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Representation - Paralegal and Lay Representatives - General
MORE CASES
Part 1 | Part 2
. Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario
In Caruso v. Law Society of Ontario (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here brought against the dismissal of an application "for declarations that “licensed paralegals in Ontario are authorized to provide immigration legal services in accordance with section 91(2) of [IRPA], including assisting clients in preparing and completing applications under [IRPA] and any of [its] associated Regulations”.
The court considers (and dismisses) the possibility of conflict wrt LSO By-law 4 ['Licensing'] and IRPA provisions regarding immigration consultants, here finding that both provincial and federal legislatures share jurisdiction under the constitutional 'double aspect' doctrine:B. Did the Divisional Court err in failing to find that By-Law 4 must be interpreted consistently with federal legislation to provide broad authority to paralegals to provide immigration and refugee services?
[74] Both provincial governments and the federal government have jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867, relating to legal representation in immigration matters: Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, 2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, at paras. 34, 38, 42 and 46-47. Provincial jurisdiction is provided by s. 92(13) (property and civil rights) and possibly by s. 92(14) (the administration of justice): Mangat, at para. 46. Federal jurisdiction derives from s. 91(25) (naturalization and aliens). In areas of concurrent jurisdiction such as this, both jurisdictions can legislate relating to the same subject pursuant to the double aspect doctrine, so long as the legislation does not conflict: Mangat, at para. 23. If it does conflict, the provincial legislation will be constitutionally inoperative pursuant to the paramountcy doctrine: Mangat, at paras. 74-76.
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a. Identifying conflicts
[80] A conflict triggering the doctrine of paramountcy can arise in two ways. First, there can be an “operational conflict” where it is impossible to comply with both the federal law and provincial law simultaneously because one of the enactments says “yes” and the other says “no”. Alternatively, there will be a conflict where “imposing an obligation to comply with provincial legislation would in effect frustrate the purpose of a federal law”: Murray-Hall v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2023 SCC 10, [2023] 1 S.C.R. 367, at para. 84.
[81] Of importance, courts should not be quick to find that there is a conflict. The burden of proof in establishing a conflict is a “high one”: Murray-Hall, at para. 85. Courts should seek to achieve “co-operative federalism”, by accepting harmonious readings of federal and provincial statues that operate in areas of concurrent jurisdiction where possible: Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 189, at para. 17.
b. The decision in Mangat does not govern
[82] Mr. Caruso relies upon the Mangat decision to support his position that By-Law 4 creates division of powers problems. In my view the Mangat decision does not assist his position.
[83] Mr. Mangat was a non-lawyer working as an immigration consultant in British Columbia for a fee. The Law Society of British Columbia sought to enjoin him from being paid for providing those services, alleging that he was violating the prohibition in s. 26 of the Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 25, against non-members of the Law Society practicing law. Gonthier J. held for a unanimous court that s. 26 was inoperative notwithstanding that both British Columbia and the federal government had concurrent jurisdiction to legislate relating to the provision of legal services for a fee in immigration matters. He found that there was a conflict between the two statutes, rendering the British Columbia statute inoperative under the paramountcy doctrine: Mangat, at paras. 72-76.
[84] Although the legal principles it identifies are relevant here, the holding in Mangat does not govern this litigation directly. All of the legal services that Mr. Mangat provided related exclusively to IRB refugee hearings, including representation and litigation advice, and the preparation of litigation documents. This, of course, is advocacy work that would be permissible for paralegals under Ontario’s By-Law 4. Gonthier J. was careful to confine the application of the Mangat decision, given the narrow range of legal services that Mr. Mangat provided. He cautioned, that “[o]ther services related to immigration were not in issue in this case and so this judgment should not be interpreted as granting a broad right to practise law in all matters concerning aliens and immigrants without being a member of the Law Society”: Mangat, at para. 32. Therefore, the holding in Mangat does not assist Mr. Caruso’s submissions.
[85] In any event, the federal legislation at issue in Mangat was materially amended after the decision was rendered. Mangat focused on the impact of ss. 30 and 69(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, which provided in material part that a person “with respect to whom an inquiry [by an adjudicator] is to be held” has the “right to obtain the services of a barrister or solicitor or other counsel and to be represented by any such counsel at the inquiry” for a fee (emphasis added).[15] Gonthier J. interpreted “other counsel” as meaning “non-lawyers”: Mangat, at para. 55. Section 26 of the Legal Profession Act of British Columbia conflicted with this federal provision because it purported to prohibit other counsel, who were not barristers or solicitors, from undertaking such representation for a fee.
[86] After Mangat was decided, IRPA was enacted. In isolation, s. 167(1) provides the same broad right to be represented by counsel as the Immigration Act did.167 (1) A person who is the subject of proceedings before any Division of the Board and the Minister may, at their own expense, be represented by legal or other counsel. [Emphasis added.] [87] However, ss. 91(1) and (2) were added to IRPA, and on any reasonable reading, they materially limit the right of representation by non-lawyers to regulated paralegals or immigration consultants. Put otherwise, they describe and limit the “other counsel” who are permitted to provide representation. I will reproduce these provisions for convenience:Representation or advice for consideration
91(1) Subject to this section, no person shall knowingly, directly or indirectly, represent or advise a person for consideration — or offer to do so — in connection with the submission of an expression of interest under subsection 10.1(3) or a proceeding or application under this Act.
Persons who may represent or advise
(2) A person does not contravene subsection (1) if they are
(a) a lawyer who is a member in good standing of a law society of a province or a notary who is a member in good standing of the Chambre des notaires du Québec;
(b) any other member in good standing of a law society of a province or the Chambre des notaires du Québec, including a paralegal; or
(c) a member in good standing of the College, as defined in section 2 of the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Act. [Emphasis added.] [88] It is the underlined words in s. 91(2)(b) that address representation by Ontario paralegals.
c. IRPA and By-Law 4 do not conflict
[89] In my view, even leaving aside considerations relating to co-operative federalism and the heavy burden on those who claim jurisdictional conflict, it is obvious that there is no conflict between By-Law 4 and IRPA, ss. 91 and 167(1).
[90] Section 167(1) creates the right of persons to be represented in proceedings by “other counsel” or non-lawyers in IRPA matters. But as I have explained, the right to be represented by “other counsel” is restricted in s. 91 in all IRPA matters to non-lawyers whose legal work is regulated. This is the clear purpose of s. 91. It was enacted in the wake of Mangat, which like Pointts before it, raised public interest issues by permitting paid representation by unregulated non-lawyers.
[91] The federal government initially attempted to regulate IRPA legal services through IRPA regulations. In 2004, it passed Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2004-59, which created the profession of licensed immigration consultants who would be the sole non-lawyers providing legal services in immigration and refugee matters. This regulatory scheme was put on a statutory footing through Bill C-35[16], which was passed in 2011 after a 2008 House of Commons Standing Committee report, “Regulating Immigration Consultants” confirmed that there were continuing problems with unregulated non-lawyers providing immigration and refugee services. The initial draft of Bill C-35 would have confined representation to lawyers, federally regulated immigration consultants and Quebec notaries, excluding paralegals entirely. But as described, the LSO, the only Canadian law society which regulates paralegals, lobbied to add licensed paralegals. Bill C-35 was amended, producing what is now s. 91(2)(b) of IRPA.
[92] This history confirms that paralegals were added to the list of authorized representatives because they were perceived to be adequately regulated by the LSO. This was the heart of the LSO submission before the Standing Committee made by Treasurer Pawlitza in 2010, which evidently prevailed. When Bill C-35 was introduced by federal Minister of Immigration Jason Kenney, he said, “[T]he government proposed the recognition of paralegals regulated by a law society” and added, “By recognizing the ability of law societies to govern their members in the public interest, such recognition could help protect would-be immigrants”: House of Commons Debates, 40-3, No. 112 (7 December 2010), at p. 6883.
[93] I do not accept Mr. Caruso’s position that this history confirms that Parliament intended to create an affirmative right to retain paralegals to perform all legal services relating to matters that are administered through IRPA. As the Divisional Court recognized, this history shows that through this legislation “Parliament demonstrated its intention that such paralegals would be regulated by the provincial law societies”. The text of s. 91(2)(b) confirms this as well. It permits paralegals to provide legal services only if “in good standing of a law society of a province”. In effect, through this provision Parliament has delegated the regulation of IRPA legal services by paralegals to law societies.
[94] I also agree with the Divisional Court’s conclusion that Parliament demonstrated an intention “that such paralegals would … comply with their regulatory requirements.” Applying the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the terms “in good standing of a law society of the province” interpreted in the context of s. 91 and IRPA as a whole, a paralegal who is exceeding their regulatory authority by providing legal services they are not licensed to provide is not complying with their regulatory requirements and therefore is not in good standing.
[95] Permitting paralegals to do so would also defeat the purpose of confining legal services to non-lawyers who are regulated. The training that paralegals receive is doubtlessly linked to the activities they are permitted to undertake. If paralegals are permitted to provide legal services that they are not licensed to provide and not trained to perform, in contravention of the restrictions imposed by the regulatory body relied upon to protect the public interest, it would destroy the purpose of s. 91 of ensuring that non-lawyers providing legal services in IRPA matters are regulated.
[96] I am therefore satisfied that there is no operational conflict between IRPA and By-Law 4. Instead, IRPA effectively incorporates the limits imposed in By-Law 4 by leaving it to the LSO to regulate paralegals who provide IRPA services. Moreover, complying with By-Law 4 would not create a conflict by frustrating the purpose of a federal law. As the Divisional Court found, “[w]here Parliament’s purpose is to restrict the provision of legal services to persons regulated by the provincial law society, regulation by the provincial law society is not incompatible with Parliament’s purpose. Indeed, regulation by the provincial law society is exactly what Parliament intended.”
Conclusion on Issue (b), the division of powers issue
[97] I would therefore find that the double aspect doctrine applies and that By-Law 4 can coexist with the material provisions in IRPA. Even if By-Law 4 was ambiguous, which it is not, the presumption of constitutionality does not apply. I would therefore deny this ground of appeal. . Saltat v Correia and others
In Saltat v Correia and others (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court illustrates a tribunal case where the HRTO allowed the applicant to have her "husband to act as her representative and as a witness" as a form of disability human rights accomodation:[17] In 2024, the applicant submitted a request for accommodation to the HRTO. The applicant requested permission for her husband to act as her representative and as a witness, for extended time limits and for additional time to complete forms. She also asked for the proceeding to be in-person. In response, the HRTO informed the applicant that her husband could act as her representative, setting out the needed steps, and noted that there were no witnesses at a mediation. The HRTO further indicated that extensions of time could and should be requested as relevant deadlines may arise. And the HRTO indicated that after a hearing event or mediation was scheduled, the applicant could request an in-person hearing together with supporting medical documentation. . R. v. Robinson
In R. v. Robinson (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal denied a motion for waiver of the duty to file a transcript on a criminal appeal. The appellant had non-LSO assistance, and the court referenced "pseudo-legal arguments". This 13-paragraph ruling is worth reading to get a flavour for the court's unusual patience with this unrepresented appellant.
. Kiani et al v. Rivera et al.
In Kiani et al v. Rivera et al. (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a landlord's RTA s.210 appeal, here brought against LTB findings "that the respondents’ tenancy in a rooming house was subject to the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“RTA”) and awarded damages to each of the tenants are after being locked out from the rooming house".
Here the court considered the landlord's argument that the LTB erred in allowing them to be represented by a person not LSO-licensed:Issue #1: Did the Board err in permitting David Anton to represent the Landlord?
[15] This issue was raised in the Notice of Appeal as follows:[The LTB] erred in law in the issuance of it October 7th, 2024 Orders ... when Member Nikitin incorrectly decided to allow a non-licensee to act as a legal practitioner for the landlords, despite no objections by the parties. By doing so, the landlords received ineffective representation brought on by inadequate direct and cross-examination, resulting a denial of procedural justice. [16] This issue was not addressed in the Appellants’ Factum.
[17] Each Order addressed the Landlord’s representation as follows:The Landlord was represented by David Anton, who is not a licensee with the Law Society. He and [Mr. Charmchi] assured the board that his representation complied with the “Practice Direction on Representation before the Landlord and Tenant Board, Unlicensed Representatives”. David Anton appeared as the Landlord’s friend and was not being compensated. Neither the Landlord nor the Applicants objected to David Anton representing the Landlord. I noticed Mr. Anton referred to [Mr. Charmchi] as “Mr. Charmchi” and as “my client” at times during the hearings. These are unusual ways to address one’s friend but I didn’t invite parties submissions on this issue at the hearing and will therefore not address this matter any further. [18] The transcript also shows that both Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi expressed their agreement when asked by Member Nikitin whether they were content with being represented by Mr. Anton.
[19] A complaint of ineffective representation at the Landlord and Tenant Board was also raised in Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, 2025 ONSC 841. I agree with the views expressed by Corbett J. at paras. 4-7:[4] I would find that the [Appellant] may not raise the “ineffective assistance” in this court because (i) she failed to raise it at first instance before the LTB when she had about ten weeks to do so between the end of the hearing and the release of the LTB’s decision; and (ii) she failed to raise it before the LTB during Reconsideration proceedings. Had I concluded that the Appellant should be permitted to raise this issue for the first time in this court, I would have dismissed the appeal because “ineffective assistance” is not a basis for interfering with a civil judgment: the Appellant’s remedy for alleged ineffective assistance lies in civil proceedings against her representative and/or a complaint to his professional regulator, and not a setting aside of a decision that discloses no reversible error on the basis of the evidence and arguments made below.
[5] Had I concluded that it was arguable that “ineffective assistance” could be a basis for interfering with the result below, I would not see this court adjudicate the “ineffective assistance” argument at first instance, but rather, I would quash the LTB’s Reconsideration decision and direct that the Reconsideration process be run anew, with the Appellant able to raise the “ineffective assistance” argument there. In my view the LTB, and not this court, should (i) rule on whether ineffective assistance is available in proceedings before the LTB; and (ii) if the answer to (i) is yes, establish the test(s) and process(es) to be followed to raise such arguments before the LTB.
[6] ... residential tenancy disputes arise in real time, in a real context, and there are important interests of both landlords and tenants that require a conflict resolution process that is reasonably fast, efficient, and inexpensive. Proceedings before the LTB often involved parties who are represented by non-licensed agents, friends, family members, and many parties who self-represent. Why should these persons have less entitlement than those who have retained licensed professionals to a “do over” when their representatives fail to do a good job, or they themselves fail to approach their own case in the most effective way?
[7] Unlike in the criminal context, in civil proceedings the other side has an important interest in the principles that (i) parties are responsible for the manner in which their own case is presented; and (ii) decisions reached after following the prescribed process should have final effect. [20] The LTB’s decision to permit David Anton to represent the Landlord is entitled to deference. The LTB is a high-volume tribunal that it is statutorily mandated to adopt the most expeditious method of determining questions arising in a proceeding that all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard on the matter: RTA, at s. 183. The Member raised the issue of Mr. Anton’s representation given that he was not licensed with the Law Society of Ontario. He also addressed the requirements of the LTB’s Procedural Direction on Representation before the Landlord and Tenant Board. Both Mr. Anton and Mr. Charmchi advised the Board Member that Mr. Anton was a friend and that he was not being compensated. Both Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi told the Board Member that they wished for Mr. Anton to represent them. They are now dissatisfied with the outcome of the LTB hearing and Mr. Anton’s representation. However, it was open to them to retain counsel – as the Tenants did – or a paralegal, but instead chose to rely on Mr. Anton’s assistance. Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi bear the responsibility for their choices, not the Member or the Tenants. Further, it appears that they did not raise their concerns about Mr. Anton’s representation with the Member nor did they seek a review of the LTB Orders on this basis or at all. At this point, more than one year after the LTB Orders were issued, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to send this matter back to the LTB for another hearing on the merits. . Stile Carpentry Ltd. v. 2004424 Ontario Inc.
In Stile Carpentry Ltd. v. 2004424 Ontario Inc. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal denied a R15.01(2) motion for permission to allow a corporation to be represented by a non-lawyer.
Here the moving party had in past filed facta:... with the court that are replete with fabricated legal citations. They reference non-existent cases and miscite genuine cases for propositions that those cases do not even address. They provide notional hyperlinks to authorities that link instead to wholly irrelevant documents. They reference provisions of statutes that do not exist. Quoted text from case law and statutes are completely fabricated. .....
[4] Rule 15.01(2) provides:A party to a proceeding that is a corporation shall be represented by a lawyer, except with leave of the court. The starting point is that corporations must be represented by counsel. The grant of leave is exceptional. As Huscroft J.A. noted in GlycoBioSciences Inc. (Glyco) v. Industria Farmaceutica Andromaco, S.A., de C.V. (Andromaco), 2024 ONCA 481, aff’d 2024 ONCA 760, at para. 6, although judges have a discretion to grant leave, that discretion must not be exercised in a way that normalizes the practice and undermines the rule.
[5] The effective operation of the legal system is premised on the participation of a well-trained and regulated body of professionals. A critical question, from the perspective of maintaining the integrity of the justice system, is whether a proposed representative is not only reasonably capable of comprehending the issues and setting out the position of the corporation, but also of advocating in a manner that meets the professional ethical standards expected of solicitors.
[6] Furthering access to justice can be a reason to grant leave: Stayside Corporation Inc. v. Cyndric Group Inc., 2024 ONCA 630, at para. 11. But as Glyco explains, at para. 7, it is not the only relevant consideration:A non-lawyer who is closely tied to the corporation granted leave under r. 15.01(2) is akin to a self-represented party, but the separate legal personhood of the corporation means, in effect, that the non-lawyer is providing legal services to another person, contrary to s. 26.1(1) of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8. Moreover, non-lawyers are not bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor are they subject to the personal financial consequences associated with cost orders that self-represented litigants face: Leisure Farm Construction Limited v. Dalew Farms Inc. et.al., 2021 ONSC 105at paras. 12-15. Permitting a non-lawyer to act also risks creating an undue burden on the respondents and the court. [7] The concerns articulated in Glyco of non-lawyers imposing an undue burden are abundantly displayed in this case.
[8] It is not disputed that Mr. Paraskevopoulos has a sophisticated understanding of commercial property leases. But his recent efforts at representing the corporation amply demonstrate that he is unable to do so in a manner that does not impose unacceptable costs on both opposing counsel and the court. He has, on multiple occasions, filed factums with the court that are replete with fabricated legal citations. They reference non-existent cases and miscite genuine cases for propositions that those cases do not even address. They provide notional hyperlinks to authorities that link instead to wholly irrelevant documents. They reference provisions of statutes that do not exist. Quoted text from case law and statutes are completely fabricated.
[9] A solicitor who acted in such a manner – whether out of duplicity or incompetence – would rightly face severe consequences: professional disciplinary proceedings and punishment ranging from a citation to fine or disbarment, in addition to public opprobrium. But a non-lawyer faces none of these sanctions, notwithstanding the costs that such conduct imposes on opposing parties and the court, who are left to identify and expose the fabrications. A rigorous application of r. 15.01(2) is one of the few tools currently available to courts to apply to non‑lawyers to manage this risk. . Caruso v. The Law Society of Ontario
In Caruso v. The Law Society of Ontario (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered (and dismissed) a JR by an Ontario paralegal challenging the accepted constitutional governage of immigration consultants, specifically whether LSO By-law 4 ['Licensing'] governed the issue as opposed to s.91(2) ['Representation or Advice'] of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
In these quotes the court sets out the licensing regime of Ontario paralegals, which is closely related to that for lawyers:[1] The central issue raised in this application is whether the processing and filing of immigration applications on behalf of clients is within the Applicant’s scope of practice as a paralegal licensed by the Law Society of Ontario (LSO).
[2] The Applicant takes the position that he is authorized to provide such legal services pursuant to s. 91(2) of the federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA).
[3] The Applicant takes the position that, properly interpreted, there is no LSO by-law that limits the authorization set out in the IRPA. Accordingly, the LSO’s policy that purports to limit his scope of practice in matters relating to immigration to providing legal services in connection with proceedings or intended proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is, therefore, not authorized by the LSO by-laws.
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Law Society Act
[11] Lawyers and paralegals in Ontario are governed by the LSO. The regulation of lawyers by the LSO (formerly the Law Society of Upper Canada) dates back to 1797: “An Act for the better Regulating the Practice of the Law” 1797 (U.C.) (2nd Sess.), c. 13.
[12] The regulation, licensing and discipline of paralegals by the LSO only began in 2007 pursuant to statutory amendments enacted in 2006 (Access to Justice Act, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. C). Ontario was the first province or territory to licence paralegals and remains the only province or territory in which paralegals require a licence.
[13] Section 26.1(1) of the Law Society Act contains a broad prohibition that “no person, other than a licensee whose licence is not suspended, shall practise law in Ontario or provide legal services in Ontario”.
[14] Only lawyers are licensed to practice law. Paralegals are licensed to “provide legal services”. The Law Society Act defines “the provision of legal services” in ss. 1(5)-(7):Provision of legal services
(5) For the purposes of this Act, a person provides legal services if the person engages in conduct that involves the application of legal principles and legal judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person.
Same
(6) Without limiting the generality of subsection (5), a person provides legal services if the person does any of the following:
1. Gives a person advice with respect to the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of the person or of another person.
2. Selects, drafts, completes or revises, on behalf of a person,
i. a document that affects a person’s interests in or rights to or in real or personal property,
ii. a testamentary document, trust document, power of attorney or other document that relates to the estate of a person or the guardianship of a person,
iii. a document that relates to the structure of a sole proprietorship, corporation, partnership or other entity, such as a document that relates to the formation, organization, reorganization, registration, dissolution or winding-up of the entity,
iv. a document that relates to a matter under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada),
v. a document that relates to the custody of or access to children,
vi. a document that affects the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of a person, other than the legal interests, rights or responsibilities referred to in subparagraphs i to v, or
vii. a document for use in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.
3. Represents a person in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.
4. Negotiates the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of a person.
Representation in a proceeding
(7) Without limiting the generality of paragraph 3 of subsection (6), doing any of the following shall be considered to be representing a person in a proceeding:
1. Determining what documents to serve or file in relation to the proceeding, determining on or with whom to serve or file a document, or determining when, where or how to serve or file a document.
2. Conducting an examination for discovery.
3. Engaging in any other conduct necessary to the conduct of the proceeding. [15] Also relevant is subs. 1(8), which exempts specified persons conducting specified activities from the definition of “practicing law or providing legal services”. Of relevance to this case is subs. 1(8)1, which provides:(8) For the purposes of this Act, the following persons shall be deemed not to be practising law or providing legal services:
1. A person who is acting in the normal course of carrying on a profession or occupation governed by another Act of the Legislature, or an Act of Parliament, that regulates specifically the activities of persons engaged in that profession or occupation. [16] Section 27(1) of the Law Society Act provides for classes of licences to be prescribed by the LSO in its by-laws:Classes of licence
27 (1) The classes of licence that may be issued under this Act, the scope of activities authorized under each class of licence and any terms, conditions, limitations or restrictions imposed on each class of licence shall be as set out in the by-laws. [17] Finally, s. 62(0.1) 4 of the Law Society Act gives the LSO broad authority to make by-laws governing the classes of licences that may be issued, including the scope of activities authorized under each class of licence:62(0.1) Convocation may make by-laws,
4. prescribing the classes of licence that may be issued under this Act, the scope of activities authorized under each class of licence and the terms, conditions, limitations or restrictions imposed on each class of licence; [18] Pursuant to its authority under s. 62(0.1) 4 of the Law Society Act, the LSO enacted By-Law 4, in 2007. That provision is at the heart of this legal dispute.
[19] Paralegals hold a Class P1 licence. Section 6(2) of By-Law 4 prescribes the scope of practice for paralegals:Activities authorized
(2) Subject to any terms, conditions, limitations or restrictions imposed on the class of licence or on the licensee and subject to any order made under the Act, a licensee who holds a Class P1 licence is authorized to do any of the following:
1. Give a party advice on his, her or its legal interests, rights or responsibilities with respect to a proceeding or the subject matter of a proceeding.
2. Represent a party before,
i. in the case of a proceeding in the Small Claims Court, before the Small Claims Court,
ii. in the case of a proceeding under the Provincial Offences Act, before the Ontario Court of Justice,
iii. in the case of a proceeding under the Criminal Code, before a summary conviction court,
iv. in the case of a proceeding before a tribunal established under an Act of the Legislature of Ontario or under an Act of Parliament, before the tribunal, and
v. in the case of a proceeding before a person dealing with a claim or a matter related to a claim, before the person.
3. Anything mentioned in subsection 1 (7) of the Act, provided the activity is required by the rules of procedure governing a proceeding.
4. Select, draft, complete or revise, or assist in the selection, drafting, completion or revision of, a document for use in a proceeding.
5. Negotiate a party’s legal interests, rights or responsibilities with respect to a proceeding or the subject matter of a proceeding.
6. Select, draft, complete or revise, or assist in the selection, drafting, completion or revision of, a document that affects a party’s legal interests, rights or responsibilities with respect to a proceeding or the subject matter of a proceeding. [20] By-Law 4 defines “proceeding” as a “proceeding or intended proceeding” before certain bodies, including “a tribunal established under an Act of the Legislature of Ontario or under an Act of Parliament”.
[21] If a legal service does not fall within a paralegal’s scope of practice under By-Law 4, it is proscribed by s. 26.1(1) of the Law Society Act.
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