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JR - Public v Private (9)

. Drinnan v. Workplace Safety Insurance Appeal Tribunal

In Drinnan v. Workplace Safety Insurance Appeal Tribunal (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court granted the court's R2.1.01 ['frivolous, vexatious or abuse of process'] motion to quash a JR, here where it was 'apparently' brought against "a letter received by the Applicant on May 28, 2026 from WSIAT Emergency Management and Security" directed at addressing recent communications respecting "a pattern of increasingly inappropriate and concerning content, including unusual themes and unfounded allegations, delivered in a manner that is inconsistent with respectful and appropriate interaction".

Here the court considers the JR-justiciability of this "WSIAT Emergency Management and Security letter", both as a public-private matter and as a non-decision:
[16] To the extent that his Application relates to the WSIAT Emergency Management and Security letter of May 28, 2026, this letter is not a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 2(1)2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J-1 (JRPA), and is not amenable to judicial review. Security decisions and procedures at WSIAT are not a public function governed by statutory decision-making procedures.
. Nahirny v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario

In Nahirny v. Liquor Control Board of Ontario (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court considered the JR-justiciability of the termination of a union LCBO employee (it being apparently argued that it was a 'statutory power of decision'), here in an R2.1 frivolous and vexatious motion context:
[1] This court directed the Registrar to give notice to the Applicant pursuant to Rule 2.1 in August, and identified the following concerns with the application:
The Registrar is directed to issue a notice pursuant to r. 2.1 that the court is considering dismissing this application as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, based on the following concerns:

1. The impugned decision is a decision of the LCBO to terminate the employment of the applicant for creating false documents and using them in a process before the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

2. The Applicant’s employment was governed by a Collective Agreement between the Ontario Public Service Employees Union and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario.

The impugned decision of the LCBO (to terminate the applicant’s employment) does not appear to be an exercise of a statutory power of decision or to otherwise be subject to judicial review pursuant to ss. 2 and 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act. Further, jurisdiction over a dispute regarding termination of the Applicant’s employment would appear to lie to the Ontario Labour Relations Board or a labour arbitrator pursuant to the Collective Agreement.

Respondents shall not respond to submissions from the Applicant respecting this notice unless the court subsequently directs otherwise.
....

[7] It is plain and obvious that this court has no jurisdiction to judicially review the LCBO’s decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment. The termination decision is not an exercise of a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and is not a decision of a sufficiently public nature to found review jurisdiction in this court pursuant to s. 2(2) of the JRPA. ....

[8] The Applicant’s core argument seems to be that the LCBO was governed by privacy legislation in respect to the complaints made to the IPC, and thus that the steps taken by the LCBO in the IPC process, being governed by statute, are somehow “statutory powers of decision” or are of a sufficiently “public” nature as to be amenable to judicial review. That is simply not so. The LCBO’s compliance – or non-compliance – with privacy legislation are not statutory powers of decision, and the impugned decision – to terminate Mr Mahirny’s employment, does not become a statutory power of decision – or a decision of a sufficiently public nature to be amenable to judicial review – because they arise in the context of privacy regulation.
. Land Design Inc. v. Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp.

In Land Design Inc. v. Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp. (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought against a decision and a reconsideration decision of the Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corp. [Infrastructure Ontario (IO)] "disqualifying LANDinc from a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) process", this "related to a contract for construction administration services for redevelopment and revitalization of Ontario Place, on the shores of Lake Ontario, in Toronto".

The court considers JR jurisdiction on a public-private basis, here regarding 'procurement' for public contracts:
1. Jurisdiction

(18) LANDinc argues that this court has jurisdiction over this application pursuant to ss. 2(1)1 and 6(1) of the JRPA. LANDinc concedes (correctly in my view) that the impugned decisions do not involve an exercise of a “statutory power of decision” within the meaning of s. 2(1)2 of the JRPA: Grascan Construction Ltd. v. Metrolinx, 2017 ONSC 6424, paras. 77 and 83 (Div. Ct.); Midnorthern Appliances Industries Corp. v. The Ontario Housing Corp. (1977), 1977 CanLII 1081 (ON HCJ), 17 O.R. (2d) 290 (Div. Ct.).

(19) IO does not contest this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to JRPA, s. 2(1), without prejudice to arguing in future cases that public procurement decisions are not subject to judicial review.

(20) The AG Ontario submits that jurisdiction is a “threshold issue” and may not be presumed because it is uncontested by IO in this case.

(21) I agree with the AG Ontario on this point. The Divisional Court is a statutory court. It has no inherent jurisdiction, but rather, it has only the jurisdiction that has been created by statute. Jurisdiction is not conferred on this court by consent (or non-opposition) of the parties: Tele-Zone Inc. v. Attorney General (Canada), 2008 ONCA 892, paras. 3, 4 and 92; aff’d 2010 SCC 63; 1819472 Ont. Corp. v. John Barrett General Contractors Ltd., 2024 ONCA 333, para. 21; 376965 Ont. Ltd. v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Board, 2025 ONSC 3084, para. 27 (Div. Ct.); Berentschot v. Ontario, 2025 ONSC 4857, para. 9 (Div. Ct.).

(22) Fundamentally, judicial review is “directed at public decision making.” This court’s jurisdiction to undertake judicial review pursuant to JRPA, s. 2(1) is engaged only where “there is an exercise of state authority” and “that exercise is of a sufficiently public character.” See Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26, paras. 13, 14 and 16.

(23) To determine whether a decision is of a “sufficiently public character” to be subject to judicial review, the court considers the factors described in Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 437:
- the character of the matter for which review is sought

- the nature of the decision maker and its responsibilities

- the extent to which the decision is founded in and shaped by law as opposed to private discretion

- the decision-making body’s relationship to other statutory schemes and parts of government

- the extent to which a decision maker is an agent of government or is directed, controlled or significantly influenced by a public entity

- the suitability of public law remedies

- whether the decision belongs to an “exceptional” category of cases where the conduct has attained a serious public dimension
(24) The Air Canada factors “do not operate as a strict test or checklist.” The factors apply contextually, in the circumstances of a particular case, to guide the court’s determination whether the impugned decision(s) are of a sufficiently public character as to be subject to judicial review: West Whitby, para. 40; Khorsand v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2024 ONCA 597, paras. 63-76.

(25) There are cases where the court has found that procurement decisions are not amenable to judicial review: 376965 Ontario Limited v. Regional Municipality of Durham Police Service Board, 2025 ONSC 3084 (Div Ct motions judge); Astro Zodiac Enterprises Ltd. v. Board of Governors of Exhibition Place, 2022 ONSC 1175 (Div. Ct.); A-1 Credit Recovery v. Ministry of Finance, 2023 ONSC 6667.

(26) In Bot Construction, this court found that it had jurisdiction over a decision not to disqualify a respondent (and to award that respondent the contract) and reversed the Ministry of Transportation’s decision. The Court of Appeal reversed the Divisional Court on the basis that the impugned Ministry decision was reasonable: Bot Construction Limited v. Ontario (Transportation), 2009 ONCA 879. In Thales, likewise, this court found that it had jurisdiction to judicially review a decision upholding tender conditions alleged to violate that Canada-Europe Free Trade Agreement and found (a) that the impugned conditions were unreasonable; and (b) that the dispute resolution process followed by Ontario violated the terms of the Free Trade Agreement. The Court of Appeal reversed both substantive conclusions of this court and did not decide the jurisdictional issue: Thales DIS Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Transportation), 2023 ONCA 866. These two cases provide authority from the Divisional Court that judicial review may be available in public procurement cases, in particular circumstances, and that the Court of Appeal has neither approved nor disapproved these findings.

(27) Divisional Court precedent (cited above) establishes that public procurement decisions are not reviewable in this court as a general class: jurisdiction turns on a case-by-case analysis guided by an application of the Air Canada factors to the particular circumstances of the case.

(28) In my view, there are several aspects of this case that lead to the conclusion that the impugned decision has a sufficiently “public” dimension as to render the impugned decision amenable to judicial review.
(a) the Project itself is a large one in respect to which there is considerable public interest: the redevelopment of an important public landmark in a prominent location on Toronto’s waterfront;

(b) the RFP is in respect to a substantial services contract overseeing important aspects of substantial construction work on the Project;

(c) the impugned decision involves both factual and legal determinations, and then an exercise of discretion based on those findings.

(d) the legal determinations pertain to provisions in the RFP aimed at preventing a respondent from obtaining, or being seen to obtain, unfair advantage over other respondents through prohibited contact with the Premier of Ontario and a Minister of the Crown. In addition, these provisions seek to establish a process seen to be transparently independent of political lobbying and interference, to limit or eliminate an appearance of impropriety in the awarding of public contracts.

(e) the factual determinations include assessing the nature of contacts made with the Premier of Ontario, a Minister of the Crown, and members of the Premier’s office which could give rise to concerns about the propriety of the conduct of everyone involved in the impugned events.

(f) the issues raised on the application are justiciable through the application of administrative law principles, and public law remedies could be suitable, depending on this court’s findings respecting the merits of the application.
(29) Taking these factors together, I am satisfied that there is a sufficiently public nature to the impugned decision to ground jurisdiction for judicial review. Some of these factors, on their own, would not be sufficient to ground jurisdiction: just because a project is of great public interest or the RFP is in respect to a proposed contract involving expenditure of a substantial amount of public money, may not, on their own, be sufficient to ground jurisdiction for judicial review. Many public tendering processes involve large projects and expensive contracts. Contrary to LANDinc’s submission on this issue, Ontario jurisprudence does not establish that the size of a project and the cost of the anticipated contract are sufficient, by themselves or together, to grant jurisdiction. In Bot Construction, for example, the scale of the project and value of the contract made the issue of “the fairness and integrity of the process followed in the expenditure of significant public funds” of sufficiently public importance to ground jurisdiction for judicial review (at para. 24).[1] The size of the Project and the value of the intended contract were important, in light of the underlying issue on the application (integrity of the procurement process) but only arose to the level of being “sufficiently public” in nature because issues related to the integrity of the process were also involved.

(30) The grounds for disqualification in this case, and the involvement of senior members of the Executive, including the Premier and a Minister of the Crown, provide the basis for concluding that the court’s assessment of whether the impugned decision is in accordance with the law and principles of procedural fairness has a “serious public dimension” grounding jurisdiction.
. 2417563 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton

In 2417563 Ontario Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Brampton (Div Ct, 2026) the Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this seeking "to quash the by-law and set aside the sale to 258" - these both relating to the sale of a narrow strip of land by the municipality.

Here the court considered the public-private distinction as it bears on viable JR grounds:
The nature of the transaction and the property

[31] The City urges us to conclude that the sale of the strip to 258 was in essence a private transaction that is beyond the scope of judicial review. In making this submission, the City relies on the case of Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26, where Rowe J. wrote as follows for the court (at paras. 14 and 20):
Not all decisions are amenable to judicial review under a superior court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Judicial review is only available where there is an exercise of state authority and where that exercise is of a sufficiently public character. Even public bodies make some decisions that are private in nature — such as renting premises and hiring staff — and such decisions are not subject to judicial review: Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347, at para. 52. In making these contractual decisions, the public body is not exercising “a power central to the administrative mandate given to it by Parliament”, but is rather exercising a private power (ibid.). Such decisions do not involve concerns about the rule of law insofar as this refers to the exercise of delegated authority.

....

.... In my view, a decision will be considered to be public where it involves questions about the rule of law and the limits of an administrative decision maker’s exercise of power. Simply because a decision impacts a broad segment of the public does not mean that it is public in the administrative law sense of the term. Again, judicial review is about the legality of state decision making.
[32] The City argues that just because it is a public body that derives its power to act from statute does not mean that all its actions raise issues about the rule of law or the legality of state decision making. It equates the sale of land in this case with “renting premises and hiring staff” – an action of insufficiently “public character” to warrant the attention of the court on judicial review.

[33] Several considerations weigh against the City’s argument. These include the role of the City in the structure or network of government, the statutory foundation for the City’s authority, the fact that the City’s constituting statute requires it to pass by-laws to authorize the sale of land, and the public nature of the process of selling land owned by the City: Air Canada, at paras. 50 – 60.

[34] On the other hand, the sale of land in this case was not a matter of broad public interest. The City’s public notice of the sale of the strip appears to have generated no response at all. That may be because the transaction in this case involved the sale of a disused strip of land that was of no use to the City (apart from its sale value) and was of use to an extremely small universe of potential buyers all of whom knew that the strip would be coming available. It was sold to one of those buyers – 258 – an innocent arm’s length third party that diligently pursued its interest in the strip, negotiated in good faith with the City, and purchased the property for value. Contrary to the submission of the applicants, there is no evidence that 258 was engaged in any improper conduct in this case. It cannot be criticized.

[35] By contrast, the applicants were not diligent. They were advised to check back in two weeks and did not check in for 16 months. Although they deny it, there is evidence that they were advised to watch the City’s website for information. Even if they were not so advised, being on the lookout for public notices respecting the sale of the strip (including on the City’s website) was the prudent course for an interested and diligent buyer. If the applicants had taken that course, they would have seen the relevant notice, which identified the strip precisely by using its unique PIN (Property Identification Number), assigned by the Land Registry. I add that there is no dispute that the applicants were told on May 25, 2023, by the Commissioner that the termination of the CN agreement was “very close.” They also knew that such termination would eliminate any impediment to the sale of the strip. Considering these facts, it is very difficult to understand why the applicants would take no step whatsoever to pursue their interest in the strip for 16 months.

[36] In any case, the applicants now attempt to vindicate their perceived private law rights using the public law tool of judicial review. This was never the central purpose of judicial review: Strickland, at para. 48. While I do not suggest that any sale of land by a municipality will be beyond the reach of judicial review, I am satisfied that the transaction in this case was of limited public character and does not justify the court exercising its discretion on judicial review in the circumstances of this case. As the respondents argue, this sale was a routine matter of contract that raised no issues respecting the rule of law or the limits of municipal power or the execution of the City’s central governmental mandate: Air Canada, at para. 52.

[37] Some sales of properties by municipalities, of course, have attracted the attention of the courts on judicial review. The cases of North End Community Health Association v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2012 NSSC 330 and Know Your City Inc. v. The Corporation of the City of Brantford, 2021 ONSC 154, provide good examples.

[38] At issue in the former was the sale of a decommissioned school where a variety of proposals for the use of the subject property were made by several public interest groups and by a property developer, each of which would have been of interest to many of the residents of Halifax. Even there (at para. 45), the court recognized the essentially private nature of sales of land by municipalities but engaged in judicial review given that municipal policy respecting such sales required that non-profit community groups be given priority in the making of submissions respecting the use to be made of the school (see paras. 2 and 48).

[39] In Know Your City, the land at issue was a portion of a municipal golf course. The municipality had determined to sell the property so that it could use the proceeds of the sale to finance public housing, which was in short supply. Various residents opposed the sale and one of the issues on the application was whether the municipality had failed to give adequate notice of the proposed sale to the local First Nation.

[40] Both cases involved significant pieces of public property and raised matters of significant public concern. The public nature of the transactions and of the process of considering and negotiating their sale was undeniable. By contrast, in the present case, there was almost no interest in a small rump of land that was of no use to anyone except the applicants and 258. The applicants failed to act diligently, while 258 was alert and pursued its own interests assiduously.
. Amaro v. The Chiefs of Ontario

In Amaro v. The Chiefs of Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed a JR, this brought by the applicant against the refusal of the Chiefs of Ontario ('COO'), "a private voluntary association of First Nations Chiefs in Ontario", which declined "to support his cause and intervene with political advocacy to address the injustice illustrated by his personal experience".

The court considers the public-private distinction in JRs, here in light of the available prerogative remedies [JRPA s.2(1)1]:
[4] These reasons will explain why the application for judicial review is dismissed. In summary, this motion is not about the merits of Mr. Amaro’s concerns about the COO’s decision or his goals to achieve policy reform on behalf of all off-reserve First Nations people like him. The barrier to his application is that the COO’s decision as a private voluntary association is not subject to judicial review. The court therefore has no jurisdiction to review the decision. Moreover, the issues raised, and relief sought, by the applicant are not justiciable. The relief sought on this application is demonstrably unsuitable for adjudication and must be dismissed.

....

1. The decision is not public in nature.

[52] The Divisional Court’s jurisdiction is determined by statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction: Adams, at para. 22. The relief sought in this application for judicial review must fall within s. 2(1) of the JRPA, or it is beyond the jurisdiction of this court: Beaucage, at para. 21.

[53] Section 2(1) of the JRPA provides that on an application for judicial review, the court may grant orders in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari or for relief by way of declaration. These remedies are available only against exercises of power that are public in character. While the notion of public law defies full and precise definition, the courts use these prerogative remedies to supervise persons and bodies that derive their powers from statute in their performance of functions of a public or governmental nature: Setia v. Appleby College, 2013 ONCA 753, at para. 20; Air Canada v. v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347, at para. 55; Highwood Congregation v. Wall, 2018 SCC 26, at para. 15

[54] The assessment of whether a particular decision is subject to public law and its remedies requires careful consideration and weighing of the relevant circumstances of the particular case informed by the experience of case law. That experience has identified a number of factors relevant to the determination of whether a matter is of sufficient public character to bring it within the jurisdiction of public law: Setia, at para. 33; Beaucage, at paras. 25-26; Trost v. Conservative Party of Canada, 2018 ONSC 2733 (Div. Ct.), at para. 13; Air Canada, at para. 60.

[55] I have considered these factors in all the circumstances of the case and find that the following are material and dispositive to the question. They lead to the conclusion that the COO’s decision does not have sufficient public dimension to which public law remedies can be applied.

[56] The character of this matter for which review is sought is private. At its core, the application challenges the decision of a private association not to pursue the political advocacy agenda requested by the applicant. I acknowledge the applicant’s emphasis that his personal experience only serves as an example of the problem of systemic discrimination experienced by many non-reserve members. Nevertheless, broad public impact is insufficient to bring a decision within the public law sphere for judicial review. Simply because a decision impacts a broad segment of the public does not mean that it is public in the administrative law sense of the term. Previous cases that reviewed voluntary association decisions relied on the broad public impact of the decision rather than the narrower question of whether the decision was within the public law sphere. That approach is no longer accepted law: Beaucage, at para. 25. The relevant inquiry is whether the legality of state decision making is at issue: Highwood, at para. 21.

[57] The decision-maker is a private, voluntary, membership-based association that operates pursuant to a charter and with the administrative support of a separate corporate secretariat. It is not a creature of statute. The COO’s mission is to support all First Nations in Ontario as they assert their sovereignty, jurisdiction and their chosen expression of nationhood. It is true that the COO works and engages in advocacy with the provincial and federal governments and the Assembly of First Nations on identified priorities. However, it is not woven into the government network and does not exercise a power as part of that network. A significant role in policy consultations does mean that the COO is a public body or that its decisions are public law decisions: Beaucage, at paras. 38, 46. While the COO plays an important role in public policy, it is not a governmental actor. The COO does not draw its powers from government and does not exercise public responsibilities: Trost, at para. 16.

[58] I accept the respondent’s submission that the COO’s organization is materially like that of the Métis Nation of Ontario, which was closely considered by the Divisional Court in Beaucage on the same question. In finding the Métis Nation of Ontario’s membership decision was not subject to judicial review, the court held that the nature of the organization, its responsibilities and its relationship with government do not transform its decisions into public law decisions subject to judicial review: Beaucage, at para. 44. That rationale applies here with equal force.

[59] The decision itself is the exercise of private discretion. It did not emanate directly from a public source of law such as statute, regulation or order. While the COO plays an important role in public policy, it remains a private actor.

[60] The Divisional Court does not have jurisdiction to review the COO’s decision, and the application is dismissed for the foregoing reasons.


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