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Estates - Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA). Devonport v. Devonport
In Devonport v. Devonport (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, this brought against an estates application that applied the 'substitutional gifts' provision [SLRA s.31] to grant real estate to the spouse of the deceased son to whom it was bequested by will:[1] The appellant appeals from the judgment of the application judge interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport (the “testator”). The will provided for a specific bequest to the testator’s son of a property on Hopewell Avenue in the City of Ottawa. The testator’s son pre-deceased her. The application judge found that the Hopewell property did not lapse into the residue of the testator’s estate, but rather, pursuant to s. 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.26 (the “SLRA”), passed to the wife of the testator’s son. On that basis, the application judge declared the son’s wife the owner of the Hopewell property from the date of the testator’s death.
[2] After hearing submissions from the appellant, we dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent, with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.
[3] The appellant argues that the application judge erred in concluding that the anti-lapse provision of s. 31 of the SLRA applied. The appellant argues that the terms of the will show a contrary intention which renders s. 31 inapplicable. The appellant further argues that the application judge erred in excluding the evidence of the solicitor who assisted the testator in drafting the will.
[4] We are not persuaded that the application judge erred. The application judge’s interpretation of s. 31 of the SLRA was correct and consistent with the jurisprudence. He also correctly set out the principles applicable to interpreting the terms of a will and determining the subjective intention of the testator. He made no palpable and overriding error in his interpretation of clause 3(e) of the will, which provided for the disposition of the Hopewell property, in the context of the will as a whole, and made no error in concluding that the will did not show a contrary intention which would oust the application of the anti-lapse provision in s. 31 of the SLRA. Nor did the application judge err in his interpretation of clause 6, which he found would only become operative if one of the beneficiaries separated or divorced. . Alger v. Crumb
In Alger v. Crumb (Ont CA, 2023) the Court of Appeal briefly reviews the history of the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA):[12] The SLRA was enacted in 1977 and replaced four statutes. Part I “Testate Succession” replaced the Wills Act, S.O. 1966, c. 433; Part II “Intestate Succession” replaced parts of the Devolution of Estates Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 129; Part IV “Survivorship” replaced the Survivorship Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 454; and Part V “Support of Dependents” replaced the Dependents’ Relief Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 126.
[13] Part III “Designation of Beneficiaries of Interest in Funds or Plans” contains new provisions that specify how a person who owns certain defined plans or funds can designate a beneficiary to receive the plan or fund on the person’s death.[1] Section 50 defines a “plan” to include an RRIF and a TFSA as defined under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp).[2]
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