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Highways - Vehicle Stops. R. v. Jackson
In R. v. Jackson (Ont CA, 2025) the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a defendant's criminal appeal, this brought against a conviction "for possession of fentanyl, a Schedule I substance, for the purpose of trafficking".
Here the court considers detention in an HTA context (vehicle stop):1. Detention
[13] Section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act provides that, “A police officer, in the lawful execution of his or her duties and responsibilities, may require the driver of a vehicle, other than a bicycle, to stop ...”: R. v. Gonzales, 2017 ONCA 543, 136 O.R. (3d) 255, at para. 55.
[14] Detention may be for both purposes of road safety and investigation of criminal activity. However, s. 216 (1) does not provide lawful authority to stop the vehicle and detain the occupants if the highway safety concerns are merely a “ruse” or “pretext” to stop the vehicle for some other reason: R. v. Mayor, 2019 ONCA 578, 378 C.C.C. (3d) 453, at paras. 8-9; and R. v. Tully, 2022 ONSC 1852, 505 C.R.R. (2d) 87, at para. 25.
[15] Determining police purpose is a factual inquiry that requires consideration of all the circumstances including the officers’ evidence, the evidence of the detained person, the circumstances of the stop, and police conduct during the stop: Mayor, at para. 10. Deference is owed to a trial judge’s findings of fact.
[16] As noted by Binnie J. for the Supreme Court in R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at paras. 3-4:Clearly random checks of vehicles for highway purposes must be limited to their intended purpose and cannot be turned into “an unfounded general inquisition or an unreasonable search” ...
Nevertheless, roadside stops sometimes develop in unpredictable ways. It is necessary for a court to proceed step by step through the interactions of the police and the appellants from the initial stop onwards to determine whether, as the situation developed, the police stayed within their authority, having regard to the information lawfully obtained at each stage of their inquiry. [Citations omitted.] ....
1. The Highway Traffic Act Stop
[20] The application judge accepted that the police may not use a Highway Traffic Act detention as a pretext to do something else. The application judge correctly noted however that, “[T]here is no dispute that a police officer who is in the lawful execution of his or her duties may require a driver of the motor vehicle to stop in order to ensure compliance with highway regulation and road safety” pursuant to s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act: Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, (1998) 1998 CanLII 7198 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (C.A.), leave to appeal granted but appeal discontinued, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87.
[21] The application judge did not find that the police used the Highway Traffic Act stop as a pretext to conduct a criminal investigation into the suspected drug transaction. He noted that Mr. Jackson agreed that he was not wearing a seatbelt and accepted that:Officer Hatzes readily acknowledged that he did not have enough evidence to arrest Mr. Jackson for a drug offence —he merely had a suspicion. Officer Hatzes was credible in his evidence that if he had not seen an actionable Highway Traffic Act offence, he would not have initiated a stop of the West vehicle. Put differently if Mr. Jackson had been wearing his seatbelt, he and Ms. West would never have been investigated. [22] After stopping the vehicle because he believed Mr. Jackson was not wearing his seatbelt, the officer approached the vehicle and confirmed that Mr. Jackson was not wearing a seatbelt. This was not a pretext; it was a reasonable step and a valid reason to stop the vehicle for a Highway Traffic Act violation.
[23] For these reasons, we find no error in the application judge’s conclusion that Mr. Jackson was not arbitrarily detained pursuant to s. 9 of the Charter because, although the police had a suspicion that Mr. Jackson was in possession of drugs, they had legitimate grounds to stop him for the Highway Traffic Act offence.
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