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Charter - s.24(2) - Exclusion of Criminal Evidence (8). R. v. Singer
In R. v. Singer (SCC, 2026) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this brought against a Saskatchewan CA decision which "acquitted him of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample".
Here the court considers the Charter 24(2) 'evidence exclusion' doctrine:[109] In my view, the evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. I reach this conclusion by considering the impact of admitting this evidence on public confidence in the administration of justice over the long term, based on a balancing of the three lines of inquiry described by this Court in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353: (1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (2) the impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests; and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits (para. 71; see also R. v. Fox, 2026 SCC 4, at paras. 91, 94, 111 and 118; R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 234, at para. 74; Beaver, at para. 116; McColman, at para. 54).
[110] The first line of inquiry under s. 24(2) considers whether the Charter-infringing state conduct is so serious that the court needs to dissociate itself from it. This line of inquiry requires a court to situate the seriousness of the state’s Charter-infringing conduct on a spectrum of culpability. At one end of the spectrum are infringements that are technical, inadvertent, or otherwise minor, as well as those that reflect an understandable mistake. At the other end are infringements that constitute a wilful or reckless disregard for Charter rights, a major departure from Charter standards, or a systemic pattern of Charter-infringing state conduct (Grant, at para. 74; Fox, at para. 94; Tim, at para. 82; Beaver, at para. 120).
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[115] The second line of inquiry, the impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests, is driven by society’s interest in protecting Charter rights. It requires determining the extent to which the breach “actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed” (Le, at para. 151, quoting Grant, at para. 76; Fox, at para. 111; Tim, at para. 90; Beaver, at para. 123). As with the first line of inquiry, a court must situate the impact of the breach on a spectrum (Fox, at para. 111; Tim, at para. 90). In some cases, the impact may be merely fleeting, technical, transient, or trivial, while in others it may be profoundly intrusive or seriously compromise the interests underlying the infringed right (R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 28; Tim, at para. 90). In these latter cases, there is a higher risk that admitting the evidence would signal to the public that Charter rights “are of little actual avail to the citizen”, and would thus bring the administration of justice into disrepute (Grant, at para. 76; see also Fox, at para. 111; Beaver, at para. 123).
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[119] The third line of inquiry under the s. 24(2) analysis asks “whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion” (Grant, at para. 79; Fox, at para. 118; Tim, at para. 96; Beaver, at para. 129). In conducting this inquiry, a court may consider the reliability of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case, and the seriousness of the offence (Grant, at paras. 81-84; Fox, at para. 118; Tim, at paras. 96-97; Beaver, at para. 129).
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[121] The final step in the s. 24(2) analysis involves balancing the three lines of inquiry (Grant, at para. 85; Fox, at para. 125; Tim, at para. 98; Beaver, at para. 133). The cumulative weight of the first two lines of inquiry is balanced against the third, with a prospective and societal focus on the broad impact of admission or exclusion of the evidence on the reputation of the justice system over the long term (Fox, at para. 125; Tim, at para. 98; Beaver, at para. 134; McColman, at para. 74).
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