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JR - Prematurity (6). Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores
In Community Voices Committee Incorporated v. Municipality of Huron Shores (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court granted a motion to stay a JR on abuse of process grounds, this where it was brought to challenge "two municipal resolutions authorizing the demolition of the Dean Lake Bridge, a through-truss bridge adjacent to Highway 17 in Northeastern Ontario".
This case involves the too-frequent confusion between generic JR proceedings [under the JRPA] and Municipal Act s.273 ['Application to quash by-law'] applications - the latter being procedurally being brought under RCP 14.05, the former under RCP 38 and 68 - and appropriate remedies therefor:[2] In this motion, the respondent, the Municipality of Huron Shores (“the Municipality”) seeks an Order striking or staying the application. The Municipality argues that the application is an abuse of process or, alternatively, that the applicants have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25 (“Municipal Act”) and instead have improperly sought to invoke judicial review.
[3] The applicants are residents of the Municipality and members of the Community Voices Committee Incorporated (“the Residents”). They oppose the Municipality’s motion. They argue that their application satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1 (“JRPA”) and that there is no legal requirement that their challenge to the Municipality’s resolutions proceed exclusively under the Municipal Act.
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Issues to be Determined
[16] In oral argument, the Municipality conceded that the Residents are not prohibited from proceeding by way of judicial review. Both judicial review and a s. 273 application are legal avenues available to the Residents: Durham Citizens Lobby for Environmental Awareness & Responsibility Inc. v. Durham (Regional Municipality), 2011 ONSC 7143 at para. 15. The issue is whether a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy such that the Court ought to decline to exercise its discretion to conduct a judicial review.
[17] The issues to be determined in this motion are as follows:a. Do the Residents have an adequate alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act;
b. Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process; and,
c. Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application. Do the Residents have a reasonable alternative remedy under s. 273 of the Municipal Act
The Law
[18] Judicial review is a discretionary remedy that is not available to litigants as of right. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that a court may exercise that discretion not only to determine an application on its merits, but also to determine whether to undertake judicial review at all: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2022 ONCA 446, at para. 44.
[19] Judicial review may be refused where there is an adequate alternative remedy: Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, [2015] 2 SCR 713, at paras. 40-45.
[20] In determining whether to proceed with an application for judicial review, a court should weigh all relevant circumstances. When presented with a potential alternative remedy, this requires the court to examine both the adequacy of the alternative remedy and the suitability and appropriateness of judicial review: Strickland, at para. 43.
[21] In Strickland at para. 42, the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive set of considerations to be balanced, including the following: the nature of the error alleged; the nature of the alternative forum, including its remedial capacity; the relative expertise of the alternative decision-maker; the convenience of the alternative remedy; the existence of adequate and effective recourse in the forum in which litigation is already taking place; expeditiousness; economical use of judicial resources; and, cost.
[22] The balancing exercise should also weigh the purposes and policy considerations underpinning the legislative scheme in issue: Strickland, at para. 44.
Analysis
[23] Having regard to all the circumstances, I find that a s. 273 application is an adequate alternative remedy to an application for judicial review in this matter.
[24] If granted, an application for judicial review would proceed in the Divisional Court before a panel of three judges. A s. 273 application would proceed before a single judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. Judicial economy therefore favours a s. 273 application.
[25] Expeditiousness, convenience, and cost also tip in favour of a s. 273 application. Divisional Court sittings for the Northeast Region occur twice annually, in the Spring and Fall, in Sudbury. Superior Court sittings occur throughout the year and, in this case, would take place in Sault Ste. Marie. The Superior Court sittings would be closer to where the parties are located, thereby reducing the costs of participation. These considerations also favour a s. 273 application.
[26] Also relevant to the issue of costs is the fact that this motion has been brought at an early stage in these proceedings, before any significant time or costs have been incurred by the parties. This mitigates prejudice should the application be struck or stayed in favour of an alternative remedy.
[27] The Residents argue that judicial review has a broader scope of review than a s. 273 application. They submit that it would involve not only a review of the legality of the Resolutions, but also the procedural fairness of the decision-making process that culminated in the Resolutions. As the application also raises issues of reasonable apprehension of bias and bad faith, they submit that the door could arguably be opened to a reasonableness review of the Municipality’s exercise of its decision-making authority.
[28] The case law does not support the Residents’ argument that their application offers a substantially broader scope of review. Requiring the Residents to proceed with a s. 273 application would not significantly narrow the scope of the issues that could be raised. As noted by Ellies J. in Fortin v. Sudbury (City), 2020 ONSC 5300, at para. 56:As I will explain, courts have quashed by-laws as being illegal under s. 273 for a number of different reasons. In addition to quashing by-laws that are enacted beyond the scope of a municipality’s statutory authority, courts have quashed by-laws where a municipality has failed to follow statutorily-mandated or common law procedural requirements, where Council has demonstrated bias, and where Council has demonstrated bad faith. The applicant attacks the KED by-laws on all three of these legal grounds. [29] See also: London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., 2007 SCC 29, [2007] 2 SCR 588; Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), 1990 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1170; Grosvenor v. East Luther Grand Valley (Township), 2007 ONCA 55; Re McGill and City of Brantford, 1980 CanLII 1741 (ON HCJ).
[30] Proceeding in the manner proposed by the Residents would also not open the door to otherwise unavailable standards of review. As noted in Fortin at para. 67, in addressing the standard of review in a s. 273 application:Thus, there are differing standards of review depending on whether the question is one of vires or not: Wpd Sumac Ridge Wind Inc. v. Kawartha Lakes (City)¸2015 ONSC 4164 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 20-21. I believe that what can be safely gleaned from the decision in RSJ Holdings is that the degree of deference to be shown to municipal acts will depend on the extent to which the illegality in question involves a question of law and the extent to which it affects the democratic legitimacy of its decision. [31] What those standards of review would be in this case is an issue to be determined when the proceeding is ultimately adjudicated on its merits.
[32] In my view, the remedies available on an application for judicial review are also not substantially different from those available in a s. 273 application. Pursuant to s. 2(1) of the JRPA, an applicant for judicial review may request relief in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Pursuant to s. 273 of the Municipal Act, the Court is limited to quashing the by-laws at issue, however, it is also available to an applicant pursuant to Rule 14.05(3)(g) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to request ancillary relief including mandatory orders, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In my view, injunctive relief is a reasonable substitute for an order of prohibition, the only order not available in a s. 273 application.
[33] In my view, the scope of review, standard of review, and range of available remedies are all neutral factors which do not weigh in favour of either judicial review or a s. 273 application.
[34] Another consideration which tips the scale in favour of a s. 273 application is the nature of the evidentiary record available for use in the application. With narrow exceptions, a court on judicial review is limited to the record that was before the decision-maker: Mirza et al. v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 6727, at para 12; Barney v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2021 NSSC 264, at para. 34. No such constraints are applicable to a s. 273 application. While the Residents argue that it is premature to speculate whether additional evidence may be required, I agree with the Municipality that, given the issues raised in the application, including bad faith and bias, it is possible and indeed likely that evidence beyond the record before the Municipality will be required to fully adjudicate this matter. This weighs in favour of a s. 273 application.
[35] Finally, the Municipality argues, and I agree, that a s. 273 application is the legislature’s chosen forum and process to challenge municipal by-laws, resolutions, and orders and that it should not be departed from lightly, particularly when the substance of the application engages the very issues contemplated by s. 273. While judicial review is available, it should not be preferred to the legislature’s chosen forum absent circumstances weighing in its favour: Yatar at para. 45; Minnow Lake Restoration Group Inc. v. Sudbury (City), 2022 ONSC 4084, at para. 52. As I have found, no such circumstances exist in the present case – instead the circumstances either weigh in favour of a s. 273 application or are neutral as between the two processes.
Is the Residents’ application otherwise an abuse of process
[36] The Municipality argues that the Residents’ application is an abuse of process because it constitutes an attempt by the Residents to circumvent the legislature’s statutory framework for challenging municipal decisions, and because it relies upon legislation which is inapplicable to the case before the Court, namely the Bridges Act. The Municipality also raises issues of delay.
[37] As it pertains to the choice of forum, I would reiterate that both judicial review and a s. 273 application were legal avenues available to the Residents. While I have found that the Court ought not to exercise its discretion to grant judicial review, it is my view that it was not an abuse of process for the Residents to ask the Court to consider the merits of such a process.
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Should the Court exercise its discretion to stay or strike the Residents’ application
[39] The Court’s authority to strike an application arises pursuant to Rules 25.11 and 38.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The moving party is required to demonstrate that the pleading: may prejudice the fair trial of the action; is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious; or is an abuse of the process of the court.
[40] In this case, I have found that the Residents’ application was not an abuse of the process of the court. There is also no evidence before me that the application may prejudice a fair hearing of the proceeding, or that it is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious. I therefore decline to strike the Residents’ application.
[41] In my view, a stay of this proceeding is the more appropriate remedy. A stay is a discretionary order available pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”). Pursuant to s. 107 of the CJA, a stay may be ordered when there are two or more proceedings in two or more different courts, and they have a question of law or fact in common or claim relief arising from the same occurrence. While a parallel proceeding has not yet been commenced, in this case where one has been directed, I find that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion and order a stay.
[42] I therefore order a stay of this proceeding until after the determination of a s. 273 application, if any. . Montford v. Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine et al
In Montford v. Canadian College of Naturopathic Medicine et al (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR application on RCP 2.1 ['Frivolous, Vexatious or Abusive Proceedings'] grounds, here brought against "two decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario".
Here the court considered JR prematurity as a basis of RCP s.2.1 [frivolous and vexatious] grounds:[10] Absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings until after they are completed or until effective remedies are exhausted. This is a principle “scrupulously” followed in this court to avoid the fragmentation of proceedings: Awada v. Allstate, 2021 ONSC 8108, at paras. 7-9. The Court of Appeal has upheld this court’s dismissal of an application under r. 2.1 as premature where the tribunal process was ongoing and even though the applicant had alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court of Appeal stated: “There were no exceptional circumstances that justified the court’s intervention before the Tribunal’s proceedings were exhausted. This is settled law, and the Divisional Court was right to dismiss the application on this basis.”: R (H.C.) v. Ontario Special Education Tribunal, 2026 ONCA 419, at para. 5.
[11] The same analysis applies here. Mr. Montford’s allegations of bias are for the Tribunal to deal with at first instance. The court may review the Tribunal’s findings once its process is complete, but that has not yet happened. Moreover, according to Mr. Montford’s submissions, the appointment of the adjudicator he complained about has expired and the adjudicator will no longer be at the Tribunal. Mr. Montford’s other allegations about the processes followed by the Tribunal can similarly be addressed if he challenges the Tribunal’s final decision on judicial review. Mr. Montford’s allegations about the merits of the Tribunal’s November 17 decision also may become moot after the Tribunal completes its reconsideration process. Finally, the Tribunal process has not been excessively delayed. The timing does not provide a basis for this court’s interference while the process is ongoing.
[12] The Tribunal must be permitted to complete its process to avoid fragmentation and so that this court has the benefit of the Tribunal’s final reasoning and decision, should one of the parties seek judicial review once the Tribunal process is complete. The current application is patently premature and is dismissed. . Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Apple Canada Inc.
In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Apple Canada Inc. (Fed CA, 2026) the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed, on a motion to strike, a SOCAN-brought JR, this brought against a Copyright Board ruling regarding preliminary case management issues.
Here the federal court considers the JR doctrine of prematurity, and it's exceptions:[11] Absent exceptional circumstances, parties to an administrative process cannot proceed to the court system until that process has run its course: Canada (Border Services Agency) v. C.B. Powell Limited, 2010 FCA 61 at para. 31 [C.B. Powell]; Dugré v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 8 at paras. 34, 37 [Dugré].
[12] This principle applies "“to all matters that arise”" before the administrative decision maker: Klos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 238 at para. 6. A procedural fairness concern does not meet the "“exceptional circumstances”" threshold: Herbert v. Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FCA 11 at para. 11.
[13] The purpose of this rule is to prevent "“fragmentation of the administrative process and piecemeal court proceedings”", to eliminate "“the large costs and delays associated with premature forays to court”", and to avoid "“the waste associated with hearing an interlocutory judicial review when the applicant for judicial review may succeed at the end of the administrative process anyway”": C.B. Powell at para. 32, cited in Dugré at para. 34.
[14] Indeed, for an applicant to bypass the administrative process, "“the consequences of an interlocutory decision [must] be so ‘immediate and radical’ that they call into question the rule of law”": Dugré at para. 35, quoting from Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2015 FCA 17 at paras. 31–33 [Wilson].
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C. There are no exceptional circumstances
[28] Finally, I agree with the respondents that there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify early recourse to the courts in respect of the Phase I Ruling. The consequences of the Phase I Ruling, as an interlocutory one, cannot be described in the terms outlined in Dugré and Wilson: the consequences are not so immediate and radical that they call into question the rule of law. In other words, the situation before me is not analogous to circumstances that could "“justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition”": Dugré at para. 36, citing Wilson at para. 33, and Forner v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2016 FCA 35 at paras. 14–15.
[29] In this regard, this Court has held that "“even constitutional questions or questions qualified as ‘jurisdictional’ questions cannot attract interlocutory relief”": Lafond v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2023 FCA 227 at para. 10; Dugré at para. 36, citing C.B. Powell at paras. 39–46, and Black v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 201 at paras. 18–19. The same must be said here—the circumstances are not exceptional. . Corporation of the Township of Emo v. Borderland Pride [no reconsideration]
In Corporation of the Township of Emo v. Borderland Pride (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court considers an HRTO JR, which itself is challenged initially as premature on the basis that no HRTO reconsideration was sought nor conducted:[8] The applicants commenced this application for judicial review without first seeking reconsideration at the HRTO. A number of issues were raised in the Court’s pre-hearing case management. However, the lack of a reconsideration was not raised at that point. It appears that it was not raised until the exchange of factums for this hearing.
[9] We accept the applicants’ submissions that, in good faith, they did not expect that the issue would be raised at that late point in the proceedings. Nonetheless, it is appropriate that this Court address the issue as a preliminary matter.
[10] While there is a right to seek judicial review, the court must determine whether judicial review is appropriate: Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8, at paras. 51 and 54. If, in considering the application, the court determines that one of the discretionary bases for refusing a remedy is present, the court may decline to consider the merits of the judicial review application.
[11] Absent exceptional circumstances, reviewing courts will generally decline to engage in a judicial review if the applicant has not exhausted all available, effective remedies within the administrative regime: Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541, at paras. 68-69.
[12] Where internal review processes have not been exhausted, alternative remedies may exist: Yatar, at para. 63. Several factors inform the question of whether an alternative remedy is adequate: Yatar, at para. 64, citing Strickland v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37, at para. 43. We have therefore considered all relevant factors.
[13] In short, the applicants submit that seeking a reconsideration was not mandatory and was pointless. They ask us to assume that a reconsideration would not have been of any assistance on the issues now raised in this application for judicial review. We are not persuaded that it is appropriate to make that assumption.
[14] Rule 26.5 of the HTRO Rules of Procedure provides that, to grant a request for reconsideration, the party must show that at least one of the following applies:a. there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or
b. the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or
c. the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or
d. other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions. [15] Without limiting the applicants’ grounds, at least these subrules may be relevant here:(i) Rule 26.5 b and c, with respect to the order against the CAO despite the lack of notice that she might be subjected to an order as if she was a party; and,
(ii) Rule 26.5 c and d, on the issue of equating discrimination with bad faith and doing so without a proper analysis having regard for freedom of expression protected under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. [16] The applicants have pointed to some cases, which predate Yatar and are fact specific. The applicants raised other issues in support of their request that this Court proceed despite the lack of a reconsideration, all of which we have considered.
[17] Beginning with delay, we agree that there was a lengthy delay at the HRTO even considering the overlap with the Covid-19 Pandemic. It would also have been highly preferrable for the issue to be raised early in the case management process in this Court. We have taken delay into account.
[18] Another case-specific submission relates to a garnishment order obtained immediately after the HRTO Decision, seeking to collect the monetary compensation. The applicants obtained an interim stay in this Court to address the garnishment, but they could have done so in the Superior Court.
[19] The applicants then submit that the HRTO does not have any particular expertise in municipal law. However, the issues addressed at the HRTO arise in many different legal contexts. The HRTO is the first step in considering those issues when they arise within a complaint under the Human Rights Code. Here, the issue is immunity under the Municipal Act and the relationship between discrimination under the Code and good faith under the Act. We are not persuaded that the HRTO has no relevant expertise in this case.
[20] The applicants also submit that they wish to proceed with the court hearing, and the other parties either agree or do not object to proceeding without a reconsideration. (The HRTO properly takes no position.) However, it is not for the parties to displace the principles that are set out above. Although we recognize that this case has its own history, the fact of consent, or the lack of an objection, does not remove the general, principled expectation that internal tribunal processes be exhausted before seeking judicial review.
[21] Lastly, the applicants submit that the HRTO (and potentially other tribunals) will be assisted by a binding decision of this Court on the important issue of immunity. This general submission could be made in many challenges to tribunal decisions.
[22] We have considered all of the submissions raised before us in the exercise of our discretion. Although it was open for us to dismiss this application as premature, we have decided to exercise our discretion to impose a stay with terms that would permit an attempted reconsideration while minimizing costs and delay. This outcome reflects the particular history of this case and all the other factors relevant to whether reconsideration is an adequate and effective alternative recourse. . Georgiou v. Ministry of Health et al.
In Georgiou v. Ministry of Health et al. (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court granted a motion to quash a JR, this where the underlying JR advanced a number of remedies respecting medical referral.
Here the court states JR 'prematurity' doctrine, and it's underlying policy reasons:[30] Courts will not judicially review the proceeding of a lower court or an administrative tribunal until that proceeding has concluded and its decision is final. Courts have repeatedly refused to prematurely intervene in an administrative proceeding because:Applications for judicial review may ultimately be totally unnecessary: a complaining party may be successful in the end result [ ... ] Also, the unnecessary delays and expenses associated with such appeals can bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Garrick v. Amnesty International Canada, 2011 FC 1099, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 146, at paras. 48-49, citing Zundel v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 17138 (FCA), [2000] 4 F.C. 255, at para. 10. . Ashar v. Ontario Labour Relations Board
In Ashar v. Ontario Labour Relations Board (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a labour OLRB JR, this on a R2.1 'frivolous and vexatious' motion where the underlying grounds alleged "unlawful reprisal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act".
The court applies the doctrine of JR 'prematurity', here in a R2.1 frivolous and vexatious dismissal:[10] I accept that Mr. Ashar has not brought his application in bad faith. However, his application is patently premature. The decision he seeks to have reviewed is an interim decision of the Board. The Board dismissed Mr. Ashar’s request that he be granted default judgment. In its May 26, 2025 directions, it had said that a “Consultation hearing” would be scheduled to deal with the remaining allegations that had not been dismissed. The Board therefore will proceed to deal with the allegations it has permitted Mr. Ashar to pursue. If Mr. Ashar ultimately is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board at the conclusion of its proceedings, he can seek to judicially review the Board’s final decision, which can include the procedural steps leading to that decision.
[11] Absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere in ongoing administrative proceedings until after they are completed or until effective remedies are exhausted. This is a principle “scrupulously” followed in this court to avoid the fragmentation of proceedings: Awada, at paras. 7-9.
[12] Mr. Ashar believes the court should intervene because the Board should not have allowed the responding party to continue to participate in his application since it did not respond to Board directions. But the Board found the responding party had already submitted a response to the application, so there was no basis for default judgment. In any event, the Board’s decision to allow an application to proceed to a decision on the merits in the face of a request for default judgment does not on its own constitute exceptional circumstances.
[13] Mr. Ashar has raised a concern about access to judicial oversight. As I have said, that will be available to him at the completion of the Board process. The court will not intervene at this stage of the Board’s proceeding. The application is doomed to fail and therefore is dismissed pursuant to r. 2.1.01. . Cai Song v. Ontario Labour Relations Board
In Cai Song v. Ontario Labour Relations Board (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a labour JR, here brought against the OLRB's dismissal of the applicant's unlawful reprisal and unfair labour practice applications.
Here the court applies the doctrine of 'prematurity' where the applicant did not avail themselves of available OLRB reconsideration proceedings:[13] If the applicant felt that he was denied an opportunity to make submissions on defamation and harassment, he could have sought reconsideration under s.114(1) of the LRA which gives the Board the power to reconsider any decision it has made. These issues fall squarely within Information Bulletin 19 where the Board has stated it will grant a request for reconsideration in a variety of circumstances including “Where representations are sought to be made which the party seeking consideration had no previous opportunity to make”. Therefore, the applicant’s application for judicial review on this issue is premature.
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