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Courts - Inherent and Plenary Powers (2). R. v. Varennes
In R. v. Varennes (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada considered law that indictable offences should be tried by judge and jury, except where both defendant and Crown agree to judge-only trials [under CCC 469, 471 and 473 - Part XIV 'Jurisdiction']. The court allowed an appeal, here where the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new murder trial after the Crown refused to consent to a judge-only trial - finding two exceptions (Charter s.11(b) due to risk of COVID delay and inherent jurisdiction) to this statutory elections rule:[1] When an accused is charged with an indictable offence listed in s. 469 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‐46 — including murder — the trial shall take place before a judge and jury. Section 473(1) of the Criminal Code provides an exception if both the accused and the Attorney General consent to a judge-alone trial.
[2] This appeal asks when a superior court judge can order a judge-alone trial for a murder charge, despite the prosecution’s refusal to consent under s. 473(1).
[3] The appellant, Pascal Varennes, was charged with the second degree murder of his spouse. His trial was scheduled for September 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic. In June 2020, he requested a judge-alone trial under s. 473(1). He argued, among other reasons, that pandemic-related delays to jury trials risked breaching his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[4] The prosecution refused to consent to a judge-alone trial. It asserted that the public interest favoured a jury trial for a murder charge in a domestic violence context in a small community and that pandemic-related restrictions would not clearly delay the trial.
[5] The appellant filed a motion seeking an order to proceed by judge alone. Concerned that pandemic-related restrictions would likely delay the trial, the trial judge found that the Crown’s refusal to consent was [translation] “unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances” and ordered a judge-alone trial (2020 QCCS 2734, at para. 50). After trial, she acquitted the appellant of second degree murder and convicted him of manslaughter.
[6] The Crown appealed the acquittal. It argued that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in overriding its refusal to consent. The Court of Appeal of Quebec concluded that the Crown’s decision whether to consent to a judge-alone trial under s. 473(1) constitutes prosecutorial discretion, which is reviewable only for abuse of process. Finding that this high threshold was not met, the Court of Appeal declared the judge-alone trial a “nullity”, and ordered a new trial.
[7] Before this Court, the parties disagree on whether the Crown can challenge an order relating to the mode of trial in an appeal against an acquittal, and on the standard a trial judge must apply when deciding whether to order a judge-alone trial. On the first issue, I agree with the Crown that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. On the second issue, I conclude the Court of Appeal erred by requiring proof of an abuse of process.
[8] Our law recognizes two distinct paths for superior courts to review decisions taken by prosecutors, such as a refusal to consent under s. 473(1). First, superior courts have inherent jurisdiction, including to review core prosecutorial discretion for abuse of process and other prosecutorial decisions on a lower standard. Second, superior courts may order an “appropriate and just” remedy for a rights violation pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter, including in anticipation of probable future breaches. Such s. 24(1) remedies can have the effect of overriding a prosecutor’s decision.
[9] Either legal framework — inherent jurisdiction or s. 24(1) — could empower a superior court to order a judge-alone trial for an offence listed under s. 469. The Court of Appeal focused on whether inherent jurisdiction applied in this case, but did not consider s. 24(1) as a separate font of jurisdiction.
[10] Like the trial judge, I conclude that the Crown’s decision whether to consent to a judge-alone trial is not a decision engaging core prosecutorial discretion, and so could be reviewed by the trial judge under her inherent jurisdiction on a standard lower than abuse of process. I also conclude that the trial judge found that proceeding with a jury trial would likely lead to unreasonable delay, and so had jurisdiction to grant her order as a Charter remedy.
[11] Reading the trial judge’s reasons as a whole, I would review her decision as an application of remedial jurisdiction under s. 24(1). The trial judge found as fact that without intervention, the appellant’s Charter rights were at substantial risk. Given the pandemic emergency, she concluded that proceeding with a jury trial would likely breach the appellant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time, and so violate s. 11(b). I decline the Crown’s invitation to disturb this finding as speculative or to view it with hindsight. These were the early days of the pandemic, marked by uncertainty and isolation, before even the development of a vaccine. As my colleague Rowe J. points out, in 2020 there was an extreme public health crisis, and jury trials posed a grave health risk to jurors; proceeding with a jury trial under these circumstances would have burdened an already overtaxed justice system. Public health restrictions prevented large gatherings, to limit the grave risk of infection. Yet the jury selection process necessarily required gathering hundreds of people together indoors. Even if a jury could be selected, any infection amongst the jurors could derail the trial. With a second wave of infections approaching, there was sound reason to believe that a jury trial would not proceed in fall 2020, and for an indeterminate period thereafter. In this extraordinary situation, the trial judge’s findings of fact established an anticipated breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.
[12] In considering whether to override the Crown and order a judge-alone trial under s. 24(1) of the Charter, trial judges must consider “the sometimes complementary and sometimes opposing concerns of fairness to the individual, societal interests, and the integrity of the judicial system” (R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 69). The judge must weigh the importance of vindicating Charter rights and ensuring state compliance with the Charter against countervailing considerations, including the public value in jury trials and respect for the separation of powers.
[13] By ordering a judge-alone trial, the trial judge prevented a probable s. 11(b) breach and avoided a stay of proceedings, thus protecting the appellant’s rights while also respecting the Crown’s decision to prosecute the charge on its merits. Based on her findings of fact, I conclude that the order for a judge-alone trial was an appropriate and just s. 24(1) remedy. The Court of Appeal erred in ordering a new trial. I would allow the appeal. . R. v. Varennes
In R. v. Varennes (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada considered law that indictable offences should be tried by judge and jury, except where both defendant and Crown agree to judge-only trials [under CCC 469, 471 and 473 - Part XIV 'Jurisdiction']. The court allowed an appeal, here where the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new murder trial after the Crown refused to consent to a judge-only trial - finding two exceptions (Charter s.11(b) due to risk of COVID delay and inherent jurisdiction) to this statutory elections rule.
Here the court considers these Charter and inherent jurisdiction exceptions to this statutory judge-jury elections rule:B. The Trial Judge Had Jurisdiction To Order a Judge-Alone Trial
[37] Under ss. 471 and 473 of the Criminal Code, all trials for offences listed in s. 469, including murder, must take place in a superior court before a judge and jury, unless the accused and Attorney General consent to a trial by judge alone. Section 473(1) states:473 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, an accused charged with an offence listed in section 469 may, with the consent of the accused and the Attorney General, be tried without a jury by a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction. [38] The key question in this appeal is: on what basis can a superior court judge order a judge-alone trial for an offence listed in s. 469, notwithstanding the Attorney General’s refusal to consent?[2]
[39] There are two recognized routes through which a trial judge can override a prosecutorial decision. First, superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to “control the process of the court, prevent abuses of process, and ensure the machinery of the court functions in an orderly and effective manner” (R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 18; see also R. v. Kahsai, 2023 SCC 20, at para. 36). Courts have inherent jurisdiction to review any prosecutorial decision for abuse of process. For decisions falling outside the core of prosecutorial discretion, a court may be able to review on a wider basis (R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at para. 36). Second, judges have a constitutional duty to grant meaningful remedies in response to the violation of Charter rights. Courts can always review a prosecutor’s decision for compliance with the Charter (Anderson, at para. 45). Either framework — inherent jurisdiction or Charter — could allow a superior court to order a judge-alone trial in the circumstances of a given case (see, e.g., R. v. McGregor (1999), 1999 CanLII 2553 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 455 (C.A.)).
[40] My analysis continues as follows. First, I shall explain why the Attorney General’s decision under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code is not core prosecutorial discretion and therefore could be reviewed under a superior court’s inherent jurisdiction on a standard less than abuse of process. Second, I shall address how the Crown’s refusal to consent to a judge-alone trial can be overridden by a court using the framework for ordering remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter in anticipation of a rights violation. I end by applying that framework to the factual findings made by the trial judge.
(1) A Decision Under Section 473(1) Does Not Involve Core Prosecutorial Discretion
[41] The issue debated in this case — and at the appellate court level over three decades — is whether the Crown’s refusal to consent to a judge-alone trial under s. 473(1) lies within the core exclusive jurisdiction of the Attorney General and can only be reviewed under a court’s inherent jurisdiction to remedy an abuse of process. To resolve that debate, I turn to first principles and our jurisprudence.
(a) The Constitutional Role of the Attorney General
[42] The doctrine of core prosecutorial discretion derives from the Attorney General’s constitutional role as Chief Law Officer of the Crown (Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, at para. 45; Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 34). The Attorney General has exclusive constitutional responsibility to determine whether to bring the weight of the state to bear in criminal prosecutions and is the “first representative of the Sovereign in the courts, in whose name nearly all criminal proceedings are conducted” (J. L. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (1964), at p. 2; see also Wilkes v. The King (1768), Wilm. 322, 97 E.R. 123; Krieger, at para. 24; R. v. Power, 1994 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at pp. 621-23).
[43] The provincial Attorneys General act under the provinces’ responsibility under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 for the administration of justice (see, e.g., Act respecting the Ministère de la Justice, CQLR, c. M-19, s. 4; Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, s. 5). In Quebec, the legislature has delegated the prosecutorial aspect of the Chief Law Officer role to the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions, who serves “[u]nder the general authority” of the Attorney General of Quebec as their lawful deputy (Act respecting the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions, CQLR, c. D-9.1.1, s. 1; see also Godbout v. R., 2017 QCCA 569, at para. 13). Crown prosecutors — here the prosecutors of the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions — serve as agents of the Attorney General and bear the delegated role of the Chief Law Officer in individual prosecutions (Criminal Lawyers’ Association, at para. 37).
[44] The Attorneys General exercise their constitutional Chief Law Officer function independently of partisan considerations and make prosecutorial decisions without interference from their cabinet colleagues (see generally Krieger, at para. 30; Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, at para. 47). Individual Crown prosecutors must also consider the broader public interest throughout the conduct of criminal proceedings (R. v. Thursfield (1838), 8 Car. & P. 269, 173 E.R. 490; R. v. Puddick (1865), 4 F. & F. 497, 176 E.R. 662). In Canada, Rand J. famously explained the Crown’s responsibilities in Boucher v. The Queen, 1954 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1955] S.C.R. 16, at pp. 23-24:It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings. More recently, this Court has held that it is a principle of fundamental justice within s. 7 of the Charter that prosecutors must serve the public interest and not act “for the good of the government of the day” (R. v. Cawthorne, 2016 SCC 32, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 983, at paras. 26-28).[45] When a prosecutor exercises discretion, they are presumed to do so in good faith, consistent with their Boucher responsibilities (Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 95). To respect the separation of powers and prerogatives of the Attorney General, courts must adopt a posture of deference whenever reviewing a decision by a prosecutor or considering making an order that would have the effect of overriding a prosecutor’s decision.
(b) Core Prosecutorial Discretion
[46] Given the distinct constitutional role and responsibilities of the Attorney General as Chief Law Officer, this Court has recognized that certain decisions by Crown prosecutors, as their agents, must be immune from a court’s inherent judicial review jurisdiction except in cases of an abuse of process. These decisions lie within the inherent prosecutorial jurisdiction of the Attorney General and go to “the nature and extent” of the prosecution of criminal offences that come before the judge (Krieger, at para. 47). These decisions constitute “core prosecutorial discretion”.
[47] The use of the word “core” to qualify prosecutorial discretion does not imply that this is a narrow category (Anderson, at para. 41). Rather, core prosecutorial discretion encompasses prosecutorial decisions derived from the core constitutional authority inherent to the Attorney General (Krieger, at paras. 43 and 49). Anderson confirmed Krieger and the criteria that applied to such discretion. Although Anderson suggested that the use of the word “core” had caused some confusion, in my view it helpfully distinguishes discretionary decisions that engage the inherent jurisdiction of the Chief Law Officer from other discretionary decisions that prosecutors make in the conduct of proceedings. Indeed, this Court has continued to refer to “core prosecutorial discretion” since Anderson (see, e.g., Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 24, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 214, at para. 62, per Moldaver J.; R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, at para. 161, per Moldaver J.; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Clark, 2021 SCC 18, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 607, at paras. 126-30, per Côté J.). Parliament has codified some core prosecutorial decisions in statute (Anderson, at para. 44). But what qualifies these decisions as core prosecutorial discretion is not their statutory nature, but their connection to the Attorney General’s inherent constitutional function.
[48] In Krieger, this Court wrote that what unites instances of core prosecutorial discretion “is that they involve the ultimate decisions as to whether a prosecution should be brought, continued or ceased, and what the prosecution ought to be for” (para. 47 (emphasis in original); see also R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, at para. 30). Both Krieger and Anderson note that core prosecutorial discretionary decisions impact the “nature and extent” of the criminal proceedings. They confirm that such decisions do not encompass those that impact how the proceedings will be conducted (see, e.g., Anderson, at para. 60, citing R. v. Auclair, 2014 SCC 6, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 83). Rather, they involve decisions that fall outside the judiciary’s role in adjudicating matters on their merits. Anderson provides a list of examples of core prosecutorial discretion: whether to repudiate a plea agreement, to pursue a dangerous offender application, to prefer a direct indictment, to charge multiple offences, to negotiate a plea, to proceed summarily or by indictment, and to initiate an appeal (para. 44). Anderson also determined that a decision on whether to provide a notice that would increase penal jeopardy is an instance of core prosecutorial discretion (para. 63).
[49] What is common to these examples is that they directly impact the nature and extent of the criminal jeopardy to which the accused will be subjected. These decisions are within the core constitutional jurisdiction of the Attorney General acting as the Chief Law Officer. Judicial deference to these decisions therefore respects the separation of powers and the constitutional role of the Attorney General (Krieger, at paras. 45-46). It also has the effect of serving the public good (Miazga, at para. 47).
[50] While core prosecutorial discretion demands strong deference, it does not demand absolute immunity from review.
[51] This Court has long recognized that the actions of the executive are subject to judicial review. This principle is most often invoked in judicial review of the executive’s exercise of authority delegated by the legislature. But this Court has also held that the judiciary can review the executive’s exercise of its inherent constitutional authority and prerogatives and order remedies for arbitrary, abusive, or unconstitutional acts (R. v. Jewitt, 1985 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128, at pp. 131-37; Nelles v. Ontario, 1989 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Air Canada v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1986 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539, at p. 545; Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, at paras. 36-37).
[52] The abuse of process doctrine reflects the necessarily high threshold for the judiciary to invoke its inherent jurisdiction and intrude on the Attorney General’s core prosecutorial discretion.
[53] The doctrine of abuse of process applies in various fields of law and “engages the inherent power of the court to prevent misuse of its proceedings in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or would in some way bring the administration of justice into disrepute” (Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, at paras. 33-36). Courts must remedy an abuse of process because to allow trials to proceed in such circumstances “would tarnish the integrity of the court” (R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667).
[54] In the criminal law context, abuse of process targets egregious conduct that threatens an accused’s right to a fair trial or undermines the integrity of the justice system (R. v. Brunelle, 2024 SCC 3, at para. 27; R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 31). This Court has called the threshold for finding an abuse of process in a criminal case “notoriously high” and stated that “successful reliance upon the doctrine will be extremely rare” (Nur, at para. 94; R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316, at para. 42). That said, abuse of process can exist even absent prosecutorial misconduct. I agree with the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario that this Court has recognized abuses of process in situations of both improper intent and abusive effects (I.F., at paras. 12-13; see also R. v. Keyowski, 1988 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657; Babos, at para. 37).
[55] In sum, where the Attorneys General or their agents make decisions that directly affect the nature and extent of the criminal jeopardy a person may face, these constitute decisions of core prosecutorial discretion and a court may not interfere under its inherent jurisdiction except to remedy an abuse of process.
[56] In addition to decisions directly affecting the jeopardy of an accused, prosecutors make a wide variety of discretionary decisions every day that do not fall within core prosecutorial discretion. Krieger and Anderson recognized that prosecutors make decisions relating to “tactics or conduct before the court”, which cover a wide range of decisions within the proceedings, including which charges to prioritize for limited court dates, what witnesses to call, what questions to ask, and how to present an opening or closing address — decisions that do not directly change the criminal jeopardy an accused may face (Krieger, at para. 47; Anderson, at paras. 57-61; see also R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 751, at paras. 14 and 21). The term “tactics” does not mean that these discretionary decisions are unimportant. Rather, Krieger and Anderson used “tactics or conduct before the court” to reflect that these discretionary decisions do not attract the same separation of powers imperative as core prosecutorial discretion, since they do not tread on the core of the constitutional role of the Chief Law Officer.
[57] While courts may review or override non-core prosecutorial discretion on a less demanding standard than an abuse of process, deference will generally still be warranted (Anderson, at paras. 59-61). Like any litigant, the Crown will necessarily know many circumstances outside the purview of the trial judge. As made clear by this Court in Boucher, the Crown must use its knowledge to act in the public interest. And, as a practical matter, intrusive judicial oversight of prosecutorial decision making would grind the criminal justice system to a halt (Smythe v. The Queen, 1971 CanLII 831 (SCC), [1971] S.C.R. 680, at p. 686; R. v. Beare, 1988 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at pp. 410-11). Because these non-core decisions cover a broad range — from the everyday issues that form part of a litigant’s conduct of a trial to decisions authorized under statute — the standard for a judge to override a Crown decision will vary with the circumstances. The precise standard in a given case will depend on the nature of the Crown conduct, the presence or absence of statutory authority, the impact on trial fairness, and any other relevant interest (see, e.g., R. v. Cook, 1997 CanLII 392 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113, at paras. 61-62; R. v. Samaniego, 2022 SCC 9, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 71, at paras. 19-26; R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 36-37). As I shall explain, the fact that a non-core prosecutorial decision is made pursuant to statutory authority will require that deference feature prominently in the analysis.
(c) A Decision Under Section 473(1) of the Criminal Code Does Not Fall Within Core Prosecutorial Discretion
[58] This is a question of first instance for our Court. For at least 30 years, appellate courts have differed on whether a Crown’s decision to refuse to proceed by judge alone — under s. 473(1) or similar provisions — engages core prosecutorial discretion, and on which standard to apply when reviewing the decision. Some cases have clearly characterized a Crown’s refusal to consent as core prosecutorial discretion (R. v. E. (L.) (1994), 1994 CanLII 1785 (ON CA), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 228 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ng, 2003 ABCA 1, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 349; R. v. Effert, 2011 ABCA 134, 276 C.C.C. (3d) 487; R. v. Matthews, 2022 ABCA 115, 41 Alta. L.R. (7th) 30; Lufiau (2022)). Others have not characterized the decision and have simply stated that the threshold for overriding the Crown’s decision will be high (R. v. Khan, 2007 ONCA 779, 230 O.A.C. 179, at paras. 13-16; R. v. Saleh, 2013 ONCA 742, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 431). Still others have held that the decision falls outside of core prosecutorial discretion altogether (R. v. R. (J.S.), 2012 ONCA 568, 112 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 127; St-Pierre v. R., 2016 QCCA 545, at para. 25). All have recognized that the standard is demanding.
[59] In this case, the Court of Appeal followed the line of jurisprudence that characterized the Crown’s refusal to consent to a judge-alone trial as core prosecutorial discretion. The court then asked whether the decision was an abuse of process because of its direct or anticipated effects on the right of the accused (C.A. reasons, at para. 27). It concluded that the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the decision as falling outside of core prosecutorial discretion and by using a broader standard of review than abuse of process (para. 24).
[60] With respect, I disagree. A decision under s. 473(1) affects the identity of the fact finder and the mode of trial. It does not impact the nature and extent of the criminal jeopardy facing the accused. It relates to how the proceedings will be conducted and not to whether a prosecution will be brought, or what the prosecution will be for. While the jury system is obviously a key feature of our criminal justice system, a trial by judge alone or a trial by judge and jury are two comparable routes to a fair trial of the charges laid by the prosecutor. As such, the Attorney General’s decision under s. 473(1) does not engage their core, inherent constitutional role as Chief Law Officer of the Crown.
[61] However, the Attorney General’s decision is made pursuant to statute, which engages the separation of powers imperative of parliamentary sovereignty (Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26, at para. 49). Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to make policy decisions relating to criminal procedure (Criminal Lawyers’ Association, at para. 28; Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(27)). Courts must be respectful of Parliament’s legislative decision, made pursuant to its constitutional authority, to vest these responsibilities in prosecutors and the accused rather than the courts.
[62] This said, courts have a constitutional duty to review the executive’s exercise of delegated authority for legality and compliance with the Constitution (Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v. Lafontaine (Village), 1991 CanLII 82 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 326, at p. 360; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121, at p. 140). Further, statutes cannot abrogate the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court, which includes jurisdiction to ensure that trials operate fairly and efficiently (Reference re Code of Civil Procedure (Que.), art. 35, 2021 SCC 27, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 291, at paras. 65 and 68, per Côté and Martin JJ., at paras. 232 and 234, per Wagner C.J., and at para. 301, per Abella J.). At a minimum, courts can still review decisions taken by prosecutors under delegated statutory authority for abuse of process.
[63] Here, Parliament determined that the mode of trial would be judge and jury, unless both the accused and the Attorney General consent to judge alone. It is not appropriate in this case to decide generally how a superior court, acting under its inherent jurisdiction, should approach trial fairness when faced with a statutory decision by the Crown that does not fall within the core of prosecutorial discretion. The parties and interveners focused their arguments on whether s. 473(1) engaged core prosecutorial discretion. The Crown made no submissions on what standard to apply if the decision fell outside the core. The appellant relied on the trial judge’s selection of “unfair or unreasonable” as the basis to override the decision.
[64] I need not decide what precise standard would be required for a court to review, under inherent jurisdiction, such a non-core prosecutorial decision made pursuant to statute, in the absence of full argument from the parties, given that the remedial jurisdiction under the Charter also applies in this case.
[65] In addition to inherent jurisdiction, the appellant invoked s. 24(1) of the Charter in his motion. The trial judge’s reasons for ordering a judge-alone trial related primarily to the risk of unreasonable delay.
[66] Delay that does not constitute an abuse of process can still violate s. 11(b) of the Charter. A trial judge’s discretion to remedy unreasonable delay under s. 24(1) of the Charter is therefore broader than it is under inherent jurisdiction (see generally R. v. Rahey, 1987 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, at pp. 635-36, per La Forest J.; Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 220, at paras. 45-49). I thus turn now to the framework for a trial judge’s remedial jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter. . Arapakota v. Imex Systems Inc. [dismissal for delay of an application]
In Arapakota v. Imex Systems Inc. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered on appeal dismissing an application for delay, here "relying on the Superior Court’s inherent jurisdiction". I note that RCP R48.14 has express provisions for dismissal for delay of actions, but not applications - thus the need to rely on the court's inherent jurisdiction:D. THE LEGAL TEST ON A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR DELAY
[11] There is an inherent right of the court to dismiss a proceeding for delay. In Marché D’Alimentation Denis Thériault Ltée v. Giant Tiger Stores Limited, 2007 ONCA 695, 87 O.R. (3d) 660, at para. 24, Sharpe J.A. for the court held that:A court has inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, which “includes the discretionary power to dismiss an action for delay.” … “The power of a superior court to strike a matter for want of prosecution does not hinge on the niceties of the wording of the rules, but rather flows from the inherent power of the court to prevent an abuse of its own process.” In at least two cases, this court has characterized lengthy, unexplained delays as “an abuse of the court's process”. [Citations omitted.] See also Susin v. Baker and Baker, 2004 CanLII 12392 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7, leave to appeal refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 164; and Convay v. Marsulex Inc., 2002 CanLII 8446 (Ont. C.A.).
[12] This is true whether the proceeding is commenced as an action or an application. Otherwise, there would be no mechanism to dismiss an application for delay: see Gilmour v. Estate of Charles Wayne West, 2018 ONSC 2130, at paras. 46-48.
[13] An order dismissing a proceeding for delay will be justified where the delay is inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial to the respondents in that it gives rise to a substantial risk that a fair determination of the issues will not be possible: Langenecker v. Sauvé, 2011 ONCA 803, 286 O.A.C. 268, at paras. 4-7.
[14] “The inordinance of the delay is measured simply by reference to the length of time from the commencement of the proceeding to the motion to dismiss ... Memories fade and fail, witnesses become unavailable, and documents and other potential exhibits are lost. The longer the delay, the stronger the inference of prejudice to the defence case flowing from that delay”: Langenecker, at paras. 8-11. Accordingly, inordinate delay generates a presumption of prejudice: Langenecker, at para. 23.
[15] The motion judge’s order to dismiss an Application for delay is a discretionary order that is entitled to deference. The order will not be interfered with unless the motion judge exercised his or her discretion unreasonably or acted on a wrong principle: Ali v. Fruci, 2014 ONCA 596, 122 O.R. (3d) 517, at para. 10.
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G. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
[22] We are satisfied that the motion judge made no error in deciding that there was inordinate delay as:a. The Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 provide for the administrative dismissal of actions that have not been set down for trial after five years, and these proceedings were brought by way of application, which “is expected to be a more expeditious avenue than an action” and procedures are more streamlined;
b. This matter was brought on the Commercial List, the very purpose of which is to “expedite the hearing and determination of matters involving issues of commercial law”: Deutsche Postbank AG v. Kosmayer, 2019 ONSC 6997, at para. 21 (quoting from the Commercial List Practice Direction), aff’d 2020 ONCA 410;
c. The appellants themselves argued before the motion judge that the matter “will not take a long time to resolve” and is not unduly complicated, such that it should and could have been resolved early; and
d. The motion judge noted that the Application “was first scheduled to be heard on October 25, 2018, just a few months after it commenced. A new hearing date could have been readily obtained after the adjournment of this hearing date. This was not done. Instead, [almost five years] passed without any activity.” [23] We are also satisfied that the motion judge made no error in concluding that the delay is inexcusable as:a. Mr. Arapakota maintains he periodically informed the respondents that he intended to proceed with the Application, but took no steps to advance the litigation;
b. Mr. Arapakota admitted that the delay in moving the Application forward was mainly caused by Mr. Arapakota focussing on other litigation;
c. Though Mr. Arapakota claims the appellants have been self represented since 2019, he filed no notice of intention to act in person until June 27, 2022; and
d. Contrary to Mr. Arapakota’s submission, COVID-19 was not really a factor in the context of this nearly-five-year delay in moving the matter forward, as the Commercial List was shut down for only a very short time. [24] Having drawn the conclusion that there was inordinate delay and that the delay was inexcusable, the motion judge properly noted that there was a presumption of prejudice that a fair hearing would no longer be possible if the matter proceeded: see Ticchiarelli v. Ticchiarelli, 2017 ONCA 1, at paras. 28, 32. . His Majesty the King in right of Ontario v. Dell
In His Majesty the King in right of Ontario v. Dell (Div Court, 2023) the Divisional Court considered whether the court could look to it's 'inherent jurisdiction' to justify orders which were issued prior to a statutory 'leave to sue' requirement (it couldn't):(2) Inherent Jurisdiction
[55] All agree that the scope of inherent jurisdiction does not extend to making orders that contravene a statute. The court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters that are regulated by statute, “so long as the court can do so without contravening any statutory provision”: R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, at para. 32 (emphasis in Caron); Stephen Francis Podgurski (Re), 2020 ONSC 2552, at para. 69.
[56] It is therefore unnecessary to address this issue. The Superior Court’s inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to contravene the automatic stay in s. 17 of the Act. . Turmel v. Canada (Attorney General)
In Turmel v. Canada (Attorney General) (Fed CA, 2023) the Federal Court of Appeal considered (and dismissed) an appeal from a frivolous litigant declaration order [under s.40 FCA], here with supplementary terms regarding outstanding cost orders and "aiding or abetting others to initiate proceedings before that Court". In this quote the court endorses for this purpose a reliance on the 'plenary jurisdiction' of the statutory (not s.96 constitutional) Federal Court of Appeal:[12] Respecting the additional measures imposed on the appellant, the Application Judge correctly pointed out that the Federal Court has “plenary jurisdiction to impose additional requirements as may be necessary to prevent abuses of process” and that some litigants may require different measures and restrictions, including safeguards to “discourage them from finding other ways to continue their vexatious conduct” (Decision at paras. 49–50).
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