Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Criminal - Reasons for Decision

. R. v. R.L.

In R. v. R.L. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a Crown appeal, here from an acquittal for sexual assault.

The court considers inadequate reasons for decision, here in this Crown criminal appeal context:

[3] The legal requirements for sufficiency of reasons are well-established. Poor reasons, in themselves, do not justify appellate intervention. Appellate intervention is only warranted where the insufficiency of reasons prevents meaningful appellate review: Sheppard, at paras. 25-26, 28, and 55; R.E.M., at para. 15; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 70, 74-75. An appellate court must take a functional approach to the sufficiency of reasons, and review a trial judge’s reasons in the context of the record and the live issues at trial: R.E.M., at paras. 16, 35; G.F., at paras. 69-70. In short, to be sufficient, reasons must make clear what was decided and why, and the logical connection between the two: R.E.M., at paras. 17-18.

[4] The requirement of sufficient reasons applies to a Crown appeal from an acquittal. However, unlike the accused’s right of appeal from conviction, the Crown’s right of appeal is limited to questions of law alone: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 676(1)(a). Whether a trial judge’s reasons acquitting an accused are sufficient must be assessed in light of the Crown’s limited right of appeal: R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, at para. 21. In the words of Binnie J. in Walker, at para. 2:

Caution must be taken to avoid seizing on perceived deficiencies in a trial judge’s reasons for acquittal to create a ground of “unreasonable acquittal” which is not open to the court under the provisions of the Criminal Code[.]

[5] Because of the Crown’s burden to prove the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, an acquittal, unlike a conviction, can be based on an absence of evidence or on a trial judge concluding that one or more elements of the offence were not proven to the criminal standard: Walker, at para. 22; R. v. Aiken, 2021 ONCA 298, 155 O.R. (3d) 413, at paras. 43-44. In addition, in a trial that turns on credibility, like this one, a reasonable doubt can arise when the trial judge is unable to resolve conflicting evidence and does not know who to believe: R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, at pp. 757-58; R. v. Challice (1979), 1979 CanLII 2969 (ON CA), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 546 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 556-57. In the context of a Crown appeal from an acquittal, reasons will be insufficient if they fail to explain the basis for the trial judge being left with a reasonable doubt.

[6] Having considered the trial judge’s reasons in the context of the evidence and live issues in this trial, we are not persuaded that the trial judge’s reasons are insufficient. The reasons meet the requirements set out in R.E.M. and Sheppard.

....

[14] The trial judge’s reasons could have been clearer. She gave them orally and they are relatively brief. But they are sufficient to understand why she was left with a reasonable doubt and to permit appellate review. The closing words of Binnie J. in Walker, at para. 27, are equally applicable here: “While the trial judge’s reasons, delivered orally, fell well short of the ideal, that is not the applicable standard. They were not so inadequate that the Crown’s limited right of appeal was impaired.”

. R. v. Sheppard

In R. v. Sheppard (SCC, 2025) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed a Crown appeal, this from an Alberta CA criminal sentence variation for jury convictions for "sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching".

Here the court re-considers principles applicable to drafting criminal reasons for decision:

(a) Governing Principles

[44] Sentencing judges are required to provide reasons for sentence (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 726.2). This Court has repeatedly emphasized that appellate courts are to review those reasons functionally and contextually (R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (“Sheppard 2002”); R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 68-69; R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 19; Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, at para. 101; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 15; R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 15).

[45] Reviewing reasons functionally means assessing whether they are sufficient not in the abstract, but in relation to the fundamental purposes that reasons serve (Sheppard 2002, at para. 42). Those purposes are to hold judges accountable to the public, to provide an intelligible result to the parties, and to enable effective appellate review (paras. 15, 42 and 55; G.F., at para. 68). What is necessary to achieve those purposes will depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the issues that were in dispute (G.F., at para. 68; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 31).

[46] Under a contextual approach, “[t]he foundations of the judge’s decision must be discernable, when looked at in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the history of how the trial unfolded” (R.E.M., at para. 17). As this Court explained in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, “[i]n sentencing, as with any decision, the reasons must, when read in conjunction with the record, show why the judge reached a particular result” (para. 39; see generally R.E.M., at para. 37). Sentencing reasons must also be read and understood in conjunction with the reasons for conviction or, in the case of a jury trial, the verdict and the essential facts it implies.

[47] On this approach, an appellate court may intervene only if the reasons are legally or factually insufficient or if they are so muddled that meaningful appellate review is impossible (G.F., at paras. 71 and 108; Sheppard 2002, at paras. 28 and 46; R.E.M., at para. 17). Legal sufficiency requires that the aggrieved party be able to understand the legal basis of the decision in order to meaningfully exercise any right of appeal (G.F., at para. 74; Sheppard 2002, at paras. 64-66). However, it does not demand that the sentencing judge expound on features of the criminal law that are uncontroversial in the context of the case. Sentencing judges are presumed to know the basic principles of criminal law at issue in the case (R.E.M., at para. 45). Factual sufficiency requires that the factual basis for the decision be discernible, even if articulated unartfully (G.F., at para. 71; Sheppard 2002, at para. 55).

[48] The functional and contextual approach rejects a fine parsing of reasons in search of error (R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 13 and 33). In G.F., Karakatsanis J. expressed concern that some appellate courts continue to parse reasons, often in a manner that attacks the trial judge’s credibility findings:

Despite this Court’s clear guidance in the 19 years since Sheppard to review reasons functionally and contextually, we continue to encounter appellate court decisions that scrutinize the text of trial reasons in a search for error, particularly in sexual assault cases, where safe convictions after fair trials are being overturned not on the basis of legal error but on the basis of parsing imperfect or summary expression on the part of the trial judge. Frequently, it is the findings of credibility that are challenged. [para. 76]

[49] I echo my colleague’s concern, which is no less salient in the context of sentence appeals. On a sentence appeal, the factual findings and basic credibility determinations that are implied by the verdict are not up for debate. The sentencing judge may be called upon to make further findings of fact or credibility determinations that relate only to issues on sentencing (Criminal Code, s. 724). While the basis for those further findings must be discernible upon a contextual review of the record, the credibility findings themselves are owed “particular” deference on appeal (G.F., at para. 81; see also Dinardo, at para. 26).

[50] The foregoing principles guide appellate courts in determining whether reasons are insufficient, which is an error in principle (Nahanee, at para. 59(ii)). Under the Lacasse framework, however, the appellant must not only identify an error in principle but must also show that the error impacted the sentence. In my view, the “impact” criterion dovetails with the functional approach to reviewing the sufficiency of reasons: appellate intervention is permitted only when a deficiency renders the sentence incomprehensible or appellate review impossible. When this is the case, the appellate court is justified in assuming that the deficiency impacted the sentence, since the inherent nature of insufficient reasons is that they make the presence of faulty reasoning impossible to prove.

. Tobin (Re)

In Tobin (Re) (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an NCR appeal.

Here the court cited a case that found an "it was an error for the Board to issue a disposition that fails to reflect its reasons”:

[17] In Re Le Feuvre, 2020 ONCA 822, at para. 12, this court found that “it was an error for the Board to issue a disposition that fails to reflect its reasons.” We find that the Board made a similar error in this case. The fact that Mr. Tobin is obligated to reside at the hospital when his current condition would allow him to live in some form of supervised community housing is at least in part due to the hospital’s error. The hospital’s obligation to remedy this situation should be reflected in the Board’s disposition rather than simply a strong suggestion to act with due diligence in the reasons. Accordingly, we would amend the disposition to include the following term: “The hospital is to exercise all due diligence in pursuing community housing for Mr. Tobin”.

. R. v. S.M.

In R. v. S.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here from a "conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial".

The court considers the trial judge's reasons, and was critical of their adequacy where there were clear differences in the opposing party's evidence:

[14] Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently emphasized that appellate courts are to take a “functional and contextual reading of a trial judge’s reasons when those reasons are alleged to be insufficient.” As a result, “[appellate courts] must assess whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review” (citations omitted). See R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 69, 81. In this case, looking at the reasons as a whole and the evidence before the trial judge, we are satisfied that the reasons were sufficient to “aptly demonstrate the rationale behind her conclusions on credibility and reasonable doubt.” See Gagnon, at para. 18.

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[25] We nevertheless acknowledge that the trial judge’s analysis of the complainant’s credibility was not ideal. While she elaborated clear and cogent explanations for rejecting the appellant’s evidence and justified her credibility and reliability findings in this regard, her direct findings on the complainant’s credibility were limited to a few lines. That said, while it would have been preferable for the trial judge to further elaborate her credibility findings regarding the complainant, the reasons read in context demonstrate that she was aware of and “grappled with the critical issues, including contradictory evidence” between the witnesses. See Polemidiotis, at para. 30, citing R.E.M., at paras. 55-57. Between the two “starkly different versions of events”, the trial judge would have known that “the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s and appellant’s accounts [were] fundamental to the resolution of the issues at trial.” See R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, 162 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 28. It is evident that the trial judge had assessed the complainant’s credibility as part of the totality of the evidence. This court cannot intervene simply because we would have preferred the trial court to provide a more fulsome explanation for her acceptance of the complainant’s evidence. See G.F., at para. 76; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 26; R. v. Griffin, 2023 ONCA 559, 429 C.C.C. (3d) 231, at paras. 37-38.

. R. v. J.C.

In R. v. J.C. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a criminal dangerous offender designation appeal.

Here the court considers the adequacy of criminal reasons:

[27] An appeal lies from the judgment, not the reasons for judgment. Poor articulation of reasons, by itself, does not provide a ground for appellate intervention, which is only justified when it is not possible to discern a logical connection between the verdict and the basis for the verdict, thereby foreclosing meaningful appellate review: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 25-26, 28; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 25; and R. v. H.S.B., 2008 SCC 52, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 32, at para. 2.

[28] Moreover, appellate review of the sufficiency of reasons must proceed on the basis of a deferential, functional approach that requires reading the reasons in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the live issues at trial: R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 17, 55.

. R. v. S.M.

In R. v. S.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal against a conviction for sexual assault.

Here the court considers the adequacy of reasons for decision:

[23] Trial judges are presumed to know the law, and are not required to recite W.(D.) mechanically. The question is whether the reasons, read as a whole, demonstrate that the trial judge understood and properly applied the threshold of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Flynn, 2010 ONCA 424, at para. 5; R. v. Karas (2006), 2006 CanLII 19326 (ON CA), 211 O.A.C. 260, at paras. 5-6.

. R. v. Polemidiotis

In R. v. Polemidiotis (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here against convictions for sexual assault.

Here the court considers reasons for decision in a criminal context:

[29] Reasons for judgment will be insufficient where they prevent meaningful appellate review. An appellate court must take a functional and contextual approach to reviewing a trial judge’s reasons. The issue on appeal is whether the reasons for judgment, read as a whole and in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why in a manner that permits effective appellate review: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 25, 28; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 69; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 52-53.

[30] Trial judges are not required to address in their reasons all issues raised or all evidence presented at trial. However, the reasons must demonstrate that the trial judge understood and grappled with the critical issues, including contradictory evidence: R.E.M., at paras. 55-57.

. R. v. Marchant

In R. v. Marchant (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here in an interesting case of 'failure to provide the necessaries of life' [CCC s.215] by paramedic first responders.

Here the court considered the adequacy of the trial reasons for decision:

The Reasons are Sufficient and Not Contradictory

[74] A functional and contextual approach must be taken to determining the adequacy of reasons for judgment: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 28-33; R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 19; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 15. The question is whether the reasons, when read in context and as a whole, and in light of the issues advanced at trial, explain why the trial judge decided as they did: R.E.M., at para. 17; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 31. Approaching the reasons in this way in this case leaves no question as to why the trial judge decided as he did.

. R. v. N.C.

In R. v. N.C. (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal found that a conviction could not be supported where "(a)t no point in his reasons did the trial judge make any finding that the Crown had proven mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt":

[10] We also agree with the appellant’s second submission that the trial judge erred by failing to turn his mind to the mens rea requirement of the offence. At no point in his reasons did the trial judge make any finding that the Crown had proven mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the trial judge stated the following at the end of his reasons:

In accordance with the law that I recited earlier, the court's acceptance of the complainant's testimony on this point, means that the actus reus of a sexual assault has been made out. The Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, [N.C.], committed a sexual assault against [E.K.]. He is found guilty of the offence of sexual assault, contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code. [Emphasis added.]

[11] Having concluded that the actus reus of the offence had been committed, the trial judge was required to turn his mind to whether the necessary mental state – knowing of or being wilfully blind or reckless as to lack of consent – had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While we acknowledge that a trial judge is under no obligation, in reasons for judgment, to expound on basic criminal law principles, that does not mean that trial judges are relieved from their obligation to provide reasons that permit appellate review. We are of the view that these reasons do not meet that standard. As we read the record, although defence counsel acknowledged the case was about the complainant’s “consent”, he did not expressly concede that the appellant had knowledge of a lack of consent. Respectfully, the trial judge did not grapple with the entirety of the appellant’s evidence nor did he make an explicit finding that there was no air of reality to a mistake of fact defence. The reasons do not review important aspects of what the appellant stated he did to ascertain consent from the complainant, including asking her questions, nor do the reasons deal with the evidence of what the appellant testified was behaviour and communication that he perceived to be consent.