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Police - Complaint - Screening. Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency) [screening out complaints]
In Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency) (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a police complaint JR, here respecting "the decision dated July 8, 2024 (the “Screening Decision”) of the Complaints Director of the respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (the “LECA”)":[2] In the Screening Decision, the Complaints Director decided to exercise his statutory discretion not to deal with the applicant’s complaint about the conduct of an officer of the Toronto Police Service, thereby “screening out” the complaint from further consideration on a stand-alone basis. In doing so, the Complaints Director decided to consider the complaint as part of the ongoing statutory review that the applicant initiated relating to an earlier complaint that the applicant made to the LECA.
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C. Screening of complaints
[10] The statutory scheme for managing police conduct complaints set out in the PSA provides the Complaints Director with broad authority to determine how to address complaints.
[11] The initial step is a screening process, under which the Complaints Director decides if the complaint should proceed for further action (“screened in”) or should not proceed any further (“screened out”): PSA, s. 60. Complaints are presumptively screened in unless the Complaints Director exercises his legislative discretion not to deal with the complaint, thereby screening it out. The Complaints Director also has the discretion to consolidate two or more complaints “if, in his or her opinion, it is appropriate to do so”: see Rules of Procedure, r. 6.A.1.
[12] The screening process is neither an investigation nor a hearing into the merits of the complaint: see Anwar v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 3150 (Div. Ct.), at para. 15; Endicott v Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2014 ONCA 363, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 149, at para. 28. Rather, the Complaints Director is tasked with determining whether the allegations or issues in the complaint, on their face, fall within his statutory mandate and jurisdiction and whether the complaint reveals a prima facie violation of the PSA.
[13] The Complaints Director has broad authority to screen out complaints: see PSA, s. 60(1), under which the Complaints Director “may, in accordance with this section [60], decide not to deal with a complaint made to him or her by the public under this Part [V]” of the PSA. A complaint may be screened out if the complaint is made more than six months after the facts on which it is based occurred: PSA, s. 60(2). A complaint may also be screened out if (i) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or made in bad faith, (ii) the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with, in whole or in part, under another Act or other law, or (iii) having regard to all the circumstances, dealing with the complaint is not in the public interest: PSA, s. 60(4). It is not in the public interest to screen in a complaint that does not, on its face, disclose a breach of the PSA or the Code of Conduct under the PSA[2] (the “PSA Code of Conduct”): Rules of Procedure, r. 6.5.
[14] To accord with s. 60(4) of the PSA, the Complaints Director is required to consider the public interest when performing the screening process. Rule 6.4 of the Rules of Procedure provides:In determining whether or not to deal with a complaint, the [Complaints] Director will have regard to the public interest. Public interest will always involve a balancing of interests and a broad range of considerations. Some of the factors which the Director may consider will include:
(i) the effect of a decision to deal or not to deal with a complaint on public confidence in the accountability and integrity of the complaints system
(ii) the number of complainants involved
(iii) the seriousness of the complaint, including the seriousness of the harm alleged
(iv) whether the complaint relates to an incident or event that has already been the subject of an earlier complaint
(v) whether there are issues of systemic importance or broader public interest at stake
(vi) the likelihood of interfering with or compromising other proceedings
(vii) whether another venue, body or law can more appropriately address the substance of the complaint. [15] If a police conduct complaint is screened in, the Complaints Director is required by s. 61(5) of the PSA to either (i) refer the complaint to the chief of police of the police force to which the complaint relates (to be dealt with under s. 66), (ii) refer the complaint to the chief of police of a different police force (to be dealt with under s. 67), or (iii) retain the complaint within the LECA (to be dealt with under s. 68). In each instance, the complaint is required “to be investigated and the investigation to be reported in a written report”: PSA, ss. 66(1), 67(1), 68(1).
[16] At the conclusion of an investigation dealt with under s. 66, if the chief of police on review of the investigation report “is of the opinion that the complaint is unsubstantiated, the chief of police shall take no action in response to the complaint” and is required to notify the complainant, the subject police officer and the Complaints Director, in writing: PSA, s. 66(2). In these circumstances, the complainant may, within 30 days of such notification, ask the Complaints Director to review the chief of police’s decision: PSA, s. 71(1). Upon completion of the Complaints Director’s review (without holding a hearing), the Complaints Director may confirm the chief of police’s decision or take other steps that may include (i) directing a further investigation, (ii) directing the conduct of a hearing, or (iii) taking over the investigation of the complaint: PSA, ss. 71(2), 71(3).
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[44] The standard of review that applies to the Screening Decision is reasonableness. The Divisional Court has consistently reviewed decisions of the Complaints Director on a reasonableness standard: see Engels v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 5104 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 30-31. The Complaints Director’s exercise of legislative discretion not to deal with a complaint is entitled to deference upon judicial review: Wall v. Ontario (Independent Policy Review Director), 2013 ONSC 3312, 362 D.L.R. (4th) 687, at para. 21; aff’d 2014 ONCA 884, 123 O.R. (3d) 574.
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[55] As noted in A.Z. v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2023 ONSC 6365 (Div. Ct.), at para. 46, “the threshold for procedural fairness at the screening phase is low”; see also Endicott, at para. 28, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the PSA does not contemplate the need for a hearing or notice, nor does it impose any specific procedural requirement.” As well, in Engels, at para. 90, the Divisional Court made a similar statement about complainants’ procedural rights relating to the investigation of police conduct complaints.
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[61] As well, we do not agree that there was unfairness arising from the Complaints Director’s failure to “bear in mind” r. 6.5 of the Rules of Procedure when making the Screening Decision. In addition to the public interest screening factors set out in r. 6.4, a further basis for “screening out” a complaint in the public interest is provided in r. 6.5, if the complaint does not disclose “on its face” a breach of the PSA or the PSA Code of Conduct. In Poyton, at para. 32, the court relied on r. 6.5 to support the conclusion that the complaint should be screened out because the complaint did not “on its face” disclose a basis for finding police misconduct. It is still open to the Complaints Director to screen out a complaint in the public interest, without addressing whether the complaint disclosed a breach of the PSA or the PSA Code of Conduct “on its face”. In the Screening Decision, at p. 2, the Complaints Director directed that the issues raised in the May 2024 Complaint are to be addressed in the context of the applicant’s request for review under s. 71 of the PSA, as he was authorized to do under r. 6.1.A. The May 2024 Complaint was not unfairly dismissed out of hand, as the applicant suggests.
[62] We see no basis for concluding the Screening Decision should be set aside because the applicant was denied procedural fairness.
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[71] In his factum, the applicant argues that the Screening Decision is a textbook example of the two types of fundamental flaws that make a decision unreasonable, since it is not “rational and logical” and is entirely “untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it”: see Vavilov, at para. 101. The applicant submits that the Screening Decision does not reflect the substance and scope of the May 2024 Complaint, indicating that the Complaints Director did not meaningfully grapple with the key issues or central arguments or provide any indication that the applicant was heard or that the Complaints Director listened. Among other things, the applicant repeats his submission that the Complaints Director failed to appreciate that allegations relating to providing a forged transcript for the university code of conduct proceeding was entirely distinct and independent from Detective Petrie’s task of investigating the 2023 Complaint, which was the matter under review in s. 71 request for review process. As well, the applicant again faults the Screening Decision for not including implicit or explicit reference to r. 6.5 of the Rules of Procedure relating to misconduct “on the face” of the complaint.
[72] We have concluded that the applicant has not discharged his burden of establishing that the Screening Decision was unreasonable. To the extent that the applicant repeats the submissions he made with respect to apprehension of bias and procedural fairness, we also find them unpersuasive in establishing that the Screening Decision was unreasonable.
[73] The Complaints Director’s reasons for screening out a complaint need not be lengthy or complex. They simply must answer the question “why?”. A complainant and the reviewing court are entitled to know the rudiments of the explanation for why the complaint has been screened out and will not be investigated: Wall (C.A.), at para. 62. The standard is not perfection and reasons for decision do not necessarily need to include all the arguments or details that were made or to reference every applicable statutory or regulatory provision: see Poyton, at para. 23.
[74] The Screening Decision was reasonable and supported by intelligible reasons that justified the conclusions reached. The Complaints Director noted the similarity of the allegations and evidence between the May 2024 Complaint and the 2023 Complaint that is subject to the s. 71 request for review. He concluded that the outstanding s. 71 review would be the most appropriate process to consider the allegations set out in the May 2024 Complaint. The Complaints Director was entitled to exercise his discretion in a manner that preserved the resources of the LECA in the public interest, while continuing to allow consideration on the merits of the applicant’s allegations in the May 2024 Complaint.
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