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. Bratusa v. Doersam
In Bratusa v. Doersam (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, this brought against "an order staying their application for dependant’s support under the Succession Law Reform Act" where the "motion judge .... found that the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction" under jurisdiction simpliciter doctrine.
Here the court distinguishes the jurisdiction simpliciter test between tort and estate/family contexts:[24] I would allow the appeal on the basis that it was an error for the motion judge to hold that the appellants’ residence in Ontario was not a presumptive connecting factor. This was a claim for dependant support and not a tort claim. Dependant support is akin to a claim for support in the family law context. The residence of the claimant at the time the claim is made is a recognized presumptive connecting factor in the family law context and should equally be recognized in the context of a claim for dependant support. This is not a weak connection. Ms. Dawson has not rebutted this presumptive connecting factor. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary to address the application of the doctrine of necessity.
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Standard of review
[26] The application of the test for jurisdiction simpliciter is a question of mixed fact and law. An appellate court will only interfere if the court below made a palpable and overriding error, unless there was an extricable error of law, in which case the standard of review is correctness: Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, at para. 13. An extricable question of law includes circumstances where the court below failed to consider a required element of a legal test, mischaracterized a legal test or made a similar error in principle: Sinclair v. Venezio Turismo, 2025 SCC 27, 505 D.L.R. (4th) 451, at para. 41.
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Issue 2: Did the motion judge err in finding that the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction?
a. General principles that apply to jurisdiction
[29] In order to find that the court has jurisdiction simpliciter over a claim, the court must be satisfied that there is a real and substantial connection between the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the forum in which the claim is brought: Sinclair, at para. 43.
[30] The Supreme Court has established a list of presumptive factors that allow a court to assume jurisdiction over a tort claim: (a) the defendant is domiciled in the province; (b) the defendant carries on business in the province; (c) the tort was committed in the province; and (d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province: Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, at para. 90; Sinclair, at para. 47.
[31] The onus is on the plaintiff to establish that one or more presumptive connecting factors are present: Van Breda, at para. 100; Sinclair, at para. 48. If the plaintiff meets this onus, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing that the presumptive connecting factor does not support a real and substantial connection between the dispute and the forum: Van Breda, at para. 95; Sinclair, at para. 49.
[32] In Sinclair, Côté J. explained the relationship between the two stages of this analysis:The assessment of whether a presumptive connecting factor has been established is concerned with the existence of a connection between the jurisdiction and the dispute, whereas the assessment of whether the presumption has been rebutted is concerned with the strength of that connection.… The two stages of the analysis taken together provide an opportunity for a court to holistically assess the extent to which a real and substantial connection exists, as required by Van Breda. [Emphasis in original.] [33] The list of presumptive connecting factors for tort claims is not meant to be exhaustive: Van Breda, at para. 91; Sinclair, at para. 48. In identifying new presumptive connecting factors, the Supreme Court directed in Van Breda, at para. 91, that the court should consider:(a) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized presumptive connecting factors;
(b) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law;
(c) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and
(d) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private international law of other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and comity. [34] The list of presumptive connecting factors identified in Van Breda were provided in the context of tort claims. As the Supreme Court explained in Van Breda, at para. 85, the list is not meant to be “an inventory of connecting factors covering the conditions for the assumption of jurisdiction over all claims known to the law.” There may be other presumptive factors that apply when dealing with other types of claims: see e.g., Wang v. Lin, 2013 ONCA 33, 358 D.L.R. (4th) 452, at para. 46; UD Trading Group Holding PTE. Limited v. TransAsia Private Capital Limited, 2021 ONCA 279, at para. 43.
b. Analysis
[35] In this case, the motion judge considered a number of potential presumptive connecting factors, and rejected them on the basis that, even if they gave rise to a connection between Ontario and the claim, they were too weak to confer jurisdiction. The potential presumptive connecting factors the motion judge considered were factors derived from Van Breda in the context of a tort claim, including whether the claim dealt with property in Ontario or a contract made in Ontario. The motion judge also rejected the fact that Mr. Doersam made his will in Ontario as a presumptive connecting factor because this litigation was not a will challenge.
[36] In the context of his analysis, the motion judge rejected the appellants’ current residence as a potential presumptive factor, stating that “the current domicile of the plaintiff is not a proper consideration.”
[37] This was a correct statement in the context of a tort claim. In effect, in Van Breda, at para. 86, the Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff’s presence in the jurisdiction on its own should not be treated as a presumptive connecting factor. However, this does not necessarily mean that it should not be treated as a presumptive connecting factor in the context of a dependant support claim. To determine whether it should be treated as a presumptive connecting factor, it is necessary to consider the nature of a dependant support claim.
[38] Section 58(1) of the SLRA provides for the support of dependants when the deceased has not made adequate provision for them:Where a deceased, whether testate or intestate, has not made adequate provision for the proper support of his dependants or any of them, the court, on application, may order that such provision as it considers adequate be made out of the estate of the deceased for the proper support of the dependants or any of them. [39] Section 57(1) of the SLRA defines a dependant as including a child or spouse “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death”. Section 57(1) further provides that “spouse” has the same meaning as under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
[40] Given that the stated purpose of a dependant support claim is to provide support to the dependants of a deceased, which include spouses and children to whom the deceased was providing support before his or her death, I find that a dependant support claim is more akin to a claim for support in the family law context than a tort claim. Therefore, in determining what presumptive connecting factors apply, it makes sense to look at the factors that courts have previously identified as applying to claims for support in the family law context.
[41] In the family law context, this court has recognized that the residence of the support claimant at the time the claim is made is a presumptive connecting factor: Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116, 118 O.R. (3d) 763, at para. 38, leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 161; Wang, at para. 47; Parrish v. Navarro, 2014 ONCA 856, at para. 5.
[42] In Knowles, at para. 38, Doherty J.A. made the point that the presumptive connecting factors relevant to a claim for support are different than those relevant to a tort claim, and that they may include the residence of the applicant:[T]he appellants point to Van Breda, at para. 86, as authority for the proposition that the residence of the applicant at the time of the application cannot be a presumptive connecting factor for the purposes of jurisdiction. The statement in Van Breda is made in respect of tort claims. No doubt, it will also apply to other kinds of claims, but it does not necessarily apply to all claims. Support claims are arguably quite different from tort or contract claims in that, absent appropriate support from the former partner, the burden of support may fall on the state where the party seeking support resides. As stressed in Van Breda, the list of presumptive connecting factors depends, in part, on the subject matter of the litigation. It follows that the factors may vary depending on the nature of the claim. [Emphasis added.] [43] Besides the rationale provided by Doherty J.A. for recognizing the residence of the support claimant as a presumptive connecting factor, I would add that support is prospective. It is meant to ensure that the future needs of dependants are met. The needs arise and are ongoing in the jurisdiction where the claimants are located at the time the claim is made. This is different from claims in tort, which seek to compensate for harms suffered as a result of past wrongful conduct. This wrongful conduct, and the harms suffered, could have occurred in a jurisdiction that may have no connection to the plaintiff’s current residence.
[44] Accordingly, in this case, the motion judge should have considered whether the appellants’ residence at the time they brought the application was a presumptive connecting factor for the purpose of a dependant support claim. Had he done so, based on the similarities between a support claim in the family law context and a support claim in the estate context, he should have concluded that the appellants’ residence in Ontario at the time of the application was a presumptive connecting factor. In fairness, it does not appear that this specific argument was made on the motion below.
[45] As reviewed above, once the court finds the existence of a presumptive connecting factor, the defendant can rebut the presumption by showing that the connection is nevertheless too weak to justify the Ontario court taking jurisdiction. In this case, when considering the potential presumptive connecting factors of property in Ontario or a contract made in Ontario, the motion judge found that these were too weak to create a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the claim for dependant support.
[46] I reach a different conclusion when viewing the claim from the perspective that the appellants’ residence in Ontario as a presumptive connecting factor. The appellants’ need for support is in Ontario as their stated intention is to continue living here, at least part of the time. In addition, in accordance with s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA,[3] the estate’s biggest asset through which a claim for support may be satisfied are the insurance policies that were established in Ontario.
[47] This is not to say that the presumptive connecting factor of the claimant’s residence at the time of the dependant support application can never be rebutted. There may be circumstances where the claimant’s residence is clearly transitory or temporary such that their future needs are disconnected from their current residence. It may also be evident that the claimant is forum shopping. However, in this case, Ms. Bratusa has real, pre-existing and ongoing ties to Ontario. She was born here and lived here for many years, until she moved to Costa Rica. Her parents still live here. She now has employment in Ontario, and Olivia lives and goes to school here.
[48] The respondents rely on Kristjanson J.’s decision in the family law proceedings between Mr. Doersam and Ms. Dawson in support of their position that there is no real and substantial connection between the appellants’ claim and Ontario. The claims, however, are completely different. Notably, at the time Ms. Dawson brought the family law proceedings in Ontario, both she and Mr. Doersam were living in Costa Rica. The outcome of the jurisdiction motion may well have been different if Ms. Dawson had moved to Ontario with the children after the separation.
[49] I make one final observation. As recognized by the motion judge, the issue of jurisdiction is distinct from the question of choice of law: Van Breda, at para. 111; Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 1973 CanLII 192 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, at p. 397. It may turn out that the SLRA does not apply to the appellants’ claim, including s. 72(1)(f), which may allow access to the life insurance. But this is an issue to be decided at a later stage and is not to drive the court’s consideration of whether the court in Ontario has jurisdiction over the claim.
[50] Accordingly, I find that there is a real and substantial connection between the claim for dependant support and Ontario based on the appellants’ residence in Ontario. Given the motion judge’s conclusion that Ontario is a convenient forum for the litigation, a finding that the respondents do not challenge, I conclude that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over the claim for dependant support. . Reference re iGaming Ontario
In Reference re iGaming Ontario (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a 'reference' [under CJA 8 'References to Court of Appeal'] regarding whether "legal online gaming and sports betting [would] remain lawful under the Criminal Code if its users were permitted to participate in games and betting involving individuals outside of Canada".
Here the court considers the 'real and substantial connection' standard (or test) - key to deciding international venue issues, and a candidate for resolving this reference issue:1. The origins and scope of the RSC family of tests
[117] The Supreme Court summarized the origins and scope of the RSC test in Sharp v. Autorité des marchés financiers, 2023 SCC 29, 487 D.L.R. (4th) 467, at paras. 104-23. It stated that the RSC test is best described as a family of tests, recognizing that the same formula of words “involves different considerations in each of the varying contexts in which the formula is employed”: at para. 118.
[118] The first branch of the RSC family of tests was developed in the area of private international law or conflicts of laws. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 1990 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R 1077, the Supreme Court explained that the court of one province should recognize the judgment of the court of another Canadian province where there is a real and substantial connection between that court and the subject matter of the litigation. Versions of this test were applied in Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, to determine that Canadian courts should enforce judgments from courts outside Canada where there is a real and substantial connection between the cause of action and the foreign court, and in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, where the Supreme Court identified a non-exhaustive list of rebuttable presumptive connecting factors between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum to determine when a Canadian court could assume jurisdiction over the tort claims of its residents injured abroad.
[119] A second branch of the RSC family of tests was recognized in Unifund. In Unifund and the cases following it, the test was applied to determine when an otherwise valid provincial law can apply to extraterritorial persons or activities without offending the restriction against extraterritorial provincial legislation under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In Unifund, the issue was whether a reimbursement provision of Ontario’s Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, with respect to statutory accident benefits paid to Ontario residents under their policy in respect of a British Columbia motor vehicle accident, could be constitutionally applied to the British Columbia insurer of the at-fault driver. The Supreme Court ruled that provincial regulatory legislation can apply to out-of-province defendants where there is a “sufficient connection” among the enacting jurisdiction, the subject matter of the legislation, and the individual or entity sought to be regulated by it, subject to the principles of order and fairness that underlie our federal arrangements, which are applied flexibly according to the subject matter of the legislation: at para. 56. There are two steps to the Unifund test: first, assess and weigh the relevant connections; and second, apply the principles of order and fairness: see Sharp, at paras. 126-35.
[120] A version of the RSC test has also been applied to discern “the presumptively intended reach of federal legislation”: Sharp, at para. 110. In SOCAN, the Supreme Court considered whether provisions of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, applied to communications with international participants. Recognizing that comity among independent nation states lacks the constitutional status it enjoys among the provinces of Canada and does not limit Parliament’s legislative competence, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that, “in the absence of clear words to the contrary … Parliament [does] not intend its legislation to receive extraterritorial application”: at para. 55. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he applicability of [the] Copyright Act to communications that have international participants will depend on whether there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in question for Canada to apply its law consistent with the ‘principles of order and fairness … that ensure security of [cross-border] transactions with justice’”: SOCAN, at para. 57, citing Morguard, at p. 1097. Similarly, in Libman v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, in the context of determining the reach of certain offences in the Criminal Code, and whether a transnational crime, which took place partly in Canada, could be prosecuted in Canada, the Supreme Court held that it was sufficient that there was a “real and substantial link” between the offence and this country: at pp. 212-13.
[121] The courts have also adopted a variation of the RSC test when determining whether provincial legislation is unconstitutional by reason of extraterritoriality. That matter is not a question of the application of a valid provincial or federal law but, rather, asks whether the law itself is beyond the legislative jurisdiction of the province. In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of legislation that created a civil cause of action permitting the British Columbia government to seek compensation for tobacco-related health care costs. The first step in the analysis was to identify the pith and substance of the subject legislation and a head of power in s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 under which it could fall. The second step was to determine whether the legislation respected the territorial limits on provincial legislative competence mandated by s. 92. The Supreme Court observed that where the pith and substance of a law is related to an intangible matter, it is appropriate to look to the relationships among the enacting territory, the subject matter of the legislation, and the persons made subject to it to determine whether the law has a “meaningful connection” to the enacting province, and whether it pays respect to the legislative sovereignty of other territories: at paras. 36-38. See also Sanis Health Inc. v. British Columbia, 2024 SCC 40, 497 D.L.R. (4th) 571, at para. 85.
2. The RSC test does not apply
[122] From this brief overview of the existing applications of the RSC family of tests, certain features are apparent. First, as the Supreme Court explains in Sharp, the RSC tests operate differently depending on their context. Typically, the court will examine the connection among the extraterritorial person, the enacting jurisdiction, and the subject matter of its legislation. In each case, the connecting factors must be considered and weighed. “[T]here is no single standard defining what constitutes a sufficient connection: whether there is a sufficient connection depends largely on context”: Ontario College of Pharmacists v. 1724665 Ontario Inc. (Global Pharmacy Canada), 2013 ONCA 381, 363 D.L.R. (4th) 724, at para. 68.
[123] Second, underlying the RSC test is respect for the legislative and operational authority of other jurisdictions, whether they are other provinces or nations. The RSC test in turn reflects the concern for territorial limitations on legislative or regulatory authority, reflecting the requirements of order and fairness underlying Canadian federal arrangements under the Constitution, and in the case of the reach of federal legislation and regulation, international principles of comity: see Imperial Tobacco, at para. 27; and SOCAN, at para. 60. This underscores the origins of the test, which lie in principles of private international law founded on respect for interprovincial and interstate comity: Beals, at paras. 27-28. For example, in SOCAN, after examining the relevant connecting factors, the Supreme Court reviewed the relevant international treaties and directives, and the approaches to the reach of copyright laws in the United States, Australia and France, before determining that “the conclusion that Canada could exercise copyright jurisdiction in respect of both transmissions originating here and transmissions originating abroad but received here is not only consistent with our general law, but with both national and international copyright practice”: at para. 76 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
[124] The AGO submits that this court should apply the RSC test as articulated and applied in Unifund. However, the Unifund line of cases does not involve the statutory interpretation of the phrase “in that province”. Rather, these cases concern the constitutional limits on a province when regulating extra-provincial parties and activities. What is at issue in this reference is not the scope of Ontario’s legislative authority – that is, whether it could, absent the Criminal Code restrictions on lottery schemes, enact laws concerning internet gaming that can have effect outside of Ontario. Rather, the question is whether Ontario will conduct and manage the Proposed Model “in that province” in accordance with s. 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, notwithstanding the international components of the Proposed Model.
[125] The AGO also advocates for the adoption of the RSC test by pointing to what it describes as the “intangible” or “incorporeal” nature of internet gaming. The AGO says that the RSC test makes sense because it has been applied in other cases involving intangible subjects, cases such as SOCAN and Imperial Tobacco.
[126] While the AGO is correct that SOCAN is an example of a case where the RSC test was employed to determine whether communications occurred in Canada, the test was not used in the way the AGO proposes. There are two parts to the Supreme Court’s analysis in SOCAN. First, the court determined the scope of federal jurisdiction over copyright, which engaged the RSC test. Second, the court considered whether Canada intended to impose liability on every participant in an internet communication with a real and substantial connection. The court said this was a “different issue” that was a question of statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act and did not engage the RSC test: at para. 53. That is, in SOCAN, the RSC test was used to determine the permitted scope of federal jurisdiction over copyright, given the absence of constitutional limits on the extraterritorial application of federal laws. Applying a common law limit to the presumptive scope of federal laws is a very different form of analysis than interpreting a statutory restriction on the geographic scope of a government’s authority.
[127] In Imperial Tobacco, the context for the application of the “meaningful connection” test was a determination of whether the pith and substance of a law exceeded the legislative jurisdiction of a province. Here, what is at issue is not the territorial limits on Ontario’s ability to legislate, but the interpretation of a federal restriction on Ontario’s permitted ability to conduct a lottery scheme in compliance with the Criminal Code. In this reference, there is no suggestion that the federal Parliament does not have legislative authority under its criminal law power to prohibit or restrict gaming in Ontario and the other provinces and territories.
[128] We do not accept the argument that the RSC test should apply here because versions of that test have been applied in cases involving intangibles. Those applications occurred in specific contexts that are different from the context in which the reference questions arise. The reference before this court does not depend on Ontario’s constitutional authority to legislate; it depends on the correct interpretation of a provision of the Criminal Code. As the Federal Court of Appeal noted in CSIS, at para. 68, when it refused to interpret a restriction that limited CSIS’s mandate to actions “within Canada” in accordance with the RSC test, the considerations that govern the interpretation of a federal statutory restriction are very different from the intended use of the RSC test.
[129] Finally, the AGO has not explained how the RSC test could be applied in this reference. Even if we were persuaded that the RSC test would otherwise be appropriate, it is not clear what factors should be considered and what elements would constitute a real and substantial connection sufficient to anchor the Proposed Model to Ontario’s conduct and management of the current iGaming Scheme.
[130] Instead, the AGO states that the Proposed Model would be lawful under the Criminal Code “because it would be sufficiently connected to the province: it would be conducted and managed by the province; it would be authorized by the provincial legislature; and it could only be accessed by individuals in the province. Permitting players in Ontario to pool liquidity with players outside of Canada would not undermine this connection” (emphasis added). Essentially, the AGO relies on Ontario’s operation of the current iGaming Scheme to ground a real and substantial connection to its conduct and management of the international aspects of the Proposed Model.
[131] As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, that is not the way the RSC test has been applied. In Unifund, the Supreme Court evaluated the strength of the connections among the province, the subject matter of the legislation and the individual or entity sought to be regulated by it, followed by a consideration of the principles of order and fairness applied flexibly to the extraterritorial elements. A similar set of considerations was identified in Imperial Tobacco: at para. 36.
[132] The RSC test in Unifund requires the court to examine the connection between the provincial scheme and the extra-provincial person or aspect to which that scheme is extended. To apply that test in the present context would require an assessment of the connection between Ontario’s conduct and management of the Proposed Model and the international elements – specifically the participation of players in other jurisdictions. We have been supplied with insufficient information to undertake such an examination. . Sinclair v. Venezia Turismo
In Sinclair v. Venezia Turismo (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, this from an Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that held that an Ontario lawsuit relating to a tort case largely centred in Italy was out of the Ontario court's jurisdiction:
Here the court considers the 'real and substantial connection' test:(2) The Real and Substantial Connection Test
[43] In order to assume jurisdiction over a claim, a court must be satisfied that there is a real and substantial connection between the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the forum in which it is brought (Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., 1973 CanLII 192 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, at pp. 407‑8; Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 1990 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, at pp. 1108‑10; Hunt v. T&N plc, 1993 CanLII 43 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, at pp. 325 and 328; Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, at paras. 23 and 28; Tolofson v. Jensen, 1994 CanLII 44 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, at p. 1054; Van Breda, at paras. 22‑50 and 67).
[44] The real and substantial connection test seeks to mitigate the jurisdictional overreach that can arise when the connection between the forum, the subject matter of the dispute, and the defendant is not sufficient for a court to assume jurisdiction (Van Breda, at para. 99). Just as Canadian law requires proof of a real and substantial connection to a foreign jurisdiction to recognize foreign judgments, comity dictates that Canadian courts not decide matters without a real and substantial connection here (see Beals, at paras. 28 and 34‑38).
[45] In setting out rules for establishing whether a real and substantial connection exists, courts should bear in mind the objectives of order and fairness. Orderly conflict of laws rules ensure that parties can “predict with reasonable confidence whether a court will assume jurisdiction in a case with an international or interprovincial aspect” (Van Breda, at para. 73). But, in the search for certainty and predictability in access to justice, courts must be careful not to exclude fairness. Fair conflict of laws rules also provide parties with “protection against being pursued in jurisdictions having little or no connection with the transaction or the parties” (Morguard, at p. 1108).
[46] As LeBel J. noted in Van Breda, balancing order and fairness can be a challenge. The presumptive connecting factors intend to reconcile fairness with the “need for security, stability and efficiency in the design and implementation of a conflict of laws system” (para. 73). They provide an orderly framework that prevents jurisdictional questions from being decided entirely on an ad hoc, case‑by‑case basis, while simultaneously allowing for flexibility and growth.
[47] Writing for a unanimous Court, LeBel J. in Van Breda, at para. 90, set out four factors that presumptively allow a court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute in tort cases:(a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
(b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
(c) the tort was committed in the province; and
(d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province. [48] LeBel J. explained that this list is not exhaustive and can be reviewed over time but that the factors, when made out, warrant presumptive effect. The onus rests on the plaintiff to establish that one or more of the listed factors exist: “If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing this, the court might presume, absent indications to the contrary, that the claim is properly before it under the conflicts rules and that it is acting within the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction . . .” (Van Breda, at para. 80, citing J. Walker, “Reforming the Law of Crossborder Litigation: Judicial Jurisdiction”, consultation paper for the Law Commission of Ontario (March 2009), at pp. 19‑20 (online); see also para. 91).
[49] Once the plaintiff has established one of the presumptive connecting factors, the defendant may rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing that the factor does not, in the circumstances of the case, point to a real relationship between the dispute and the forum (Van Breda, at para. 95). If the defendant fails to rebut the presumption, the court must accept jurisdiction over the dispute.
[50] The assessment of whether a presumptive connecting factor has been established is concerned with the existence of a connection between the jurisdiction and the dispute, whereas the assessment of whether the presumption has been rebutted is concerned with the strength of that connection. I am in agreement with my colleague in dissent on this point (para. 204). The two stages of the analysis taken together provide an opportunity for a court to holistically assess the extent to which a real and substantial connection exists, as required by Van Breda. . Castillo v. Xela Enterprises Ltd.
In Castillo v. Xela Enterprises Ltd. (Ont CA, 2024) the Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a contempt finding, here where the contemnor (the one being in contempt) sworn a key Declaration in Guatemala.
Here the court discusses the 'real and substantial connection' test:Analysis
(1) Did the motion judge err in law by holding that the court had territorial jurisdiction to find the appellant in contempt based on his Declaration that was not made in Canada but in Guatemala?
[55] The appellant submits that because the court found that the contemptuous conduct by the appellant was making the Declaration in Guatemala, the court did not have territorial jurisdiction to make the contempt finding against him. The appellant relies on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Libman v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, at pp. 199, 212-13, 1985 CanLII 51, at paras. 42, 73-76.
[56] In Libman, the Supreme Court set out the test for determining when a Canadian court may take jurisdiction over a criminal offence that occurred in whole or in part outside Canada. LaForest J. summarized the test at pp. 212-12 (para. 74):As I see it, all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada. As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a “real and substantial link” between an offence and this country, a test well-known in public and private international law. [57] He concluded at p. 213 (para. 76):Just what may constitute a real and substantial link in a particular case, I need not explore. There were ample links here. The outer limits of the test may, however, well be coterminous with the requirements of international comity. [58] The test also applies to a finding of civil contempt: see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626, at p. 670, 1998 CanLII 818, at para. 52.
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