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COVID - 2020 Civil and Administrative Time Extension. Brady v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care [clarifying]
In Brady v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a plaintiff's appeal, here brought against the "motion judge’s order dismissing her claim for wrongful dismissal".
Here the court considers the COVID-originated EMCPA limitation six-month time-extension:[2] ... Second, she found that the claim was statute-barred because it was commenced after the two-year limitation period had expired. The appellant argues that the motion judge erred in both of these conclusions.
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[6] The appellant argues that her claim was discoverable on April 30, 2020, the date she was advised she was being terminated from the acting manager position and would be returned to her position in the bargaining unit. We note that it could be argued that the claim was discoverable as late as May 22, 2020. However, because limitation periods were suspended throughout that period, the limitation analysis is the same whether the claim was discoverable on April 30, 2020 or as late as May 22, 2020.
[7] At the time the appellant’s claim was discoverable in late April or mid-May 2020, limitation periods were suspended as part of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The relevant legislative and regulatory provisions are as follows:Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9 (the “EMCPA”)
7.1(6) If a provision establishing a limitation period or a period of time within which a step must be taken in a proceeding is temporarily suspended by the order and the order does not provide for a replacement limitation period or period of time, the limitation period or period of time resumes running on the date on which the temporary suspension ends and the temporary suspension period shall not be counted.
O. Reg. 73/20, formerly under the EMCPA
1. Any provision of any statute, regulation, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario establishing any limitation period shall be suspended, and the suspension shall be retroactive to Monday, March 16, 2020.
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6. For greater certainty, any limitation period or period of time within which a step must be taken in a proceeding that is temporarily suspended under this Regulation resumes running on the date on which the temporary suspension ends and the temporary suspension period shall not be counted. [8] The temporary suspension of limitation periods created by the regulation ended on September 14, 2020: O. Reg. 457/20, s. 1, under the Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 17. The total length of the suspension of limitation periods under the regulation was 183 days.
[9] We agree with the motion judge’s conclusion that, although the appellant’s claim was discoverable in late April or mid-May 2020, the limitation period was suspended until September 14, 2020, the date that the suspension of limitation periods ended. On September 14, 2020, the limitation period started running on the appellant’s claim. Because the two-year period started running on September 14, 2020, it expired on September 14, 2022. The appellant commenced her claim on October 27, 2022. This was outside the two-year limitation period.
[10] The appellant renews the argument made below that the limitation period should be calculated by starting on the date her claim was discoverable, April 30, 2020, and adding the full length of the suspension of limitation periods, 183 days, plus the two-year limitation period. Using this approach, the appellant argues that she had until October 30, 2022 to commence her claim – two years and 183 days from April 30, 2020. In support of this argument the appellant relies on McAuley v. Canada Post Corporation, 2021 ONSC 4528. In that case at para. 42, Boswell J. described the effect of the suspension of limitation periods as “to extend any running limitation period by 183 days. In other words, all limitation periods subject to the regulation were extended by roughly six months.”
[11] The motion judge rejected this argument. She was correct to do so. The appellant’s reliance on McAuley is misplaced. In McAuley, unlike this case, the claim was discoverable prior to the suspension of limitation periods. Thus, when limitation periods were suspended effective March 16, 2020, the limitation clock in McAuley was already running. The suspension of limitation periods under the EMCPA stopped the running of limitation periods for 183 days, and then the limitation clock restarted running on September 14, 2020. It was in the context of a limitation period that was already running when the suspension started on March 16, 2020, that Boswell J. said that the effect of the extension of limitation periods “was to extend any running limitation period by 183 days.”
[12] Where, as in this case, the claim was not discoverable before the commencement of the suspension of limitation periods, the limitation clock did not start running until the suspension ended on September 14, 2020. There is no need to notionally add 183 days to the limitation period. The two-year period simply started running later – on September 14, 2020, when the suspension of limitation periods ended. . Beshay v. Labib
In Beshay v. Labib (Ont CA, 2024) the Court of Appeal noted the 2020 six-month (March-August) COVID suspension of civil and administrative time limits:[7] Rule 48.14(1) directs the registrar to dismiss actions that have not been set down for trial within five years. However, in March 2020, the Superior Court of Justice suspended operations on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in all filing deadlines being extended for six months. As a consequence, the r. 48.14(1) deadline in this case was extended from December 2021 to June 2022.
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