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Statutory Interpretation - Modern Principle - Procedure. Jakupovic v. Intact Insurance Company
In Jakupovic v. Intact Insurance Company (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an insurer's LAT SABS appeal, this brought against a Divisional Court finding that "the respondent complied with s. 32(1) [SS: 'Notice to insurer and application for benefits'] of the SABS", here where the issue was whether the claimant had met the seven day "or as soon as practicable after that day" time limit.
Here the court stresses that statutory interpretation procedure under the modern principle is to first conduct the text/context/purpose analysis and then (and only then) - if there is uncertainty or ambiguity - to have recourse to other statutory interpretation doctrine (for example here it was 'consumer' interpretation):[17] Both the respondent and the intervener emphasized that the SABS is consumer protection legislation. While that is undoubtedly correct, the Divisional Court erred in law by focusing its analysis on the fact that the SABS is consumer protection legislation rather than following the established principles of statutory interpretation. The Divisional Court’s analysis proceeded directly to weighing two competing interpretations in light of the purposes of the regulation, without first considering whether the text, context, and purpose read together pointed towards a clear meaning. This was an error. As the Supreme Court has noted, “even ‘laudable’ policy objectives do not themselves permit courts to apply interpretations that are not consistent with the text and context”: Telus Communications Inc. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2025 SCC 15, 502 D.L.R. (4th) 59, at para. 70, citing R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, [2023] 1 S.C.R. 340, at para. 26.
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[23] The foregoing analysis does not discount the purpose of the SABS. As this court has recognized, the SABS is “consumer protection legislation designed to provide fair compensation and minimize economic disruption in the lives of accident victims”: Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 882, 148 O.R. (3d) 438, at para. 43. Sections 32(1) and 34 already address non-compliance with the statutory timelines, and provide mechanisms to relieve late notice. As noted by the Divisional Court, s. 34 is “a safety valve to make sure rigid adherence to the procedural requirements in claiming benefits based upon time, does not work an injustice in an individual case”: Clouthier v. Co-Operators General Insurance, 2025 ONSC 6798, 180 O.R. (3d) 136, at para. 68. In Clouthier, the Divisional Court also remarked that the SABS should be interpreted in a way which balances speedy payment to claimants with reasonable insurance rates: at para. 66.
[24] Instead of interpreting the provisions of the SABS according to their clear wording, the court below has re-written the provisions so that s. 32(1) is rendered meaningless.
[25] The Divisional Court’s interpretation is also contrary to its own jurisprudence. In Zuchelkowski v. Zenith Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 3512, the Divisional Court noted at para. 24:The SABs process is one aimed at consumer protection. The regulation is to be given a fair, large, and liberal interpretation bearing in mind its distinctly consumer-oriented purpose. But the chosen manner of carrying out the regulatory purpose must be gleaned from the words used in the relevant sections and in the regulation as a whole. [Emphasis added.] There is nothing in the words used by s. 32(1) that places an onus on the insurer to inquire of an insured if they will be submitting a SABS application in order to start the process of benefit payments.
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