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Criminal - Searches - Strip Searches. R. v. Arana
In R. v. Arana (Ont CA, 2026) the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a defendant's criminal appeal, here brought against a trial level application holding that - despite "multiple breaches of the appellant’s rights under Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" - evidence should not be excluded under Charter s.24(2).
The court considers the Charter s.24(2) 'Grant' analysis, here afresh by the appeal court and this where a strip search was central:[32] There were, as the trial judge found, three breaches: the s. 10(b) implementation breach, the s. 10(b) failure to hold off questioning breach; and the s. 8 unreasonable search breach arising from the level 3 strip search. As the trial judge stated, these breaches must be assessed for the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on the appellant’s Charter rights, and society’s interest in the adjudication of the offences on the merits.
[33] The first branch of the Grant test assesses the culpability of the state conduct. As the trial judge found, the s. 10(b) implementation breach was not deliberate. However, it was entirely avoidable and was not justified by officer safety or some other pressing reason. Although the trial judge found the 30 minute delay at the house to fall at the less serious end of the spectrum, when the additional hour – including the wait in the sallyport and delay associated with the strip search – is added in, the breach moves towards the more serious end of the spectrum.
[34] However, the seriousness of the s. 10(b) breaches is not necessarily assessed solely, or even primarily, on the quantification of the delay. The first branch of the Grant test analyzes whether the admission of the evidence would communicate that the courts “effectively condone state deviation from the rule of law by failing to dissociate themselves from the fruits of that unlawful conduct”: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 72.
[35] In this case, a relevant consideration is that the delay in access to counsel was the result of prioritizing an illegal strip search. The strip search was unjustified and, consequently, so was delaying access to counsel to facilitate it. That this breach was the result of an institutional routine practice inconsistent with longstanding case law applying s. 8 and s. 10(b) brings the state conduct closer to bad faith and increases its seriousness.
[36] With respect to the seriousness of the failure to hold off questioning, the trial judge appropriately found the seriousness to be moderate. After the appellant requested counsel, there was no urgency or danger that justified further questioning by experienced police officers who ought to have known better.
[37] With respect to the strip search itself, it was unjustified and intrusive. As the trial judge acknowledged, strip searches are highly intrusive, humiliating, and degrading: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 83. As the evidence at trial showed, a subsequent policy change surrounding level 3 searches was necessary because such searches were being conducted as a matter of routine for drug offences. Adherence to a practice that runs against the Supreme Court’s finding in Golden, at para. 90, that strip searches “cannot be carried out simply as a matter of routine policy” cannot be a mitigating factor. Mere negligence in failing to meet Charter standards does not demonstrate a “good faith” error: R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 SCR 692, at para. 143. Indeed, this court has found the wrongful belief that strip searches could be routinely conducted of every male arrested for any kind of drug offences to be an exacerbating factor: R. v. Mohammed, 2020 ONCA 9, at para. 16.
[38] In this case, the totality of the breaches must be considered moderately serious. This supports excluding the cocaine seized from the safe.
[39] As to the second Grant factor, the impact of the breaches on the appellant was moderate. This analysis is centered on the “interests engaged by the infringed right” and “[t]he more serious the incursion on these interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”: Grant, at para. 77. This weighs in favour of exclusion. Even though they were not relied on by the Crown at trial, he made self-incriminatory statements that he might not have made had he been cautioned and reminded of his right to counsel. Instead, he told the police there would be cocaine in the basement and, when questioned again later, told them where to find a key to open the safe.
[40] This is not mitigated by the fact that obtaining the key was fairly inconsequential. It is true, as the trial judge noted, that the cocaine would have been discovered in the exercise of the search warrant even without the statements and the provision of the location of the key: the safe was plastic and could have been opened without much effort without it. But the discoverability of the evidence does not negate the indignity and intrusiveness of the unwarranted strip search, the delay in speaking to counsel, and being conscripted into furnishing evidence against himself. This factor weighs in favour of the exclusion of evidence.
[41] The public interest in adjudication weighs in favour of the admission of the evidence. The appellant was found in possession of 1 kg of cocaine. This is a very significant quantity, suggesting that the appellant is a mid-level drug dealer. There is a high interest in an adjudication on the merits. Without the evidence, there can be no adjudication and an acquittal must follow.
[42] The Grant test is a structured analysis intended to lead to a conclusion about whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Grant, at para. 71. This is a very serious offence, and the evidence is reliable and necessary for a conviction. Nevertheless, on balance, the cumulation of relatively serious Charter breaches in this case, particularly breaches of an institutional nature, requires a remedy. . R. v. Samuels
In R. v. Samuels (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's criminal appeal, here brought against convictions for "two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking".
Here the court considered 'strip searches':[44] Both parties accept the definition of strip search in Golden, at para. 47: “the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person’s private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments.”
[45] The parties disagree on how it should be applied.
(1) The parties’ positions
[46] The appellant argues that any search that involves a rearrangement of clothing that exposes someone’s undergarments is a strip search. He contends that the two searches at the scene were therefore strip searches: the first, conducted by P.C. Tillsley involved moving clothing to see the waistband of the appellant’s underwear where the appellant had told P.C. Tillsley that a plastic baggie was located, and the second, conducted by P.C. Wilson and P.C. Tillsley involved removing the appellant’s joggers so that his jeans could be searched – the jeans being an undergarment since there had been a layer of clothing (the joggers) over them.
[47] The appellant also argues that the search in the booking area of the police station was a strip search because it involved S.C. Loschan rearranging the appellant’s clothes, exposing his underwear, and examining the waistband of his jeans which would give a view of what was under them. The appellant further submits that this search was conducted in a busy area of the police station in the view of multiple officers, including a female officer.
[48] The Crown disputes the appellant’s interpretation that each element of the definition in Golden is considered separately, and its corollary that rearranging clothing to expose any part of an undergarment is, in all circumstances, a strip search. The Crown argues that only visual inspections of undergarments that cover a private area such as genitals, buttocks, or female breasts constitute strip searches; the searches at the scene or in the booking area do not therefore qualify as strip searches.
(2) Discussion
[49] I prefer the Crown’s approach to the definition of a strip search in Golden to that advanced by the appellant. It better comports with the reasoning in Golden and the entire definition, considered as a whole.
[50] In Golden, the majority stressed the high standard that must be met before a strip search will be considered to be reasonable.[2] The common law authorizes a search incident to arrest, consisting of a “frisk” or “pat-down” search, where the police have reasonable and probable grounds to effect the arrest, the objective of the search is to guarantee safety of the accused or police (for example by the discovery of a weapon), to prevent escape, or to find evidence related to the arrest, and the search is not conducted in an abusive fashion: Golden, at paras. 44,75. But, the majority emphasized, the fulfillment of these criteria without more will not authorize a strip search:The fact that the police have reasonable and probable grounds to carry out an arrest does not confer upon them the automatic authority to carry out a strip search, even where the strip search meets the definition of being “incident to lawful arrest”: Golden, at para. 98. [51] Instead, the law imposes additional requirements that must be met before a strip search will be considered reasonable.In order to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness that will justify a strip search, the police must establish that they have reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest: Golden, at para. 98. Thus, even a strip search carried out in good faith and without violence “will also violate s. 8 where there is no compelling reason for performing a strip search in the circumstances of the arrest”: Golden, at para. 95. Strip searches are only constitutionally valid at common law where they are conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of discovering weapons in the detainee's possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest. In addition, the police must establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search in addition to reasonable and probable grounds justifying the arrest. Where such preconditions to conducting a strip search incident to arrest are met, it is also necessary that the strip search be conducted in a manner that does not infringe s. 8 of the Charter: Golden, at paras. 87, 95 and 98-99.
[52] What is the reason for the different standards as between a pat-down or frisk search incident to arrest on the one hand, and a strip search on the other? The majority in Golden explained that the different standards followed from the intrusiveness of a strip search and its effect on the person subjected to it. As for intrusiveness, a strip search involves “a significant and very direct interference with personal privacy” as compared to “less intrusive personal searches, such as pat or frisk searches”: Golden, at para. 89. A strip search is one of “the most intrusive manners of searching and also one of the most extreme exercises of police power”: Golden, at para. 89, citing R. v. Flintoff (1998), 1998 CanLII 632 (ON CA), 126 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 24. As for effect, a strip search is, by its nature, a “humiliating, degrading and traumatic experience for individuals subject to them”; “inherently humiliating and degrading” no matter how carried out; may be analogized to a “visual rape”; and may be experienced by women and minorities in particular as “equivalent to a sexual assault”: Golden, at paras. 83, 90; see also, R. v. Thompson, 2025 ONCA 500, 450 C.C.C. (3d) 383, at paras. 2, 31, 48, and 51-56.
[53] The Crown’s interpretation of the Golden definition of strip search fits within the broader rationale in that case. The rearrangement or removal of clothing so as to permit the visual inspection of a person’s private areas namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female) or undergarments covering those private areas, is clearly a direct interference with personal privacy, a highly intrusive and invasive manner of searching, and is inherently humiliating, degrading and traumatic for any detainee. But it is much more difficult to see that description applying to the rearrangement or removal of clothing that permits an inspection of a portion of an undergarment that does not cover a private area – such as the waistband of an undergarment, which only covers the waist – or an intermediate layer of clothing such as jeans worn under joggers but over undergarments.
[54] Turning to the language of the definition as a whole, I agree with the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Choi that the word undergarments in the definition must be read in light of the earlier language that refers to, and specifies, a person’s private areas. In Choi a police officer had visually inspected the waistband of the accused’s underwear, that is, the part of the undergarment covering the waistline. In reversing the trial court’s finding that a strip search had been conducted, Dickson J.A. stated:[75] In this case, Cpl. Pollock rearranged Mr. Choi’s clothing and visually inspected the waistband of his underwear, but not his genital or anal area, either covered or uncovered. There was nothing inherently humiliating or degrading about the search given its limited nature and the context in which it took place, namely, as part of a standard booking-in procedure at police cells. Nor was there anything to suggest that Mr. Choi found it humiliating or degrading for the officer to see the exposed waistband of his underwear. On the contrary, he was apparently and predictably unfazed by that aspect of the search. As the judge recognized, in modern times the waistband of underwear may be displayed in public in an overt and intentional way.
[76] I agree with Crown counsel that the judge erred by employing an unduly literal interpretation of the Golden definition of a strip search disconnected from its underlying purpose and context. In my view, the reference in that definition to undergarments must be read in the context of the preceding phrase. To repeat, the definition of a strip search articulated in Golden is: “the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person’s private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments”: at para. 47, emphasis added.
[77] Undergarments may well cover private areas of a person’s body, but they are not, in and of themselves, “a person’s private areas”. In my view, when the reasons in Golden are read as a whole, it is apparent that the visual inspection contemplated by the definition is an inspection of private areas of the body, whether those body areas are exposed or covered by undergarments. It follows that the salient consideration when a court determines whether a search falls within the definition of a strip search is the private nature of the body area in question, not the nature of a garment worn under an outer layer of clothing.
[78] I also agree with Crown counsel that the cases upon which Mr. Choi relied below are distinguishable from this case. In R. v. Pilon, 2018 ONCA 959, the Court found that the arresting officer conducted two searches that constituted strip searches. In the first search, the officer looked inside the appellant’s second pair of shorts, discovered he was not wearing underwear and observed the top of his buttocks and an elastic band attached to his penis. In the second, the officer pulled back the waistband of the appellant’s shorts in an effort to visually inspect his genital area. The targeted area of the appellant’s body for inspection in both searches was inherently private and, accordingly, the Court characterized the conduct as minimally intrusive strip searches. Similarly, in R. v. Byfield, 2020 ONCA 515, an arresting officer reached into the appellant’s underwear and retrieved a package of cocaine from his groin, which the Court found was a strip search because, while the appellant’s clothes were not removed, they were rearranged and his groin area was “inspected”.
[79] The important point for present purposes is that the searches in both Pilon and Byfield pertained to private areas of the body of the arrestee. Neither concerned a visual inspection of a non-private area of the body covered by an undergarment. In contrast, in this case, Cpl. Pollock intentionally limited his visual inspection of Mr. Choi’s body to his waistline area, which is not a private area. As I have explained, the elasticized waistband of his underwear inspected by Cpl. Pollock covered only this area of the body.
[80] In my view, the judge made a clear and determinative error in concluding that the search conducted by Cpl. Pollock was a strip search as defined in Golden. While I agree with the judge that, to the extent reasonably possible, a “bright line” approach to strip searches is desirable to provide certainty and promote Charter values, that line should be drawn when the search is categorized as a strip search, not when the s. 24(2) balancing exercise is conducted, as seemingly occurred in this case. Unless the area of the body inspected is inherently private, whether exposed or covered by an undergarment, the search will not fall into the category of a strip search and the additional safeguards will not apply. [Emphasis in original.]
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