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Professionals - Accountants. The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi
In The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a CPAO-initiated JR, this brought against a CPAO Appeal Decision that the Registrar readmit a former accountant who "was convicted of three counts of knowingly making a false statement in an application to obtain a small business loan, ...", and consequently had his license revoked.
Here the court considered a statutory administrative appellate 'reasonableness' standard [ie. not a JR/Vavilov 'reasonableness', but one under CPAOA, 2017 s.37(5)]:The Appeal Panel did not conduct a reasonableness review
[62] The Appeal Panel’s reasons for finding the Reconsideration Decision to be unreasonable are summarized in the following paragraph of the Appeal Decision, which for ease of reference is reproduced again:[80] The Appeal Panel finds that the Reconsideration Panel’s decision was unreasonable in that it placed disproportionate emphasis on the Appellant’s failure to express remorse in the manner expected and insufficient emphasis on his substantial rehabilitative efforts in the last 20 years. The Reconsideration Panel’s misapprehension of some of the evidence, set out above, contributed to their failure to fully appreciate the evidence of the Appellant’s rehabilitation. [63] As Vavilov makes clear, the reasonableness of a decision may be undermined if the decision maker fundamentally misapprehended the evidence before it. Absent such a misapprehension or a failure to consider relevant evidence or a reliance on evidence that was not before it, an adjudicative body that is conducting a reasonableness review is not to reweigh or reassess the evidence considered by the original decision maker.
[64] On the issue of remorse, the Reconsideration Panel concluded, after hearing Mr. Siddiqi testify, that his focus was on the suffering caused to him and his family and that he did not sufficiently appreciate the impact his misconduct had had on the banks, Industry Canada, or on the reputation of the accounting profession. As noted in the Reconsideration Decision, maintaining the reputation of the accounting profession is one of the fundamental goals of the good character requirement.
[65] The Reconsideration Panel was concerned about the issue of remorse since “when [Mr. Siddiqi] appeared before the Tribunal in 2018, [Mr. Siddiqi] did not appear to accept responsibility for any of his misconduct. He blamed his lawyers for the outcome before the Courts. The Tribunal was concerned that the Applicant took no responsibility for any of his poor choices”: Reconsideration Decision, para. 110.
[66] One of the requirements for readmission is to demonstrate a material change in the circumstances that existed when the revocation order was made. One of the circumstances that the Reconsideration Panel found existed at the time of revocation was Mr. Siddiqi’s non-acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct. Thus, the question for them was whether this circumstance had materially changed. On their assessment of the evidence, it had not.
[67] According to the Reconsideration Panel there was an “absence of any evidence from the Applicant” about the impact of his behaviour on the banks, Industry Canada or the reputation of the profession as a whole: Reconsideration Decision, para. 112.
[68] The Appeal Decision found that this statement ignored evidence from the Applicant as to his remorse that was before them. First, there was his statement in the declaration that accompanied his readmission application and second, there was his testimony that he accepted responsibility for disbursing funds to Iran and had betrayed the public trust and lived with that every day.
[69] The question then becomes whether these failures display the kind of fundamental misapprehension of the evidence that jeopardized the rationality of the Reconsideration Panel’s decision. In my view they do not. It is clear from the Reconsideration Decision that the entire panel (even the member who dissented on the result) came to the same conclusion regarding Mr. Siddiqi’s remorse – that his primary focus was on the effect of his conduct on him, his family and his professional designation. They did so after hearing and seeing Mr. Siddiqi testify, something the Appeal Panel did not do.
[70] Thus, rather than fundamentally misapprehending or ignoring the evidence before them, the Reconsideration Panel weighed all of the evidence they heard and came to the conclusion that that evidence did not demonstrate the insight they were looking for to be satisfied that there had been a material change in Mr. Siddiqi’s acceptance of responsibility for his actions since the revocation decision in 2018.
[71] The same analysis applies to the Reconsideration Panel’s view of the character letters. Their concern was whether those letters demonstrated the kind of acceptance of responsibility that they had not heard from Mr. Siddiqi in his testimony – an insight and appreciation into the effect of his conduct on the banks, Industry Canada and the reputation of the profession. The letters did not contain sufficient detail to satisfy them of this. Further, to the extent that they heard from three witnesses who wrote character letters, their evidence did not satisfy them on this point.
[72] Instead of deferring to the Reconsideration Panel’s assessment of the weight to be attributed to the character letters on the question of remorse, the Appeal Panel did its own weighing of that evidence and decided to accept it, something that is impermissible on a reasonableness review. Again, they did not see or hear the character witnesses who testified.
[73] On the issue of rehabilitation, the Appeal Panel found that the majority decision of the Reconsideration Panel was unreasonable for a number of reasons. First, they found at para. 76 of the Appeal Decision that the Reconsideration Panel “discounted” the 17 letters submitted in support of Mr. Siddiqi. While it is true that the Reconsideration Panel did express its view of the weight to be attributed to those letters on the question of remorse, there is no suggestion in the Reconsideration Decision of a questioning of the evidence in those letters as to the fact that Mr. Siddiqi was a “beloved pillar and leader in his community”. Nor does the Reconsideration Decision question the evidence as to the role that Mr. Siddiqi had played in that community and in his family since the events giving rise to the convictions that led to the revocation of his license.
[74] Second, the Appeal Panel expressed a concern about the fact that the majority of the Reconsideration Panel failed to consider Mr. Siddiqi’s exemplary conduct in the years prior to 2013. Again, there is no evidence of this. The Reconsideration Panel never questioned the fact that Mr. Siddiqi’s conduct since the events giving rise to the misconduct had been exemplary. Rather, they took the view that in light of their concerns about Mr. Siddiqi’s lack of insight into the effects of his behaviour, both at the time of his revocation and before then. The Reconsideration Panel concluded not enough time had passed since the revocation to be assured that Mr. Siddiqi had gained sufficient insight into the seriousness of his behaviour.
[75] Third, the Appeal Panel found that the Reconsideration Panel unreasonably discounted Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitative efforts because he did not self-report behaviour prior to the criminal charges being laid. I agree with the Appeal Decision that, given that Mr. Siddiqi did not appreciate that he had done anything wrong before he was charged criminally, he could not have been expected to self-report his behaviour before then. However, I do not agree that this error on the part of the Reconsideration Panel is sufficiently material to call into question the reasonableness of the Reconsideration Decision when that decision is read as a whole.
[76] Fourth, the Appeal Panel found that the Reconsideration Decision unreasonably discounted Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitative efforts because the crime he committed was not a victimless crime and the victims of the crime, namely the banks and Industry Canada, had not been fully compensated. In the view of the Appeal Panel, Mr. Siddiqi had done what the Crown had requested and had paid the fine imposed by the court at great personal sacrifice by selling his daughter’s condominium. I disagree that there was no rational basis for the Reconsideration Decision to consider the fact that the victims of the misconduct had not been fully compensated. As noted in the Reconsideration Decision, one of the goals of the good character requirement is to maintain the reputation of the profession. In other words, the public must have confidence in the good character of the profession’s members. It is not irrational to find that the public would have more confidence in a member whose misconduct had caused losses if that member had fully compensated the victims of that misconduct for their losses. In this case the fine imposed was considerably less than the losses suffered.
[77] Finally, the Appeal Decision found that the Reconsideration Decision unreasonably failed to give sufficient weight to the hours of continuing professional development that Mr. Siddiqi had engaged in over a three-year period. In the view of the Reconsideration Panel, since continuing education is a prerequisite for registration that every member must establish, it did not say much about Mr. Siddiqi’s rehabilitation. While it is true that Mr. Siddiqi performed 41 more hours of continuing education than was required over a three-year period, it is not irrational to find that this does not necessarily say anything about rehabilitation. If there had been evidence that the courses were specifically directed at gaining an understanding of the behaviour that led to the misconduct at issue (for example, courses about the fiduciary obligations of chartered accountants), there might have been a stronger argument to be made on this issue.
[78] In the end, the Appeal Panel simply had a different view than the majority of the Reconsideration Panel of the weight that should have been attributed to the evidence on rehabilitation, just as they had a different view of the weight that should have been attributed to the evidence on remorse. However, their task was not to reweigh the evidence to come their own conclusion. It was to examine the Reconsideration Decision to determine if, taken as a whole, its outcome fell within a range of reasonable outcomes and its reasoning disclosed a rational chain of analysis.
[79] It is important to emphasize again that the reasonableness analysis recognizes that reasonable people can disagree and that disagreeing with the outcome below does not entitle the reviewing body to intervene.
[80] Determining good character is a nuanced exercise. As pointed out in the Reconsideration Decision at paras. 90-91, “[g]ood character connotes moral or ethical strength, distinguishable as an amalgam of virtuous attributes or traits which would include, among others, integrity, candour, empathy and honesty…[a]n appreciation of the difference between right and wrong; [t]he moral fibre to do that which is right, no matter how uncomfortable the doing may be and not to do that which is wrong no matter what the consequences may be to oneself”.
[81] It is not surprising that reasonable people could disagree on this issue, particularly in the case of someone like Mr. Siddiqi whose misconduct involved financial fraud (a profound betrayal of the values and ethics of the accounting profession), but who, at the same time, has done much good in the world since the misconduct occurred. At play is the tension between recognizing that rehabilitation is an important value of the readmission process and the need to maintain the reputation of the profession by assuring the public that its members will not betray the fundamental values of that profession by engaging in fraudulent conduct. In the end the legislature made a choice about who should make that decision and what powers a panel on appeal should have to set aside the first decision. The decision is to be made by the panel who hears the witnesses and considers the matter at first instance. That decision can only be set aside on appeal if it is unreasonable, not if the Appeal Panel merely thinks that it is wrong. . The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi
In The Professional Conduct Committee of the CPAO v. Siddiqi (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed a CPAO-initiated JR, this brought against a CPAO Appeal Decision that the Registrar readmit a former accountant who "was convicted of three counts of knowingly making a false statement in an application to obtain a small business loan, ...", and consequently had his license revoked.
The court considered aspects of the professional regulatory regime under the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario Act, 2017:[50] Membership and discipline of chartered professional accountants are governed by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 8, Sched. 3 (“CPAO Act”) as well as the CPAO’s By-Law and Regulations. The CPAO’s General By-Law allows for the revocation of membership in the CPAO in accordance with the Regulations and for the readmission of a member whose membership was revoked.
[51] Pursuant to s. 30.1 of Regulation 6-2, an application for readmission after an order revoking membership requires an application for reconsideration of the original order before the Discipline Committee. Section 24 of Regulation 6-2 provides that an application for readmission cannot be made before the fifth anniversary of the revocation decision. Section 24 also states that the Discipline Committee may reconsider a decision by a panel of the Discipline Committee “if there has been a material change of circumstances that makes the decision or order…unnecessary.” Section 58 of Regulation 7-1 provides that a member whose membership has been revoked shall not be readmitted except in “extraordinary circumstances at the discretion of, and on the restrictions and conditions deemed appropriate by” the relevant decision-maker. Thus, the bar for readmission is a high one and the decision to readmit is discretionary.
[52] Before bringing a motion for reconsideration, the applicant must obtain written confirmation from the Registrar that all the requirements for readmission have been met except for the “good character” requirement.
[53] Pursuant to s. 35 of Regulation 6-2, the applicant in a readmission application bears the onus of establishing that they are of good character.
[54] Section 37 of the CPAO Act specifies that a final decision of the discipline committee may be appealed to an appeal committee. Pursuant to s. 10 of Regulation 6-3, an appeal is not a rehearing and is to be decided on the record before the discipline committee. The appeal committee has the power to determine any question of law or mixed fact and law that arises under the appeal and has the power to order a new hearing or make any order that the discipline committee could have made. However, s. 37(5) of the CPAO Act dictates that the appeal committee shall not make either such order “unless it determines that the decision or order appealed from is unreasonable.” By inserting this standard, the legislature has indicated that the appeal committee must give considerable deference to the decision of the discipline committee. . Olusegun v. Carleton
In Olusegun v. Carleton (Ont Divisional Ct, 2025) the Divisional Court dismissed a CJA s.31(a) appeal from a Small Claims Court, here where the appellant sued several parties including a university, several professors and the CPAO (Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario) [the latter of which this appeal involves].
Here the court considered the liability of the CPAO, the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario Act (CPAOA), the Public Accounting Act, 2004 (PAA) and related issues of statutory immunity:[5] The Appellant submitted to the Motion Judge that his claim rested on the CPAO’s recommendations of Preparatory Courses on the CPAO website. Further, the Appellant submitted that the CPAO did not have statutory immunity because recognizing certain courses offered by Carleton University was an “overreach into a non-statutory function”. The Appellant submitted that the CPAO’s legal authority is only regarding Professional Education Program courses, not CPA Preparatory Courses. He argued that the Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8 was the governing legislation on the facts of the case.
[6] The CPAO’s position was that their role is limited to recognizing courses that meet its minimum requirements for subject matter covered and hours of instruction. Their website lists the schools and courses that have been verified for entry into the CPA Professional Education Program. The CPAO submitted that this was not done in bad faith. Rather, it was to ensure that applications have the basic competencies required to protect the public.
[7] The Appellant further alleged that the CPAO was doing this to generate more profit as accredited applicants have to pay dues and that they favoured some schools over others.
[8] The Motion Judge held that the CPAO had met their onus in showing no viable cause of action against them. The Motion Judge found that the CPAO Act governed the CPAO and that the CPAO did not act outside of its mandate. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that the CPAO acted in bad faith, and the CPAO was not an agent for Carleton University. Therefore, the CPAO met the test for statutory immunity under s. 64 of the CPAO Act.
[9] Alternatively, the Motion Judge held that even without statutory immunity, there was no evidence that the Appellant’s claim was viable. The CPAO showed, based upon an affidavit from Jacqueline Mulligan, Vice President of the CPAO, Education, that they did not owe the Appellant a duty of care, or that even if there was such a duty, that they had not breached it.
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Issue 1: Did the Motion Judge err in finding that the CPAO acted within the scope of its statutory objects and err in declining to rely on the Public Accounting Act?
[15] The Appellant submits that analyzing ss. 2, 5, and 64 of the CPAO Act and ss. 2 and 3 of the Public Accounting Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 8 (which the Appellant refers to as the “Governing Act”) demonstrates that “if the legislature has expressly excluded CPA Ontario from acting in a particular accounting field, any involvement in such business, including recommending any person in that area, cannot be done in good faith.” The Appellant submits that the Motion Judge erroneously and selectively chose to consider only portions of the law relevant to her analysis while overlooking other crucial law. Namely, the Public Accounting Act.
[16] The Appellant submits that the CPAO’s overall mandate is to protect the public interest. Thus, the CPAO must regulate its members with the broader goal of protecting the public interest in mind. The Appellant submits that the CPAO did not do this. The CPAO acted outside its statutory authority because Prerequisite Education Programs are outside its jurisdiction. Thus, the CPAO acted intentionally and illegally by recommending the course he took at Carleton University. Hence, it was open to be sued in this action and cannot rely on statutory immunity from liability.
[17] I do not give effect to this ground of appeal.
[18] The CPAO acted well within its legislative mandate when advising the public through its website of the minimum requirements of courses that it would recognize including at universities like Carleton University. Section 65 of the CPAO Act empowers the regulatory body to make by-laws including ones relating to requirements for entrance into the profession. As permitted by its legislative authority, on May 19, 2014, Council for the CPAO passed a by-law, “Academic Prerequisite Review and Recognition Standards”, which amongst other things, notes that a student can enter the CPAO’s own training program “through the successful completion of CPA Ontario-recognized, academic institution, degree-credit courses…” and sets out the standards required for such courses.
[19] The Appellant’s contention that the Motion Judge erred by not referring to the “Governing Act” misunderstands the Public Accounting Act, which is concerned with the licensing and regulation of public accounting or assurance services, a subset of services that licensed CPAs may provide with additional qualifications and training. The Public Accounting Act is not concerned with the requirements for admission to the CPAO licensing process.
[20] The Motion Judge did not err by failing to refer to or rely upon legislation that is irrelevant to the CPAO’s authority to assess undergraduate courses and to the Appellant’s claim which has nothing to do with public accounting. Moreover, the Motion Judge did not err regarding the way she dealt with the CPAO’s enabling legislative framework in doing what it did that the Appellant sought to sue CPAO for.
Issue 2: Did the Motion Judge err in dealing with immunity from liability?
[21] Section 64 provides the CPAO with statutory immunity for:any act done in good faith in the exercise or performance or the intended exercise or performance of any power or duty of CPA Ontario under this Act, a predecessor Act or the Public Accounting Act, 2004, or for any alleged neglect or default in the exercise or performance in good faith of such power or duty. [22] First, the Appellant submits that the Motion Judge erred in finding that the CPAO acted within the scope of its statutory objects and was therefore immune. As I have found above, there is no error in this regard.
[23] Second, the Appellant then discusses the CPAO’s alleged fraudulent acts. The Appellant submits that the CPAO committed fraud and acted in bad faith such that “when a regulatory body intentionally acts outside its statutory boundaries, it cannot hide behind immunity”. The Appellant relies on Finney v. Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17 and Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121 for the principles regarding claiming immunity and good faith. The Appellant submits that the CPAO acted in bad faith and thus, cannot be shielded by s. 64.
[24] In my view, the Appellant is attempting to relitigate a factual finding of good faith made by the Motion Judge without pointing to any error of law or palpable and overriding error on this issue. All the CPAO’s actions fell squarely within its mandate. The CPAO acted in good faith in establishing and maintaining CPA admissions requirements. Moreover, the CPAO’s involvement in the core dispute the Appellant has with Carleton University is tenuous and remote. Any suggestion that the CPAO acted as an agent for the university or as a co-conspirator is speculative and fanciful. Clearly, the Motion Judge accepted the evidence presented by the CPAO, something she was entitled to do. This finding attracts considerable deference on appeal and the Appellant has shown no basis to overturn it.
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