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Professionals - Accountants. Olusegun v. Carleton
In Olusegun v. Carleton (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a CJA s.31(a) appeal from a Small Claims Court, here where the appellant sued several parties including a university, several professors and the CPAO (Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario) [the latter of which this appeal involves].
Here the court considered the liability of the CPAO, the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario Act (CPAOA), the Public Accounting Act, 2004 (PAA) and related issues of statutory immunity:[5] The Appellant submitted to the Motion Judge that his claim rested on the CPAO’s recommendations of Preparatory Courses on the CPAO website. Further, the Appellant submitted that the CPAO did not have statutory immunity because recognizing certain courses offered by Carleton University was an “overreach into a non-statutory function”. The Appellant submitted that the CPAO’s legal authority is only regarding Professional Education Program courses, not CPA Preparatory Courses. He argued that the Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8 was the governing legislation on the facts of the case.
[6] The CPAO’s position was that their role is limited to recognizing courses that meet its minimum requirements for subject matter covered and hours of instruction. Their website lists the schools and courses that have been verified for entry into the CPA Professional Education Program. The CPAO submitted that this was not done in bad faith. Rather, it was to ensure that applications have the basic competencies required to protect the public.
[7] The Appellant further alleged that the CPAO was doing this to generate more profit as accredited applicants have to pay dues and that they favoured some schools over others.
[8] The Motion Judge held that the CPAO had met their onus in showing no viable cause of action against them. The Motion Judge found that the CPAO Act governed the CPAO and that the CPAO did not act outside of its mandate. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that the CPAO acted in bad faith, and the CPAO was not an agent for Carleton University. Therefore, the CPAO met the test for statutory immunity under s. 64 of the CPAO Act.
[9] Alternatively, the Motion Judge held that even without statutory immunity, there was no evidence that the Appellant’s claim was viable. The CPAO showed, based upon an affidavit from Jacqueline Mulligan, Vice President of the CPAO, Education, that they did not owe the Appellant a duty of care, or that even if there was such a duty, that they had not breached it.
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Issue 1: Did the Motion Judge err in finding that the CPAO acted within the scope of its statutory objects and err in declining to rely on the Public Accounting Act?
[15] The Appellant submits that analyzing ss. 2, 5, and 64 of the CPAO Act and ss. 2 and 3 of the Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8 (which the Appellant refers to as the “Governing Act”) demonstrates that “if the legislature has expressly excluded CPA Ontario from acting in a particular accounting field, any involvement in such business, including recommending any person in that area, cannot be done in good faith.” The Appellant submits that the Motion Judge erroneously and selectively chose to consider only portions of the law relevant to her analysis while overlooking other crucial law. Namely, the Public Accounting Act.
[16] The Appellant submits that the CPAO’s overall mandate is to protect the public interest. Thus, the CPAO must regulate its members with the broader goal of protecting the public interest in mind. The Appellant submits that the CPAO did not do this. The CPAO acted outside its statutory authority because Prerequisite Education Programs are outside its jurisdiction. Thus, the CPAO acted intentionally and illegally by recommending the course he took at Carleton University. Hence, it was open to be sued in this action and cannot rely on statutory immunity from liability.
[17] I do not give effect to this ground of appeal.
[18] The CPAO acted well within its legislative mandate when advising the public through its website of the minimum requirements of courses that it would recognize including at universities like Carleton University. Section 65 of the CPAO Act empowers the regulatory body to make by-laws including ones relating to requirements for entrance into the profession. As permitted by its legislative authority, on May 19, 2014, Council for the CPAO passed a by-law, “Academic Prerequisite Review and Recognition Standards”, which amongst other things, notes that a student can enter the CPAO’s own training program “through the successful completion of CPA Ontario-recognized, academic institution, degree-credit courses…” and sets out the standards required for such courses.
[19] The Appellant’s contention that the Motion Judge erred by not referring to the “Governing Act” misunderstands the Public Accounting Act, which is concerned with the licensing and regulation of public accounting or assurance services, a subset of services that licensed CPAs may provide with additional qualifications and training. The Public Accounting Act is not concerned with the requirements for admission to the CPAO licensing process.
[20] The Motion Judge did not err by failing to refer to or rely upon legislation that is irrelevant to the CPAO’s authority to assess undergraduate courses and to the Appellant’s claim which has nothing to do with public accounting. Moreover, the Motion Judge did not err regarding the way she dealt with the CPAO’s enabling legislative framework in doing what it did that the Appellant sought to sue CPAO for.
Issue 2: Did the Motion Judge err in dealing with immunity from liability?
[21] Section 64 provides the CPAO with statutory immunity for:any act done in good faith in the exercise or performance or the intended exercise or performance of any power or duty of CPA Ontario under this Act, a predecessor Act or the Public Accounting Act, 2004, or for any alleged neglect or default in the exercise or performance in good faith of such power or duty. [22] First, the Appellant submits that the Motion Judge erred in finding that the CPAO acted within the scope of its statutory objects and was therefore immune. As I have found above, there is no error in this regard.
[23] Second, the Appellant then discusses the CPAO’s alleged fraudulent acts. The Appellant submits that the CPAO committed fraud and acted in bad faith such that “when a regulatory body intentionally acts outside its statutory boundaries, it cannot hide behind immunity”. The Appellant relies on Finney v. Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17 and Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121 for the principles regarding claiming immunity and good faith. The Appellant submits that the CPAO acted in bad faith and thus, cannot be shielded by s. 64.
[24] In my view, the Appellant is attempting to relitigate a factual finding of good faith made by the Motion Judge without pointing to any error of law or palpable and overriding error on this issue. All the CPAO’s actions fell squarely within its mandate. The CPAO acted in good faith in establishing and maintaining CPA admissions requirements. Moreover, the CPAO’s involvement in the core dispute the Appellant has with Carleton University is tenuous and remote. Any suggestion that the CPAO acted as an agent for the university or as a co-conspirator is speculative and fanciful. Clearly, the Motion Judge accepted the evidence presented by the CPAO, something she was entitled to do. This finding attracts considerable deference on appeal and the Appellant has shown no basis to overturn it.
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