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RHPA - Evidence. Bacchus v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario
In Bacchus v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an RHPA appeal, this brought against "the decision of a Committee of the Discipline Committee of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons" finding that the appellant "committed professional misconduct (the “Merits Decisions”), and the Committee decision ... revoking Dr Bacchus’ license and ordering him to pay costs of $451,461.61 (among other orders) (the “Penalty Decision”).".
Here the court considers the RHPA-HPPC variation [s.49 'Admissibility of evidence'] to the general administrative evidence provision of SPPA s.15 ['Evidence']:[19] .... The Committee declined to admit the statutory declaration into evidence.
[20] The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c. S.22, s. 15, grants administrative tribunals discretion to admit hearsay evidence. However, s. 49 of the Code provides:Despite the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, nothing is admissible at a hearing that would be inadmissible in a court in a civil action and the findings of a panel shall be based exclusively on evidence admitted before it. The statutory declaration would not be admissible in a civil proceeding (absent a successful motion to admit the evidence as an exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence). I conclude that the Committee did not err in finding the declaration inadmissible. Circumstances did not establish a basis on which the Committee could reasonably have admitted the declaration. The prosecution exercised its discretion not to summons JSH, but it was still open to Dr Bacchus to do so. Since Dr Bacchus did not do so, there was no foundation for a conclusion that JSH’s evidence could not be obtained. This fact, and the inconsistency of the statutory declaration with the preponderance of evidence before the Committee, on a key factual issue, was a sufficient basis on which to decline to admit the statutory declaration into evidence. . Rusli v Ontario College of Pharmacists [ICRC screening decisions as confidential]
In Rusli v Ontario College of Pharmacists (Ont Div Ct, 2026) the Ontario Divisional Court dismissed an appeal, this brought against "a Decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists .... and the Penalty Decision" where the appellant was found guilty of "three allegations of professional misconduct which had been brought against her in her role of pharmacist".
Here the court considers an appeal argument that the Discipline Committee erred in refusing to admit "prior decisions of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC). The prior decisions sought to be admitted consisted of three decisions regarding the appellant, three decisions regarding other professionals at Glen Shields and two decisions regarding pharmacists at other pharmacies.", all of which they characterized as 'evidence':[12] First, the appellant argues that the Committee erred in refusing to admit relevant evidence, namely The Committee rejected this request.
[13] At para.26 of the Decision the Committee gave the following reasons:[26] Registrant’s Counsel sought to introduce prior ICRC decisions involving the Registrant and other pharmacists working within the Pharmacy into evidence through cross-examination of the College Investigator. The College objected. After receiving and carefully reviewing written and oral submissions on both the admissibility and relevancy of these ICRC decisions, the Panel held that they were not relevant to the issues at hand, even recognizing the relatively low threshold for relevance, for the following reasons:a. Generally, ICRC decisions are not admissible at hearings of the Discipline Committee. They are confidential except where cautions, remedial training or referrals of specific allegations are made to the Discipline Committee. Their decisions are driven by factors unique to the case at hand and therefore cannot be compared.
b. The ICRC is a screening committee. It does not adjudicate matters, interview witnesses, make credibility findings, or make legal interpretations. Their decisions cannot help the Panel in determining whether acts of professional misconduct occurred.
c. The Panel takes its direction from the Notice of Hearing.
d. The Registrant has neither provided evidence that these decisions would assist the College in their case or harm her own defense. [14] The Committee reasonably refused the request to admit the ICRC decisions which is generally consistent with other cases. It found there was an issue of confidentiality which is based on section 23 of the Code. It took into account the role of the ICRC and the legislative scheme. Having reviewed redacted copies of the decisions relating to the appellant and another pharmacist at Glen Shields, it found that the decisions were not relevant.
[15] While reasonably rejecting the admission of the ICRC decisions at the merits hearing, at the penalty phase where the decisions were arguably more relevant, the parties entered into an Agreed Statement of Facts to include excerpts from the ICRC decisions regarding the appellant directly, explicitly in lieu of entering those decisions themselves as evidence at the hearing. I find no error.
[16] Before us, the appellant focused on the fact that she was seeking to have the decisions admitted to establish that the ICRC in a decision dealing with an earlier complaint, had approved of the pharmacy’s practices since the passage of Regulation 1093. According to her, this evidence was relevant not only to penalty, but also to whether she was guilty of the conduct alleged against her.
[17] There is no merit to this submission. In the previous complaint, consistent with its role as a screening committee, the ICRC decided that, based on what the appellant had told it about how she had changed her practices after the passage of Regulation 1093, the complaint before it should not be referred to the discipline committee. Subsequently, when it received another complaint, it investigated the appellant’s practices and, based on what it found (which included the fact that the pharmacy’s sales of veterinary drugs had increased rather than decreased after the passage of Regulation 1093), it decided that that complaint should be referred to discipline. As the Committee correctly concluded, this history was irrelevant to the question of whether the appellant was guilty of the misconduct alleged against her.
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