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JR - SOR - Reasonableness - Fact-findings. Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canada (Food Inspection Agency)
In Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canada (Food Inspection Agency) (Fed CA, 2025) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here from a Federal Court judgment dismissing "an application for judicial review of two related decisions of the respondent, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (the CFIA)" in a high-media case involving the cull of a flock of farmed ostriches.
Here the courts considers reasonableness review, here in a scientific evidence justification context:(2) Did the Federal Court err in being overly deferential to the evidence from the CFIA scientists?
[65] The appellant next contends that the Federal Court was overly deferential to the expertise of the CFIA’s scientists, suggesting that the so-called "“academy of science”" case law is no longer good law, post-Vavilov.
[66] Throughout its reasons, the Federal Court emphasized that in undertaking reasonableness review, courts cannot resolve scientific disputes or otherwise re-decide the scientific merits of a decision: FC Decision at paras. 6, 69, 84, 133, 162–163, 165, 168, 201. The appellant argues that this framing amounts to impermissible "“rubber-stamping”", excessively defers to the decision-maker’s expertise, and is thus contrary to the approach in Vavilov.
[67] We disagree and find that the Federal Court appropriately applied Vavilov to the scientific issues the appellant raised. As noted, Vavilov mandates that courts consider whether a decision "“bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision”": Vavilov at para. 99. The required considerations apply to all decisions, including those that involve the assessment and weighing of scientific evidence.
[68] However, reasonableness review does not call for courts to become the merits-decider: Safe Food Matters Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FCA 19, 46 C.E.L.R. (4th) 185 [Safe Food] at para. 37. Courts cannot reweigh the evidence, second-guess the exercise of discretion, or undertake their own statutory interpretation exercise: Safe Food at para. 39. Rather, they are limited to determining whether the administrative decision-maker’s determinations were reasonable.
[69] In addition, some determinations based on the assessment and weighing of scientific evidence, like the adoption of the Stamping-Out Policy, may arise in the context of relatively unconstrained decisions that are harder to set aside: Entertainment Software at para. 30.
[70] We note that the Federal Courts have often framed deference to science-based determinations around the courts not being an "“academy of science”": see Greenpeace Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 114, 2 Admin. L.R. (6th) 1 at paras. 60–61; Coldwater First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 34, 444 D.L.R. (4th) 298 at para. 119, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39111 (2 July 2020); Inverhuron & District Ratepayers’ Assn. v. Canada (Minister of The Environment) (2000), 191 F.T.R. 20, 2000 CanLII 15291 (T.D.) at para. 71; Inverhuron & District Ratepayers Ass. v. Canada (Minister of The Environment), 2001 FCA 203, 206 F.T.R. 318; Ontario Power Generation Inc v. Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186, 388 D.L.R. (4th) 685 at para. 126, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36711 (28 April 2016); South Shore at para. 58; Shelburne Elver Limited v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 566 at para. 68; Canadian Committee For a Sustainable Eel Fishery Inc. v. Canada (Fisheries, Oceans and Coast Guard), 2024 FC 1951 at para. 31; Georgia Strait Alliance v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2025 FC 54, 65 C.E.L.R. (4th) 319 at para. 150; Peguis First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 990, 47 C.E.L.R. (4th) 26 at para. 171, aff’d 2023 FCA 163, 59 C.E.L.R. (4th) 1; Citizens Against Radioactive Neighbourhoods v. BWXT Nuclear Energy Inc., 2022 FC 849, 51 C.E.L.R. (4th) 125 at para. 80.
[71] As noted by the Supreme Court at paragraph 143 of Vavilov, principles relating to reasonableness review developed pre-Vavilov, such as the "“academy of science”" jurisprudence, must be aligned with the reasons in Vavilov. Such alignment recognizes that some administrative decision-makers, like the CFIA, are required to assess and weigh scientific evidence and that reviewing courts must refrain from reweighing and reassessing this evidence. Thus, a reviewing court may intervene only if an applicant for judicial review establishes that the decision-maker has fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it: Vavilov at paras 125–126.
[72] This approach is the correct one and is precisely what the Federal Court did in the instant case. . Kumar v. Aviva General Insurance Company
In Kumar v. Aviva General Insurance Company (Div Court, 2024) the Divisional Court considered a specific SOR for fact-findings in a JR:[17] With respect to the application for judicial review, the decision was a reasonable one. To the extent that the Appellant raises factual arguments, none of those arguments rise to the level of showing the exceptional circumstances required to set aside a tribunal’s findings of fact: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 563, at paras. 125-126.
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