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Charter - Democratic Rights (s.3) (2). Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) [voter parity]
In Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2025) Dawes JA of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a concurring but separate judgement, makes some important points regarding Charter s.3 ['Democratic Rights']:[99] However, I write separately to note my disagreement with some of Huscroft J.A.’s comments about the role of the courts in assessing the constitutionality of federal, provincial and territorial electoral systems.
[100] Huscroft J.A. characterizes the s. 3 Charter right as “a right to vote pursuant to the electoral system in operation – whatever that system is, and regardless of the electoral outcomes that may obtain.” Elsewhere in his reasons he suggests that there is no “role for the court in evaluating proposals for electoral reform.”
[101] In my view, such a narrow conception of the scope of s. 3, and of the role of the courts in enforcing its guarantees, is at odds with the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of s. 3 in the Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), 1991 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (“Saskatchewan Boundaries Reference”). Writing for the majority in that case, McLachlin J., as she then was, concluded that s. 3 guarantees citizens not just the right to cast a ballot, but a right to “effective representation”. She explained that this does not guarantee absolute voter parity, but added, at p. 185, that:[D]eviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, dilution of one citizen’s vote as compared with another’s should not be countenanced. [Emphasis added.] [102] Once it is recognized that s. 3 guarantees citizens a right to effective representation, it follows that s. 3 must constrain both the extent to which an electoral system can permissibly deviate from absolute voter parity, and the justifications that can permissibly be relied on by the legislature to support any such deviations. While in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, at para. 37, the majority stated that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the type of electoral system in which the right to vote or to run for office is to be exercised”, it did so in the course rejecting an argument that s. 3 constitutionally enshrined “the values or objectives that might be embedded in our current electoral system”. I do not read the majority’s reasons as suggesting that every imaginable electoral system would be constitutionally compliant, no matter how much it departs from “the ideal of a ‘free and democratic society’ upon which the Charter is founded”: Saskatchewan Boundaries Reference, at p. 181; Figueroa, at para. 27. In my view, it falls to the courts to decide whether a particular set of legislative choices about how elections are conducted conforms with the demands of the Charter.
[103] That said, I agree with Huscroft J.A. that the existing federal Single Member Plurality electoral scheme does not violate s. 3 of the Charter. In particular, I do not accept the appellants’ contention that the s. 3 right to effective representation requires that all voters have their votes “contribute to the election of a representative that they support”. Under any system of representative democracy with a limited number of seats, some voters will inevitably cast their ballots for unsuccessful candidates or for political parties who are awarded no seats. The logic of the appellants’ argument implies that every imaginable electoral system – including the proportional representation systems they favour – would violate the s. 3 Charter rights of at least some voters, and would thus require justification under s. 1. I am not persuaded that this would be a sensible interpretation of the s. 3 right. To the contrary, I am satisfied that legislatures have considerable leeway to choose between a wide range of different electoral models that all provide effective representation and “meaningful participation”[1] in the electoral process to a sufficient extent to meet the demands of s. 3. . Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses (IMHO harshly) a Charter s.3 ['democratic rights'] and s.15 ['discrimination'] challenge to the federal electoral system.
Here the court summarizes it's dismissal of this Charter challenge, perhaps at it's harshest in the case:[1] Canada has had the same federal electoral system since 1867. Candidates representing political parties seek election in over 300 ridings across the country. The candidate who gets the most votes wins the riding, and following constitutional convention the Governor General invites the political party whose candidates win the most ridings to form a government and seek the confidence of Parliament.
[2] The percentage of votes a party’s candidates obtain nationally – aggregated across elections in all of the ridings – may not be commensurate with the percentage of ridings that party wins in the election. For example, a party with support concentrated in particular ridings may win a larger percentage of ridings than its national support suggests it should. Conversely, a party whose support is distributed more evenly across many ridings may win fewer seats than its national support suggests. This is by no means a failure of the system. The number of seats a party has in Parliament is based on individual elections at the riding level rather than the support a political party receives on a national basis, and the parties campaign accordingly. The percentage of the vote that a party obtains nationally is simply irrelevant.
[3] Many countries have different electoral systems including ranked ballots, single transferable votes, party list, and mixed member proportional representation. Proportional representation electoral systems (PR) share the goal of establishing proportionality between the number of votes a party receives in an election and the number of seats that party receives in the legislature.
[4] PR renders single-party majority government exceptional, as political parties will rarely receive over 50% of the vote and hence win over 50% of the seats in the legislature. Multi-party coalition governments are thus a feature of many forms of PR. Negotiations between multiple parties are required following elections in order to form coalition governments that can command majority support in the legislature and so ensure the passage of legislation.
[5] Electoral reform is a longstanding matter of political debate and academic study in Canada. Some political parties have campaigned on promises of electoral reform and some provinces have held referendums on the adoption of proportional representation systems. But all attempts to change the electoral system – that is, the manner in which votes are translated into representation in Parliament – have failed.
[6] This is the context in which the appellants bring their application seeking a declaration that the federal electoral system is unconstitutional. They argue that it violates not only the right to vote protected by s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also the right to equality protected by s. 15(1). The electoral system, they say, is “‘a relic of days more barbarous than ours’, where representation was restricted to propertied men and stands against Canada’s diverse pluralistic society with distinct minorities and voices.”
[7] These are extraordinary claims. If they are correct, the federal electoral system is an affront to basic constitutional rights. The same would presumably be true of all the provincial and territorial electoral systems as well.
[8] But these claims are not correct. The electoral system is not in conflict with either the right to vote or the right to equality. It does not violate the Charter.
[9] The appellants’ arguments that the electoral system violates the Charter are, in essence, a repackaging of failed political arguments as constitutional rights violations. The expert evidence put forward in support of them is replete with highly contestable policy arguments about which reasonable disagreement abounds, not only in the academic community but amongst the public at large. This evidence demonstrates the shortcomings of constitutional litigation in addressing public policy disagreements.
[10] The short answer to the argument that the electoral system violates the Charter is that Canadian citizens are free to vote for anyone they choose, for any reason they choose. Their choices do not constitute state action and cannot give rise to outcomes that violate either s. 3 or s. 15(1), regardless of how their votes translate into representation in Parliament. There is no constitutional requirement that their individual choices aggregate in a way that achieves some ideal of representational diversity. Neither the political party affiliation nor the personal characteristics of the candidates who win election are relevant to the constitutionality of the electoral system.
[11] Changing the electoral system may or may not be a good idea but it is not required by the Charter, nor is there any role for the court in evaluating proposals for electoral reform.
[12] I would dismiss the appeal. The court sets out the essence of it's s.3 Charter reasoning at paras 40-55, and it's Charter s.15 reasoning at paras 86-95.
It concludes:CONCLUSION
[96] In summary, Canada’s electoral system does not establish limits on either the right to vote under s. 3 or the right to equality under s. 15(1). No burden of justification under s. 1 arises. In light of these conclusions, it is not necessary to address the argument that SMP is, in effect, constitutionalized by parts of the Constitution Act, 1867, such that it cannot be altered without constitutional amendment, and I make no comment on it. . Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses (IMHO harshly) a Charter s.3 ['democratic rights'] and s.15 ['discrimination'] challenge to the federal electoral system.
Here the court canvasses current 'right to vote' doctrine [Charter s.3 'democratic rights']:The right to vote in the Supreme Court
[26] Unlike many Charter rights, the right to vote in s. 3 is not worded vaguely. On the contrary, it is expressed with rule-like clarity: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly”. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the right to vote leaves much unsaid. The right to vote presumes a democratic procedural baseline and all that this entails – voter enumeration and registration, elections with secret ballots, secure places to vote, vote-counting and dispute resolution procedures, and so on, all of which are provided by ordinary legislation and executive decisions. See, generally, Grégoire Webber, et al., Legislated Rights: Securing Human Rights through Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). But are other rights implied by the right to vote?
[27] The Supreme Court has decided several cases concerning the right to vote and two lines of decisions emerge. The first applies the right to vote in rule-like fashion and gives rise to little difficulty for purposes of this appeal. This line of cases implicates the most basic aspect of the right to vote: the right to participate in an election by casting a ballot. For example, in Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 92 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 and Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, the Court invalidated legislation that denied inmates the right to vote, while in Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 3, the Court invalidated legislation that denied citizens living abroad the right to vote. Haig v. Canada, 1993 CanLII 58 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 also concerned the right to cast a ballot, but it arose in the context of a referendum rather than an election and the Court found no infringement of s. 3.
[28] The second line of cases involves a purposive interpretation of the right to vote and results in the establishment of two additional rights: the right to “effective representation” and the right to “meaningful participation”. These rights introduce considerable uncertainty as to the outer boundaries of the right to vote and are key to the outcome of this appeal.
Effective representation
[29] The concept of effective representation was outlined by McLachlin J. in Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), 1991 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. She described it as entitling citizens to be represented in government – to have a voice in government deliberations and to have the ability to raise their concerns and grievances with their elected representatives. Justice McLachlin described effective representation as a freestanding right, rather than simply the purpose of the right to vote: at pp. 188-89.
[30] In doing so she merged conceptually distinct concepts: rights, which are constitutionally protected, and the purpose of particular constitutionally protected rights, which is not. The purpose ascribed to a particular right will often be broader than the right itself, and as a result the characterization of purposes as rights may broaden the scope of Charter rights considerably. However, recognition of the right to effective representation did not have the effect of broadening the right to vote in the Electoral Boundaries Reference; on the contrary, it led to a narrower result than what would have been required had the Court concluded that the right to vote required each vote to count equally. The Court held that disparity in the size of electoral ridings that had the effect of enhancing or diminishing the relative value of individual votes did not infringe the right to vote. This was the context in which the court concluded that the right to vote protected “effective representation”. Although the court stated that parity of voting power was an important consideration, it was not the only thing that mattered: geography, community history, community interests, and minority representation were also important considerations in determining the size of electoral ridings.
[31] Despite the outcome in the Electoral Boundaries Reference, “effective representation” is a vague term that has the potential to broaden the scope of the right to vote considerably. It all depends on what the concept of representation includes and what “effective” representation is understood as requiring. The question on this appeal is whether effective representation extends to the manner in which votes are translated into representation in Parliament.
Meaningful participation
[32] The right to effective representation was supplemented by the right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process – the right to “meaningful participation” – in Figueroa. Iacobucci J. described this right as participatory in nature, concerned with enhancing participation in the electoral process and promoting political debate so that society can benefit from the full range of opinions that people hold. He emphasized that participation in the electoral process has an intrinsic value regardless of its outcome: citizens must be afforded a genuine opportunity to take part in governance by participating in selecting their elected representatives.
[33] Although the right to meaningful participation is not subject to internal qualifications, Iacobucci J. noted that the content of the right is stated in qualified terms. Voters have the right to be reasonably informed and candidates’ have the right to have a reasonable opportunity to present their positions: Figueroa, at para. 131. This, he said, means that s. 3 does not protect the right of citizens to play an unlimited role in the electoral process.
[34] Although the Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to both effective representation and meaningful participation in its recent decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Working Families Coalition (Canada) Inc., 2025 SCC 5, 500 D.L.R. (4th) 193, the court split three ways in applying these rights. A majority of the court held that limitations on third party spending in the pre-election period violated the right to meaningful participation because they permitted political parties to have a disproportionate voice in the political discourse, and so deprived voters of a broad range of views and perspectives on social and political issues. Thus, the right to vote is concerned with political discourse and related issues, including spending limits, and may be exercised by third parties as well as political parties and their candidates. . Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) [proportional representation]
In Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismisses (IMHO harshly) a Charter s.3 ['democratic rights'] and s.15 ['discrimination'] challenge to the federal electoral system.
Here the court considers 'proportional representation', a much-favoured alternative to the present 'first past the post' or 'SMP' (single member plurality) electoral systems:[16] The application judge canvasses evidence from several scholars concerning the operation of proportional representation electoral systems around the world. The evidence is voluminous and I will not review it here. The application judge does not make findings on every aspect of the evidence. Instead, at various points in his decision he simply recounts and summarizes the various opinions concerning how electoral systems work and their impact on the formation of governments and the operation of the political system.
[17] The application judge reviews statistical evidence concerning the election of women in SMP and PR systems, noting the experts’ views that various cultural and sociological factors are at play in electoral outcomes. He states that although it is self-evident that electoral systems may be tangentially implicated in women’s participation in politics, “the particular type of system – whether SMP or PR – is not the cause of women’s comparative advantages or disadvantages across societies.” That said, the application judge adds that the experts did not have the ability to analyze “the deep sociological and cultural questions underlying the status of women[‘s] position in different societies.” He describes the evidence concerning the representation of diverse minorities as necessarily incomplete and states that the political success of “racialized communities … is at best only tangentially related to the form that elections take.”
[18] The application judge states that if political effectiveness were the goal, SMP would have a stronger case than PR; but if citizens’ “happiness” were the goal, PR would have the upper hand. Both are important from the political science and sociological point of view, and neither can be discounted in assessing the merits of competing electoral systems. “That said”, he concludes, “neither effectiveness nor satisfaction factors directly into an analysis of constitutional rights.” . Ontario (Attorney General) v. Working Families Coalition (Canada) Inc.
In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Working Families Coalition (Canada) Inc. (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal, this from an appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal which was allowed and held that an Ontario Election Finances Act (EFA) "spending limit violated the right to vote under s. 3" ['Democratic rights of citizens'] of the Charter.
Here the court summarizes their ruling, regarding third party advertising:[1] This appeal concerns the right to vote, which lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. Canada was founded as a democracy (Reference re Alberta Statutes, 1938 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 100, at pp. 145-46, per Cannon J.), and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms constitutionally entrenched the right of all citizens to participate in elections. Section 3 of the Charter guarantees each citizen the right to vote in elections of members of the House of Commons and the provincial legislative assemblies, and the right to be qualified for membership therein.
[2] This Court has long recognized that s. 3’s protection must be interpreted broadly and extend to the conditions under which the right to vote is formally exercised (Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 11; Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 25 and 27). The right to vote is more than “the bare right to place a ballot in a box” (Dixon v. B.C. (A.G.), 1989 CanLII 248 (BC SC), [1989] 4 W.W.R. 393 (B.C.S.C.), per McLachlin C.J., at p. 403). It is exercised within a framework of institutions and actors, including regular elections and sittings of the legislatures guaranteed by ss. 4 and 5 of the Charter, political parties, candidates, campaigns, electoral districts, laws regulating conditions for voting, and more (Y. Dawood, “Electoral fairness and the law of democracy: A structural rights approach to judicial review” (2012), 62 U.T.L.J. 499, at p. 519; P. Thibault, “Les droits démocratiques (articles 3 à 5)”, in E. Mendes and S. Beaulac, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (5th ed. 2013), 563, at pp. 564 et seq.).
[3] This appeal requires the Court to consider whether the limit on third party spending on political advertising in the year before an election period, set out in s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (EFA), infringes s. 3 of the Charter.
[4] Third parties are defined broadly in s. 1 of the EFA as any person or entity that is not a registered candidate, constituency association, or political party. They encompass a diverse range of citizens and groups who aim to provide information to other citizens and draw attention to issues of importance to them. Third party political advertising is a medium through which voters receive different views on political candidates, parties, and important public issues. This information helps voters identify the views of others in their community and informs the key issues on the election agenda. As this Court has recognized, third party advertising adds fresh perspectives to the political discourse (Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at para. 55). It may give voice to vulnerable or underrepresented groups. It may help voters to assess their options or identify important issues absent from the election agenda, and to push political parties and candidates to address them. Third party advertising thus assists citizens in casting an informed vote (Harper, at para. 55).
[5] The challenged spending limit restricts the amount that third parties can spend on political advertising in the year before a provincial election period (the pre-writ year). The election period begins when the writ is drawn up, one month before election day (also called the writ period). Third parties are capped at $600,000 in advertising spending for the entire pre-writ year (EFA, s. 37.10.1(2)(b)). By contrast, registered political parties may spend up to $1,000,000 in advertising; this limit applies for only six months before the election period (s. 38.1). In the first six months of the pre-writ year, political parties face no limits on political advertising.
[6] The application judge relied on expert evidence suggesting that both a 6- and 12-month spending limit for third parties would promote electoral fairness, and concluded that the challenged provision did not violate s. 3 of the Charter. He determined that third parties could still advertise within the spending limit, and that expensive television advertisements did not contribute to policy debates. The application judge thus concluded that the law respected the right of voters to meaningfully participate in the electoral process through an informed vote.
[7] With respect, I disagree. An examination of the extent of low-cost advertising that third parties can still engage in does not capture the broader impacts of the spending limit that, by design, creates absolute disproportionality, or a disproportionality that is so marked on its face that it allows political parties to drown out the voices of third parties on political issues from reaching citizens during an entire year of legislative activity.
[8] This Court’s interpretation of s. 3 has been “guided by the ideal of a ‘free and democratic society’ upon which the Charter is founded” (Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), 1991 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (Saskatchewan Reference), at p. 181; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, at paras. 26-27). To interpret the scope of s. 3’s protection, this Court has emphasized free and open participation, respect for the diverse interests of a broad range of citizens, fairness in political discourse, and the importance of citizen participation in political life for public faith in our laws and institutions (Saskatchewan Reference, at pp. 181-82 and 188; Figueroa, at paras. 27-30; Harper, at paras. 70 and 72).
[9] In this way, this Court has held that the purpose of s. 3 is for voters to be effectively represented in government, and to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. A legislative measure that undermines or interferes with citizens’ ability to meaningfully participate in the electoral process will infringe the right to vote. And meaningful participation requires that citizens be able to vote in an informed way (Harper, at paras. 71 and 73). An informed vote is foundational to the health of the electoral system and a properly functioning democracy.
[10] An egalitarian model of elections — endorsed by this Court in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), 1997 CanLII 326 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, and Harper — aims to achieve a balance in the political discourse, such that no one participant in the electoral system can exert undue influence. These participants include candidates, political parties and third parties (Harper, at para. 87). Assessing whether spending limits may lead to a disequilibrium in that discourse is necessarily a comparative analysis. Given the competitive nature of elections, the capacities of different actors to participate fairly in the electoral process are interconnected and will be affected by how all actors are regulated (Figueroa, at para. 49). In principle, spending limits may level the playing field and ensure wealth cannot be mobilized to drown out other voices (Harper, at para. 72). However, limits that restrict rather than promote citizens’ access to diverse information and views may violate their right to meaningfully participate in the political process (Harper, at para. 74).
[11] This Court’s jurisprudence is clear that s. 3 does not require that all participants in the electoral system be treated equally. However, s. 3 will be infringed if spending limits allow any political actor or third party a disproportionate voice in the political discourse given their role in the electoral process, thus depriving voters of a broad range of views and perspectives on social and political issues.
[12] The issue in this case is not whether the evidence establishes that third parties can still provide some information to the public. It is about whether legislation that on its face limits third parties during a critical time in the democratic cycle, while imposing no limits at all on political parties for half that period, undermines voters’ right to an informed vote that reflects their views. The application judge erred in law by failing to engage with the qualitative differences that permit political parties to drown out the voices of third parties.
[13] In my view, the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter. The spending limit applies to issue-based political advertising during a full quarter of the standard life of a legislative assembly, during which citizens’ s. 3 rights are engaged and the government is engaged in policy development and lawmaking. It has the clear potential to severely curtail voters’ exposure to different views on the political issues that define their community in the year before the election period. During this period, the legislature will sit, as it must do under s. 5 of the Charter, debating policies and influencing the election agenda. Third parties are strictly limited in their ability to inform citizens while political parties face no restrictions in the first six months of the pre-writ year. This differential treatment creates a disproportionality in the political discourse. Further, this disproportionality in political discourse persists over the second six months: if third parties do provide their perspective during the first six months of the pre-writ year, they may be unable to contribute meaningful information closer to the election. As a result, on their face, the statutory provisions create an absolute disproportionality in the broader political discourse that deprives voters of a broad range of views and perspectives on issues during a critical period in the democratic cycle. This undermines the voter’s right to an informed vote and to meaningful participation in the electoral process. . Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General)
In Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General) (SCC, 2021) the Supreme Court of Canada consider Charter s.3 electoral rights:[45] Section 3 guarantees citizens the right to vote and run for office in provincial and federal elections, and includes a right to effective representation. The text of s. 3 makes clear, however, that it guarantees “only the right to vote in elections of representatives of the federal and the provincial legislative assemblies” (Haig, at p. 1031 (emphasis added)) and “does not extend to municipal elections” (p. 1031 (emphasis added), citing P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed. 1992), vol. 2, at p. 42‑2). Simply put, ss. 2(b) and 3 record distinct rights which must be given independent meaning (Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 829 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at paras. 79‑80; Harper, at para. 67). Effective representation is not a principle of s. 2(b), nor can the concept be imported wholesale from a different Charter right.
[46] In any event, effective representation connotes voter parity which, while not exhaustive of the requirements of effective representation, is the overarching concern and the condition of “prime importance” (Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), 1991 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p. 184). What matters is the relative population of the wards, not their absolute size. To hold otherwise implies keeping the population of wards relatively constant by increasing the number of councillors to keep pace with population growth, a notion unknown to Canadian law (in s. 3 or elsewhere) and which would not be without its own difficulties, including potentially unwieldly growth in the size of Toronto City Council (M. Pal, “The Unwritten Principle of Democracy” (2019), 65 McGill L.J. 269, at pp. 298‑99; J. C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (2001), at pp. 15 and 19).
[47] And even were effective representation to apply as a consideration here, we would not find that the principle has been violated due only to the larger population sizes of the wards created by the Act. It is not disputed that the 25‑ward structure of the Act enhanced voter parity, relative to the 47‑ward structure preferred by the City (which was not even designed to achieve voter parity until 2026) (A.F., at para. 150; R.F., at paras. 35, 38, 133, 143 and 148). Indeed, the Toronto Ward Boundary Review’s reasoning for having rejected the 25‑ward structure was criticized on this very basis (R.R. (short), vol. II, at pp. 65, 69, 72-73 and 77-78). While the principle of effective representation encompasses more than simple voter parity, those who rely upon the principle of effective representation here fail to identify any other factors — geography, community history, community interests and minority representation — that could conceivably justify a departure from parity (see Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), at p. 184).
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