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Torts - Motor Vehicle Accidents (MVA)
EDITING NOTE
There are MVA tort cases in /insurance-auto that could be transferred here.
CASES
. Kou v. Karmah
In Kou v. Karmah (Ont Div Ct, 2025) the Ontario Divisional Court allowed an appeal, here from an MVA lawsuit "splitting liability for the collision between the respondent (65%) and the appellants (35%)", this where the "parties reached an agreement on damages and proceeded to a summary trial under the simplified procedure on the issue of liability only".
Here the court considered liability in rear-end MVA situations:Did the trial judge make a legal error?
[24] The appellants submit that the trial judge erred in not finding the respondent 100% liable for the collision given the trial judge’s conclusion that Ms. Kou was following too closely. According to the appellants, the trial judge failed to consider the reverse onus that applies in rear-end collision cases. The appellants state that the respondent had to disprove her own negligence before there could be any consideration of Mr. Karmah’s liability. Further, the appellants allege that the trial judge’s liability split reflects a departure from the well-established case law dealing with following too closely/rear-end collisions.
[25] The respondent firstly denies that the trial judge made a finding that Ms. Kou was following too closely and, regardless, submits that it was open to the trial judge to make a finding that Mr. Karmah was negligent based on the particular facts in this case.
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Reverse onus – rear-end collisions
[27] The jurisprudence related to rear-end collisions is well settled. Generally, liability will rest with the driver that collides with the rear-end of a vehicle: Beaumont v. Ruddy, 1932 CanLII 147 (ON CA), [1932] O.R. 441 (C.A.). Over the course of decades, a common law reverse onus has developed whereby the driver that collides with the rear-end of a vehicle must rebut the presumption that they are negligent: see Iannarella v. Corbett, 2015 ONCA 110, 124 O.R. (3d) 523, at para. 19; Ozimkowski v. Raymond, 2018 ONSC 5779, at para 29, aff’d 2019 ONCA 435; Chernet v. RBC General Insurance Company, 2017 ONCA 337, at para. 10.
[28] In certain circumstances, the driver that rear ends a vehicle can discharge the onus to prove they are not negligent by proving that the conduct of the lead vehicle contributed to the collision: Rahimi v. Hatami, 2015 ONSC 4266, at para. 14.
[29] In this case, the trial judge did not specifically mention a reverse onus, or the presumption of negligence, that is involved in rear-end collision cases. However, he cited the prevailing authorities and noted: “[i]n assessing whether an apportionment of blame for the accident is appropriate in this case, I am mindful that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.” When the reasons for judgment are viewed as a whole, particularly considering the comments made on the record, I am satisfied that the trial judge was aware of the reverse onus in rear-end collision cases and the respondent’s burden. The appellants have not demonstrated that the trial judge made a legal error in this respect.
Following too closely jurisprudence
[30] The trial judge did not use the language “following too closely” to describe Ms. Kou’s driving leading up to the collision. However, the trial judge concluded that Ms. Kou had insufficient time to react when Mr. Karmah stopped his vehicle given her distance from his car. I find that this conclusion, coupled with the 65% liability attributed to Ms. Kou, is the equivalent to making a finding that Ms. Kou was following too closely.
[31] The parties agree that following too closely is prohibited under Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 158(1). Further, there is agreement that a driver found to have been following too closely will generally be held fully liable for a rear-end collision: Beaumont, at pp. 444 – 445; Rahimi at para. 14. This is because Courts have repeatedly held that drivers have an obligation to maintain “a safe distance behind the vehicle ahead, keep a lookout and maintain a reasonable speed, so that he or she has sufficient time to stop if the vehicle ahead suddenly stops”: Iannarella, at para. 9.
[32] Sudden stopping of the lead vehicle within one’s own lane of traffic has generally not been the source of liability in rear-end collision cases, but rather something that should be anticipated by the following driver: Ozimkowski, at paras. 29-30.
[33] In Martin-Vandenhende 2012 ONCA 53, 287 O.A.C. 250, there was evidence that the lead driver involved in a rear-end collision first signaled and drove off onto the shoulder, as if allowing the rear driver to pass, only to suddenly swerve back into the lane of traffic without signaling. The Court of Appeal distinguished the circumstances in that case, from traditional following-too-closely cases: “[t]his was not a case about a lead car simply stopping suddenly or engaging in some confusing maneuvers within its own lane, and the driver of a following vehicle not having proper care and control of the following vehicle sufficient to enable him or her to react to the sudden stop”: at para. 39. . Morales v. Laguardia
In Morales v. Laguardia (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal noted this in relation to sudden auto accidents:[12] We begin by noting, as did the motion judge, that in Gill v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 1973 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1973] S.C.R. 654, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, at p. 665:It is trite law that faced with a sudden emergency for the creation of which the driver is not responsible he cannot be held to a standard of conduct which one sitting in the calmness of a courtroom later might determine was the best course. . Sanson v. Paterson
In Sanson v. Paterson (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal cited an HTA provision setting out the onus of proof for MV accidents:[12] Section 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act provides:When loss or damage is sustained by any person by reason of a motor vehicle on a highway, the onus of proof that the loss or damage did not arise through the negligence or improper conduct of the owner, driver, lessee or operator of the motor vehicle is upon the owner, driver, lessee or operator of the motor vehicle.
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