Simon's Megalomaniacal Legal Resources

Criminal - Reasons for Decision

. R. v. S.M.

In R. v. S.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here from a "conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial".

The court considers the trial judge's reasons, and was critical of their adequacy where there were clear differences in the opposing party's evidence:

[14] Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently emphasized that appellate courts are to take a “functional and contextual reading of a trial judge’s reasons when those reasons are alleged to be insufficient.” As a result, “[appellate courts] must assess whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why they decided that way in a manner that permits effective appellate review” (citations omitted). See R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at paras. 69, 81. In this case, looking at the reasons as a whole and the evidence before the trial judge, we are satisfied that the reasons were sufficient to “aptly demonstrate the rationale behind her conclusions on credibility and reasonable doubt.” See Gagnon, at para. 18.

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[25] We nevertheless acknowledge that the trial judge’s analysis of the complainant’s credibility was not ideal. While she elaborated clear and cogent explanations for rejecting the appellant’s evidence and justified her credibility and reliability findings in this regard, her direct findings on the complainant’s credibility were limited to a few lines. That said, while it would have been preferable for the trial judge to further elaborate her credibility findings regarding the complainant, the reasons read in context demonstrate that she was aware of and “grappled with the critical issues, including contradictory evidence” between the witnesses. See Polemidiotis, at para. 30, citing R.E.M., at paras. 55-57. Between the two “starkly different versions of events”, the trial judge would have known that “the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s and appellant’s accounts [were] fundamental to the resolution of the issues at trial.” See R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, 162 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 28. It is evident that the trial judge had assessed the complainant’s credibility as part of the totality of the evidence. This court cannot intervene simply because we would have preferred the trial court to provide a more fulsome explanation for her acceptance of the complainant’s evidence. See G.F., at para. 76; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 26; R. v. Griffin, 2023 ONCA 559, 429 C.C.C. (3d) 231, at paras. 37-38.

. R. v. J.C.

In R. v. J.C. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a criminal dangerous offender designation appeal.

Here the court considers the adequacy of criminal reasons:

[27] An appeal lies from the judgment, not the reasons for judgment. Poor articulation of reasons, by itself, does not provide a ground for appellate intervention, which is only justified when it is not possible to discern a logical connection between the verdict and the basis for the verdict, thereby foreclosing meaningful appellate review: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 25-26, 28; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 25; and R. v. H.S.B., 2008 SCC 52, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 32, at para. 2.

[28] Moreover, appellate review of the sufficiency of reasons must proceed on the basis of a deferential, functional approach that requires reading the reasons in the context of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the live issues at trial: R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 17, 55.

. R. v. S.M.

In R. v. S.M. (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal against a conviction for sexual assault.

Here the court considers the adequacy of reasons for decision:

[23] Trial judges are presumed to know the law, and are not required to recite W.(D.) mechanically. The question is whether the reasons, read as a whole, demonstrate that the trial judge understood and properly applied the threshold of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Flynn, 2010 ONCA 424, at para. 5; R. v. Karas (2006), 2006 CanLII 19326 (ON CA), 211 O.A.C. 260, at paras. 5-6.

. R. v. Polemidiotis

In R. v. Polemidiotis (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here against convictions for sexual assault.

Here the court considers reasons for decision in a criminal context:

[29] Reasons for judgment will be insufficient where they prevent meaningful appellate review. An appellate court must take a functional and contextual approach to reviewing a trial judge’s reasons. The issue on appeal is whether the reasons for judgment, read as a whole and in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why in a manner that permits effective appellate review: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 25, 28; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para. 69; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 52-53.

[30] Trial judges are not required to address in their reasons all issues raised or all evidence presented at trial. However, the reasons must demonstrate that the trial judge understood and grappled with the critical issues, including contradictory evidence: R.E.M., at paras. 55-57.

. R. v. Marchant

In R. v. Marchant (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a criminal appeal, here in an interesting case of 'failure to provide the necessaries of life' [CCC s.215] by paramedic first responders.

Here the court considered the adequacy of the trial reasons for decision:

The Reasons are Sufficient and Not Contradictory

[74] A functional and contextual approach must be taken to determining the adequacy of reasons for judgment: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 28-33; R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 19; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 15. The question is whether the reasons, when read in context and as a whole, and in light of the issues advanced at trial, explain why the trial judge decided as they did: R.E.M., at para. 17; R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 31. Approaching the reasons in this way in this case leaves no question as to why the trial judge decided as he did.

. R. v. N.C.

In R. v. N.C. (Ont CA, 2024) the Ontario Court of Appeal found that a conviction could not be supported where "(a)t no point in his reasons did the trial judge make any finding that the Crown had proven mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt":

[10] We also agree with the appellant’s second submission that the trial judge erred by failing to turn his mind to the mens rea requirement of the offence. At no point in his reasons did the trial judge make any finding that the Crown had proven mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the trial judge stated the following at the end of his reasons:

In accordance with the law that I recited earlier, the court's acceptance of the complainant's testimony on this point, means that the actus reus of a sexual assault has been made out. The Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, [N.C.], committed a sexual assault against [E.K.]. He is found guilty of the offence of sexual assault, contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code. [Emphasis added.]

[11] Having concluded that the actus reus of the offence had been committed, the trial judge was required to turn his mind to whether the necessary mental state – knowing of or being wilfully blind or reckless as to lack of consent – had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While we acknowledge that a trial judge is under no obligation, in reasons for judgment, to expound on basic criminal law principles, that does not mean that trial judges are relieved from their obligation to provide reasons that permit appellate review. We are of the view that these reasons do not meet that standard. As we read the record, although defence counsel acknowledged the case was about the complainant’s “consent”, he did not expressly concede that the appellant had knowledge of a lack of consent. Respectfully, the trial judge did not grapple with the entirety of the appellant’s evidence nor did he make an explicit finding that there was no air of reality to a mistake of fact defence. The reasons do not review important aspects of what the appellant stated he did to ascertain consent from the complainant, including asking her questions, nor do the reasons deal with the evidence of what the appellant testified was behaviour and communication that he perceived to be consent.