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Charter - s.1 Oakes Test - Minimum Impairment (2). Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador
In Taylor v. Newfoundland and Labrador (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada partially allowed an appeal, this brought against a Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal order that dismissed an earlier appeal from a Superior Court dismissal of an application seeking "a declaration that the [SS: covid-era] Travel Restrictions infringed the mobility rights in s. 6 of the Charter, could not be justified under s. 1, and were of no force and effect".
Here the court revisits the Charter s.1 'minimal impairment' element:[234] In a great majority of cases, minimal impairment has been the linchpin of the s. 1 analysis (Hogg and Wright, at § 38:20). At this stage, the government must prove that there were no less harmful means to achieve the objective in a real and substantial manner. Some deference is owed to the government, especially when responding to complex social problems, but the right must be impaired as little as reasonably possible (John Howard Society, at para. 95; R. v. Brown, 2022 SCC 18, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 374, at para. 135). Judicial deference should not extend to accepting any law “simply on the basis that the problem is serious and the solution difficult” (RJR-MacDonald, at para. 136).
[235] Hindsight plays no role in this analysis (Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at paras. 95-96). While we now know more about COVID-19, and the intensity of spring and summer 2020 may seem like a distant memory, the s. 1 analysis is conducted based on what was known when the decisions were made.
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[245] The test for minimal impairment is not a standard of perfection, nor — we reiterate — does it operate with the benefit of hindsight. The government is entitled to deference in achieving its pressing and substantial objective, particularly in a health emergency. We agree with the application judge that none of the alternatives constituted a similarly effective, less rights-impairing substitute for the travel restriction to meet the objective of protecting those in Newfoundland and Labrador from illness and death. . Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General)
In Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against a dismissal of a labour union's application for "a declaration that Bill 178 [SS: 'Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017'] limited the rights of OPSEU members to freely associate in striking under s. 2(d) [SS: 'freedom of association'] of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a manner that could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and a declaration under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 that Bill 178 is of no force and effect".
Here the court considered whether the 'Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017' (which was 'back-to-work' legislation) and which breached Charter s.2(d) ['freedom of association'], was justified under Charter s.1 [ie. was demonstrably justified] - here under the 'minimal impairment' element:[28] With the continuing evolution of the Oakes test, minimal impairment no longer plays the dominant role, especially in areas where complex social policy is under consideration and significant court deference is accorded to the legislature. The proportionate effects inquiry has become weightier.
[29] The evolution of the law can be seen in the changes in Professor Peter Hogg’s longstanding text on constitutional law: Peter Hogg & Wade Wright, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2007) (loose-leaf 2025-Rel. 1). Professor Hogg originally took the position that the proportionate effects inquiry was “redundant”: at § 38:22. Latterly, Professor Wade Wright, the current editor, favours what he calls a “competing view”, that “while it may change the outcome only rarely, it nonetheless still has an important role to play, and may change the outcome in some cases”: at § 38:22. This evolution is seen in the cases as well: see Hutterian Brethren, at paras. 75-78, per McLachlin C.J., and at para. 149, per Abella J. (dissenting, but not on this point); and Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, at para. 46. The idea that the proportionate effects inquiry was redundant was not accepted elsewhere: see Guy Régimbald and Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 2nd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017), at §§ 20.32-20.33; Dwight Newman, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, “Constitutional Law (Charter of Rights)”, (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2023 Reissue), at HCHR-23; and Michael Plaxton, Sovereignty, Restraint, & Guidance: Canadian Criminal Law in the 21st Century (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2019), at pp. 64-65.
[30] The governing principles of law on the minimal impairment inquiry are that Parliament or the legislature need not choose the absolutely least intrusive means to attain the pressing and substantial objective; the means selected must come within a range of means that limit the Charter right or freedom as little as reasonably possible: R. v. Swain, 1991 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, at para. 64. Justice Wilson held that in circumstances where the legislature must accommodate divergent interests in crafting legislation, as is the case in labour relations, an impugned law would fail the minimal impairment inquiry only where there are alternative measures “clearly superior to the measures currently in use”: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 1991 CanLII 68 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, at para. 170.
[31] Justice McLachlin’s (as she then was) formulation of the test in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1995 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160, was adopted by the Supreme Court in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), 1997 CanLII 326 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at para. 58: “The tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator.” Accordingly: “If the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement” (citations omitted).
[32] Justice Gonthier’s caution continues to resonate: “it is not sufficient that a judge, freed from all [policymaking] constraints, could imagine a less restrictive alternative”: Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 112. Chief Justice McLachlin and Deschamps J. explained that “[t]he Court will not interfere simply because it can think of a better, less intrusive way to manage the problem”: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 94. They added: “What is required is that the [government concerned] establish that it has tailored the limit to the exigencies of the problem in a reasonable way.”
[33] Finally, McLachlin C.J. stated in Hutterian Brethren, at para. 53: “In making this assessment, the courts accord the legislature a measure of deference, particularly on complex social issues where the legislature may be better positioned than the courts to choose among a range of alternatives.”
[34] Judicial deference to the legislature at the minimal impairment stage has increasingly taken the form of a flexible approach that is sensitive to the context of the law in issue.
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