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Torts - Trespass (2). Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency [useful]
In Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court allowed a JR, this brought against the dismissal of a review by the LECA Complaints Director, that of the dismissal of a "complaint to the chief of police of the Peel Regional Police" (which had been referred to the chief by the LECA Complaints Director).
The court considers what lawful demands the police may make of a citizen without having criminal suspicion - here the allegation was that the police claimed "that he was required to provide identification because he was on private property and the police had “trespass authority”."):[28] In his report, the investigator found that the officers were authorized to investigate Mr. Sarpong and that there was no evidence of unlawful detention. He based that finding on a document entitled “Authorization Pursuant to Trespass to Property Act” provided by the “occupier” [2] of the hotel to Peel Regional Police. The document provided that Peel police officers were authorized to enter the hotel property for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Trespass to Property Act; and, “in particular, section 2(1)(b) which gives the occupier the authority to extend authorization for persons other than the occupier to direct persons to leave the premises.”
[29] In confirming the investigator’s findings, the Director did no more than refer to the investigator’s determination that the police were authorized to enforce provisions of the Trespass to Property Act, and to his finding that the officers conducted a reasonable investigation and were legally authorized to investigate Mr. Sarpong’s purpose for being on the property. Missing from the analysis is any explanation of how one gets from the provisions of the Act, and the conclusion that the officers were legally authorized to investigate Sarpong’s purpose, to the conclusion that he had not been unlawfully detained.
[30] In R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at para. 130, the court said the following about the extent of the authority given by s. 2(1)(b) of the Trespass to Property Act to persons authorized by the occupier:No statute authorized these police officers to detain anyone in the backyard. At trial, the police invoked the Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21, as a source of authorization to enter to assess whether the young men were trespassing. However, as a matter of law, the Act does not authorize the police to engage in investigative detentions on private property. Rather, it provides authorization only for the police to arrest individuals where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that they are trespassing (s. 9). No such grounds existed. [31] More recently, in R. v. Virk, 2025 ONSC 5790, at para. 23, the court held that police authority under the Trespass to Property Act is restricted to directing persons to leave the property:As an aside, although the police were undoubtedly entitled to speak with Mr. Virk to determine if he was a trespasser, they did not have the power to detain him if he was. Under the Trespass to Property Act, even if he could not account for his presence at the school, that would have only entitled the police to request that he leave the property. Under that Act, the only "detention" power is the authority to arrest a trespasser who refuses to leave when directed: see Trespass to Property Act, s.2(1)(b) and s. 9(1). [32] The central argument raised by Mr. Sarpong in his request for review was that in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was committing an offence, it was unlawful for the police to demand identification on threat of arrest. The Director failed to grapple with this argument.
[33] With respect to Mr. Sarpong’s complaint that the police demand for identifying information was unlawful, the Director should consider the applicability of “Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties”, being O. Reg. 400/23, under the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019.
[34] With respect to Mr. Sarpong’s complaint that he had been unlawfully detained, the relevant law would include R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 and R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.
[35] In Grant, at para. 44, the court held that a detention occurs when a physical or psychological restraint results in a suspension of an individual’s liberty interest. “Psychological detention is established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply.”
[36] In Mann, at para. 45, the court held that police may detain a person for investigative purposes where “there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is necessary.” . Resler v. Anglin [trespass to chattels]
In Resler v. Anglin (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed a defendant's SCC appeal, this brought against an Alberta CA ruling that allowed an appeal where the Alberta QB struck the plaintiff's "amended statement of claim in its entirety, finding that it amounted to an abuse of process, disclosed no reasonable cause of action and, in any case, the allegations had no reasonable chance of success given Resler’s common law and statutory immunities".
Here the court implicitly notes that 'trespass to chattels' is a tort:(3) The Trespass to Chattel Claim
[94] This claim relates to the allegations that Anglin’s signs were damaged or removed even after having been rendered compliant with the CEO’s guidelines. As the Court of Appeal majority notes, this allegation would support a claim for trespass to chattels as against the other defendants (para. 70). As regards Resler, however, it may be subsumed in and succeed as a particular of the misfeasance in public office claim. To that extent, the Court of Appeal majority allowed the claim to be maintained. I endorse this approach. . Sheridan Retail Inc. v. Roy [trespass nominal damages]
In Sheridan Retail Inc. v. Roy (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses a plaintiff's appeal (though allowing the costs appeal), here brought against a successful defendant's CJA s.137.1(3) SLAPP dismissal motion regarding an action that was first advanced in defamation and some economic torts - but then re-focussed to center on a trespass that the defendant engaged in to gather photo evidence of their allegations.
The court considers that nominal damages arise from a trespass that causes no harm, here in this SLAPP harm-expression balancing context:[77] SRI claims that the motion judge erred in several respects in her assessment of the threshold requirement relating to its trespass claims. I will begin with its submission that the motion judge misapprehended the law of trespass by failing to recognize that a person who enters a public mall for an unauthorized purpose, such as theft, can be a trespasser: see e.g., Hudson’s Bay Co. v. White, [1997] O.J. No. 307 (Gen. Div.), at para. 9, rev’d in part on other grounds, [1998] O.J. No. 2383 (Div. Ct.). It argues by analogy that Mr. Roy’s entrance for the purpose of undertaking unauthorized investigations, as it alleges, is comparable.
[78] I take no issue with the legal proposition that SRI relies upon, ...
....
[81] I now return to SRI’s reliance on White. Even if Mr. Roy was a trespasser because he entered mall property to conduct “unauthorized investigations”, in the absence of SRI demonstrating grounds to believe it suffered the damages it pleaded, his acts of trespass would only be actionable per se. The problem that this presents is that a trespass that produces no actual harm is a mere technical case that will not have the substantial merit needed to outweigh the protected right to expression, despite entitling the claimant to nominal damages to vindicate their property rights: see e.g., Deluca v. Paul Guiho Trucking & Construction Ltd. (1984), 1984 CanLII 2188 (ON CA), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 267 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 274; Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, 2025 BCCA 131, 8 B.C.L.R. (7th) 266, at paras. 35-39; and see Pointes, at para. 47. The motion judge was entitled to conclude in this case that the alleged trespasses claims did not have substantial merit that could outweigh the protected right to expression.
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