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Complaints - Defamation. Zeppa v. Rea
In Zeppa v. Rea (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a SLAPP 'grounds to believe' (standard) issue, here where the respondent was sued for defamation on making a police complaint:[5] The appellant subsequently brought this action, seeking over $1,000,000 in damages for various causes of action, including defamation. The appellant alleged in the statement of claim that the respondent defamed him by reporting the incident at the restaurant to the police. He claimed that the respondent made a false statement. Two years later, the appellant amended the statement of claim to add four causes of action: breach of fiduciary duty, interference with economic relations, misfeasance in public office, and champerty, all relating to the respondent’s opposition to his corporation’s development project. He also increased the claim to $11,000,000.
[6] The motion judge dismissed the appellant’s action under r. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”).[1] The central focus of this appeal is a challenge to the motion judge’s findings that the appellant had not established that there were grounds to believe (i) the claim had substantial merit, (ii) the respondent had no valid defence, and (iii) the appellant had suffered sufficiently serious harm that the public interest in permitting the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the respondent’s expression.
[7] After hearing oral submissions, the appeal was dismissed with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
[8] The motion judge did not make a reviewable error. The action, as framed, could not surmount the initial hurdle: to establish grounds to believe that the claim had sufficient merit. The motion judge did not, as the appellant argued, conduct an inappropriately deep dive into the record. Even on the “grounds to believe” standard, the action was hopeless. This was not a case where a person’s reputation was smeared by false accusations that were later publicized. The police investigated a complaint, found that the conduct complained of did not amount to uttering threats, and closed the investigation. The appellant argued that the fact of making a complaint to the police can, without more, constitute defamation. We were not taken to any case law that would support such a proposition.
[9] That is sufficient to dispose of the appeal and it is not necessary to consider the remaining branches of the test. Accordingly, the argument that there were grounds to believe that the defence of qualified privilege could have been defeated by malice is unavailing.
[10] Finally, even if the argument could have proceeded to the final step, there is a strong public policy reason not to discourage parties from reporting to police what they believe to be criminal acts, even if it turns out that they are mistaken as to the facts or the law or both. The public interest in protecting this expression is very strong, and the appellant did not meet his onus of establishing that he was harmed in any way exceeding minor inconvenience and embarrassment. . Luoy v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
In Luoy v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, here against orders that "struck out various pleadings relating to defamation and libel".
The court enumerates some documents that were not defamatory, here in a regulatory/investigative context:[2] .... As part of that investigation, CIBC reported the client complaint to the regulator, the Enforcement Department of the New Self-Regulatory Organization of Canada (the “New SRO”).
[3] The appellant pleaded that various documents contained defamatory statements. These documents are: (1) a March 31, 2023 letter from the New SRO to CIBC Securities advising that it was commencing an investigation; (2) a Member Events Tracking System (“METS”) report that CIBC Securities sent to the New SRO as part of the investigation; and (3) a Microsoft Teams chat between the appellant and a CIBC employee.
[4] The motion judge held that neither the letter from the New SRO nor the METS report contained the alleged defamatory statements. Further, even if the letter from the New SRO did contain defamatory statements, these were not published by the respondents. The Microsoft Teams chat could not be considered a publication within the meaning of the elements of defamation. Accordingly, the motion judge struck out various pleadings relating to defamation and libel.
[5] The motion judge struck paragraph 60 of the pleadings as “scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”. She did not grant leave to amend the pleadings because additional facts could not make the defamation claim tenable. The motion judge declined to award costs to either party.
....
[7] We see no error in the motion judge’s analysis of the documents alleged to contain defamatory statements. ....
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