues raised in the complaint; and second, whether the findings of the chief of police are supported by the available evidence: Boua v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 2172 (Div. Ct.), at para. 16.
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Decision of the Complaints Director
[21] Following his review, the Complaints Director concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe that the officers’ conduct constituted misconduct. He found that the investigator had correctly identified and investigated the allegations of misconduct, that his findings were consistent with the available evidence, and that “he clearly laid out his reasoning path in support of his conclusions.” . Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency)
In Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency) (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a police complaint JR, here respecting "the decision dated July 8, 2024 (the “Screening Decision”) of the Complaints Director of the respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (the “LECA”)".
Here the court dismisses a set aside motion, this of an earlier JR record motion [under CJA 21(5)] (now coupled with this JR since the court route is the same):[3] The applicant also seeks to set aside the decision of Justice Shaun O’Brien of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 14, 2025, reported at 2025 ONSC 1668 (the “ROP Decision”). In the ROP Decision, O’Brien J. dismissed the applicant’s motion to compel the LECA to add certain internal LECA documents to the record of proceeding (“ROP”) for the judicial review application. The disputed documents were prepared in connection with another complaint that the applicant made about the conduct of the same police officer.
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[32] In Endicott, at paras. 39-46, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered what should be included in the ROP for judicial review of a screening decision relating to a police conduct complaint. The court decided that in that case, a “full and accurate record” did not extend beyond the applicant’s complaint and attachments, the screening decision and the information in the Complaints Director’s file that was directly relevant or part of the screening decision. In the ROP Decision, at paras. 10-11, the motion judge rejected the applicant’s submission that Endicott supported his position about the appropriate scope of the ROP in this case. We see no error in her reaching that conclusion.
[33] Absent narrow exceptions, judicial review applications are decided solely on the record that was before the underlying decision maker for the decision: see Boua v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 2172, 173 O.R. (3d) 165 (Div. Ct.), at para. 8. The narrow exceptions were established in Keeprite Workers' Independent Union and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 1980 CanLII 1877 (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1980] S.C.C.A. No. 16262 (cited by the motion judge in the ROP Decision, at para. 15). The Keeprite exceptions allow an applicant to deliver affidavit evidence to supplement the record in limited circumstances. The applicant provided no such affidavit evidence in this case, instead advancing speculative submissions about the disputed documents’ contents. . Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency)
In Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency) (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a police complaint JR, here respecting "the decision dated July 8, 2024 (the “Screening Decision”) of the Complaints Director of the respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (the “LECA”)".
The court notes the police complaint regime LECA revision at 01 April 2024:B. Complaints Director’s statutory authority
[8] At the time of the applicant’s prior complaints, the Independent Police Review Director was responsible for managing complaints by members of the public about the conduct of police officers in Ontario under statutory authority derived from Parts II.1 and V of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (the “PSA”).
[9] On April 1, 2024, the PSA was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1 (the “CSPA”). The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (the “OIPRD”) continued under the name of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency. The Independent Police Review Director became the Complaints Director, who is the LECA’s head: CSPA, ss. 130(1), 130(2).[1] Under s. 216(3) of the CSPA, the Complaints Director exercises the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director with respect to (a) police conduct complaints made prior to April 1, 2024, and (b) complaints about police conduct occurring prior to (and not continuing after) April 1, 2024. Such complaints (including the applicant’s May 2024 Complaint) continue to be dealt with in accordance with the PSA as it read prior to its repeal: CSPA, ss. 216(1), 216(2). The OIPRD Rules of Procedure (amended February 2024) made under s. 56 the PSA (the “Rules of Procedure”) continue to apply to those complaints. . Watt v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency)
In Watt v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency) (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court reviews the OIPRD to LECA police complaint regime transition:[6] At the time of Dr. Watt’s complaint, the Independent Police Review Director was responsible for managing complaints by members of the public about the conduct of police officers in Ontario under statutory authority derived from Parts II.1 and V of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (the “PSA”).
[7] On April 1, 2024, the PSA was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1 (the “CSPA”). The OIPRD continued under the name of the Law Enforcement Review Agency (the “LECA”) and the Independent Police Review Director became the Complaints Director, who is the LECA’s head: CSPA, ss 130(1), 130(2). For complaints made prior to April 1, 2024, the Complaints Director exercises the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director: CSPA, s. 216(3). Such complaints (including Dr. Watt’s complaint) continue to be dealt with in accordance with the PSA as it read prior to its repeal: CSPA, s. 216(1). The OIPRD Rules of Procedure (amended February 2024) made under s. 56 the PSA (the “Rules of Procedure”) continue to apply to those complaints. . Deveaux v. Cornwall Police Services
In Deveaux v. CORNWALL POLICE SERVICES (Div Court, 2024) the Ontario Divisional Court considered a JR, here where a self-presenting complainant to the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA) sought a review of LECA's suspension of it's investigation while a related civil case was resolved. This in the context of a situation where "the Crown withdrew the charge right before the cross-examination of a police witness", and the complainant submitted "that he has proof that officers who arrested him lied to the SIU initially and in court during his trial".
Here, Myers J essentially pleads with respondent lawyers involved to take the case in hand and "lead the clients to a fair outcome and not simply make the process impenetrable and inaccessible":[24] I obviously have no idea at this stage whether there is truth to Mr. Deveaux’s complaints. But someone among the government respondents should know. Watching a self-represented party try to understand and valiantly battle the procedural complexities thrown up by the phalanx of legal talent being brought to bear by government leads me to wonder how someone who truly has a provable claim can be expected to ever access civil justice.
[25] I am not sure I understand the war in which this proceeding is just one battle. Shouldn’t our police services be transparent and accountable to the public whom they serve? Are there documents or recordings that people know will prove the truth of the claims one way or the other? Is there a public interest in having them produced to answer the questions raised in these proceedings? If Mr. Deveaux’s allegations are not true, shouldn’t those involved be publicly exonerated? If they are true, shouldn’t those involved be accountable? In whose interest is requiring motion after motion after motion and three or more different legal proceedings to access evidence that will resolve an issue about alleged police misconduct pro or con? Who can afford the battles let alone the war of attrition being waged?
[26] I can only express the hope that if there is a lawyer who knows the truth of the allegations, that he or she will lead the clients to a fair outcome and not simply make the process impenetrable and inaccessible. Our system of justice is built upon the principle that lawyers are duty-bound to ensure that all parties receive a fair hearing. They are not just champions for the rich and strong. See: Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1-1: The lawyer’s duty to fearlessly raise every issue for their cleint [sic] is to be performed, “in a way that promotes the parties' right to a fair hearing in which justice can be done.” . Liu v. London Police Service
In Liu v. London Police Service (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR of "the decision of the Chief of Police of the London Police Service (LPS), and the unreported decision of the Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA), formerly known as the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), confirming the Chief’s decision.":Request for OIPRD review
[15] On March 9, 2024, the applicant requested that the Director of the OIPRD conduct a review of the Chief’s decision, pursuant to s. 71 of the Police Services Act.
OIPRD becomes LECA
[16] On April 1, 2024, the Police Services Act was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, S.O. 2019, c.1, Sched. 1. The Community Safety and Policing Act created the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA) which replaced the former OIPRD. LECA is an arms-length agency of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General that is tasked with investigation of public complaints about the conduct of police officers in Ontario.
Complaints Director’s decision
[17] On April 17, 2024, the Complaints Director with LECA wrote to the applicant setting out his decision confirming the decision of the Chief of Police that the allegations of misconduct were unsubstantiated. In his decision, the Complaints Director advised that, given the request for review had been made prior to April 1, the Director had conducted the review pursuant to s. 71 of the Police Services Act.
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Standard of Review
[22] The decision of the OIPRD (LECA) is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), 2019 S.C.C. 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653.
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