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JR - No JR of Interlocutory Administrative Orders. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Rodas Tejeda
In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Rodas Tejeda (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal considers the general principle that there should be no JR of interlocutory administrative decisions, subject to 'exceptional circumstances':[74] Another consideration bears mention, namely, that settled principles of administrative law prevent interlocutory judicial review applications, barring exceptional circumstances. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against fragmenting administrative processes through premature judicial intervention, particularly where the impugned decision is preliminary in nature and forms part of an integrated statutory scheme.
[75] In Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364, the Supreme Court of Canada held that decisions to refer a human rights complaint for further adjudication are discretionary screening determinations that do not resolve the merits or finally determine jurisdiction. As such, while they are reviewable, such screening decisions attract significant deference, and intervention is warranted only where there is no reasonable basis for the referral (at paras. 45–49, 53). The Court emphasized that judicial review at this stage should be rare, as it risks fragmenting the administrative process, depriving the reviewing court of a full evidentiary record, and would undermine legislative schemes designed to entrust decision-making to specialized bodies (at paras. 35–36).
[76] This Court has similarly adopted this approach. In C.B. Powell Limited v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 FCA 61 [C.B. Powell], this Court held that courts should refrain from intervening in ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances (at para. 4).
[77] This Court’s decision in Gupta v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 202 [Gupta], emphasizes the same restraint principle. There, the Court reinforced that judicial review is generally unavailable prior to the exhaustion of adequate alternative administrative remedies, absent exceptional circumstances. It further emphasized that the threshold for such exceptionality is high, and that alleged procedural unfairness occurring prior to a final administrative decision will not, in the ordinary course, justify premature judicial intervention: Gupta at paras. 7–8. This reasoning underscores the preference for allowing administrative processes to run their course before resort to the courts is permitted.
[78] Likewise, in Lin, this Court confirmed that an application for judicial review of a decision to refer a section 44 report was premature because the ID and, if necessary, the IAD could assess "“… any procedural fairness or substantive issues regarding the section 44 screening process that undermine the [ID’s] ability to proceed”" (at para. 4).
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